Argument from Gradation

1. Introduction

The Argument from Gradation—also known as Aquinas’s Fourth Way—is a classical theistic argument that moves from observed degrees of value and perfection in the world to the existence of a maximally perfect being. It is one of the five brief arguments for God’s existence presented by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae (ST I, q.2, a.3).

In outline, the argument begins from the claim that many things are said to be more or less good, true, or noble. It then invokes a metaphysical principle linking such comparative judgments to a maximum within a relevant order or “genus.” From there it concludes that there must be something that is maximally true, good, and noble, and that this maximal source is what is called God.

The Fourth Way is tightly connected to a broader scholastic metaphysical framework, including:

• the doctrine of the transcendentals (being, goodness, truth, etc.),
• the notion of participation, and
• an ontology structured by act and potency.

Because these background ideas are not widely shared in contemporary philosophy, the argument has been subject both to misinterpretation and to extensive reconstruction.

In modern discussion, the Argument from Gradation occupies an intermediate space between:

• cosmological-style arguments (which emphasize metaphysical dependence and causality), and
• moral/value-based arguments (which appeal to objective goodness or perfection).

It has been assessed in terms of its logical structure, its metaphysical presuppositions, and its implications for metaethics and value theory. Some philosophers treat it as a historical curiosity tied to outdated physics, while others develop sophisticated contemporary versions framed in terms of objective value realism, great-making properties, or degrees of being.

This entry traces the argument’s origin, structure, metaphysical assumptions, variations, criticisms, and subsequent influence within philosophy of religion and metaphysics.

2. Origin and Attribution

2.1 Aquinas’s Formulation

The Argument from Gradation is generally attributed to Thomas Aquinas (1224/5–1274). Its canonical formulation appears in:

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“The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things.”

— Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.2, a.3

In the Summa Theologiae, the Fourth Way is one of the Five Ways intended as demonstrationes of God’s existence. Aquinas’s text is highly compressed, consisting of only a few sentences, and relies on a metaphysical vocabulary he develops elsewhere.

2.2 Predecessors and Intellectual Sources

Although the Fourth Way is Aquinas’s, historians typically view it as drawing on earlier Platonic and Neoplatonic themes of grade and participation. Influential sources include:

• Plato, especially the Republic and Symposium, where degrees of goodness and beauty are connected to Forms and to the Form of the Good.
• Augustine, who interprets created goods as participating in God’s uncreated goodness.
• Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, whose hierarchical ontology of being and goodness informs medieval scholastic thought.
• Aristotle, particularly metaphysical discussions of maximum and minimum in a genus and of perfection as the completion of form.

2.3 Attribution and Debates About Uniqueness

Scholars generally agree that Aquinas’s Fourth Way is the first explicit, systematic statement of this specific argument in Christian scholasticism. However, there is some debate about:

• how original the argument is relative to Augustinian and Dionysian ideas of hierarchical participation, and
• whether Aquinas’s appeal to “more and less good, true, and noble” is best seen as Aristotelian (genus-based maxima) or Platonic (participation in a supereminent Good).

Later Thomists such as Cajetan and Suárez attribute the argument firmly to Aquinas while elaborating its metaphysical underpinnings, sometimes modifying key premises. Modern historians differ on whether Aquinas intended the Fourth Way as an independent proof or as a variant expression of themes already implicit in his other Ways.

3. Historical and Intellectual Context

3.1 Medieval Scholastic Setting

The Argument from Gradation emerges within 13th‑century scholasticism, a period marked by:

• the reception and Latin translation of Aristotle’s works,
• the integration of Augustinian and Aristotelian traditions, and
• the systematization of Christian theology within a university context.

Aquinas writes in an environment where questions about degrees of being, hierarchies of creatures, and the convertibility of being and goodness were already under active debate.

3.2 The Transcendentals and Hierarchy of Being

By Aquinas’s time, a sophisticated doctrine of transcendentals—properties such as being (ens), one (unum), true (verum), and good (bonum)—had been articulated. These properties were taken to apply to everything that exists, albeit in different modes and degrees.

This metaphysical backdrop included:

• a hierarchical ontology, ranging from inanimate objects to plants, animals, humans, angels, and God;
• a tendency to interpret degrees of value (more perfect, more noble) as correlating with degrees of being.

