The Luck Argument

1. Introduction

The Luck Argument is a family of objections aimed primarily at libertarian (indeterministic) accounts of free will. Its central contention is that if acts of free will crucially involve undetermined events, then what an agent does will be too dependent on luck to ground the kind of control required for moral responsibility.

Proponents of the argument maintain that libertarians face a dilemma:

1. If the processes leading to action are fully determined by prior states and laws, then (they claim) there is no robust sense in which the agent could have done otherwise, so libertarian free will is lost.
2. If, to avoid determinism, crucial elements of decision or action are left indeterministic, then, holding fixed everything about the agent and the past, more than one incompatible outcome remains possible. Which one actually occurs therefore seems to be a matter of luck rather than agential control.

From this, critics of libertarianism infer that indeterminism does not help with free will; rather, it threatens to make agency hostage to chance. The Luck Argument is often presented as a challenge that any viable libertarian theory must answer, rather than as a single canonical argument with a unique formulation.

Different versions focus on different targets: some concentrate on event‑causal libertarian views in which neural or mental events are indeterministic; others challenge agent‑causal theories that posit a special power of the agent to “settle” undetermined outcomes; still others address non‑causal models of action. Across these variants, the shared issue is whether the presence of luck at key junctures in agency undermines responsibility‑conferring control.

The Luck Argument has become a standard tool in contemporary debates about free will, used not only by compatibilists and hard determinists but also by skeptics about moral responsibility and by revisionist theorists proposing to weaken traditional control requirements.

2. Origin and Attribution

There is no single author or canonical statement of the Luck Argument. Rather, it emerged gradually within late twentieth‑century analytic philosophy as worries about chance, control, and responsibility were sharpened in response to libertarian theories of free will.

Early Sources and Consolidation

Several figures are commonly cited as central to its development:

While van Inwagen is often credited with emphasizing that indeterminism at the moment of decision appears to make what one decides depend on chance, later authors such as Kane and Mele gave the Luck Argument its name and explicit structure as a distinct objection.

Terminology and Variants

The issue appears under several labels:

• “Luck Objection” or “Luck Problem” (Mele, Clarke)
• “Luck Argument against Libertarian Free Will” (various critics of libertarianism)
• Sometimes simply as a dimension of the broader “problem of moral luck” (as connected by authors like Neil Levy).

Although earlier philosophers, including Hume, Kant, and mid‑twentieth‑century theorists of indeterminism, discussed concerns about chance and responsibility, contemporary scholars typically treat the late twentieth‑century literature as the point at which these concerns coalesced into a structured, named argument specifically targeting libertarian free will.

No consensus attribution exists: the Luck Argument is generally regarded as a collective product of the free will literature, refined through debate among libertarians, compatibilists, and skeptics rather than inaugurated by a single foundational text.

3. Historical Context in Free Will Debates

The Luck Argument developed within a broader historical shift in free will debates from predominantly theological and ethical concerns to highly analytic discussions of causation, laws of nature, and agency.

Pre‑20th Century Background

Earlier philosophers already worried about the relationship between chance and responsibility:

• Ancient and medieval discussions often associated chance with irrationality or providential ignorance, generally treating it as inimical to rational control.
• David Hume argued that indeterministic “liberty of chance” would undermine moral responsibility, prefiguring later luck concerns.
• Immanuel Kant struggled to reconcile freedom with causal laws, sometimes invoking a noumenal agent not subject to empirical determination, but left the detailed mechanics of chance and control underdeveloped.

However, these discussions did not isolate a specific “luck problem” for libertarianism in the contemporary sense.

Emergence in Late 20th‑Century Analytic Philosophy

From the 1960s onward, debates about free will increasingly turned on the metaphysics of determinism and indeterminism, fueled by developments in modal logic, philosophy of science, and action theory.

A rough timeline situates the Luck Argument in relation to other key developments:

The Luck Argument thus arises at the intersection of two pressures on libertarianism:

1. The Consequence Argument pushes incompatibilists toward indeterminism as a requirement for free will.
2. Worries about luck question whether such indeterminism can secure, rather than erode, the control needed for moral responsibility.

This dialectical setting explains why the Luck Argument became central: it challenges whether libertarians can reap the benefits of indeterminism without paying the price in responsibility‑undermining chance.

