Skeptical Theism

Overview and Motivation

Skeptical theism is a family of positions in the philosophy of religion developed as a response to the evidential problem of evil. The evidential problem of evil argues that the quantity, severity, and apparent pointlessness of suffering in the world provide strong evidence against the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good God.

Skeptical theists are theists—they affirm the existence of such a God—but they maintain a significant epistemic skepticism about human ability to judge what reasons God might have for allowing specific instances or patterns of evil. Their central claim is not that God does have justifying reasons for every evil, but that humans are in no position to infer that God lacks such reasons simply because we cannot see what they might be.

The term and central ideas are associated with late 20th- and early 21st-century analytic philosophers of religion, including Stephen Wykstra, William Alston, Michael Bergmann, and others. Wykstra’s “CORNEA” principle (Condition of ReasoNable Epistemic Access) is often cited as a key starting point for contemporary skeptical theism.

Core Claims and Logical Structure

Skeptical theism targets a key premise in evidential arguments from evil, such as those developed by William Rowe. Rowe-style arguments typically use a “noseeum inference”: if, after careful consideration, we cannot see any morally sufficient reason for an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being to allow a certain horrific evil, then it is likely that no such reason exists.

Skeptical theists challenge this inference by appealing to the cognitive distance between humans and God.

Central skeptical-theist claims often include:

1. Epistemic limitation claim
   Humans are limited in knowledge, creativity, moral insight, and understanding of long-term and large-scale consequences. An omniscient God could have reasons—perhaps highly complex, involving distant times, unknown people, or goods beyond current human comprehension—that we are unable to grasp.

2. CORNEA-style principle
   Drawing on Wykstra, skeptical theists often endorse a principle like:

   • If we are to justifiably infer from “we see no X” to “probably there is no X,” we must be in a position where, if X existed, we would likely see it.
     They argue that, with respect to God’s reasons for allowing suffering, humans do not meet this condition of reasonable epistemic access.

3. Defeat of noseeum inferences
   Since we are not in a good position to detect God’s possible justifying reasons, our failure to see such reasons is weak evidence or no evidence at all that there are none. Thus, a key premise of evidential arguments from evil is undercut.

4. Compatibility of skepticism and theism
   The skepticism in question is local rather than global: it pertains specifically to God’s reasons in permitting evil. Skeptical theists typically deny that this commits them to skepticism about almost everything else.

In a simplified logical form, many versions of skeptical theism can be represented as:

• P1. If God exists, God’s knowledge and perspective vastly exceed ours.
• P2. If God’s perspective vastly exceeds ours, then we lack reasonable epistemic access to all or most of God’s morally sufficient reasons for allowing specific evils.
• P3. Evidential arguments from evil depend on claiming that, because we fail to see God’s justifying reasons, it is likely that no such reasons exist.
• P4. But given P1 and P2, this “noseeum” inference is unreliable or unjustified.
• C. Therefore, the evidential problem of evil fails to provide strong (or any) evidence against God’s existence.

Proponents argue that this approach does not by itself prove that God exists; rather, it aims to defeat or weaken the evidential force of evil as an argument against theism.

Major Objections and Debates

Skeptical theism is highly controversial. Critics raise a range of objections, many claiming that the skeptical stance has problematic implications beyond the problem of evil.

1. Moral paralysis and action-guidance

Some critics contend that skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis. If humans cannot reasonably judge whether God might have good reasons for allowing horrific events, then:

• Can we confidently say that any apparently horrendous action is morally wrong?
• When we prevent suffering, might we be interfering with greater goods known only to God?

On this view, skeptical theism threatens to undercut our ability to make ordinary moral judgments, including judgments that genocide, torture, or child abuse are wrong without qualification.

Skeptical theists reply that their skepticism is targeted: it concerns God’s reasons for permitting evils, not human reasons for acting. They typically insist we still have robust, defeasible knowledge of moral obligations at the human level and that, absent special revelation, we are morally required to prevent suffering where we can.

2. Global skepticism and “skeptical sinkhole” concerns

Another objection suggests that once skeptical theism is accepted, it may spread into a more global skepticism:

• If we are so radically ignorant about God’s reasons, how can we trust our moral, theological, or even empirical reasoning at all?
• Could God have unknown reasons to deceive us or to allow our cognitive faculties to be unreliable?

Critics argue that this might undermine religious belief itself, since trust in revelation, religious experience, or arguments for God’s existence also depends on assumptions about God’s goodness and non-deceptiveness. Skeptical theists typically respond that their position is modest, not implying that God ever wills deception, only that we cannot map particular evils to particular divine reasons.

3. The problem of divine hiddenness

Some have linked skeptical theism to debates about divine hiddenness—the question of why God is not more obvious to sincere seekers. If skeptical theists emphasize our limited access to God’s reasons, critics argue this same reasoning might be used to “explain away” apparently unjustified divine hiddenness, making theism unfalsifiable or insulating it from empirical criticism.

Defenders respond that theism can still be constrained by broader considerations (coherence with religious texts, tradition, or overall evidential balance), and that skeptical theism is not meant to answer every challenge, only the specific noseeum inferences about evil.

4. Diminishing theodical projects

Skeptical theism stands in a complex relationship with theodicies (systematic attempts to explain why God allows evil). Some versions may seem to render theodicies unnecessary or even misguided, since they emphasize that we should not expect to know God’s reasons.

Critics worry this can make discussions about God’s justice and goodness largely empty: if God’s reasons are always beyond us, then debates about whether God is good risk becoming contentless. Some theists also fear that excessive skepticism weakens the traditional claim that God is morally perfect in any familiar sense.

Skeptical theists often respond by distinguishing between:

• Defensive strategies: undercutting arguments against God (where skeptical theism is central), and
• Exploratory theodicies: tentative proposals for how God’s goodness might be compatible with observed suffering, which remain valuable as long as they are not claimed to be complete or exhaustive explanations.

5. Assessment of evidential force

At the core of the debate is a disagreement over how much evidential weight the existence of seemingly pointless evils should have. Critics argue that even granting some epistemic limits, the scale, intensity, and distribution of suffering still strongly disconfirm traditional theism. Skeptical theists maintain that the epistemic gap is so large that this intuitive evidential judgment is unreliable.

Because of these unresolved tensions, scholarly assessment of skeptical theism remains divided. It is widely regarded as one of the most influential contemporary responses to the evidential problem of evil, but its broader epistemological and moral implications continue to be the subject of extensive philosophical debate.