Within this framework, the idea that greater goodness implies greater actuality or perfection of being was relatively uncontroversial among scholastics.

3.3 Interaction with Aristotelian Science

The argument also reflects then-current scientific and physical conceptions. Aquinas’s reference to fire as “hottest” and the cause of other hot things draws on:

• an Aristotelian theory of elements and their natural qualities,
• a general idea that physical qualities admit of maxima and minima within a genus.

These scientific assumptions were later superseded, but they shaped the illustrative examples Aquinas used.

3.4 Theological Aims

Aquinas situates the Fourth Way within a larger project of natural theology: demonstrating certain truths about God by reason alone. The argument is meant to show, starting from empirical features of the world (gradation in goodness, truth, and nobility), that there must be a first principle who is maximally perfect.

This aim is continuous with broader medieval concerns to:

• reconcile philosophical metaphysics with Christian doctrine, and
• provide rational grounds for belief in a God characterized by absolute perfection.

4. The Argument Stated

4.1 Aquinas’s Textual Version

Aquinas’s own succinct presentation in Summa Theologiae I, q.2, a.3 can be paraphrased as follows:

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Among beings we find some that are more and less good, true, noble, and so on.
But “more” and “less” are said of different things according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum.
Thus there is something which is truest, best, and noblest, and consequently most being.
And what is the maximum in any genus is the cause of all that are in that genus.
Therefore there must be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

4.2 Standard Contemporary Restatement

Contemporary philosophers often restate the argument in a more explicit, premise‑conclusion form. A widely used formulation is:

1. There are real degrees of perfection (e.g., goodness, truth, nobility) among things.
2. Where there are such ordered degrees, they are understood by reference to a maximum in the relevant order.
3. Whatever is maximal in an order of perfection is the cause of all that possess that perfection to a lesser degree.
4. Therefore, there exists something that is maximally good, true, and noble and the cause of all such perfections in other things.
5. This maximally perfect cause is what is called God.

4.3 Scope of the Claim

The argument purports to move from observations about created things—for example, that some acts are better than others, some beings more perfect or noble than others—to the existence of a single being that is:

• maximally perfect in the relevant respects, and
• causally responsible for the perfections present in everything else.

Within Aquinas’s broader metaphysics, this being is further identified with subsistent being itself and with the God of classical theism, though those identifications are usually spelled out in subsequent arguments rather than in the Fourth Way itself.

5. Logical Structure and Form

5.1 Deductive Aspirations

Aquinas presents the Fourth Way as a demonstrative argument, and many Thomists interpret it as aiming at a deductively valid structure when read against his broader metaphysics. In such readings, if all the premises (including tacit metaphysical principles) are true, the conclusion that a maximally perfect cause exists would follow necessarily.

5.2 Core Inference Pattern

The argument can be schematized as:

• From ordered degrees of a property (goodness, truth, nobility)
• plus a principle that degrees presuppose a maximum,
• plus a principle that a maximum is causally primary,
• infer a maximal cause of that kind of perfection.

Some commentators see the structure as a form of inference to a necessary explanatory terminus within an axiological order.

5.3 Points of Logical Contention

Philosophers disagree about how to formalize the key steps. Major issues include:

• Whether the move from “more and less F” to “there exists something maximally F” is a valid general rule or relies on additional constraints (such as the property in question being a transcendental or a “pure perfection”).
• Whether the claim that “what is maximum in a genus is the cause of all in that genus” is logically independent or smuggles in causal assumptions from other arguments (e.g., cosmological arguments).
• Whether the reasoning involves a fallacy of composition or an illicit transition from comparative relations to the existence of a single individual maximum.

5.4 Deductive vs. Explanatory Readings

Commentators distinguish between:

Some contemporary defenders refine the premises to secure validity; some critics argue that, on any plausibly modest formulation, the argument is at best probabilistic or abductive.

6. Key Metaphysical Assumptions

The Fourth Way presupposes a range of metaphysical theses that are only briefly alluded to in Aquinas’s text but elaborated elsewhere in his work.