4. Core Statement of the Luck Argument

Although formulations vary, many presentations of the Luck Argument share a common core: they maintain that indeterminism in the causal history of free actions introduces luck in a way that is incompatible with robust control and moral responsibility.

A representative schematic statement runs as follows:

1. Responsibility requires control. For an agent to be morally responsible, it must be up to the agent, in some suitably robust sense, what she does or decides.
2. Libertarianism requires indeterminism. Libertarians claim that at least some free actions involve indeterministic events at crucial junctures—typically, during decision or choice.
3. Indeterminism preserves openness between alternatives. Given a complete description of the past and the laws, it remains genuinely possible that the agent choose A or choose B.
4. Holding fixed prior conditions, which alternative occurs is not settled by the agent’s state. If two incompatible outcomes are each compatible with exactly the same prior facts about the agent’s character, reasons, and deliberation, then the actual outcome is not fully explained by those agential factors.
5. Such dependence on undetermined factors constitutes luck. When the difference between performing one action rather than another is due to which way an indeterministic event goes, the result appears to be a matter of luck.
6. Luck of this kind undermines responsibility. If the agent’s control does not extend to which outcome occurs, then the agent allegedly lacks the sort of authorship or control required for being genuinely responsible for that outcome.

From these premises, critics infer that libertarian free actions would be “too lucky” to ground moral responsibility. Different authors emphasize different steps—for example, some focus on the explanatory gap at step 4, others on the normative claim in step 6—but the shared conclusion is that indeterministic freedom collapses into chance unless some additional, non‑lucky source of control is specified.

5. Logical Structure and Inferential Strategy

The Luck Argument is typically presented as a reductio against libertarianism: assuming libertarian commitments about indeterminism and free will, it attempts to show that those commitments lead to an untenable outcome in which free actions are mere products of luck.

Overall Logical Form

A common abstract structure is:

1. Assume libertarianism: some free actions are indeterministic.
2. Analyze what indeterminism at the relevant point entails (e.g., multiple possible outcomes consistent with the same prior conditions).
3. Argue that this entails a level or kind of luck in the actual outcome.
4. Claim that such luck is responsibility‑undermining.
5. Conclude that libertarian free will, as characterized, cannot ground moral responsibility.

Many formulations treat steps (2)–(4) as the core inferential moves, with (1) simply reflecting libertarian orthodoxy and (5) presenting the critical upshot.

Key Inferential Moves

Several specific strategies are commonly employed:

• Modal Strategy: Proceeds from the fact that, given a complete description of the past and laws, more than one future outcome is possible. The inference claims that, since everything about the agent and her reasons is fixed, the difference between outcomes cannot be attributed to the agent, and so must be luck.

• Explanatory Strategy: Emphasizes that, in indeterministic cases, there is no further explanation—beyond an indeterministic propensity—of why one outcome rather than another occurs. This alleged explanatory deficit is taken to undermine control.

• Symmetry Strategy within a Choice: In a situation of deliberative conflict (e.g., reason to do A vs reason to do B), if both options are equally supported by the agent’s reasons and the ultimate selection is undetermined, critics argue that the outcomes are symmetric with respect to the agent’s motivational profile, and so which one occurs cannot be under the agent’s control.

Variants Across Targets

Different versions adjust the logical structure depending on whether they target:

• Event‑causal libertarianism, by focusing on indeterministic transitions between mental events.
• Agent‑causal theories, by challenging whether appeal to a primitive agent‑cause avoids the inference to luck.
• Non‑causal accounts, by arguing that the absence of a causal explanation intensifies rather than alleviates the luck problem.

Despite these variations, the inferential strategy consistently aims to show that indeterminism at the decision point entails that the agent lacks the control necessary for responsibility, thereby challenging libertarianism from within its own framework.

6. Key Concepts: Luck, Control, and Responsibility

The Luck Argument turns on how philosophers understand three interrelated notions: luck, control, and moral responsibility. Different precisifications of these concepts often yield different verdicts on the argument.

Luck

In this context, luck is usually understood as significant dependence on factors beyond the agent’s control. Common features include:

• Lack of control: The agent does not (and perhaps cannot) determine whether the factor occurs.
• Significance: The factor makes an important difference to outcomes or to the agent’s moral status.
• Modal fragility: In nearby possible scenarios, things easily could have gone otherwise in ways that matter morally.

