Paradox of the Stone

1. Introduction

The Paradox of the Stone—often phrased as “Can God create a stone so heavy that he cannot lift it?”—is a widely discussed challenge to the coherence of omnipotence. It condenses complex questions about divine power, logical possibility, and self‑limitation into a single, vivid scenario.

At its core, the paradox proposes an apparently simple dilemma about an omnipotent being. If such a being can create a stone too heavy for it to lift, then there is something it cannot do (lift the stone). If it cannot create such a stone, then there is something it cannot do (create the stone). Either way, the being seems unable to perform at least one task, leading to the conclusion that no being can truly be omnipotent in the straightforward sense of “able to do anything.”

The paradox functions as a test case for:

• How omnipotence should be defined and limited
• Whether talk of an all‑powerful God is logically consistent
• How divine attributes interact (for example, power with necessity or immutability)

Philosophers and theologians have used the stone case to refine or reject traditional conceptions of God, to explore the boundary between logical and metaphysical possibility, and to analyze how language can appear to describe “tasks” that may not, in fact, be genuine possibilities at all.

The paradox has become a standard example in the philosophy of religion and introductory logic courses, illustrating reductio ad absurdum argumentation, the role of definitions in philosophical disputes, and the tension between naive and more sophisticated conceptions of divine power. It also serves as a prominent instance of a broader family of omnipotence paradoxes, which attempt to show that the very idea of an all‑powerful being is internally unstable.

2. Origin and Attribution

The precise origin of the Paradox of the Stone, in its standard modern wording, is difficult to pinpoint. Scholars generally agree that its roots lie in medieval scholastic debates about divine power, though the familiar stone formulation is largely a product of later philosophical reflection.

Early antecedents

Discussions of whether God can do “all things” or “even the impossible” appear in late antique and early medieval Christian writers. Some interpreters trace precursors to Pseudo‑Dionysius and other patristic sources, where tensions between God’s power and logical contradiction are explored in more general terms, though without a specific “stone” example.

Medieval scholastics such as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham explicitly examined questions like whether God can make contradictions true, undo the past, or annihilate himself. These debates provided a conceptual template later adapted into more concrete thought experiments like the stone paradox.

Modern and analytic formulations

In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, the paradox was canonically framed and systematized in the 20th century. A key landmark is George I. Mavrodes’s article:

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“Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence”

— George I. Mavrodes, Philosophical Review 72 (1963)

Mavrodes did not invent all the underlying ideas, but he offered a clear and influential statement and classification of omnipotence puzzles, including stone‑type scenarios. C. Wade Savage’s response in 1967 further sharpened the “Paradox of the Stone” label and structure.

Overview of key attributions

Because the exact wording varies and earlier sources often used different illustrations (e.g., changing the past, making contradictions true), scholarly accounts typically attribute the modern stone paradox to the analytic philosophy of religion tradition rather than to a single medieval originator.

3. Historical and Theological Context

The Paradox of the Stone arises from a long history of reflection on divine attributes in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theology, especially within classical theism, which portrays God as necessary, eternal, immutable, and omnipotent.

Medieval debates about divine power

Medieval scholastics distinguished various senses of divine power, often using terms like potentia absoluta (absolute power) and potentia ordinata (ordered power). These distinctions were intended to clarify:

• What God could do in principle
• What God in fact does, given divine wisdom, goodness, and established order

Questions about whether God could do the logically impossible (e.g., make a “square circle”) or alter the past were central. The stone paradox later condensed these abstract issues into a concrete case of a self‑limitation task: God making himself unable to lift a particular stone.

Scriptural and doctrinal background

Scriptural traditions frequently describe God as able to do “all things,” a phrase that later commentators interpreted and qualified. Theologians debated whether “all things” includes what is logically impossible or contrary to God’s own nature, such as sinning or deceiving.

In Christian theology, authors like Aquinas held that divine omnipotence extends to all possible things but not to contradictions, maintaining that failures to do “non‑things” (like square circles) do not imply limits on power. Comparable discussions appear in Islamic kalām (e.g., Ashʿarite vs. Muʿtazilite views) and in Jewish medieval philosophy.

