Argument from Miracles

Definition and Core Idea

The Argument from Miracles is a type of empirical, abductive argument in the philosophy of religion. It claims that certain events—typically described as miracles—are best explained by the action of a supernatural being, most often God, and therefore provide evidential support for theism.

A miracle is commonly defined as an event that either (a) violates the laws of nature, or (b) is so highly improbable under natural laws that invoking divine agency is, proponents say, the best explanation. Examples often cited include alleged faith healings, fulfilled prophecies, or foundational religious events such as the resurrection of Jesus in Christian thought.

The argument is typically inductive or inference to the best explanation rather than deductive. It does not claim to demonstrate God’s existence with absolute certainty, but to increase the probability or rational credibility of belief in God.

Historical Background

Appeals to miracles appear in classical religious apologetics, especially within Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, where miracles are treated as divine “signs” authenticating a prophet or revelation.

In early modern philosophy, the argument came under systematic scrutiny:

• Baruch Spinoza (17th century) denied that miracles are genuine violations of nature, insisting that what appears miraculous only reflects our ignorance of natural laws.
• David Hume (18th century), in Of Miracles (Section X of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding), offered the most famous critique. He analyzed miracle reports as matters of testimony and probability and argued that it is never reasonable to believe in a violation of the laws of nature on the basis of human testimony alone.
• Nineteenth- and twentieth-century theologians and philosophers, such as Friedrich Schleiermacher, C. S. Lewis, and later Richard Swinburne, revisited miracles using modern notions of lawlike regularity, probability theory, and Bayesian inference.

In contemporary analytic philosophy, the Argument from Miracles surfaces in debates about religious experience, evidence and testimony, and Bayesian confirmation theory, often using case studies like the Lourdes healings or historical arguments for the resurrection.

Supportive Reasoning

Proponents present the Argument from Miracles in several interrelated forms.

1. Evidential and probabilistic structure

Rather than claiming that miracles prove God’s existence, defenders usually say:

• Certain events are antecedently very improbable on a purely naturalistic worldview.
• If a powerful, purposive God exists, such events might be less improbable (e.g., God may have reason to heal, guide, or reveal).
• Therefore, the occurrence of such events can raise the probability of theism relative to naturalism.

This is sometimes expressed in Bayesian terms: a miracle (M) is more probable given theism (T) than given naturalism (N), so (M) confirms (T) over (N).

2. Testimony and cumulative case

Defenders stress the cumulative weight of:

• Multiple, independent testimonies across times and cultures,
• Detailed documentation and investigation of specific cases,
• The alleged absence of satisfactory natural explanations despite scrutiny.

They argue that, just as we reasonably trust testimony in history or law courts, we may also rationally accept some miracle reports when they meet high standards: sincerity of witnesses, lack of obvious motive to deceive, corroboration, and no plausible natural account.

3. Role in religious traditions

Within religious frameworks, miracles are sometimes seen not merely as anomalies but as signs with theological meaning—for example, validating a prophet, confirming a revelation, or illustrating divine compassion or justice. For some, this fit within a wider theistic narrative further supports the claim that invoking God is an explanatory enhancement rather than an ad hoc move.

Major Criticisms and Debates

The Argument from Miracles is highly controversial, with objections targeting both the concept of a miracle and the reliability of miracle reports.

1. Humean critique of testimony

Hume’s influential line of criticism can be summarized:

• A law of nature is established by “firm and unalterable experience.”
• A miracle is defined as a violation of such a law.
• Any testimony to a miracle must therefore outweigh the entire past experience supporting the law of nature.
• Hume argues that, in practice, no human testimony has ever been strong enough to rationally overturn this weight of evidence.

He also cites further undermining factors:

• Human credulity and love of wonder,
• Religious partisanship (miracle claims from competing religions cancel each other out),
• The historical prevalence of fraud and error in extraordinary claims.

Critics in this tradition contend that it is always more rational to suppose mistake, bias, or deception than to accept that a natural law has been violated.

2. Conceptual objections to “violation of laws”

Some philosophers challenge the very idea of a violation of a law of nature:

• On certain accounts, laws are descriptive regularities or patterns summarizing what happens, not prescriptive rules that can be “broken”.
• If an event occurs, then by definition it is compatible with the true total description of reality, so speaking of a “violation” can appear incoherent.

From this angle, purported miracles are either:

• Events that are natural but not yet understood, or
• Part of an expanded natural order that already includes divine action.

This can complicate the use of miracles as distinctive evidence for a supernatural realm.

3. Competing explanations and underdetermination

Many critics argue that:

• Allegedly miraculous events often admit plausible natural explanations (psychosomatic healing, misdiagnosis, coincidence, psychological suggestion).
• Even when no current explanation is available, invoking God may be a “God of the gaps” move: plugging explanatory gaps with divine action instead of acknowledging temporary ignorance.

They claim that multiple explanations can often account for the data—naturalistic and supernatural—leading to underdetermination: the evidence alone does not uniquely support a theistic interpretation.

4. Cross-religious miracles and evidential neutrality

Another debate concerns religious diversity. Different traditions report miracles supporting mutually incompatible doctrines. Critics suggest that if all these miracle claims were granted equal credibility, they would cancel each other out as evidence for any particular religion or conception of God.

Proponents respond in various ways:

• Arguing that only some miracle claims meet stringent evidential standards,
• Interpreting miracles in other traditions as partial truths, misinterpretations, or non-doctrinal signs,
• Or treating miracles as support for a generic theism rather than for a specific creed.

5. Miracles, naturalism, and prior probabilities

Finally, the debate often turns on background assumptions:

• Those who find theism antecedently highly implausible may see miracle claims as extremely unlikely and therefore best explained by error or deception.
• Those who regard theism as live or plausible may view well-attested miracles as confirmatory data rather than outlandish exceptions.

The persuasiveness of the Argument from Miracles thus depends not only on empirical details of particular cases, but also on contested issues in epistemology, philosophy of science, and worldview assessment. Scholarly discussions continue to refine both the argument and its objections, without consensus on its ultimate force.