Evidential Problem of Evil

1. Introduction

The evidential problem of evil is a family of arguments claiming that the actual pattern of suffering in the world makes it unlikely that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God. Unlike the logical problem of evil, which alleges strict inconsistency between God and any evil at all, evidential versions allow that God and evil may be logically compatible while holding that the amount, kinds, and seeming pointlessness of suffering nonetheless count strongly against classical theism.

Central to these arguments is the notion of gratuitous evil: suffering that appears to serve no greater good and to be unnecessary for preventing equal or worse evils. Proponents contend that such evils are more probable if there is no such God than if there is, and they develop probabilistic or inductive reasoning to support that claim.

The evidential problem of evil occupies a prominent place in contemporary philosophy of religion, especially within analytic discussions of the rationality of theism, atheism, and agnosticism. It is often treated as a test case for:

• how to reason under uncertainty about large-scale features of the world;
• how to understand moral concepts such as goodness and responsibility when applied to a deity;
• how to weigh apparently conflicting bodies of evidence in a cumulative assessment of religious belief.

The debate surrounding the evidential problem of evil intersects with theodicy (attempts to justify God’s permission of evil), skeptical theism (doubts about human access to divine reasons), and Bayesian approaches to confirmation. It has also influenced reworked conceptions of God that relax traditional attributes in response to the challenge posed by suffering.

2. Origin and Attribution

The canonical modern formulation of the evidential problem of evil is widely attributed to William L. Rowe. His article “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” (1979) is generally regarded as the seminal statement of the argument in explicitly evidential and probabilistic terms.

Rowe’s Contribution

Rowe introduced the now-famous idea of apparently gratuitous suffering and offered a concrete illustration—“Rowe’s fawn”—to motivate his claims. He framed the argument as an inductive challenge rather than a deductive inconsistency, stressing that evil lowers, rather than annihilates, the rational probability of God’s existence.

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“The view that the kinds and amounts of suffering we find in our world constitute powerful evidence against the existence of God…”

— William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” (1979)

Rowe’s paper also shaped the dialectic by distinguishing between friendly atheism, unfriendly atheism, and agnosticism, thereby clarifying the range of possible doxastic attitudes toward theism in light of the evidence from evil.

Attribution and Alternative Formulations

Although Rowe’s formulation is the reference point in current literature, other philosophers have independently developed related evidential arguments:

Some historians of philosophy note that earlier thinkers expressed proto-evidential concerns, but Rowe’s work is typically cited as the first systematic, self-consciously evidential argument from evil in contemporary analytic philosophy. It set the agenda for ensuing debates over skeptical theism, theodicy, and probabilistic reasoning that dominate the modern discussion.

3. Historical Context and Precursors

Although the explicit evidential framing emerges in late 20th‑century analytic philosophy, concerns about evil as evidence against a good deity have long historical roots. Earlier discussions often blended what are now called logical and evidential strands.

Ancient and Classical Sources

• Epicurus (as reported by later writers) offered a famous trilemma about God’s power, goodness, and the existence of evil. While often read as a logical problem, some interpreters see in it an implicit evidential worry: extensive evil appears incompatible with the claimed divine attributes.
• David Hume, in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), developed a more recognizably evidential line. Through the character Philo, he argued that the “mixed” and often miserable condition of the world counts against the hypothesis of a benevolent designer:

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“Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent.
Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent…”

— David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Hume stressed that the actual world—with its diseases, disasters, and animal suffering—fits poorly with traditional theism when judged by empirical standards.

Early Modern and Theodical Context

The rise of natural theology and theodicy in the early modern period provided much of the backdrop for evidential-style reasoning:

Transition to Modern Analytic Debates

In the 20th century, J. L. Mackie’s “Evil and Omnipotence” (1955) articulated a forceful logical argument. Subsequent criticisms (notably by Alvin Plantinga) led many to judge the logical problem less conclusive, creating space for a shift toward probabilistic formulations.