6.1 Convertibility of Being and Perfections

A central assumption is the convertibility of being and certain perfections:

• Being (esse), goodness (bonum), and truth (verum) are taken as transcendentals, coextensive with all that exists.
• To be more good or more true is, on this view, to possess being in a fuller or more complete way.

This ties evaluative gradations to ontological gradations.

6.2 Act and Potency

Aquinas’s general metaphysics of act (actus) and potency (potentia) underlies the notion of degrees:

• A being is more perfect the more it is in act rather than in potency.
• Imperfections, limitations, and potentialities signal a derivative and participated mode of being.

The existence of such finite, mixed beings is taken to point toward a pure act (actus purus) as their ultimate source.

6.3 Participation

The argument assumes a participation structure:

• Finite beings possess perfections (goodness, truth, nobility) in a limited, derivative way.
• These perfections are said to be received from, or to participate in, a higher, more complete source.

This participation model is influenced by Platonist and Neoplatonist traditions.

6.4 Maximality and Causality

Another key assumption is that:

• Within a given order or genus of perfection, what is maximal is also causally primary for that genus.
• The maximally F is not just an upper bound but a source from which all other instances derive their F‑ness.

This links the axiological order (better/worse) with a causal order (principle/derivative).

6.5 Objective Value Realism

The argument implicitly relies on some form of objective value realism:

• Terms like “good,” “noble,” and “true” are treated as tracking mind-independent features of reality.
• Comparative judgments (more or less good, etc.) are assumed to have objective grounding, not merely expressive or projective roles.

Critics often target these assumptions; defenders typically argue that without them, broader aspects of rational discourse and ethics become difficult to account for.

7. Premises Examined in Detail

7.1 Premise 1: Existence of Degrees of Perfection

Content. P1 states that among beings we find more and less in respect of goodness, truth, nobility, and related “great‑making” properties.

Support. Proponents point to widespread evaluative and comparative judgments—e.g., that some actions are morally better than others, some beings more complete or excellent. In a Thomistic framework, these correspond to degrees of actuality and being.

Debates. Critics question whether these gradations are objective or merely subjective/cultural, and whether they extend to all the properties Aquinas has in mind.

7.2 Premise 2: “More and Less” by Reference to a Maximum

Content. P2 claims that “more” and “less” are said of different things by reference to what is maximal in the relevant genus (e.g., hotter by resemblance to what is hottest).

Support. Aristotelian‑inspired metaphysics sometimes treats comparative predicates as oriented toward an exemplar or limiting case that most fully realizes the relevant form. Proponents argue that intelligibility of gradations presupposes a standard.

Debates. Critics contend that many comparative scales do not require an actually instantiated maximum (e.g., heights, temperatures, or speeds may increase without bound). Defenders reply by restricting the principle to specific kinds of perfections (e.g., “pure perfections” or transcendentals) rather than all comparatives.

7.3 Premise 3: Maximum as Cause

Content. P3 asserts that what is greatest in any genus is the cause of all that belong to that genus.

Support. Aquinas appeals to the example of fire as maximally hot and as cause of hot things, intending it as a model for how a maximal instance grounds lesser ones. Within a participation framework, lesser instances of a perfection derive it from a non‑derivative source that possesses it most fully.

Debates. Many question the generality of the causal principle. Critics argue that the maximum in a class need not be the cause of the others (e.g., the tallest person does not cause the height of others). Thomists often respond that the principle is meant for ontological orders of perfection, not for ordinary quantitative scales.

7.4 Premise 4 and 5: Existence and Identification of a Maximal Being

Content. From P1–P3, Aquinas infers a being that is maximally true, good, and noble, and then identifies this being with God.

Support. The first move is taken to follow from the prior premises; the second (identifying the maximum with God) depends on further arguments showing that such a maximal source must be unique, necessary, simple, and omniperfect, which Aquinas develops elsewhere.

Debates. Some philosophers accept, for the sake of argument, a maximal source of value but question whether it must be personal, theistic, or identical with the God of classical theism. Others challenge the inference from graded properties to any single maximal bearer at all.

8. Degrees of Perfection and Transcendentals

8.1 Transcendentals in Scholastic Metaphysics

In Aquinas’s framework, transcendentals are properties that are coextensive with being and not confined to any specific category. Key transcendentals include:

These are said to be convertible: whatever is is, in some respect, one, true, and good.