Some authors distinguish between benign forms of luck and responsibility‑undermining luck, a distinction that becomes central when evaluating the force of the Luck Argument.

Control

The control condition on responsibility is formulated in different ways, but most accounts emphasize:

• Agential authorship: The action must be attributable to the agent’s own powers, reasons, or character.
• Non‑accidentality: The connection between the agent’s motivational states and the outcome must not be merely coincidental.
• Modal and historical aspects: Some theories (e.g., those invoking regulative control) require alternative possibilities; others (e.g., guidance control) focus instead on the actual operation of a reasons‑responsive mechanism.

How demanding this condition is—especially regarding immunity to luck—largely determines how threatening indeterminism appears.

Moral Responsibility

Moral responsibility is typically understood as the status of being an appropriate target of praise, blame, or reactive attitudes. The Luck Argument engages with several dimensions:

• Desert: Whether agents deserve praise or blame given the role of luck.
• Attribution: Whether an action can be properly attributed to the agent as expressing her will or character.
• Fairness: Whether it is fair to hold an agent responsible when luck significantly influences what she does.

Some theorists allow that responsibility may coexist with pervasive luck, provided that the agent still meets a suitably modest control condition. Others hold that if luck plays a direct role in determining what the agent decides or does, responsibility is compromised. These differing conceptions shape competing evaluations of the Luck Argument’s central claims.

7. Forms of Luck and Their Philosophical Significance

In assessing the Luck Argument, philosophers often distinguish multiple types of luck, asking which, if any, are incompatible with moral responsibility.

Standard Taxonomy of Luck

A widely used categorization, drawing on discussions of moral luck, includes:

The Luck Argument mainly targets causal/decision luck, though some versions also appeal to resultant luck in evaluating responsibility for consequences.

Responsibility‑Relevant Distinctions

Proponents of the Luck Argument maintain that decision luck is uniquely threatening because it bears directly on what the agent decides or does, rather than merely shaping background conditions. If, holding fixed an agent’s internal state, it is a matter of luck which action she performs, then, they contend, she lacks robust control over that action.

Libertarian critics often reply by distinguishing:

• Background luck: Luck that affects one’s character or circumstances but does not directly determine a particular decision.
• Responsibility‑undermining luck: Luck that replaces the agent’s control at the point of decision.

They argue that only the latter is problematic, and that their theories can confine luck to the background rather than the decision itself.

Epistemic vs Metaphysical Luck

Another important distinction contrasts:

• Epistemic luck: Luck relative to what observers (or the agent) can predict or know.
• Metaphysical luck: Luck grounded in the objective indeterminacy of outcomes.

The Luck Argument is primarily concerned with metaphysical luck, claiming that genuine indeterminism at the point of decision yields problematic dependence on chance, regardless of anyone’s ignorance.

These layered distinctions—among types of luck, between background and decision luck, and between epistemic and metaphysical luck—structure contemporary debates over whether, and in what forms, luck is compatible with moral responsibility.

8. Libertarian Models Targeted by the Argument

The Luck Argument is directed chiefly at libertarian theories of free will, but it engages them differently depending on how they model the metaphysics of agency and indeterminism.

Event‑Causal Libertarianism

Event‑causal libertarians hold that:

• Actions are caused by prior mental and physical events (beliefs, desires, neural states).
• Some of the causal relations involved are indeterministic.

Critics apply the Luck Argument by focusing on the indeterministic transitions between events. They contend that if, given the same prior reasons, character, and mental state, it remains undetermined which decision event occurs, then which decision actually occurs is a matter of luck. Event‑causal theorists respond by emphasizing complex, reasons‑responsive processes, but the Luck Argument presses whether these processes can fully explain outcome selection without reintroducing determinism.

Agent‑Causal Libertarianism

Agent‑causal theories posit:

• A fundamental power of the agent as substance to directly cause actions or decisions.
• This agent‑causation is not reducible to event‑causation and is typically indeterministic.

Proponents hope that this primitive power enables the agent to “settle” which outcome occurs, thereby blocking the inference to luck. Critics, however, adapt the Luck Argument by questioning whether positing an irreducible agent‑cause actually explains why one outcome rather than another occurs, or simply relocates the locus of luck to the agent’s exercise of this power. The worry is that if the agent’s exertion itself is indeterministic, the same luck problem arises.