When Rowe and later Draper developed explicitly evidential arguments, they did so against a background shaped by centuries of attempts to reconcile the empirical record of suffering with theism. Previous appeals to specific disasters, to animal pain, and to the “amount” of evil provided many of the intuitive examples that modern evidential arguments systematize into formal inductive structures.

4. The Argument Stated

In contemporary discussions, the evidential problem of evil is standardly presented as an inductive or probabilistic argument. A representative, high-level formulation runs as follows:

1. If an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God exists, then for any instance of intense suffering, God would prevent that suffering unless allowing it is necessary for a greater good or to prevent an equal or worse evil.
2. The world contains many instances of intense suffering—both human and non-human—for which no such justifying reason is apparent, even after careful reflection.
3. From our failure to discern justifying reasons in at least many such cases, it is reasonable to infer that there are no such reasons; these are gratuitous evils.
4. The existence of gratuitous evils is much more probable if there is no omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God than if such a God exists.
5. Therefore, the observed pattern of apparently gratuitous suffering constitutes strong evidence against the existence of such a God, making classical theism less probable or less rational to accept.

This statement encapsulates several key features:

• It is non-deductive: the conclusion is framed in terms of probability or evidential weight, not logical impossibility.
• It focuses on particular evils (e.g., certain cases of torture, natural disasters, or animal suffering) as data.
• It introduces a crucial inferential step from “we see no justifying reason” to “there is probably no justifying reason”, which becomes a central point of controversy.

Different philosophers will refine individual premises—especially those involving divine attributes, the definition of gratuitous evil, and the relevant probability comparisons—but most evidential arguments approximate this general structure. Later sections develop specific canonical versions (notably Rowe’s) and formal probabilistic models building on this intuitive template.

5. Logical Structure and Probabilistic Form

The evidential problem of evil is typically understood as an inductive or probabilistic argument rather than a strict logical derivation. Its structure can be analyzed along two main dimensions: the type of inference it employs and the formal frameworks used to model that inference.

Inductive and Abductive Structure

Most formulations proceed by inference to the best explanation (abduction) or by inductive generalization:

• We observe a large body of evidence of suffering (E), especially cases that appear pointless.
• We compare how well different hypotheses explain or predict E:
  • G: there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God.
  • ¬G: there is no such God (often specified as naturalism or atheism).
• Since E allegedly fits better with ¬G than with G, E is taken to confirm ¬G over G.

This pattern is sometimes expressed informally as: “Given the kinds of evil we see, it would be surprising if such a God existed; it would be unsurprising if there were no such God.”

Bayesian Formulation

A number of philosophers cast the argument explicitly in Bayesian terms, using conditional probabilities:

The evidential claim is then:

• P(E|G) < P(E|¬G)

Together with Bayes’ theorem,

• P(G|E) ∝ P(E|G)·P(G)

this implies that E decreases the probability of G relative to its prior probability P(G), unless P(G) is so high that the effect is overwhelmed. The argument’s focus, however, is on the likelihoods P(E|G) and P(E|¬G), not on a full calculation of posteriors.

Local vs. Global Structure

Some versions target specific classes of evil (e.g., animal suffering, horrendous evils) and argue that these, taken individually, lower P(G). Others consider the total evidence of evil as a single datum. In both cases, the logical structure is confirmational: evil is claimed to be evidence that makes theism less probable than it would otherwise be, rather than logically impossible.

6. Key Concepts: Gratuitous Evil and Divine Attributes

Two concepts are central to the evidential problem of evil: gratuitous evil and the traditional divine attributes.

Gratuitous Evil

Gratuitous evil is commonly defined as suffering that is:

1. Not necessary as a means to any greater good, and
2. Not necessary to prevent an equal or worse evil.

If a perfectly good God exists, proponents argue, such evils would not be permitted. The apparent presence of gratuitous evils thus drives the evidential challenge.

Different philosophers refine this notion in distinct ways:

Debate often centers on whether we are warranted in moving from epistemic to objective gratuitousness.

Divine Attributes

The argument presupposes a classical theistic conception of God, characterized by:

• Omnipotence: the power to do anything that is logically possible.
• Omniscience: knowledge of all truths, including all possible goods, evils, and their connections.
• Perfect goodness (omnibenevolence): unerring commitment to promote good and prevent evil, subject to rational constraints (such as logical possibility or compatibility with other great goods).