8.2 Degrees of Perfection

On this view, degrees of perfection correspond to degrees of participation in these transcendentals:

• A being is more good insofar as it more fully realizes its nature or has greater fullness of being.
• A being is more true in the sense of being more intelligible, more ordered, or less defective.
• Nobility is often associated with a higher mode of existence (e.g., intellectual over merely material).

The Fourth Way focuses on such transcendentals rather than on arbitrary properties (like being taller or heavier).

8.3 Analogical, Not Purely Quantitative, Degrees

Thomists typically emphasize that these degrees are analogical rather than purely quantitative:

• “More” and “less” good are not measured on a single numerical scale.
• Instead, they reflect differing modes and levels of actuality appropriate to different natures (stone, plant, animal, person).

Critics sometimes interpret Aquinas as treating perfection as a crude scalar quantity; defenders argue that his use of analogy avoids that simplification.

8.4 Transcendentals and the Maximal Instance

Because transcendentals are coextensive with being, a maximum with respect to them would be:

• a being in which being itself is not limited by potency,
• possessing goodness and truth in a wholly unrestricted and non‑participated way.

The argument’s key move is from graded participation in transcendentals to the existence of such a maximal, non‑participated instance, which later Thomistic theology identifies with God as pure act.

9. Participation and Causality

9.1 The Notion of Participation

Participation is a metaphysical relation by which a finite being has some perfection in a restricted and derived way. Aquinas inherits this idea from Plato and Neoplatonism, but adapts it to an Aristotelian ontology of substances and forms.

Examples used in Thomistic literature include:

• A heated iron participates in heat; it is not heat itself.
• A wise person has wisdom, but is not identical with wisdom as such.

In each case, the perfection in question is distinct from the participating subject and can be possessed to greater or lesser degrees.

9.2 Participation and Degrees of Perfection

On this model, finite beings are said to participate in perfections like goodness, truth, and being:

• Their perfections are received and therefore limited by their essence or nature.
• The possibility of more and less indicates that the perfection is not possessed in an unlimited or essential way.

Proponents of the Fourth Way argue that this structure points beyond finite participants to a source that has the relevant perfection identically with its essence and without limitation.

9.3 Causal Priority of the Non‑Participated

A key participation principle ties participation to causality:

• What possesses a perfection by participation depends on what possesses it essentially or in itself.
• Therefore, the perfections of finite beings require as their ultimate cause a being that is not merely a participant but the non‑participated source.

This underlies Aquinas’s claim that “what is maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus,” interpreted for ontological genera of perfection.

9.4 Types of Causality Involved

The relevant causality is often read as a mix of:

Different interpreters emphasize different aspects. Some contemporary Thomists highlight exemplary and final causality to avoid overly mechanistic readings, while critics often focus on efficient causality and question its generality.

10. Variations and Reinterpretations of the Fourth Way

10.1 Thomistic Commentarial Traditions

Later Thomists developed multiple versions of the Fourth Way:

• Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio) offered a detailed commentary, stressing the role of analogical predication and clarifying the notion of genus in which the maximum exists.
• Francisco Suárez introduced distinctions between different types of perfection (e.g., “pure perfections” that imply no limitation vs. “mixed perfections”), influencing subsequent readings.

These commentaries often refine the premises, aiming to avoid objections based on naive quantitative analogies.

10.2 Neo‑Thomist and 20th‑Century Reformulations

In the 20th century, Neo‑Thomist thinkers such as Étienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and Reginald Garrigou‑Lagrange rearticulated the argument in light of contemporary philosophy:

• Some placed heavier emphasis on degrees of being rather than on moral or axiological language.
• Others developed the argument within a more explicitly existential Thomism, focusing on participation in esse (act of existence).

These reformulations sometimes present the Fourth Way less as a stand‑alone proof and more as a moment within a broader metaphysics of participation.

10.3 Contemporary Analytic Reconstructions

Recent analytic philosophers sympathetic to Thomism (e.g., Norman Kretzmann, Brian Davies, Edward Feser) have proposed reconstructions that:

• Translate the argument into contemporary modal and metaphysical vocabulary (necessary beings, great‑making properties, etc.).
• Address common objections by restricting the relevant perfections to those that are pure and non‑comparative (e.g., perfect knowledge, moral goodness).
• Sometimes reframe the central move as an explanatory argument: the best explanation of objective value or intelligibility is a maximally perfect foundation.

