Argument from Non Belief

Overview and Historical Background

The Argument from Non Belief (often discussed under the broader heading of the problem of divine hiddenness) is a prominent argument in contemporary philosophy of religion. It claims that the presence of widespread, sincere, and apparently reasonable non-belief in God is surprising if a perfectly loving, all-powerful deity exists, and therefore counts against the existence of such a deity.

Although earlier thinkers, including some early modern philosophers, raised questions about God’s alleged “hiddenness,” the argument achieved a rigorous and influential form through the work of the Canadian philosopher John L. Schellenberg, especially in Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993). Schellenberg’s formulation focuses on the relation between divine love, relationship, and the phenomenon of non-resistant non-belief (people who do not believe in God despite being open to such belief and not actively resisting it).

The Argument from Non Belief is closely related to, but distinct from, the problem of evil. Where the problem of evil emphasizes suffering and moral evil as evidence against God, the Argument from Non Belief emphasizes the lack of clear, universally compelling awareness of God as a loving personal being.

Core Formulation of the Argument

At its core, the Argument from Non Belief is a theistic critique: it targets the existence of a perfectly loving God rather than any generic notion of a divine or supernatural reality. Schellenberg and other proponents reason from the nature of perfect love to expectations about what the world would be like if such a God existed.

A common formulation proceeds roughly as follows:

1. Perfect Love Premise: A perfectly loving God would be open to a personal relationship with every finite person who is capable of such a relationship. Love, on this view, involves seeking meaningful relationship and communion with the beloved.

2. Awareness Requirement: For such a relationship to be possible, a person must at least believe that God exists. One cannot be in a conscious, personal relationship with a being whose existence one does not even think is real.

3. No Non-Resistant Non-Belief: Therefore, if a perfectly loving God exists, God would ensure that no person capable of relationship with God is ever in a state of non-resistant non-belief—that is, sincere non-belief that is not the result of willful refusal, culpable negligence, or hostile resistance.

4. Empirical Premise: In actuality, many individuals (including thoughtful, morally serious, and intellectually honest people) report that they do not believe in God despite being open to the possibility and having reflected on available evidence and arguments. They appear to be non-resistant non-believers.

5. Conclusion: Consequently, the existence of such non-resistant non-belief is incompatible with, or at least strong evidence against, the existence of a perfectly loving God.

Proponents emphasize that the argument is not primarily about the quantity of non-believers, but about the kind of non-belief: lack of belief in God among people who would, in good faith, accept theistic belief if they found it convincing or if they experienced God’s presence in an unmistakable way.

Major Objections and Responses

The Argument from Non Belief is widely discussed and remains controversial. Theistic philosophers and theologians have developed several families of responses.

1. Free Will and Non-Coercive Relationship

One prominent line of objection holds that God must respect human freedom and avoid coercing belief. If God’s existence were too obvious—say, through constant, overwhelming manifestations—humans might be unable to freely choose for or against relationship with God. Belief would be “forced” rather than a product of genuine trust or commitment.

Proponents of the Argument from Non Belief respond that belief in God’s existence need not be coercive. They distinguish between epistemic openness (providing sufficient evidence for belief) and overwhelming compulsion. They argue that a loving God could ensure that all non-resistant persons have adequate evidence to reasonably believe, while still allowing them to reject relationship at the level of love, trust, or obedience.

2. Soul-Making and Developmental Goods

Another response proposes that divine hiddenness is part of a broader soul-making or character-forming process. On this view, periods of doubt, uncertainty, or even non-belief can contribute to moral and spiritual development—fostering virtues such as humility, courage, intellectual honesty, and perseverance.

Critics answer that this explanation may account for temporary hiddenness or limited uncertainty, but not for lifelong, non-resistant non-belief or for cases where individuals die without ever having had what appears to them as a serious opportunity to know God. They question why a loving God would permit such global and enduring hiddenness if relationship is a central divine aim.

3. The Inscrutability or Mystery of God’s Reasons

Some theists appeal to the inscrutability of God’s purposes. They admit that humans may not understand why God permits non-belief but deny that this ignorance justifies a strong inference against God’s existence. This strategy is analogous to skeptical theism in responses to the problem of evil: humans are limited, so we should be cautious in judging what an all-knowing God would or would not do.

Proponents of the Argument from Non Belief counter that the appeal to mystery can be overextended, potentially undermining any positive claims about God’s nature. They argue that if we have a sufficiently clear grasp of what perfect love entails, then we can draw at least some conditional conclusions about how a perfectly loving being would relate to finite persons—namely, not by allowing non-resistant non-belief.

4. Reinterpreting Non-Resistant Non-Belief

Another strategy challenges the key empirical premise. Some argue that genuine non-resistant non-belief is rarer than it appears. They suggest that what looks like innocent non-belief may involve subtle forms of resistance: cognitive bias, pride, moral reluctance, or a desire for autonomy.

Critics of this move contend that it risks pathologizing or morally condemning all non-believers without adequate evidence. They also note that many individuals report an explicit willingness to believe and to enter into relationship with God if only they found the belief epistemically justified.

5. Broadening the Concept of God or Revelation

A further response is to question the assumptions about God as a clearly personal, interactive, and relational being whose existence is believed through explicit theistic doctrines. Some suggest that God might be present and known in more diffuse or implicit ways—through moral experience, beauty, or a sense of the transcendent—even among those who would not self-identify as theists.

Proponents reply that the argument, as formulated, targets a specific kind of personal, perfectly loving God central to many classical theisms. If “God” is redefined in such a way that explicit awareness and relationship are no longer central, the argument may not apply, but the conclusion would be that at least the traditional personal theistic conception is in doubt.

Significance in Philosophy of Religion

The Argument from Non Belief has become a central topic in contemporary debates about the rationality of theism and divine attributes. It interacts with several key areas:

• Evidentialism vs. Reformed Epistemology: It raises questions about what kind of evidence a loving God would provide and how religious belief can be warranted or justified.
• Religious Pluralism: Widespread non-belief and diverse religious traditions prompt inquiry into why, if there is one loving God, human religious experience is so fragmented.
• Nature of Divine Love: The argument presses theists to articulate a more precise account of what divine love entails and how it should be reflected in the world’s epistemic situation.

Philosophically, the Argument from Non Belief is often viewed as probabilistic or evidential rather than logically demonstrative. It is typically presented as saying that the existence of reasonable non-belief lowers the probability of a perfectly loving God’s existence, given what one might antecedently expect if such a God existed. Critics contest both the alleged expectations and the degree to which non-belief is surprising under theism.

The argument remains widely discussed, with ongoing debates focusing on the adequacy of the notion of non-resistant non-belief, the nature of divine hiddenness, and the coherence of various conceptions of a perfectly loving deity. It stands alongside the problem of evil as one of the most influential arguments challenging classical theism in recent analytic philosophy of religion.