Free Will Defense

1. Introduction

The Free Will Defense is a family of arguments in the philosophy of religion that aim to show that the existence of evil is logically compatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God. It is typically directed against the logical problem of evil, which alleges a strict inconsistency between these claims.

In its now-standard, rigorously modal form—largely associated with Alvin Plantinga—the Free Will Defense maintains that it is at least possible that God has a morally sufficient reason to allow evil: namely, the value of creating significantly free creatures who can perform morally good actions only if they are genuinely free to do otherwise, including to do evil. If such a description is logically coherent, then the alleged contradiction between God and evil is blocked.

This entry treats the Free Will Defense as a distinct though related project from broader theodicies. Whereas a theodicy seeks to explain why God actually permits the particular pattern and quantity of evil in our world, the Free Will Defense often has a more modest aim: to show that theism is not self-contradictory even in the face of evil. Some proponents, however, blur this boundary and develop what they call “free will theodicies.”

The following sections examine the intellectual origins of the Free Will Defense, its historical development, its formal structure in terms of modal logic and possible worlds, and its central concepts such as libertarian free will and transworld depravity. They also survey major criticisms, proposed refinements, and the defense’s wider significance for debates about divine providence, human freedom, and the broader problem of evil.

2. Origin and Attribution

The canonical modern formulation of the Free Will Defense is widely attributed to Alvin Plantinga, especially in The Nature of Necessity (1974) and God, Freedom, and Evil (1974). Plantinga’s contribution lies in developing a precise modal version of the defense that responds directly to influential mid‑twentieth‑century arguments for the logical incompatibility of God and evil, notably those of J. L. Mackie.

Major Figures and Contributions

Plantinga himself does not claim to have originated the basic idea that free will can help reconcile God and evil. He presents his work as a refined defense, drawing on Augustinian and other traditions, but utilizes contemporary analytic tools—particularly modal logic and the semantics of possible worlds—to make the argument more rigorous.

Some scholars describe the resulting position as Plantinga’s Free Will Defense to distinguish it from:

• Earlier, more theological free-will theodicies (e.g., Augustine, some medieval authors).
• Later “free will theodicies” that build on but go beyond Plantinga’s limited defensive aim, such as those developed by Richard Swinburne and others.

While Plantinga is the central modern figure, attribution is not exclusive. Various philosophers of religion have adapted, extended, or criticized his framework, creating a diverse family of free‑will‑based responses to the problem of evil.

3. Historical Context

The Free Will Defense emerged within a long trajectory of attempts to reconcile divine goodness with the existence of evil, but its modern form is closely tied to debates in twentieth‑century analytic philosophy.

Pre‑modern Antecedents

Early Christian thinkers, especially Augustine of Hippo, already emphasized free will as central to the explanation of evil. Augustine argued that God created humans good and free, and that evil arises from the will’s turning away from God rather than from any defect in creation itself. Medieval theologians such as Anselm and Aquinas continued to explore compatibilities between divine omniscience, omnipotence, and human freedom, though not with the same formal tools used later.

In the early modern period, G. W. Leibniz framed the problem of evil in terms of possible worlds and divine choice, maintaining that God actualizes the best of all possible worlds in which free creatures may nonetheless sin. Although Leibniz did not formulate a Free Will Defense in Plantinga’s sense, his metaphysics of possibility and divine decision-making supplied important background.

Twentieth‑Century Analytic Setting

The immediate context for Plantinga’s formulation was the post‑war rise of analytic philosophy of religion, particularly in the Anglo‑American world. Philosophers such as J. L. Mackie and H. J. McCloskey had argued that the traditional theistic picture is logically inconsistent with the existence of evil. Mackie’s 1955 paper “Evil and Omnipotence” became a central challenge.

At the same time, developments in modal logic and possible‑worlds semantics (e.g., in the work of Saul Kripke and others) provided tools for analyzing claims about what God could or could not have done. Plantinga’s work draws heavily on these resources.

Shift in the Problem of Evil Debate

Many commentators hold that Plantinga’s defense contributed to a shift from focusing on the logical problem of evil (strict inconsistency) to the evidential or probabilistic problem (evil as strong evidence against God). Whether the logical problem was fully resolved remains disputed, but the Free Will Defense became a standard reference point in later discussions.