10.4 Non‑Theistic and Alternative Uses

A few philosophers have adapted gradation‑style reasoning for non‑traditional or impersonal conceptions of the ultimate:

• Some pantheistic or panentheistic interpretations take the maximal reality to be an all‑inclusive cosmos or Ground of Being rather than a personal God.
• Certain idealists or monists appeal to degrees of reality or value culminating in an ultimate Absolute, without equating this straightforwardly with the God of classical theism.

These reinterpretations show that the structural pattern of reasoning from degrees to a maximum can be detached from specifically Thomistic theology and embedded in broader metaphysical programs.

11. Standard Objections and Critiques

11.1 Objection: Fallacy of Composition / Illicit Inference

Critics such as J. L. Mackie and Graham Oppy argue that the move from “many things are more or less good, true, or noble” to “there is a single maximally good, true, or noble being” is fallacious. It appears to infer from facts about members of a class to a fact about a distinguished individual of that class without sufficient warrant, akin to a fallacy of composition.

11.2 Objection: Misuse of the Fire and Heat Analogy

Philosophers including Anthony Kenny and William L. Rowe fault Aquinas’s reliance on the example of fire as maximally hot and the cause of all hot things. Modern thermodynamics rejects this model: heat is a matter of kinetic energy, and there is no single privileged object from which all heat derives. Hence the analogy is taken as both empirically false and conceptually misleading.

11.3 Objection: Confusion between Ontological and Evaluative Orders

Some, such as John Hick and Richard Swinburne, argue that Aquinas conflates evaluative gradations (better/worse) with ontological gradations (more/less being). Moral and aesthetic values, they suggest, may be explained by social practices, evolutionary pressures, or psychology without positing an ontological ladder culminating in a maximal being. The connection between “more good” and “more being” is thus contested.

11.4 Objection: Subjectivity or Projectivism about Value

Metaethical anti‑realists (e.g., Mackie, Simon Blackburn) deny that value judgments refer to mind‑independent properties. On such views, to call something “better” is to express attitudes or project preferences rather than to report an objective fact. If so, the argument’s first premise—that there are real degrees of goodness, nobility, etc.—is undermined.

11.5 Objection: Absence of Necessary Maxima

Another line of critique holds that not all comparative series require an actual maximum. Many scales appear open‑ended: there need be no greatest possible speed, temperature, or amount of beauty. Thus, the inference from “more and less” to “some maximum exists” may be invalid without additional constraints on the kind of perfection involved.

11.6 Objection: From Maximal Value to God

Even if a maximal source of value exists, critics question whether it must be personal, omniscient, or omnipotent—features associated with the God of classical theism. The argument, they suggest, at most supports a supreme value or impersonal standard, leaving open substantial theological questions.

12. Thomistic and Contemporary Defenses

12.1 Metaphysical Clarification Strategy

Many Thomists respond by insisting that the Fourth Way must be read within Aquinas’s full metaphysical system:

• The argument concerns transcendentals and pure perfections, not arbitrary predicates.
• Comparative judgments about such perfections are said to imply a participation relation to a non‑participated fullness.

This clarification is intended to block objections based on simple quantitative analogies (e.g., height).

12.2 Analogical and Non‑Quantitative Readings

Defenders emphasize analogical predication:

• “Good” and “being” apply in analogous, not univocal, ways to different types of entities and to God.
• Degrees of perfection thus reflect differing modes of realization, not positions on a single numerical scale.

By highlighting analogy, they aim to show that criticisms grounded in crude scalar interpretations misfire.

12.3 Independence from Obsolete Physics

To handle the fire‑and‑heat objection, Thomists argue that Aquinas’s physical example is illustrative rather than essential. The core principle is metaphysical:

• Derived instances of a transcendental perfection require a non‑derived source.

This principle, they maintain, is compatible with modern science and does not depend on medieval theories of the elements.

12.4 Embedding in a Cumulative Case

Some contemporary theists present the Fourth Way as one strand in a cumulative case for theism:

• Combined with cosmological arguments, it supports the idea of a necessary being.
• Combined with moral and rational arguments, it supports a maximally good and intellective source of norms.