The key normative assumption is that such a God would not permit any instance of intense suffering unless allowing it were morally necessary—that is, required for some outweighing good or the avoidance of equal or greater evil. This yields a bridge principle of the form:

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If God exists, then there are no gratuitous evils.

The evidential argument contends that the actual world’s suffering profile suggests otherwise. Some responses (considered in later sections) challenge either the definition of these attributes, their implications, or our understanding of what perfect goodness would require in a complex universe.

7. Rowe’s Canonical Formulation

William L. Rowe’s 1979 article is widely taken as the standard evidential argument from evil. His formulation emphasizes a single, vivid case, generalizes from it, and then draws a probabilistic conclusion.

The Fawn Example

Rowe’s key illustration is a case of natural evil:

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“In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering.
… Suppose that there is no good state of affairs we know of that would justify an omnipotent, omniscient being in permitting this evil.”

— William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism”

Rowe argues that, so far as we can tell, this suffering:

• does not lead to any compensating moral or spiritual growth,
• is not observed or responded to in ways that yield significant goods,
• appears pointless from any humanly accessible perspective.

He concludes that it is reasonable to judge the fawn’s suffering probably gratuitous.

Rowe’s Core Argument

Rowe presents his argument in a compact form:

1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
3. Therefore, there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.

While stated in seemingly deductive terms, Rowe emphasizes that the first premise rests on inductive support from cases like the fawn and numerous human atrocities. Consequently, the overall argument is best read as evidential: the existence of such evils is strong evidence against (rather than a logical refutation of) classical theism.

Rowe later distinguishes between friendly atheism (allowing that some theists remain rational despite this evidence) and more robust forms of atheism, using his argument as a basis for nuanced positions about rational disagreement.

8. Major Variations and Bayesian Versions

Following Rowe, philosophers have developed multiple variations of the evidential problem of evil, differing in their focus, methodology, and formal apparatus.

Varieties by Focus

Some arguments concentrate on particular categories of evil:

These variants aim to show that certain subsets of evil are especially resistant to theistic justification and thus provide concentrated evidential pressure.

Draper’s Bayesian Formulations

Paul Draper has advanced a prominent Bayesian version, especially in “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists” (1989). Draper compares:

• T: Hypothesis of theism (God exists and is morally perfect).
• H: Hypothesis of “hypothesis of indifference” (if supernatural beings exist, they are indifferent to human and animal suffering).

He argues that the observed biological roles of pain and pleasure—serving survival rather than moral or spiritual ends—are much more likely on H than on T. Formally:

• P(E|H) >> P(E|T)

Thus, E confirms H over T, and, by extension, favors naturalism or atheism over theism when H is taken as a proxy or stepping stone.

Global vs. Local Arguments

Another variation concerns the scope of the data:

• Local evidential arguments: focus on specific evils (e.g., Rowe’s fawn, a particular genocide).
• Global evidential arguments: take the totality of evil and suffering as a single, large-scale datum, comparing its overall character with the predictions of theism and atheism.

Bayesian treatments often favor a global approach, modeling the entire world’s history of suffering as evidence.

Structural Differences

Some versions treat evil as:

• Primarily a disconfirmation of theism (lowering its probability).
• Or as supporting a competing hypothesis (e.g., naturalism, indifference) more directly.

Despite these differences, most variations retain the core idea that the observed facts about suffering are less surprising or more expected on non-theistic worldviews than on classical theism.

9. Relationship to the Logical Problem of Evil

The logical and evidential problems of evil are closely related but conceptually distinct. Their interaction helps explain the historical development of contemporary debates.

Distinct Aims

• The logical problem of evil claims that the coexistence of any evil with an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God is strictly contradictory or impossible.
• The evidential problem of evil concedes that such coexistence may be logically possible but argues that the actual pattern of evil makes God’s existence improbable or less reasonable to affirm.