4. The Logical Problem of Evil

The logical problem of evil alleges that the traditional theistic claims about God’s attributes are logically incompatible with the existence of evil. The Free Will Defense is crafted specifically to respond to this form of the problem.

Core Inconsistency Claim

Critics like J. L. Mackie formulated the problem roughly as follows:

1. God is omnipotent (able to do anything logically possible).
2. God is omniscient (knows all truths, including all future events).
3. God is perfectly good (always prevents evil so far as he can).
4. Evil exists.

The contention is that these four claims, together with some plausible auxiliary principles about the relationship between goodness and the prevention of evil, generate a contradiction. Mackie, for instance, articulated the “inconsistent triad” (God’s power, God’s goodness, and the existence of evil) and argued that accepting any two forces rejection of the third.

Logical Structure

In logical form, the accusation is that:

• From the divine attributes it follows that a being like God would want to and would be able to eliminate all evil.
• Hence, if God exists, no evil would exist.
• Yet evil does exist.
• Therefore, God does not exist (or at least, not a God with the traditional attributes).

Proponents of the logical problem often stress that even a single instance of apparently pointless evil would suffice to generate a contradiction if such a God exists and could have prevented it without losing any greater good.

Target for the Free Will Defense

The Free Will Defense does not necessarily challenge the existence of evil or God’s attributes as normally defined. Instead, it focuses on the auxiliary assumptions that link those attributes to the claim that God must eliminate all evil. It argues that it is at least possible that a perfectly good and omnipotent God might have a morally sufficient reason to permit some evil, particularly if that evil is a consequence of granting significant freedom to creatures.

5. The Free Will Defense Stated

In its standard form, the Free Will Defense argues that there is a possible explanation of why an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God might permit evil, an explanation that renders the coexistence of God and evil logically coherent. The emphasis is on possibility, not on asserting that this explanation is true of the actual world.

Core Idea

The central contention is that:

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It is possible that God, though omnipotent and perfectly good, could not have created a world containing moral good but no moral evil, because doing so would have required preventing creatures from being significantly free.

On this account, moral evil arises from the misuse of creaturely freedom, not from divine intention. Yet God allows such freedom because of its great value and because some moral goods—such as genuine love, moral responsibility, and virtue—are thought to require the ability to choose otherwise.

A Standard Formulation

Plantinga’s version can be summarized in terms that parallel the reference structure:

1. Worlds containing significantly free creatures performing morally good actions are, other things equal, more valuable than worlds lacking such freedom.
2. If creatures are genuinely free with respect to morally significant actions, God cannot both determine that they always choose the good and still leave them free regarding those actions.
3. It is possible that for every essence of a significantly free creature, that creature would go wrong at least once in any world where it exists and is free (i.e., it suffers from transworld depravity).
4. If so, then it is possible that even an omnipotent God could not actualize a world with moral good but no moral evil.
5. Therefore, it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting moral evil, namely the realization of goods essentially connected with significant freedom.

If this scenario is logically coherent, the alleged strict inconsistency between God and evil is neutralized.

6. Logical Structure and Modal Framework

The modern Free Will Defense is explicitly modal and deductive in form. It uses the semantics of possible worlds to analyze claims about what God could or could not have done, and about the freedom of creatures in different scenarios.

Deductive Structure

Plantinga’s defense is framed as a valid argument in which the conclusion—“It is possible that God and evil co‑exist without contradiction”—follows from the premises if those premises are themselves logically possible. The key move is not to prove that God exists, but to undercut the logical problem of evil by exhibiting one coherent description of reality where God and evil co‑exist.

The defense operates at the level of possibility claims, often symbolized in modal logic by the “diamond” operator (◇). A simplified structure is:

• ◇(There are significantly free creatures whose existence yields great goods).
• ◇(If creatures are significantly free, God cannot strongly determine all their choices).
• ◇(Every significantly free creature might exhibit transworld depravity).
• From these, ◇(God cannot actualize a world with moral good but no moral evil).
• Therefore, ◇(God and evil both exist and God remains omnipotent and wholly good).

The conclusion undermines any argument asserting that the conjunction “God exists & evil exists” is necessarily false (□¬(God & evil)).

Possible Worlds and Divine Choice

The defense models God’s creative activity as the selection and actualization of one among many possible worlds. Each possible world is a maximally complete description of the way things could have been, including:

• Which creatures exist.
• How they are endowed with freedom.
• What free choices they make under various circumstances.