On this approach, the argument is not expected to be decisive in isolation but to gain strength from its coherence with other lines of reasoning.

12.5 Engagement with Value Theory

Defenders sometimes argue that objective value realism is independently plausible—for example, in explaining moral disagreement, normative authority, or practical reason. They then present the Fourth Way as offering a metaphysical ground for such realism: a maximally good being that underwrites the objectivity and unity of value.

12.6 Alternative Theistic Revisions

Some contemporary theists sympathetic to the overall intuition of the Fourth Way modify its premise structure:

• They replace Aquinas’s genus‑maxim principle with a modal or axiological principle about the possible vs. actual instantiation of maximal value.
• Others link gradations to possible‑worlds semantics or to perfect being theology, arguing that the possibility of a maximally great being together with gradations of value supports its actuality.

These revisions aim to retain the argument’s core insight while aligning it more closely with current analytic tools.

13. Relation to Moral Realism and Value Theory

13.1 Link to Moral Realism

The Fourth Way intersects with moral realism—the view that moral claims can be true or false in virtue of mind‑independent facts. Its first premise presupposes that statements like “A is better than B” are objectively meaningful. Many defenders thus see the argument as:

• Supporting the idea that goodness is a real property, not reducible to preferences.
• Providing a metaphysical ground for moral facts in a maximally good being.

13.2 Competing Metaethical Views

Different metaethical positions interpret gradations of value differently:

13.3 Objective Value and Unity of Perfections

The Fourth Way treats different perfections—goodness, truth, nobility—as ultimately unified in a single maximal source. This has implications for value theory:

• It suggests a monistic view of value, where diverse goods are grounded in one supreme good.
• Some philosophers of value instead defend pluralism, where different goods may be incommensurable and lack a common measure. Such pluralism can be seen as resisting the argument’s drive toward a single maximum.

13.4 Normativity and Motivation

Proponents sometimes argue that a maximal good provides an anchor for the normative authority of moral claims:

• If goodness is grounded in a perfect being, moral norms derive from the nature of that being.
• Critics contend that even if such a being exists, further work is needed to show how this yields action‑guiding prescriptions, and that secular accounts of normativity may suffice.

13.5 Beyond Moral Value

The gradations invoked by the Fourth Way are not strictly moral; they also include ontological, aesthetic, and intellectual perfections. Discussions in value theory thus extend to:

• whether beauty, truth, and nobility form a coherent family of values,
• and whether their apparent interrelations suggest a common metaphysical source or are better explained by independent, domain‑specific theories.

14. Comparison with Other Theistic Arguments

14.1 Relation to Cosmological Arguments

The Fourth Way shares with cosmological arguments a focus on causal dependence and metaphysical explanation, but differs in starting point:

• Cosmological arguments typically begin from existence, contingency, or change.
• The Fourth Way begins from degrees of perfection (goodness, truth, being).

Some interpreters view it as a specialized form of cosmological argument framed in axiological rather than purely ontological terms.

14.2 Relation to Teleological (Design) Arguments

Teleological arguments appeal to order and purposiveness in nature. The Fourth Way, by contrast:

• Does not rely on empirical evidence of design or fine‑tuning.
• Focuses instead on gradation in valuable or perfective properties.

However, both can be seen as emphasizing a qualitative structure in the world that calls for explanation in terms of a supremely perfect cause.

14.3 Relation to Moral Arguments

Moral arguments for God’s existence, especially in Kantian or contemporary forms, often start from:

• the existence of moral obligation,
• or the need for a moral order in which virtue and happiness coincide.

The Fourth Way is similar in emphasizing objective value, but:

• It targets perfection and goodness generally, not just moral duty.
• It explicitly connects value to degrees of being and metaphysical participation in a way most moral arguments do not.

14.4 Relation to Ontological Arguments and Perfect Being Theology

Ontological arguments move from the concept of a maximally great being to its existence. In contrast:

• The Fourth Way starts from empirical features (observed gradations), not just conceptual analysis.
• Nevertheless, both share an interest in great‑making properties and maximality.

