Inscrutability of Reference

Overview and Historical Context

The inscrutability of reference is a central thesis in the philosophy of language associated with W. V. O. Quine. It maintains that nothing about the world, taken together with all possible evidence about speakers’ behavior, uniquely determines which objects our words refer to. The idea challenges common assumptions that there is a determinate, objective fact about what each word “latches onto” in the world.

Quine develops the thesis against the background of his broader naturalized epistemology and holism. It is closely related to, but distinct from, his indeterminacy of translation thesis. Where indeterminacy concerns the meaning of sentences across different translations, inscrutability of reference focuses on the assignment of referents to singular terms, predicates, and other expressions within a language.

The view has significant implications: it casts doubt on robust notions of semantic realism about reference, complicates ontological debates (for example, about whether we truly “quantify over” sets, numbers, or mereological sums), and motivates more deflationary or structural conceptions of language and ontology.

The Core Argument

At its heart, the argument for the inscrutability of reference can be presented in three interconnected steps:

1. Evidence for reference is behavioral and holistic.
   For Quine, all evidence about how words are used comes from observable behavior (assent, dissent, actions) in particular circumstances. Moreover, interpretation always involves the whole network of beliefs and dispositions rather than isolated word–object pairings.

2. Multiple reference schemes fit the same evidence.
   Given any total body of evidence about language use, it is possible to construct alternative reference assignments that, when combined with corresponding adjustments elsewhere in the theory, yield the same observable predictions. These rival reference schemes are empirically equivalent but differ in which objects are taken as referents.

3. No further, non-circular facts fix reference.
   According to Quine, there are no extra, inaccessible “semantic facts” that could choose one scheme over another. Any attempt to privilege one assignment appeals either to further theory (also revisable and translatable into the rival scheme) or to intuitions that presuppose the very notion of determinate reference under dispute.

From these steps, the conclusion is drawn that reference is inscrutable: there is no uniquely correct assignment of referents required by all the evidence; different, equally adequate ways of “carving up” the world can underwrite the same linguistic practice.

Examples and Theoretical Motivations

Rabbit vs. Rabbit-Stage

In Word and Object, Quine famously imagines a field linguist translating the word “gavagai” uttered by a native when a rabbit scurries by. Superficially, it appears natural to translate “gavagai” as “rabbit.” However, Quine argues that it could just as well refer to rabbit-stages (temporal slices of rabbits), undetached rabbit parts, or even more exotic entities, so long as the rest of the translation manual is adjusted correspondingly.

The crucial point is that:

• All observable dispositions to assent or dissent will be the same,
• All predictions about behavior and communication remain unchanged,
• Yet the referents posited—whole rabbits, stages, or parts—differ.

The result supports the claim that no fact about usage alone picks out a unique referent.

Permutation and Proxy Functions

Quine generalizes this idea using permutation arguments. One can imagine a function that systematically maps each object in the domain to another object (or set of objects) while preserving all the truth values of sentences by rewriting the theory correspondingly. For example:

• Suppose “cat” refers to cats in one scheme.
• In another scheme, “cat” refers to certain sets or ordered pairs.
• Provided the background theory is adjusted (e.g., to say those sets are what we normally call “cats”), the two schemes are observationally indistinguishable.

Such proxy functions show that reference can be “shifted” globally without disturbing the empirical content of discourse. This supports the thesis that what matters for our linguistic practice is the overall structure and inferential patterns, not a uniquely determined object-by-object reference map.

Relation to Indeterminacy of Translation

The inscrutability of reference is sometimes regarded as a special case or corollary of indeterminacy of translation. While indeterminacy highlights that multiple translation manuals can fit the same linguistic evidence, inscrutability emphasizes that even within a single language, the putative referents of terms are not uniquely determined.

For Quine, both theses flow from his behaviorist and holistic conception of evidence and meaning, and his rejection of a sharp analytic–synthetic distinction. If total theory is underdetermined by evidence, the semantic roles of particular terms and their referential ties are likewise underdetermined.

Criticisms and Ongoing Debates

The inscrutability of reference has generated sustained debate in philosophy of language and metaphysics.

Objections from Intuitions about Determinacy

Many critics argue that Quine overlooks intuitively compelling facts about our ordinary talk. It seems, for instance, that in typical cases:

• The English word “rabbit” refers to rabbits, not sets or undetached rabbit parts.
• Speakers can correct misunderstandings about reference (e.g., distinguishing a statue from its clay).

These critics maintain that there are facts about what terms refer to, grounded perhaps in speaker intentions, conceptual roles, or social practices, which Quine’s behavioral evidence underrepresents.

Causal and Externalist Theories of Reference

Philosophers such as Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and others in the causal–externalist tradition propose that reference is fixed by causal chains, baptisms, or relations to environmental kinds. On such views:

• The reference of “water” is determined by its underlying nature (H₂O) plus a causal–historical chain of usage.
• The reference of “rabbit” is determined by causal interactions with rabbits, not rabbit-stages or sets.

Proponents argue that these extra-linguistic, causal facts can select a unique reference scheme, and thus block Quinean inscrutability.

Deflationary and Structural Responses

Some philosophers accept a version of inscrutability and respond by deflating the notion of reference. On deflationary or structuralist views:

• What matters is the role expressions play in our overall theory,
• Reference talk is a convenient device of semantic bookkeeping, not a deep metaphysical relation.

Others suggest that reference is “relative to a scheme” or representational framework: different but equally adequate frameworks may employ different ontologies, yet none is uniquely “the way the world is.” On these views, the inscrutability of reference supports a form of ontological relativity rather than skepticism about language.

Status and Significance

The validity and scope of the inscrutability thesis remain controversial. Supporters see it as:

• A consequence of empiricism and underdetermination,
• A challenge to heavy-duty metaphysical realism about meanings and objects.

Critics contend that:

• It underestimates the role of intentions, norms, and causal structures,
• Its “rival” schemes are merely notational variants, not genuine alternatives.

Despite disagreement, the inscrutability of reference continues to shape discussions about semantic theory, ontology, and the limits of what language can determinately represent. It stands as a key argument in debates over how tightly language is tethered to the world, and what it means for words and theories to “hook onto” reality.