Historical Interaction

Many philosophers judge that Alvin Plantinga’s free-will defense and related work undermined strong logical arguments by showing that God and evil are logically compatible, at least in principle. As a result, attention shifted to evidential forms that:

• Accept compatibility, but
• Emphasize that God’s existence appears unlikely given the actual world.

Conceptual Overlap

Despite the distinction, some elements overlap:

• Both problems turn on assumptions about divine attributes and how a perfect being would act.
• Arguments developed against the logical problem (e.g., invoking free will, soul-making) are often repurposed as partial responses to evidential arguments.
• Critics sometimes question whether certain evidential formulations tacitly rely on quasi-logical assumptions (e.g., that a good God must prevent certain evils), blurring the boundary.

Nonetheless, most contemporary literature treats the evidential problem as the primary surviving form of the problem of evil, with the logical problem serving as a backdrop and contrast case.

10. Premises Examined: Divine Goodness and Power

Central premises of evidential arguments concern what an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God would do in the face of suffering. Debates over these premises focus on divine goodness and divine power.

The Goodness Premise

The crucial normative claim is often expressed as:

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A perfectly good, omniscient being would prevent any instance of intense suffering it could, unless permitting it is necessary for a greater good or to avoid an equal or worse evil.

Proponents argue that this follows from widely shared moral intuitions: a decent human agent, aware of such suffering and able to prevent it at no comparable moral cost, ought to prevent it; a perfectly good being should not fall below this standard.

Critics raise several questions:

• Whether divine goodness is fully analogous to human morality, or instead operates on different norms (e.g., emphasizing cosmic goods, aesthetic order, or eschatological outcomes).
• Whether “necessity” should be understood in terms of logical, metaphysical, or practical constraints.
• Whether a perfectly good God might legitimately permit some evils for reasons beyond our moral categories (for instance, goods related to divine–creature relationships across eternity).

The Power and Omnipotence Premise

The companion claim is that God, being omnipotent, is able to prevent any such suffering, subject only to logical possibility and perhaps compatibility with other divine goals (like free will).

Disputes over this premise concern:

• Whether omnipotence should be defined as the power to do anything logically possible, or more restrictively (e.g., excluding worlds with certain combinations of goods).
• Whether some worlds with less evil but comparable or greater goods might be incoherent or unavailable even to an omnipotent being.
• Whether divine power might be self-limited by God’s own nature or by the structure of created reality, thus affecting what God “could” do in practice.

Alternative theologies—such as process theism or finite theism—modify these attributes to reduce the apparent tension with evil, though doing so yields a different target than classical theism. Evidential arguments aimed at the classical conception thus hinge on the contested interpretation of what perfect goodness and maximal power require in permitting or preventing suffering.

11. Premises Examined: Human Epistemic Limits

Another focal premise of evidential arguments concerns our ability to assess whether any given evil is gratuitous. This premise underwrites the move from “we see no justifying reason” to “probably there is no justifying reason.”

The Epistemic Inference

The relevant inference pattern is often described as a no-seeum inference:

• We look for a justifying reason for some instance of suffering.
• We fail to find any plausible candidate.
• We conclude that, probably, no such reason exists.

Proponents argue that such inferences are common and often reasonable in ordinary life (e.g., inferring that there is no elephant in the room when we look and see none) and that, given our background knowledge, we should expect to discern at least some reasons if they existed.

Limits and Cognitive Distance

Critics emphasize human epistemic limitations:

• The moral and metaphysical landscape of possible goods, evils, and causal connections may be vast and complex.
• Humans may lack the cognitive capacity to trace long-range, indirect, or highly contingent chains of justification in a universe governed by intricate laws.
• The “cognitive distance” between finite knowers and an omniscient deity could be so great that we are not in a position to expect to see God’s reasons, even if they exist.

These considerations are developed by skeptical theists (discussed in more detail later), who maintain that our failure to see reasons does not substantially raise the probability that there are no such reasons.

CORNEA and Conditions for Reasonable Inference

A central tool in this debate is the CORNEA principle (Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access). Applied here, it states that:

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An inference from “it appears that there is no justifying reason R” to “probably there is no R” is warranted only if we would be likely to discern R if it existed.