Some contemporary philosophers blend elements of the Fourth Way with perfect being theology, arguing from the plausibility of graded perfections to the possible and actual existence of a being possessing them maximally.

14.5 Comparative Strengths and Vulnerabilities

Different theistic arguments face different challenges:

This comparative landscape shapes how philosophers evaluate the Fourth Way’s contribution to the overall case for theism.

15. Status in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion

15.1 Overall Assessment

The Argument from Gradation holds a disputed status in contemporary philosophy of religion. It is:

• Widely recognized as an important historical contribution.
• Less frequently defended in its original Thomistic form outside explicitly Thomistic circles.
• Often engaged indirectly through debates about value realism and metaphysical grounding.

15.2 Areas of Active Discussion

Current discussions tend to focus on:

• The coherence of degrees of being or reality.
• The viability of participation metaphysics in an analytic context.
• The relationship between objective value and metaphysical foundations.

Some analytic philosophers explore gradational or axiological themes without directly endorsing Aquinas’s argument, while Thomists work to show its continued relevance.

15.3 Divergent Evaluations

There is considerable diversity in evaluation:

15.4 Influence on Related Debates

Even where the Fourth Way is not directly defended, its core themes influence:

• Debates on grounding and ontological dependence (e.g., whether there is a fundamental layer of reality that is maximally real).
• Discussions of axiological foundations: whether value requires a supreme good or can be brute.
• Renewed interest in neo‑Aristotelian and neo‑Scholastic metaphysics.

15.5 Prospects for Future Work

Future work may involve:

• Further formalization of the argument using contemporary tools (e.g., grounding theory, degrees of reality, formal axiology).
• Cross‑tradition comparisons, e.g., with Indian or Islamic philosophies that also posit gradations of being.
• Interdisciplinary engagement with theology, ethics, and philosophy of science to assess how gradation‑based reasoning fits into a broader worldview.

The argument’s status thus remains contested but live in certain philosophical subcommunities.

16. Legacy and Historical Significance

16.1 Influence within Scholasticism

Within medieval and early modern scholastic traditions, the Fourth Way contributed to:

• Sustaining a hierarchical ontology of beings ordered by degrees of perfection.
• Reinforcing the doctrine that God is summum bonum (the highest good) and ipsum esse subsistens (subsistent being itself).
• Shaping discussions about the transcendentals and their role in natural theology.

Commentators such as Cajetan and Suárez engaged extensively with the argument, embedding it in scholastic curricula and disputations.

16.2 Role in Classical Theism

The argument helped articulate a picture of God as:

• The maximal instance of being, goodness, and truth.
• The source of all finite perfections.

This has influenced subsequent Catholic and broader Christian theology, including spiritual and devotional literature that presents God as the fullness of perfection to which all creatures are ordered.

16.3 Reception in Early Modern and Enlightenment Thought

With the rise of early modern philosophy, attention shifted toward other types of theistic arguments (e.g., Descartes’ ontological arguments, Leibniz’s cosmological arguments). The Fourth Way’s explicitly scholastic metaphysics became less widely accepted.

Nonetheless, gradation‑like ideas persisted:

• Leibniz spoke of a best possible world and degrees of perfection in created substances.
• Some British moralists appealed to a supreme good as grounding moral order.

16.4 Neo‑Thomist Revival

The late 19th and 20th centuries saw a Neo‑Thomist revival, especially within Catholic thought. The Fourth Way was revived as:

• An exemplar of metaphysical reasoning about God.
• A bridge between metaphysics and ethics, via degrees of goodness.

Authors like Gilson, Maritain, and Garrigou‑Lagrange popularized and reinterpreted the argument for modern audiences.

16.5 Contemporary Historical and Systematic Significance

Today, the Fourth Way is significant in at least two respects:

1. Historical: It illuminates how medieval thinkers integrated value theory, metaphysics, and natural theology. It provides a clear case study of how concepts like transcendentals and participation functioned in scholastic reasoning.

2. Systematic: It continues to inform ongoing projects in Thomistic metaphysics, classical theism, and axiology. Even critics often engage with it as a paradigmatic attempt to argue from degrees of value and being to a maximal foundation.

Through these channels, the Argument from Gradation remains an influential component of the broader philosophical conversation about God, value, and reality’s ultimate structure.