Non‑Causal and “Simple” Libertarianism

Some libertarians, sometimes called non‑causal or simple indeterminists, claim that:

• Free actions are not caused (or not primarily explained) by prior events or agent‑causes.
• Instead, they are basic, undetermined acts of will.

Here, the Luck Argument is often presented as especially pressing: if there is no causal explanation of why the agent acts one way rather than another, critics argue that the difference between outcomes is wholly a matter of luck. Defenders may appeal to primitive facts about the agent’s will or endorsement, but skeptics question whether such appeals provide the kind of non‑accidental control required for responsibility.

Across all these models, the Luck Argument queries whether indeterministic freedom can be distinguished, in a principled way, from mere chance, without collapsing back into a form of determinism or abandoning central libertarian commitments.

9. The Self-Forming Actions Strategy

One influential libertarian response to the Luck Argument is Robert Kane’s appeal to Self‑Forming Actions (SFAs). This strategy accepts that indeterminism plays a role in free will but seeks to locate it in a way that allegedly preserves responsibility‑conferring control.

Core Idea of Self‑Forming Actions

Kane proposes that:

• Certain rare, torn decisions—where an agent is deeply conflicted between competing motivations (e.g., self‑interest vs moral duty)—are self‑forming.
• In these moments, the agent exerts a deliberative effort of will in multiple directions simultaneously.
• The outcome of this effort is indeterministic: it is genuinely open whether the agent will decide one way or the other.

These SFAs are said to shape or “form” the agent’s enduring character and values. Subsequent decisions may be more determined by the character thus formed, but the earlier SFAs provide the libertarian foundation for responsibility.

Response to the Luck Argument

Kane’s strategy addresses the luck worry in several ways:

1. Non‑arbitrary effort: Even though the outcome is undetermined, the agent’s sustained effort to resolve the conflict is not itself a matter of luck. This effort is what grounds responsibility.
2. Dual responsibility: Kane argues that the agent can be responsible for either outcome because each would be an expression of the same struggle and evaluative engagement.
3. Character formation vs isolated events: By tying indeterminism to character‑forming decisions rather than to every ordinary action, Kane aims to show that luck, where it exists, is integrated into a meaningful narrative of self‑construction.

Critical Reactions

Critics question whether this strategy fully neutralizes the Luck Argument. Some contend that, given the same antecedent character and effort, it still seems a matter of luck which way the SFA turns out. Others argue that if the resulting character is itself partly a product of luck at the SFA stage, then responsibility for later, more determined actions may also be threatened.

Nevertheless, the SFA strategy is widely regarded as a central and sophisticated libertarian attempt to reconcile indeterminism with robust responsibility, and it has shaped much of the ongoing debate over whether luck and free will can coexist.

10. Compatibilist, Semicompatibilist, and Skeptical Uses

While originally framed as an objection to libertarianism, the Luck Argument has been adapted by philosophers with diverse positions on free will and responsibility.

Compatibilist Uses

Compatibilists—those who hold that free will is compatible with determinism—often employ the Luck Argument to argue that indeterminism is not only unnecessary but positively problematic for responsibility. Their uses typically include:

• Arguing that if libertarians are right that determinism threatens control, their proposed solution through indeterminism succumbs to the luck problem.
• Motivating compatibilist accounts of control (e.g., reasons‑responsiveness, guidance control) that explicitly avoid relying on indeterminism and instead focus on the actual operation of the agent’s capacities.

For compatibilists, the Luck Argument serves as a dialectical tool to press libertarians toward either relinquishing indeterminism or rethinking their control requirements.

Semicompatibilist Uses

Semicompatibilists (such as John Martin Fischer) maintain that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, even if the ability to do otherwise is not. They use the Luck Argument to:

• Support the view that alternative possibilities are not required for responsibility, since attempts to secure them via indeterminism run into luck problems.
• Emphasize guidance control, where responsibility hinges on whether the agent’s actual decision‑making mechanism is appropriately reasons‑responsive and owned by the agent, regardless of determinism.

Here, the Luck Argument reinforces a focus on actual causal histories and mechanisms rather than modal openness.