Transition to early modern and modern contexts

With the rise of early modern philosophy, the question of God’s power became entangled with new conceptions of laws of nature, modal logic, and the scope of reason. Later, in the 19th and 20th centuries, secular philosophical interest shifted toward whether divine attributes are logically coherent at all, laying the groundwork for analytic treatments of omnipotence paradoxes, including the stone case.

Within this evolving context, the Paradox of the Stone functions as a compact way of revisiting classical theological questions about the extent and nature of divine power, stripped of explicitly confessional assumptions but still shaped by that historical background.

4. The Argument Stated

The Paradox of the Stone is often presented through a simple question:

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“Can an omnipotent being create a stone so heavy that it cannot lift it?”

The challenge lies in how either possible answer seems to undermine omnipotence.

Standard formulation

Let the being under consideration be traditionally omnipotent, understood (at least initially) as able to do anything or anything possible. Consider the specific task:

• Task T: creating a stone such that the creator cannot lift it.

Now there appear to be only two exhaustive options:

1. The being can create such a stone.

   • Then there is some task the being cannot perform: lifting that stone.
   • Hence the being would no longer be omnipotent.

2. The being cannot create such a stone.

   • Then there is some task the being cannot perform: creating that stone.
   • Hence the being would not be omnipotent.

Proponents argue that the dilemma is unavoidable: whatever answer is given to the stone question, the being seems to lack at least one ability. The paradox then suggests either that omnipotence is self‑contradictory or that common definitions of omnipotence must be revised.

Narrative version

In narrative terms, we imagine a perfectly powerful agent confronting a special request: to bring about a state of affairs in which itself lacks power over some object. If the agent complies, its power is limited by the resulting stone; if it refuses or is unable, its power is limited by the request itself. The paradox arises from this tension between unlimited power and the power to limit oneself in a way that appears irreversible or absolute.

5. Logical Structure and Reductio Form

Philosophers typically analyze the Paradox of the Stone as a reductio ad absurdum: an argument that assumes a claim and derives an absurdity, thereby challenging the assumption.

Formal structure

A common logical reconstruction proceeds as follows:

1. P1. An omnipotent being can perform any task (or, more cautiously, any possible task).
2. P2. Formulate task T: creating a stone so heavy that this omnipotent being cannot lift it.
3. P3. By the law of excluded middle, either the being can perform T or cannot perform T.
4. P4. If the being can perform T, then there is some task it cannot perform (lifting the stone).
5. P5. If the being cannot perform T, then there is some task it cannot perform (creating the stone).
6. C. Therefore, in either case there exists at least one task the being cannot perform; hence no being is omnipotent in the sense defined in P1.

On this reading, the argument appears valid: if the premises hold, the conclusion follows logically.

Reductio pattern

The reductio structure is often made explicit by treating P1 (“There exists an omnipotent being with power over all tasks”) as the assumption to be refuted:

• Assume: there exists an omnipotent being.
• Show: from this assumption, one can derive that the being both can and cannot perform all tasks, or at least that there is some task it cannot perform.
• Conclude: the original assumption, under the given definition of omnipotence, leads to contradiction or absurdity.

Different authors refine this structure in various ways—for example by specifying that P1 concerns all logically possible tasks, or by analyzing how task descriptions may disguise inconsistencies. Nonetheless, the core logical strategy is to expose an internal tension in the concept of omnipotence through the carefully chosen task T.

6. Clarifying Omnipotence

The force of the Paradox of the Stone depends heavily on how omnipotence is understood. Philosophers and theologians have proposed multiple definitions, often in response to precisely this kind of challenge.

Naive versus refined definitions

A naive definition takes omnipotence as:

• “The ability to do anything whatsoever.”

Under this definition, the stone paradox appears compelling, since “creating an unliftable stone” looks like just another task.

Refined accounts typically restrict omnipotence to:

• “The ability to do all things that are logically possible,” or
• “The ability to do all compossible things, given the agent’s essential nature.”

The shift from “anything” to “anything logically possible” is central to many proposed solutions.

Logical possibility and divine nature

Some theistic philosophers, following Aquinas, maintain that omnipotence does not include doing what is logically impossible, such as making a square circle or both existing and not existing simultaneously. On this view, failing to do what is not a genuine possibility does not count as a limitation.