Within this framework, the notion of transworld depravity concerns how a given creature’s essence behaves across different possible worlds. The claim is not that God lacks power in an absolute sense, but that even omnipotence does not extend to doing what is logically impossible, such as strongly determining a free choice while it remains free in the relevant, libertarian sense.

Logical Aim

By relying on modal logic, the Free Will Defense explicitly targets the necessity claim in the logical problem of evil. If there is any logically possible world where theism and evil co‑exist without contradiction, then the charge of strict inconsistency fails.

7. Key Concepts: Significant Freedom and Transworld Depravity

Two concepts are central to Plantinga’s specific formulation of the Free Will Defense: significant freedom and transworld depravity.

Significant Freedom

Significant freedom refers to freedom with respect to morally significant actions—choices that are genuinely right or wrong to perform. A creature is significantly free if:

• On some occasions it is confronted with a morally relevant choice (e.g., to help or harm).
• It is genuinely able to choose either alternative.

Plantinga assumes a libertarian conception of this freedom: the agent could have done otherwise under exactly the same conditions, and its action is not causally determined by prior states of the world or by God’s will.

This notion matters because, on the Free Will Defense, goods such as moral responsibility, authentic love, and the development of virtue are thought to require such freedom. If God were to determine all choices, proponents claim, those goods would be absent or diminished.

Transworld Depravity

Transworld depravity is a modal property of a creaturely essence. Roughly, a creature suffers from transworld depravity if:

• In every possible world in which God creates that creature and gives it significant freedom,
• That creature commits at least one morally wrong action.

Plantinga does not assert that creatures actually have this property, but that it is possible they do. This is enough for his defensive purpose. If it is possible that all significantly free creatures suffer from transworld depravity, then it is possible that:

• For any world containing such creatures and their freedom, at least some moral evil occurs.
• Hence, there is no possible world available to God that combines moral good with no moral evil from free creatures.

Role in the Defense

These concepts together provide the mechanism by which an omnipotent, perfectly good God might be unable (without contradiction) to actualize a world with moral good and no moral evil, while still valuing the goods linked to significant freedom. Much of the critical discussion of the Free Will Defense focuses on the coherence and plausibility of these two notions.

8. Premises Examined

The Free Will Defense rests on several key premises. Philosophers typically assess them individually, distinguishing logical coherence from plausibility or truth.

P1: The Value of Significant Freedom

The first premise states that a world with significantly free creatures is, ceteris paribus, more valuable than a world without such freedom. Supporters appeal to intuitions about:

• The moral worth of autonomous choice.
• The importance of freely chosen love and virtue.
• The meaningfulness of moral responsibility.

Critics question whether this value is as great as claimed, especially when set against extreme suffering.

P2: Freedom and Divine Determination

The second premise holds that if a creature is significantly free with respect to an action, then God cannot both cause or determine that action and still leave the creature free in the relevant sense. This encodes a libertarian view of free will. Defenders argue that if God’s determination settles the choice, the agent could not have done otherwise in a robust sense.

Opponents, especially compatibilists, contend that significant freedom may be compatible with determinism, undermining the premise as stated. Some also argue that God could have created creatures who are determined yet still accountable and always choose the good.

P3–P4: Possibility of Transworld Depravity

The third and fourth premises introduce the hypothesis that all significantly free creatures might suffer from transworld depravity, and that this would limit God’s options regarding which worlds to actualize. Proponents emphasize that only logical possibility is needed to rebut the logical problem of evil.

Critics object that transworld depravity seems ad hoc or metaphysically dubious. They question whether it is even coherently describable that every essence of a significantly free creature would go wrong in every world where it is free.

P5–P6: Morally Sufficient Reason and Possibility

The final premises assert that if God has a morally sufficient reason to permit moral evil (stemming from the value of significant freedom and its attendant goods), then the existence of evil is not logically incompatible with God’s existence, and that it is at least possible that such a reason exists.

Here, discussion centers on what counts as a morally sufficient reason for a perfectly good being, and whether such reasons can be ascribed without undermining divine goodness. Even critics often concede that these premises may be logically possible, shifting debate to evidential or moral grounds rather than strict inconsistency.

9. Moral Evil, Natural Evil, and the Scope of the Defense

The Free Will Defense primarily addresses moral evil—evils that result from the free actions or omissions of moral agents (e.g., murder, cruelty, betrayal). Its core thesis is that such evils can be logically compatible with God’s existence if they arise from the misuse of significant freedom which God has good reason to grant.