The dispute then turns on whether this condition is met with respect to divine reasons for permitting specific evils. Proponents of the evidential argument tend to answer yes, at least for many stark cases; opponents tend to answer no, appealing to the depth of our ignorance about God’s purposes and the structure of reality.

12. Standard Theistic Responses and Theodicies

Theistic responses to the evidential problem of evil often take the form of theodicies or defenses that aim to show how God could permissibly allow the observed evils. These responses target either the claim that certain evils are gratuitous or the assumption that such evils significantly disconfirm theism.

Free-Will Theodicies and Defenses

Free-will approaches maintain that God grants creatures significant freedom, including the ability to do wrong, because such freedom is a great good. On this view:

• Many instances of moral evil (e.g., murder, oppression) result from misuse of freedom.
• Preventing these evils would require God to override or significantly curtail free will, undermining its value.

Some versions, such as Alvin Plantinga’s free-will defense, are primarily aimed at the logical problem, but they are also used evidentially by suggesting that a large share of observed evil is tied, directly or indirectly, to the good of freedom.

Soul-Making and Virtue-Development Theodicies

Soul-making accounts, associated especially with John Hick, argue that a world with challenges, dangers, and suffering is necessary for the development of important virtues:

• Courage, compassion, perseverance, forgiveness, and faith are said to require exposure to real risks and hardships.
• A “hedonistic paradise” would not allow for genuinely robust moral and spiritual growth.

Applied evidentially, this suggests that various evils—particularly some natural evils—serve as conditions for significant goods of character formation.

Natural-Law and Regularity Theodicies

Another strategy appeals to the value of a world governed by stable natural laws:

• Predictable regularities enable rational agency, science, technology, and coherent life-planning.
• However, such laws inevitably yield side effects such as earthquakes, diseases, and accidents.

Proponents claim that God’s commitment to a law-like order explains many natural evils without implying indifference or malevolence.

Afterlife and Eschatological Theodicies

Some theists argue that the present world should be viewed in light of an afterlife or eschatological fulfillment:

• Sufferers may receive compensation, healing, and ultimate justice.
• Horrendous evils might be “defeated” by incorporation into a larger, ultimately redemptive narrative.

These views do not deny the seriousness of evil but hold that its final evaluation must consider a broader temporal horizon than our current life.

Collectively, such theodicies aim to reduce the number of genuinely gratuitous evils and to show that theism can provide morally sufficient reasons for much or all of the observed suffering, thereby weakening the evidential force of evil against God’s existence.

13. Skeptical Theism and No-Seeum Inferences

Skeptical theism is a family of responses that addresses the evidential problem not by offering specific theodicies, but by questioning our epistemic position relative to God’s reasons. It is “skeptical” about human access to divine purposes, while remaining “theist” in affirming God’s existence.

Core Claims

Skeptical theists typically maintain:

1. There is a vast gap between human and divine cognition.
2. We are not justified in expecting to discern God’s reasons for permitting particular evils, if such reasons exist.
3. Therefore, our failure to see justifying reasons provides little or no evidence that no such reasons exist.

These claims target the key inferential step from “apparently gratuitous” to “probably gratuitous”.

Wykstra’s CORNEA

A central formulation comes from Stephen J. Wykstra, who proposes CORNEA (Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access). Applied to the problem of evil, CORNEA holds that:

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One may reasonably infer “there is probably no X” from “it appears that there is no X” only if one would likely see X if X existed.

Skeptical theists argue that, given our limited perspective on the full range of goods, evils, and their interrelations in a potentially infinite or immensely complex reality, we are not in a position where we should expect to see God’s reasons, even if they are real. The domain is thus no-seeum-unfriendly.

Variants and Debates

Different skeptical theists emphasize different aspects:

Critics raise concerns that skeptical theism might:

• Lead to moral skepticism, by undermining our confidence in judgments about what a good being would do.
• Undercut other arguments for theism, which also rely on supposed insight into God’s reasons (e.g., design, fine-tuning).
• Create tensions with traditional claims about humans being able to know something of God’s goodness.