Others, such as Alvin Plantinga, further refine the notion to maximal compossible power: an omnipotent being can realize any set of states that are jointly possible and consistent with that being’s essential nature. For a being essentially omnipotent, any state in which it is non‑omnipotent (e.g., unable to lift a stone) would be impossible, not because of a power deficit but because such a state is incoherent.

Disputed aspects

Key points of disagreement include:

• Whether “logically possible” should be defined independently of God or with reference to God’s nature
• Whether omnipotence must include the capacity for self‑limitation (e.g., ceasing to be omnipotent)
• Whether excluding certain tasks (like sinning or contradicting logic) preserves or dilutes the traditional notion of omnipotence

The stone paradox thus serves as a testing ground for competing conceptions of what it means to be all‑powerful.

7. Tasks, Pseudo-Tasks, and Logical Possibility

A major line of discussion prompted by the Paradox of the Stone concerns whether the stone scenario describes a genuine task or a misleading pseudo‑task.

Tasks vs. pseudo‑tasks

Proponents of a “pseudo‑task” diagnosis argue that some verb phrases that look like tasks actually conceal contradictions. For example, “creating a square circle” appears to describe an action but is logically impossible; there is no state of affairs that would count as success. Thus, they claim, omnipotence should not be measured by an ability to perform such pseudo‑tasks.

The key question is whether “creating a stone an omnipotent being cannot lift” is analogous to “creating a square circle.”

Logical impossibility

A logically impossible state of affairs is one that cannot obtain in any logically possible world, because it involves a contradiction (e.g., being both omnipotent and unable to lift some object). Many philosophers hold that omnipotence does not extend to such states.

George I. Mavrodes argues that, assuming an omnipotent God exists, the phrase “a stone so massive that an omnipotent being cannot lift it” describes an inconsistent situation and therefore no genuine task. Others reply that one can formulate the paradox without explicit self‑contradictory predicates, for example by speaking of a stone “that the creator cannot lift” without building omnipotence into the stone’s description.

Ongoing dispute

Critics of the pseudo‑task view contend that it risks trivializing omnipotence by labeling any problematic scenario “impossible” and thus outside the relevant domain. Defenders maintain that drawing a sharp boundary between genuine tasks and pseudo‑tasks is essential to making sense of any coherent notion of power, divine or otherwise.

The classification of the stone scenario—genuine task or pseudo‑task—remains a central point of contention in evaluating the paradox.

8. Key Variations of the Omnipotence Paradox

While the “stone so heavy God cannot lift it” is the best‑known instance, philosophers have developed a range of omnipotence paradoxes exploring similar tensions in different ways.

Classic variations

1. The locked room

   • Can an omnipotent being create a room it cannot enter, or a prison from which it cannot escape?

2. The unalterable command

   • Can an omnipotent being issue a decree it cannot later revoke?
   • This version emphasizes self‑binding through laws or promises.

3. Changing the past

   • Can an omnipotent being make it the case that something that happened did not happen?
   • This raises questions about temporal and logical constraints.

4. Self‑annihilation or self‑limitation

   • Can an omnipotent being destroy itself, or permanently give up omnipotence?

Structural analogues

Some variations eschew vivid imagery and use abstract sequences:

• Increasingly demanding tasks: Consider an infinite sequence of stones of increasing weight; for each, can the being lift it? This approach aims to avoid building apparent contradictions directly into a single description.

• Set‑theoretic formulations: Can an omnipotent being create a set of tasks that it cannot complete, or a set of numbers beyond its ability to enumerate?

Comparative overview

Despite differing in imagery, these variations share a common structure: they ask whether an all‑powerful being can bring about a state of affairs in which its own power is restricted, often in a way that seems absolute or logically problematic. The Paradox of the Stone is thus one member of a broader family of challenges targeting the coherence of omnipotence.

9. Medieval and Classical Responses

Medieval and classical thinkers did not always address the stone formulation specifically, but they developed frameworks directly applicable to it. Their responses typically revolve around distinguishing possible from impossible tasks and clarifying what divine omnipotence entails.

Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas’s influential treatment of omnipotence in Summa Theologiae (I, q.25) explicitly denies that God can do what is logically impossible. He writes:

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“Whatever implies a contradiction is not held by God’s omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility.”

— Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.25, a.3

On this account, divine inability to make contradictions true (e.g., a square circle, both being and not being omnipotent) does not signal a deficiency in power. Applied to the stone paradox, many interpreters claim that a stone unliftable by an omnipotent being would itself be a contradiction and thus outside the scope of omnipotence.