Moral Evil

For moral evil, the connection to freedom is direct: if agents must be able to choose wrongly in order to be significantly free, then some moral evil is a foreseeable consequence of granting such freedom. The defense attempts to show that this fact does not, by itself, entail a contradiction with theism.

Natural Evil

Natural evil includes suffering from earthquakes, diseases, tsunamis, and widespread animal pain, where no clear free moral agency is involved. Critics argue that the Free Will Defense, in its narrow form, does not explain why a good and omnipotent God would allow these events, since they are not straightforwardly consequences of creaturely free choices.

Proponents respond in different ways:

• Some hold that Plantinga’s defense was never intended as a complete solution to all kinds of evil, but merely as a rebuttal to the logical problem concerning at least moral evil.
• Others extend the role of freedom, suggesting, for example, that:
  • Natural evils may result from the free actions of non‑human agents (e.g., fallen angels).
  • A world governed by consistent laws of nature—necessary for stable, meaningful free action—will inevitably allow certain harmful events.
• Still others integrate free‑will considerations with wider theodicies (e.g., soul‑making or “regularity” theodicies) to address natural evil.

Scope and Limitations

Philosophical assessments often distinguish between:

Debate continues over whether a successful defense concerning moral evil significantly mitigates the broader problem of evil, especially once natural and large‑scale suffering are considered.

10. Variations and Extensions of the Free Will Defense

While Plantinga’s formulation is the best known, a range of variations and extensions use the value of freedom to address different aspects of the problem of evil.

Broader Free Will Theodicies

Some philosophers and theologians adopt a more ambitious, theodical use of free will, attempting not only to show possibility but to explain why God in fact allows evil. For example:

• Richard Swinburne proposes that God gives humans significant freedom (and also limited responsibility over one another) to enable moral growth, meaningful relationships, and cooperation in “being of use” to others.
• John Hick frames evil as part of a “soul‑making” process, where free choices, including wrongful ones, contribute to the development of mature moral character. Although Hick’s approach is not a simple extension of Plantinga’s, it shares the emphasis on freedom as necessary for certain goods.

Extensions to Natural Evil

Some extensions aim to bring natural evil under a free‑will umbrella:

• Demonic agency accounts posit that some natural disasters and diseases may be the result of free actions by non‑human, spiritual beings. This idea has roots in some religious traditions and is occasionally appropriated in analytic discussions.
• Laws‑of‑nature accounts argue that in order for free and responsible action to be possible, the world must operate according to stable, predictable laws. Such laws inevitably allow for the possibility of harm (e.g., the same tectonic processes that sustain continents cause earthquakes).

Alternative Freedom Frameworks

Other variants reconsider the nature of freedom itself:

• Some theists defend a compatibilist free‑will defense, claiming that God could deterministically order all events while still preserving a meaningful form of human freedom and responsibility. They then argue that God’s allowing certain evils may still be tied to the value of such freedom.
• Molinist approaches, drawing on Luis de Molina, integrate middle knowledge—God’s knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom—with free‑will considerations, offering different explanations for how God might weakly actualize certain outcomes while respecting freedom.

Partial and Hybrid Strategies

Many contemporary thinkers treat the Free Will Defense as one component of a larger explanatory strategy, combining it with other theodicies (e.g., soul‑making, natural law, eschatological hope) to address various dimensions of evil. These hybrid approaches diversify the role freedom plays in explanations of both moral and natural evil.

11. Standard Objections and Critiques

The Free Will Defense has generated extensive critical discussion. Objections target its assumptions about freedom, its scope, and the plausibility of its key hypotheses.

Problem of Natural Evil

Many critics maintain that the defense at best addresses moral evil while leaving natural evil unexplained. They argue that the existence of earthquakes, childhood diseases, and extensive non‑human animal suffering appears independent of creaturely free choices, and thus not justified by the value of freedom. Some conclude that even a successful Free Will Defense concerning moral evil leaves a major logical (or at least evidential) challenge untouched.

Libertarian Freedom and Determinism

Another line of critique questions the coherence or necessity of libertarian free will:

• Compatibilist philosophers contend that an agent can be genuinely free and morally responsible even if its actions are determined by prior causes, including divine will.
• Others doubt that libertarian freedom is metaphysically possible or intelligible.

