Argument from Desire

Blaise Pascal and C. S. Lewis (classical theistic form); earlier roots in Augustine

The Argument from Desire holds that certain deep, apparently innate human longings for transcendent or ultimate fulfillment are best explained by the existence of God or a supernatural reality capable of satisfying them.

At a Glance

Quick Facts
Type
formal argument
Attributed To
Blaise Pascal and C. S. Lewis (classical theistic form); earlier roots in Augustine
Period
Developed from late antiquity; influential modern form in the 20th century
Validity
controversial

Overview and Historical Background

The Argument from Desire is a family of theistic arguments claiming that certain deep, enduring human longings—especially for ultimate meaning, joy, or fulfillment—indicate the existence of a transcendent reality, commonly identified with God. It is not typically presented as a strict proof, but rather as a probabilistic or cumulative-case argument.

Historical roots are often traced to Augustine of Hippo, who wrote in the Confessions that “our heart is restless until it rests in you,” suggesting that human restlessness points beyond the finite world. Blaise Pascal developed a related idea in the Pensées, stressing the “infinite abyss” in the human heart that nothing finite can fill.

The most influential modern version is associated with C. S. Lewis, particularly in works such as Mere Christianity, The Problem of Pain, and the autobiographical Surprised by Joy. Lewis emphasizes a distinctive kind of longing he calls Sehnsucht—a bittersweet desire for an elusive, transcendent joy. According to Lewis, the best explanation of this desire is the existence of God and a reality beyond the natural world.

While primarily discussed within philosophy of religion and Christian apologetics, the argument intersects with phenomenology, existentialism, and philosophical anthropology, where questions about the structure and significance of human desire are central.

Formulations of the Argument

Proponents distinguish between innate (natural) desires and artificial (acquired) desires:

  • Innate desires are claimed to be universal or near-universal, rooted in human nature (e.g., hunger, thirst, desire for companionship).
  • Artificial desires arise from culture or individual history (e.g., desire for luxury cars, specific status markers).

The Argument from Desire usually takes the following informal structure:

  1. Humans experience a deep, enduring desire for ultimate meaning, joy, or fulfillment that finite goods cannot fully satisfy.
  2. Other innate desires correspond to real satisfiers (e.g., hunger–food, thirst–water, sexual desire–sexual union).
  3. The desire for ultimate fulfillment appears to be innate, not merely culturally conditioned.
  4. Therefore, there is likely a real object corresponding to this desire.
  5. The best candidate for such an object is a transcendent reality (often specified as God or eternal life with God).

C. S. Lewis casts this more existentially: if we find in ourselves a desire that no earthly experience can satisfy, “the most probable explanation is that we were made for another world.” Later philosophers sympathetic to Lewis, such as Peter Kreeft, attempt to formalize this into a more explicit inductive or abductive argument, stressing its role as an explanatory hypothesis rather than a deductive proof.

Some secular or less theistic versions loosen the conclusion. They infer not specifically a personal God, but a more general transcendent order, ultimate value, or some objective structure of meaning beyond individual preference. In these forms, the argument becomes a broader claim about the objectivity of value or the non-illusory character of certain moral–spiritual experiences.

Major Criticisms and Debates

The Argument from Desire is widely regarded as controversial. Criticisms tend to focus on its key premises and on the move from human psychology to metaphysical reality.

1. The “correspondence of desires” premise

Critics challenge the idea that every innate desire must have a corresponding real object:

  • They note that the empirical generalization (e.g., hunger–food, thirst–water) might simply reflect evolutionary history, not a metaphysical law.
  • Some argue there are apparent counterexamples, such as a desire for perfect justice or perfect knowledge, which may have no realizable object.
  • Even if all known natural desires do have real satisfiers, opponents claim that induction from a small sample cannot ground a strong metaphysical conclusion about an infinite or transcendent object.

Defenders respond that the premise is not offered as an exceptionless law but as a strong, undefeated pattern that makes the inference to a real transcendent satisfier rationally permissible, especially within a broader theistic worldview.

2. Natural vs. artificial desire

Another key point of contention is whether the desire in question is innate:

  • Critics suggest that religious or transcendent longings may be culturally generated or psychologically conditioned, akin to artificial desires.
  • From a naturalistic or evolutionary perspective, such desires might be by-products of cognitive capacities (abstract thinking, imagination, social bonding) rather than indicators of a real transcendent object.

Proponents reply that the desire for ultimate meaning and fulfillment exhibits cross-cultural recurrence and a certain structural depth that differentiate it from more superficial, culturally specific wants. They maintain that this provides evidence—though not proof—for its rootedness in human nature.

3. Alternative explanations

Many philosophers argue that the relevant desires can be explained without positing God:

  • Evolutionary psychology: Desires for meaning, belonging, and hope might enhance survival and cooperation, regardless of whether their ultimate objects exist.
  • Psychoanalytic and existential explanations: Longing for transcendence may express anxiety about death, finitude, or contingency, without implying any corresponding reality.
  • Aesthetic or symbolic interpretations: Experiences of longing might be understood as encounters with ideals or values that are conceptual or intersubjective, not ontologically transcendent.

From this perspective, the Argument from Desire is seen as an instance of the wishful thinking fallacy: inferring reality from what we deeply want to be true. Defenders counter that the argument does not simply claim “we desire X, therefore X exists,” but rather appeals to a broader, structured pattern of desire–satisfaction relations and to the explanatory power of the theistic hypothesis.

4. Scope and modesty of the conclusion

Even some sympathetic philosophers maintain that the argument, at best, supports a modest conclusion:

  • It may render belief in God or transcendence intelligible and existentially fitting for those who experience such desires.
  • It may carry persuasive force as part of a person’s “total evidence,” especially in conjunction with other theistic arguments.

However, critics emphasize that the argument’s premises are contested and that its inferential leap—from psychological facts to metaphysical reality—remains debated. As a result, the Argument from Desire is rarely regarded as decisive, but instead as one strand in broader discussions about the meaning of human longing, the nature of religious experience, and the relationship between existential need and metaphysical truth.

In contemporary philosophy of religion, the argument continues to attract interest precisely because it sits at the intersection of rational inference and lived experience, raising enduring questions about whether and how our deepest desires might be clues to the structure of reality.

How to Cite This Entry

Use these citation formats to reference this argument entry in your academic work. Click the copy button to copy the citation to your clipboard.

APA Style (7th Edition)

Philopedia. (2025). Argument from Desire. Philopedia. https://philopedia.com/arguments/argument-from-desire/

MLA Style (9th Edition)

"Argument from Desire." Philopedia, 2025, https://philopedia.com/arguments/argument-from-desire/.

Chicago Style (17th Edition)

Philopedia. "Argument from Desire." Philopedia. Accessed December 11, 2025. https://philopedia.com/arguments/argument-from-desire/.

BibTeX
@online{philopedia_argument_from_desire,
  title = {Argument from Desire},
  author = {Philopedia},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://philopedia.com/arguments/argument-from-desire/},
  urldate = {December 11, 2025}
}