Supporters contend that the skepticism is targeted and limited, aimed specifically at complex, large-scale providential reasoning, and thus does not entail wholesale moral or religious skepticism. Within the evidential problem of evil, skeptical theism functions primarily as a defeater for the inference from hidden reasons to genuine gratuitousness.

14. Atheistic and Agnostic Conclusions

Evidential arguments from evil are often used to support atheism or agnosticism, but the exact conclusion drawn can vary significantly among proponents.

Forms of Atheistic Conclusion

Some philosophers take the evidential problem of evil to justify positive atheism—the belief that there is no God:

• They argue that the pattern of suffering, especially apparently gratuitous or horrendous evils, strongly disconfirms classical theism.
• Together with the absence (or perceived weakness) of countervailing evidence for God, this is taken to warrant the belief that no omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God exists.

Others adopt more modest claims, such as:

• Theism is significantly less probable than its main competitor (often naturalism).
• It is irresponsible or irrational to continue believing in God given the evidential situation.

Friendly Atheism and Rational Disagreement

William Rowe introduced the notion of “friendly atheism”, which holds that:

• The evidential problem of evil makes it reasonable for him to reject theism.
• Nevertheless, some theists may remain epistemically justified in their belief, given different total evidence or epistemic principles.

This position allows for reasonable disagreement among well-informed parties.

Agnostic Responses

Some philosophers treat the evidential problem of evil as supporting agnosticism rather than atheism:

• They maintain that evil does present serious evidence against theism.
• However, they also hold that other considerations (e.g., cosmological arguments, moral experience, religious testimony) counterbalance this evidence sufficiently to leave the overall question undecided.

In a Bayesian framework, this corresponds to the view that evil lowers P(G) but not to the point where belief or disbelief is clearly rationally mandated.

Scope and Strength of the Conclusion

There is also disagreement about scope:

In all these cases, the evidential problem of evil functions as a weighable consideration within broader assessments of the rationality of religious belief, rather than as an automatic, stand-alone refutation.

15. Interactions with Other Arguments for and against God

The evidential problem of evil rarely operates in isolation. Philosophers often consider it alongside other arguments for and against God, assessing the net evidential balance.

Cumulative-Case Reasoning

Many theists and atheists adopt a cumulative-case approach:

• For theism: cosmological arguments, teleological/fine-tuning arguments, moral arguments, and religious experience are cited as confirming evidence for God.
• Against theism: the evidential problem of evil, divine hiddenness, and some naturalistic explanations of religious belief are cited as disconfirming evidence.

The resulting picture is that evil is one factor among many; its impact depends on how strongly other arguments are judged to support or undermine theism.

Bayesian Integration

In Bayesian terms, the evidential problem of evil concerns P(E|G) vs. P(E|¬G). Other arguments affect:

• The prior probability P(G) (e.g., cosmological or moral arguments might raise it).
• Additional likelihoods (e.g., fine-tuning might make P(F|G) > P(F|¬G) for some evidence F).

On this picture, the rational assessment of God’s existence depends on the total evidence:

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P(G|All Evidence) ∝ P(G) × Π P(Eᵢ|G)

Evil is simply one Eᵢ among others.

Specific Interactions

• Fine-tuning vs. evil: Some contend that fine-tuning evidence strongly supports theism, while evil significantly disconfirms it, leading to a tension in the overall probability calculus.
• Moral arguments vs. moral evil: The existence of objective moral values is sometimes taken as evidence for God, while the existence of moral atrocities is taken as evidence against a good God. How these interact is disputed.
• Hiddenness and evil: The divine hiddenness argument (emphasizing non-belief where God’s presence would be expected) is often seen as complementary to the evidential problem of evil, both pointing to a gap between the world we observe and what some expect from a loving God.

Methodological Implications

The need to integrate multiple arguments raises methodological questions:

• How to avoid double-counting evidence that may be relevant to more than one argument.
• Whether intuitions about God’s moral character, used in both supporting and criticizing theism, can be consistently applied.