If libertarian freedom is rejected, the premise that God could not create free creatures who always choose the good appears undermined. Critics suggest that God might have created beings with a form of freedom compatible with always choosing rightly.

Transworld Depravity

Plantinga’s notion of transworld depravity is often criticized as ad hoc or “gerrymandered.” Skeptics question whether it is genuinely possible that every significantly free creature would go wrong at least once in every possible world in which it exists and is free. Some argue that, given the huge space of possible worlds, it seems highly likely that at least some creatures would freely always do right in some worlds, making God’s inability to actualize such worlds doubtful.

Proportionality and Horrendous Evil

Some philosophers accept much of the defense’s structure but challenge whether the value of freedom is sufficient to justify the immense quantity and extremity of actual evils, including genocides and so‑called “horrendous evils.” They argue that a perfectly good God might reasonably allow some moral evil but would prevent the worst atrocities, perhaps by limiting freedom or intervening selectively.

Divine Foreknowledge and Responsibility

Another concern arises from divine foreknowledge. If God infallibly knows which free actions creatures will perform and still chooses to create a world in which they commit terrible evils, critics contend that God remains significantly responsible for those evils. They question whether appealing to free will truly absolves God, or whether divine choice of world still implicates God in the resulting suffering.

12. Responses and Proposed Resolutions

Defenders of the Free Will Defense, and related views, have proposed a range of responses to the objections outlined above. These responses often clarify the limited aim of the defense, refine its assumptions, or supplement it with additional doctrines.

Limited Defensive Aim

Many followers of Plantinga emphasize that the Free Will Defense is meant only to rebut the logical problem of evil. On this interpretation:

• It need not provide a comprehensive account of all evils.
• It suffices to show that there is a logically possible scenario in which God and evil co‑exist.

From this vantage point, criticisms about explanatory completeness or overall plausibility are seen as shifting the debate to the evidential problem of evil.

Addressing Natural Evil

To extend the defense:

• Some appeal to non‑human freedom, positing that natural evils may result from the actions of spiritual beings (e.g., demons). Critics often find this speculative, but it remains logically possible.
• Others invoke a laws‑of‑nature theodicy, arguing that a world suitable for free and responsible agents must operate under stable laws, which will unavoidably permit natural disasters and diseases.

These moves aim to subsume at least some natural evils under a broader free‑will framework.

Clarifying Libertarian Assumptions

Defenders of the libertarian view argue that:

• Robust moral responsibility and certain forms of love or worship plausibly require the kind of alternative‑possibilities freedom Plantinga presupposes.
• Even if compatibilist freedom is coherent, the question is whether it delivers the specific goods God is purported to value.

Some philosophers attempt to formulate a free‑will defense compatible with soft determinism, though such versions typically modify the original premises.

Defending Transworld Depravity

Plantinga and sympathizers stress that:

• The hypothesis of transworld depravity is introduced only as a logical possibility, not as a probable or actual state of affairs.
• Demanding more than sheer possibility (e.g., empirical support) mislocates the burden of proof in a debate over logical consistency.

Others attempt to render the notion less ad hoc by linking it to broader views about human moral psychology, original sin, or creaturely finitude, though such connections go beyond Plantinga’s minimalist strategy.

Foreknowledge and Providence

To address concerns about foreknowledge and divine responsibility, different approaches emerge:

• Open theists propose that God does not have exhaustive definite foreknowledge of future free actions, thereby reducing divine complicity.
• Molinists suggest that God’s knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom constrains which worlds are feasible, potentially reinforcing something like transworld depravity.
• Classical theists sometimes argue that God’s knowing and permitting free actions does not make God their author, distinguishing between permission and causation.

These proposals seek to preserve both divine goodness and creaturely responsibility while accommodating the role of evil.

13. Relation to Theodicy and Evidential Arguments from Evil

The Free Will Defense occupies a particular position within the broader landscape of responses to evil, distinct from but interacting with both theodicy and evidential arguments.

Defense vs. Theodicy

A common distinction is:

Plantinga himself characterizes his work primarily as a defense, not a theodicy. Nonetheless, some later thinkers use the term “free will theodicy” when they deploy similar ideas in a more explanatory, world‑describing way.

