Problem of Divine Hiddenness

Overview and Historical Context

The Problem of Divine Hiddenness is a prominent argument in contemporary philosophy of religion that challenges the existence of a perfectly loving, personal God by appealing to God’s apparent absence, silence, or hiddenness. It focuses on the fact that many seemingly sincere, morally serious people either lack belief in God or experience profound divine silence, despite desiring or being open to relationship with God.

While questions about God’s absence appear in religious texts and mystical writings throughout history, the problem received a systematic and influential formulation in the late 20th century, especially in the work of Canadian philosopher John L. Schellenberg, notably in Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993). Schellenberg’s version is often treated as an evidential argument for atheism, distinct from but comparable to the Problem of Evil.

The argument is typically directed at classical theism, which holds that there exists an all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly loving God who desires relationship or communion with human beings.

Core Argument and Variants

Schellenberg’s formulation centers on the notion of nonresistant nonbelief—the idea that some people fail to believe in God without resisting God or culpably ignoring available evidence. These individuals might be honest agnostics, former believers who lost faith without rejecting God, or people who never encountered theistic concepts in a compelling way.

A simplified version of the argument runs as follows:

1. Perfect divine love and openness to relationship
   A perfectly loving God would always be open to a personal relationship with any finite person. Such a God would not arbitrarily exclude some individuals from the possibility of relationship.

2. Belief as a condition for relationship
   For a meaningful, conscious personal relationship to exist, a person must at least believe that the other party (in this case, God) exists. Relationship cannot be fully mutual if one side is unaware that the other exists.

3. No nonresistant nonbelief under perfect love
   If God is perfectly loving and desires relationship with all, there would be no nonresistant nonbelievers. God would ensure that all who are open to relationship have sufficient evidence or experiential awareness to believe.

4. Existence of nonresistant nonbelievers
   Many individuals appear to be nonresistant nonbelievers: they do not believe in God, but not through willful rejection; rather, they find the available evidence insufficient or were never exposed to theistic belief in a way they could reasonably accept.

Conclusion:
If such nonresistant nonbelief exists, then a perfectly loving God, as described by traditional theism, does not exist. Therefore, belief in that kind of God is undermined.

In addition to this central version, philosophers have explored several variants:

• Experiential Hiddenness: Emphasizing the felt absence of God, especially among believers who seek divine guidance, comfort, or presence but experience prolonged silence.
• Global or Cultural Hiddenness: Noting that vast populations across history and in various cultures have had little or no access to monotheistic ideas, raising questions about God’s universal availability.
• Personal Tragedy and Hiddenness: Highlighting cases where people suffer deeply and sincerely call out to God but report no discernible response, even at crucial moments of crisis.

These variants share the core intuition that a loving God’s existence and presence should be more epistemically accessible—that is, more readily knowable—than they appear to be.

Major Theistic Responses

Theistic philosophers have developed a range of responses, often granting that divine hiddenness is a serious challenge but disputing one or more key premises.

1. Free will and non-coercive relationship

Some theists argue that too-clear evidence of God’s existence might coerce belief, undermining the value of free, loving relationship. On this view, God maintains a certain epistemic distance so that humans can freely respond in trust or love rather than out of fear or compulsion.

Critics of this response question whether mere belief in God’s existence would actually be coercive, noting that strong but resistible evidence is possible in other domains without destroying freedom.

2. Soul-making and moral-spiritual development

Another line of response draws on soul-making theodicies: divine hiddenness, like some forms of suffering, may play a role in fostering virtues such as humility, trust, perseverance, or genuine moral autonomy. Proponents argue that the struggle with doubt can be spiritually beneficial and can deepen eventual relationship with God.

Skeptics reply that such benefits do not explain the existence of lifelong, nonresistant nonbelief or the absence of God in the lives of those who apparently seek God sincerely without any apparent spiritual gain.

3. Doubts about nonresistant nonbelief

Some theists challenge the key empirical claim that truly nonresistant nonbelievers exist, suggesting that deep down everyone has some awareness of God (a view sometimes linked to reformed epistemology and ideas from thinkers like Alvin Plantinga). Apparent nonresistance might mask subtle forms of resistance, self-deception, or misplaced priorities.

Opponents contend that this response risks being psychologically speculative or unfalsifiable, and that many individuals’ own testimonies about their openness to God should be taken seriously.

4. Mysterious divine reasons

Another strategy appeals to divine mystery: even if humans cannot currently see why God would remain hidden, it does not follow that no good reasons exist. Given the cognitive gap between finite humans and an infinite God, it may be unsurprising that some divine purposes for hiddenness lie beyond our understanding.

Critics argue that while some appeal to mystery is reasonable, too much reliance on mystery can weaken the explanatory power of theism and resemble a “skeptical theism” strategy that risks undermining our moral and rational judgments more broadly.

5. Alternative conceptions of God

Some thinkers respond by revising the concept of God. Instead of a uniformly self-revealing, personal, and relational deity, they propose views where God is more impersonal, non-personal, or not primarily oriented toward individual relationships. On such conceptions, divine hiddenness may be less surprising.

Others within theistic traditions resist these revisions, arguing that they diverge too far from classical or scriptural portrayals of a loving, relational God.

Philosophical Significance

The Problem of Divine Hiddenness has become one of the central debates in analytic philosophy of religion, standing alongside the Problem of Evil as a leading evidential challenge to theism. It significantly influences discussions on:

• The nature of faith, doubt, and religious experience
• The relationship between evidence, belief, and rationality in religious contexts
• The attributes of God, especially perfect love and God’s desire (or lack thereof) for relationship
• The epistemology of religious testimony, mystical experience, and religious diversity

Because it focuses on God’s loving character rather than solely on power or knowledge, the argument presses theists to clarify what divine love entails in practice—especially for those who seem honestly open to God yet remain unconvinced.

Philosophers remain divided on the argument’s force and soundness. Many regard it as a powerful challenge that any robust theistic worldview must address; others see it as less compelling once certain background assumptions about love, freedom, or evidence are re-examined. Its ongoing discussion continues to shape contemporary understandings of both theism and atheism in philosophical discourse.