These issues underscore that the evidential problem of evil is best understood within a broader argumentative network, influencing and being influenced by other considerations in the philosophy of religion.

16. Contemporary Debates and Developments

Contemporary work on the evidential problem of evil spans a range of topics, from fine-grained epistemology to new empirical data about suffering.

Refinements of Evidential Arguments

Philosophers have refined evidential arguments in several ways:

• Targeted arguments focusing on animal suffering, especially over evolutionary timescales, have gained prominence. Critics of theism argue that non-human pain appears especially hard to reconcile with many theodicies centered on human freedom or soul-making.
• Horrendous evils have been explored in depth, with attention to whether such evils can be “defeated” or integrated into a life that is, on the whole, a great good.

These refinements aim to show that even if some broad theodicies explain portions of evil, residual categories remain that strongly challenge theism.

Developments in Skeptical Theism

The literature on skeptical theism has expanded, addressing worries about:

• Moral paralysis: whether skepticism about God’s reasons undermines confidence in ordinary moral reasoning.
• Global skepticism: whether the same epistemic moves that block the evidential argument also threaten scientific or everyday reasoning.

Some authors propose limited forms of skeptical theism designed to avoid these alleged pitfalls, while maintaining enough skepticism to blunt the evidential force of evil.

New Theodical Strategies

Theodicy has likewise evolved:

• Participatory and relational theodicies stress divine solidarity with sufferers (e.g., through doctrines of incarnation or divine passibility), which may affect how the evidential weight of evil is perceived.
• Some philosophers explore the idea of defeating evil (particularly horrendous evil) rather than merely balancing or outweighing it, drawing on the work of Marilyn McCord Adams and others.

Interdisciplinary and Non-Western Perspectives

There is increasing engagement with:

• Cognitive science of religion, which raises questions about how evolved cognitive dispositions influence perceptions of evil and the divine.
• Non-Western traditions and alternative conceptions of the divine or ultimate reality (e.g., in Hindu, Buddhist, or process-theological frameworks), which may reinterpret or reframe the problem of evil in ways that partially sidestep classical theistic assumptions.

Overall, contemporary debates tend to be more nuanced and diversified, exploring a spectrum of positions rather than a simple theism–atheism dichotomy, and considering the evidential problem of evil alongside developments in epistemology, ethics, and comparative philosophy of religion.

17. Legacy and Historical Significance

The evidential problem of evil has had a substantial impact on the philosophy of religion, as well as on broader discussions about rational belief, moral theory, and the nature of evidence.

Shaping the Contemporary Agenda

Rowe’s and Draper’s formulations helped shift the center of gravity from:

• Logical arguments (aimed at strict inconsistency)
  to
• Evidential arguments (concerned with probability and rational credence).

This shift has aligned debates about God more closely with general philosophical concerns about inductive reasoning, Bayesian confirmation, and epistemic humility.

Influence on Theistic Thought

For theists, the evidential problem of evil has:

• Stimulated more sophisticated theodicies, incorporating insights from psychology, evolutionary biology, and social ethics.
• Encouraged closer attention to suffering, both human and non-human, in theological reflection and religious practice.
• Motivated the development of skeptical theism and other strategies that reshape understandings of divine–human cognitive relations.

It has also prompted some to explore non-classical conceptions of God (finite, process, or open theism) that aim to reduce the tension between evil and divine attributes.

Methodological Contributions

Beyond philosophy of religion narrowly construed, the evidential problem of evil has served as a case study in:

• How to handle disconfirming evidence for strongly held worldviews.
• The interaction between moral intuitions and metaphysical commitments.
• The possibilities and limits of reasonable disagreement among epistemic peers.

Ongoing Significance

The argument remains a central reference point in introductory and advanced discussions of religion and rationality. It continues to shape curricula, textbooks, and public debates about faith and skepticism.

Historically, the evidential problem of evil can be seen as the latest stage in a long trajectory—from ancient puzzles about divine justice, through early modern theodicies, to contemporary probabilistic analysis—illustrating how changing conceptions of reason, evidence, and God have transformed the ways philosophers grapple with the enduring question of suffering in a theistic universe.