Relation to Evidential Problem of Evil

The evidential problem of evil claims that, even if God and evil are logically compatible, the amount, kinds, and distribution of evil provide strong evidence against God’s existence or goodness. Many critics accept that Plantinga’s defense may have undermined the classical logical problem but argue that:

• It does little to address why there is so much apparently gratuitous or pointless suffering.
• The probabilistic weight of massive and horrendous evils remains a serious objection.

Proponents of the Free Will Defense sometimes reply that:

• It removes one of the strongest anti‑theistic arguments (the alleged strict contradiction).
• It can form part of a cumulative case theists present against evidential objections, particularly by grounding the claim that some evils are at least instrumentally linked to valuable goods like freedom and responsibility.

Integration with Broader Strategies

In contemporary philosophy of religion, many theists:

• Treat the Free Will Defense as a first step, securing logical coherence.
• Then develop or combine it with:
  • Soul‑making theodicies.
  • Greater‑good and eschatological accounts.
  • Appeals to human cognitive limitations (“skeptical theism”).

In this way, the Free Will Defense functions as a structural component within larger responses to both logical and evidential forms of the problem of evil.

14. Impact on Debates about Free Will and Divine Providence

The Free Will Defense has significantly influenced discussions of human freedom, divine providence, and their compatibility.

Free Will Debates

Because the defense presupposes a libertarian notion of freedom, it has become a focal point in free‑will literature:

• Libertarians often appeal to the defense to illustrate the philosophical and theological importance of alternative‑possibilities freedom.
• Compatibilists critique it to argue that meaningful freedom does not require indeterminism and that theism can accommodate determinism.

The prominence of the defense has thus kept questions about metaphysical freedom central in philosophy of religion.

Models of Divine Providence

Different models of divine providence interact with the Free Will Defense in distinct ways:

Debates over these models often revolve around whether God controls or merely permits creaturely actions, and how that bears on divine responsibility for evil.

Influence on Doctrines of Grace and Salvation

The defense also intersects with discussions of:

• Predestination and election: Some theologians question whether robust doctrines of predestination are compatible with the kind of significant freedom the defense requires.
• Grace and human response: If God’s grace is irresistible or fully determining, the space for libertarian freedom in salvation contexts may be reduced, impacting how (or whether) a Free Will Defense can be extended to those domains.

In these ways, the Free Will Defense has acted as a bridge between technical analytic debates and traditional theological questions about how God governs and relates to the world.

15. Legacy and Historical Significance

The Free Will Defense, particularly in Plantinga’s formulation, is widely regarded as a landmark in late twentieth‑century philosophy of religion.

Influence on the Problem of Evil Debate

Many commentators judge that the defense has significantly reframed the problem of evil:

• It shifted scholarly focus from the logical to the evidential problem, as numerous critics now concede that a strict contradiction between God and evil is difficult to sustain.
• It established modal logic and possible‑worlds reasoning as standard tools in the field, influencing subsequent work on divine attributes, providence, and counterfactuals of freedom.

Even critics often take the Free Will Defense as the primary reference point when formulating new objections or alternative approaches.

Role in Analytic Philosophy of Religion

The defense contributed to the legitimization of analytic philosophy of religion within mainstream analytic philosophy. Plantinga’s rigorous use of logic and metaphysics demonstrated that religious topics could be treated with the same technical sophistication as other philosophical issues.

Subsequent generations of philosophers—both theistic and atheistic—have engaged with or built upon his work, leading to a substantial literature on:

• The coherence of divine attributes.
• The metaphysics of free will.
• The nature of possible worlds and modality.

Broader Cultural and Theological Impact

Beyond academic philosophy, the Free Will Defense has influenced:

• Apologetics and popular religious discourse, where simplified versions are commonly invoked to explain how a good God might allow suffering.
• Systematic theology, especially in discussions of providence, grace, and theodicy, where theologians wrestle with whether and how to integrate Plantinga‑style arguments into broader doctrinal frameworks.

Continuing Debates

The defense’s legacy is not one of settled consensus. Ongoing debates concern:

• The viability of libertarian free will.
• The adequacy of free‑will‑based accounts of horrendous and natural evils.
• The extent to which the defense has truly resolved, rather than displaced, the most forceful challenges from evil.

Nonetheless, the Free Will Defense remains a standard tool and a central point of reference in contemporary discussions of God, freedom, and evil, marking it as one of the most influential contributions to modern philosophy of religion.