Problem of Evil Evidential

Overview and Contrast with the Logical Problem of Evil

The evidential problem of evil is a family of arguments in the philosophy of religion that aims to show that the kinds and amount of suffering found in the world make it improbable—rather than strictly impossible—that an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God exists. It is often contrasted with the logical problem of evil, which attempts to show that the existence of such a God is logically inconsistent with the existence of any evil at all.

Where the logical problem of evil claims that “God and evil cannot possibly coexist,” the evidential (or probabilistic, inductive) problem of evil instead claims that “given the actual pattern of suffering we observe, God’s existence is unlikely.” This shift from strict logical contradiction to probabilistic tension has made the evidential problem of evil one of the most influential and widely discussed arguments against theism in contemporary analytic philosophy.

Rowe’s Formulation and Key Concepts

The most influential modern version is due to the American philosopher William L. Rowe. Rowe focused on what he called apparently gratuitous evils—instances of suffering that, as far as we can see, do not lead to a greater good and could have been prevented without losing any equal or greater good.

Rowe illustrates this idea with vivid cases, such as:

• a fawn caught in a forest fire, dying slowly and unnoticed, seemingly without contributing to any greater good;
• particular instances of severe human or animal suffering that do not appear connected to moral growth, free will, or other commonly cited goods.

From such cases, Rowe builds a probabilistic inference:

1. A perfectly good, all-powerful, all-knowing God would prevent any intense suffering unless preventing it would also prevent a greater good or cause an equal or greater evil.
2. There are instances of intense suffering that seem to lack any justifying greater good or necessity.
3. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe (though not certain) that some suffering is genuinely gratuitous—that is, neither necessary for, nor outweighed by, any greater good.
4. The existence of gratuitous evil renders the existence of a God with the traditional attributes improbable.

Rowe emphasizes that this is not a deductive proof but an inductive or evidential argument: from the data of experience, we infer what is more or less likely.

Central to the debate are two key ideas:

• Gratuitous evil: evil that is not logically or practically required for a greater good.
• “So far as we can see” reasoning: we move from “we cannot see a good reason” to “probably there is no good reason.”

Critics often challenge this inference from epistemic limitation; defenders of the evidential problem argue that in many ordinary domains such inferences are reasonable, and that similar reasoning is used elsewhere in science and everyday life.

Major Theistic Responses

Theistic philosophers have developed several prominent strategies in response to the evidential problem of evil. These responses do not necessarily claim to fully explain every instance of suffering; rather, they aim to show that the evidential force of evil against theism is weaker than Rowe and others suggest.

Skeptical Theism

Skeptical theism does not deny that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. Instead, it questions whether human beings are in a position to judge what reasons such a God might have for allowing particular evils. On this view, our cognitive limitations—finite knowledge, lack of access to long-term consequences, and ignorance of the full range of possible goods and evils—undermine the inference from “no discernible reason” to “probably no reason.”

Proponents argue that given the vast disparity between a divine mind and human minds, we should expect to be unable to see many justifying reasons if they exist. Critics counter that if skeptical theism is taken too far, it risks moral skepticism more generally: if we cannot judge whether any horrendous suffering might be outweighed by unknown goods, our ordinary moral reasoning could be destabilized.

Theodicies and Defenses

Other responses provide more positive explanations—often called theodicies—of why God might permit evil:

• Free will theodicy: God values significantly free creatures, and the misuse of freedom by humans (and perhaps other agents) leads to much moral evil. Some suggest that stable, law-governed natural processes, which are necessary for meaningful freedom and responsibility, also bring natural evils as side effects.
• Soul-making (Irenaean) theodicy: Drawing on ideas associated with Irenaeus and developed by John Hick, this view holds that suffering and struggle are conditions for moral and spiritual growth. A world designed for the development of virtuous character may require dangers, challenges, and the possibility of serious harm.
• Greater-good and global theodicies: Some argue that apparently pointless evils may be necessary elements of a complex “global” structure of goods, such as a rich moral landscape, a stable natural order, or opportunities for virtues like courage, compassion, and self-sacrifice.

Defenders emphasize that these frameworks may not provide a specific explanation for every instance of suffering but attempt to show that it is not improbable that God has adequate reasons overall.

Modal and Probabilistic Critiques

Some philosophers respond by challenging the probabilistic claims at the heart of evidential arguments. They dispute whether the observed distribution of evil really lowers the probability of God’s existence once other data (such as alleged evidence for God, religious experiences, or claims about fine-tuning) are taken into account.

Others argue that Rowe’s and similar arguments rely on controversial assumptions about how to assess epistemic probability in cases involving a vastly superior mind. On this view, the probability calculus is too uncertain to yield a strong conclusion either for or against God’s existence based on evil alone.

Assessment and Ongoing Debates

The evidential problem of evil remains a central topic in contemporary philosophy of religion. It is widely regarded, even by many theists, as one of the most serious intellectual challenges to traditional theism, precisely because it does not claim a strict inconsistency but instead appeals to patterns of suffering that are difficult to reconcile with the existence of a perfectly good God.

Ongoing debates focus on several issues:

• The scope of our moral and theological ignorance: How much does our limited perspective weaken inferences from “we see no reason” to “there is no reason”?
• Animal suffering and natural evil: Long histories of non-human suffering, predation, disease, and mass extinctions raise questions that are not easily addressed solely by free will or human soul-making.
• The weight of cumulative cases: Some philosophers explore “cumulative” evidential arguments, where different kinds of evil (horrendous suffering, hiddenness of God, distribution of religious belief) are taken together.
• The balance of evidence: Others ask how evidence from evil should be combined with other arguments in philosophy of religion—cosmological, teleological, moral, and experiential arguments.

Because it is framed in probabilistic rather than absolute terms, there is no consensus on whether the evidential problem of evil is ultimately decisive. Instead, it functions as a major constraint on theistic theories of God’s nature and action, pushing theists to offer more nuanced accounts of divine goodness, providence, and the role of suffering in the world, while continuing to serve as a central argument for many philosophical critics of theism.