Other scholastic approaches

Duns Scotus and William of Ockham also distinguished between God’s absolute power and the ordained order of creation. They debated whether God could do things contrary to the actual order (e.g., different laws of nature) while largely agreeing that strict contradictions remain impossible.

Some Islamic theologians, particularly in the Ashʿarite tradition, emphasized God’s absolute will and power even over what we consider necessary connections, while Muʿtazilite thinkers tended to emphasize rational constraints. Analogous discussions in Jewish philosophy (e.g., Maimonides) also stressed that God cannot do what is logically contradictory.

Early modern views

Classical theistic philosophers such as René Descartes entertained the idea that God’s power might extend beyond the logically possible, allowing God to make even mathematical truths otherwise. However, this view is controversial and not widely adopted in later discussions of the stone paradox, which typically presuppose that logical contradictions mark the boundary of possibility.

Overall, medieval and classical responses laid the groundwork for later treatments by insisting that omnipotence must be understood in relation to logical consistency, an insistence that directly informs many modern analyses of the stone problem.

10. Analytic Reformulations and Modern Debates

In the 20th century, the Paradox of the Stone became a central case study in analytic philosophy of religion, where emphasis is placed on rigorous logical formulation and conceptual clarity.

Mavrodes and early analytic treatments

George I. Mavrodes’s 1963 paper systematized omnipotence puzzles and argued that, given an omnipotent God, the phrase “a stone an omnipotent being cannot lift” is self‑contradictory, much like “a married bachelor.” On his view, the stone scenario describes a pseudo‑task, so the paradox dissolves once omnipotence is properly understood.

C. Wade Savage’s 1967 response, titled “The Paradox of the Stone,” questioned this solution, contending that Mavrodes’s move presupposes what is at issue—namely, that God is omnipotent—and that the paradox can be reframed without obvious contradictions in the task description.

Plantinga and maximal compossible power

Alvin Plantinga introduced the influential notion of maximal compossible power, arguing that omnipotence consists in the ability to actualize any state of affairs that is broadly logically possible. Because God is essentially omnipotent on this account, any state in which God is non‑omnipotent (e.g., unable to lift some stone) is impossible. The stone scenario is thus excluded as inconsistent with God’s essential nature.

Atheistic and skeptical uses

Philosophers critical of theism, such as J. L. Mackie and others, have used the stone paradox to argue that traditional conceptions of God are internally incoherent. They often treat the paradox as one among several (alongside the problem of evil, for example) suggesting that divine attributes, taken together or separately, are logically problematic.

Contemporary discussions

Modern debates extend beyond the original puzzle to consider:

• Whether omnipotence is best analyzed using modal logic or possible‑worlds semantics
• How omnipotence interacts with other attributes like omniscience and necessity
• Whether paraconsistent or dialetheist logics (allowing some true contradictions) offer novel ways to interpret omnipotence paradoxes

The stone paradox thus remains a standard example in analytic discussions, both as a challenge to and a tool for refining the concept of an omnipotent being.

11. Standard Objections and Critical Responses

Debate over the Paradox of the Stone has generated a set of widely discussed objections to the paradox and corresponding counter‑arguments.

1. Logically impossible tasks are not genuine tasks

Objection:
Tasks like “create a stone an omnipotent being cannot lift” are said to be logically impossible, analogous to making a square circle. Since omnipotence does not include performing contradictions, the paradox relies on a misunderstanding of what omnipotence covers.

Critical responses:
C. Wade Savage and others argue that labeling the stone task “impossible” risks question‑begging: it assumes a prior account of omnipotence that excludes such tasks. Critics also suggest that one can frame the paradox without apparent contradictions in the description (e.g., “a stone the creator cannot lift”), leaving the challenge intact.

2. Mavrodes’s inconsistent‑description solution

Objection (Mavrodes):
If God is omnipotent, then “a stone an omnipotent being cannot lift” is contradictory; if God is not omnipotent, the paradox does not arise. The alleged paradox conflates worlds with and without an omnipotent being in a single description.

Critical responses:
Savage contends that this solution depends on treating omnipotence as a fixed background assumption rather than the claim under scrutiny. Critics also propose alternative formulations that avoid explicit reference to omnipotence within the stone’s description.

3. Reformulating omnipotence as maximal compossible power

Objection (Plantinga and others):
Once omnipotence is defined as the ability to do all broadly logically possible and compossible things, the stone scenario describes an impossible state (God’s non‑omnipotence) and so poses no threat.

Critical responses:
Some philosophers question whether appealing to “essential” omnipotence sidesteps the issue by stipulation. Others argue that this redefinition may significantly revise traditional religious understandings of God’s power.

4. Paradox as evidence of conceptual incoherence

Objection (from critics of theism):
The persistence of paradoxes like the stone suggests that the concept of omnipotence is inherently incoherent, especially when combined with other divine attributes.

Critical responses:
Defenders of theism maintain that many alleged paradoxes dissolve under careful analysis of language, logic, and modality. They argue that these puzzles highlight the need for more precise theology rather than demonstrating outright incoherence.

These exchanges constitute the core of contemporary debate over whether the stone paradox succeeds as a refutation of omnipotence or merely reveals the need to clarify related concepts.

12. Revising the Concept of Omnipotence

In response to the Paradox of the Stone and related puzzles, many philosophers have proposed revisions or refinements of omnipotence rather than abandoning the concept outright.

Restricting to logical possibility

A common move is to define omnipotence as the ability to do all things that are logically possible. On this view, God’s inability to do the logically impossible (e.g., create contradictions) is not a limitation. The stone scenario is then treated as describing a logically impossible state and is excluded.

Maximal compossible power

Following Alvin Plantinga, some theorists define omnipotence as maximal compossible power: the ability to actualize any compossible set of states of affairs—those that can exist together in a single possible world. Because God is taken to be essentially omnipotent, any world in which God is non‑omnipotent (e.g., unable to lift a stone) is impossible. Thus, no stone could make an essentially omnipotent being powerless.

Self‑limitation and essential attributes

Another strategy distinguishes between:

• Tasks that involve temporary or local self‑limitation (e.g., voluntarily refraining from using power), and
• Tasks that would involve a permanent loss of an essential attribute (e.g., ceasing to be omnipotent).

Some theists allow that God can self‑limit in the former sense but deny that omnipotence requires the latter, arguing that giving up an essential property is not a genuine possibility.

Restricted omnipotence theses

Some philosophers adopt a more modest restricted omnipotence:

• God can do all things that are metaphysically possible and consistent with divine perfection.
• God cannot perform actions incompatible with attributes such as perfect goodness or rationality.

This view may place moral and rational constraints—beyond sheer logical consistency—on divine power.

Non‑classical and revisionary approaches

A minority of thinkers explore more radical revisions:

• Paraconsistent or dialetheist accounts allow that some contradictions may be true, potentially accommodating an omnipotent being that both can and cannot perform certain tasks.
• Others suggest treating talk of omnipotence as analogical, symbolic, or non‑literal, thereby sidestepping strict logical analysis.

These diverse proposals illustrate how the stone paradox has functioned as a catalyst for rethinking what it means to ascribe unlimited power to a divine being.

13. Implications for Theism and Atheism

The Paradox of the Stone has been used to support a range of positions concerning the rational status of theism and the coherence of talk about God.

Arguments against theism

Some atheists and agnostics treat the stone paradox as evidence that the concept of an omnipotent God is self‑contradictory. If a central divine attribute cannot be coherently defined, then, they argue, the traditional theistic God cannot exist. This line of reasoning often forms part of broader critiques that also invoke the problem of evil or alleged conflicts between divine attributes (e.g., omniscience and human freedom).

Support for revised theism

Other theists interpret the paradox not as a refutation of God’s existence but as a prompt to refine theological language. On this view, the stone problem shows that naive formulations like “God can do anything” are philosophically inadequate. Instead, more carefully qualified theism—defining omnipotence in terms of logical or metaphysical possibility—can, they claim, remain coherent.

Non‑cognitivist and metaphorical interpretations

Some philosophers adopt a theological non‑cognitivist stance, arguing that terms like “omnipotent” do not correspond to clear, testable concepts and that paradoxes such as the stone problem reveal deep indeterminacy in God‑talk. Others propose understanding omnipotence metaphorically, as a way of expressing religious devotion or ultimate dependence, rather than as a precise metaphysical attribute.

Epistemic and apologetic consequences

The paradox also influences views on:

• The burden of proof: whether theists must demonstrate the coherence of omnipotence or skeptics must demonstrate its incoherence.
• The role of mystery in theology: some theists accept that human reason may not fully grasp divine attributes, while critics argue that appealing to mystery can mask conceptual problems.

Thus, the Paradox of the Stone functions both as a tool for challenging traditional theism and as a stimulus for more nuanced accounts of divine power and religious language.

14. Connections to Logic and Metaphysics

The Paradox of the Stone intersects with several core issues in logic and metaphysics, extending its significance beyond the philosophy of religion.

Logical principles and paradox

The paradox implicitly relies on standard logical principles:

• The law of non‑contradiction: a being cannot both be omnipotent and non‑omnipotent in the same respect at the same time.
• The law of excluded middle: for any given task T, an omnipotent being either can or cannot perform T.

Debates about the stone issue thus engage with differing conceptions of logical impossibility, consistency, and even alternative logics. Some dialetheist or paraconsistent logicians consider whether relaxing non‑contradiction could permit a coherent, though paradox‑tolerant, concept of omnipotence.

Modality and possible worlds

Metaphysically, discussions of omnipotence often use possible‑worlds semantics to analyze what tasks are broadly logically possible. Questions include:

• In which possible worlds does an omnipotent being exist?
• Are there possible worlds in which such a being lacks omnipotence?
• How should we model tasks that would change or remove essential properties?

The stone paradox presses on whether there can be a world containing an essentially omnipotent being and a state of affairs (like an unliftable stone) that appears to undermine that essential property.

Essence, necessity, and self‑limitation

The puzzle also connects to debates about essential properties and necessary existence. If omnipotence is essential to God, then any scenario in which God is non‑omnipotent is impossible. This links the paradox to broader questions about:

• The nature of essence (what a thing must be to be what it is)
• Whether entities can alter or discard their essential properties
• The distinction between metaphysical vs. merely physical or practical limitations

Language, reference, and description

Finally, the stone paradox raises issues in the philosophy of language: does every grammatically well‑formed description (“a stone an omnipotent being cannot lift”) pick out a genuine possible state of affairs, or can language outstrip possibility? The answer affects how philosophers treat other paradoxical constructions and informs broader discussions about the relationship between linguistic form and metaphysical content.

In these ways, the Paradox of the Stone functions as a focal point for exploring fundamental questions about logic, modality, and the structure of possibility.

15. Legacy and Historical Significance

The Paradox of the Stone has achieved a prominent place in both academic philosophy and broader cultural discussions of God and omnipotence.

Role in philosophy of religion

In contemporary philosophy of religion, the stone paradox is a standard tool:

• It appears in textbooks, anthologies, and introductory courses as a canonical example of how conceptual analysis can challenge theological claims.
• It has shaped debates over defining omnipotence, influencing figures such as George Mavrodes, C. Wade Savage, Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, Norman Kretzmann, and Patrick Grim.

The paradox has also inspired a broader family of omnipotence puzzles, keeping questions about divine power at the forefront of analytic discussions.

Pedagogical and popular impact

Beyond specialist literature, the stone question is often used in:

• Introductory logic and critical thinking courses to illustrate reductio ad absurdum and the importance of precise definitions.
• Public debates, apologetics, and online discussions as a familiar shorthand for questioning or defending the coherence of belief in an all‑powerful God.

Its simple formulation makes it accessible, while the underlying issues are philosophically rich.

Influence across fields

The paradox’s influence extends into:

• Systematic theology, where it has prompted more sophisticated accounts of divine attributes and the limits of theological language.
• Metaphysics and modal logic, by motivating investigations into possibility, necessity, and essential properties.
• The philosophy of language, as a case study in how apparently meaningful sentences may fail to describe genuine possibilities.

Continuing relevance

Even where specific formulations of the stone puzzle are viewed as solved or defused by some philosophers, the issues it dramatizes—about the coherence of maximal greatness, the boundary between language and possibility, and the interplay of divine attributes—remain central. The paradox thus holds enduring historical significance as a compact, influential, and widely discussed lens through which questions about omnipotence and the nature of God have been examined across centuries.