Skeptical and Revisionist Uses

Skeptics about free will or moral responsibility, and some revisionists, use the Luck Argument more radically:

• By combining it with the Consequence Argument and with considerations of moral luck, they suggest that both determinism and indeterminism confront us with forms of luck that undermine robust, desert‑based responsibility.
• Some argue for global skepticism about responsibility; others advocate for revising our responsibility practices to be less demanding or more forward‑looking (e.g., emphasizing moral influence rather than desert).

In these hands, the Luck Argument is not merely an anti‑libertarian tool but part of a broader case that deep control may be unattainable under any plausible metaphysics.

11. Standard Objections and Replies

Debate over the Luck Argument has generated a set of recurring objections and corresponding replies. These exchanges often turn on how strictly one interprets control requirements and what kinds of luck are thought to be responsibility‑undermining.

The Discrimination Objection

This objection holds that the Luck Argument fails to distinguish between problematic and benign forms of luck. Critics note that ordinary moral judgments already tolerate extensive constitutive and circumstantial luck; thus, the mere presence of luck cannot, by itself, undermine responsibility.

• Objection: The argument overgeneralizes, threatening to undermine responsibility in everyday cases where some luck is clearly present.
• Replies: Defenders respond that their focus is on decision luck—luck at the very point of choice—arguing that this is distinctly corrosive of control, unlike background luck in character or circumstances.

Self‑Forming Actions Response

Libertarians such as Kane advance the Self‑Forming Actions (SFA) model (discussed above) specifically to meet the luck challenge.

• Objection to Luck Argument: Indeterminism in SFAs does not replace agential control but is interwoven with the agent’s strenuous effort and evaluative engagement.
• Replies: Critics contend that, even in SFAs, given the same prior character and effort, the outcome remains a matter of luck, so the problem is merely relocated rather than solved.

Modest Libertarianism Objection

Some, notably Alfred Mele, argue that certain versions of the Luck Argument impose an excessively demanding standard of control, effectively requiring near‑immunity from luck.

• Objection: Agents need only sufficient, not maximal, control; the fact that an action could easily have gone otherwise does not by itself show that the actual outcome is irresponsibly lucky.
• Replies: Proponents of the Luck Argument counter that their standard is not perfectionist but reflects ordinary intuitions about non‑accidental authorship; if outcomes are not robustly linked to the agent’s reasons and character, responsibility is compromised.

Symmetry (Parity) Objection

Another line of criticism, sometimes associated with Neil Levy and others, claims that the Luck Argument may equally threaten compatibilism.

• Objection: If dependence on luck undermines responsibility, then determinism also generates a luck problem via constitutive and circumstantial luck: who we are and what we do depend heavily on factors beyond our control.
• Replies: Defenders of the Luck Argument often try to mark a distinction between background luck (present under determinism) and direct decision luck (allegedly unique to indeterminism), insisting that only the latter is responsibility‑defeating. Critics question whether this line can be stably drawn.

These exchanges structure much of the contemporary discussion, with no consensus yet on whether the Luck Argument survives these objections or needs substantial revision.

12. Relation to the Consequence Argument and Moral Luck

The Luck Argument is closely linked to two other major themes in contemporary free will discussions: the Consequence Argument and the phenomenon of moral luck.

Relation to the Consequence Argument

The Consequence Argument, associated with Peter van Inwagen, aims to show that if determinism is true, then our actions are consequences of laws and past events not up to us, and thus we lack the ability to do otherwise.

The two arguments interact in the following way:

For many theorists, these arguments create a dialectical squeeze: determinism threatens freedom via the Consequence Argument, while indeterminism appears to threaten it via the Luck Argument. Skeptics may use the pair to argue that no metaphysical picture easily vindicates robust free will.

Libertarians typically endorse or adapt the Consequence Argument while resisting the Luck Argument; compatibilists often challenge the Consequence Argument and embrace the Luck Argument as a critique of libertarianism.

Relation to Moral Luck

The broader literature on moral luck—influentially discussed by Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams—concerns how factors beyond an agent’s control (constitutive, circumstantial, and resultant) shape moral evaluation.

The Luck Argument can be seen as a specialized application of moral luck concerns to the metaphysics of free will:

• It focuses on decision luck, a specific kind of moral luck, and asks whether responsibility can survive when key aspects of deciding are beyond control.
• Discussions of moral luck underscore that our practices of praise and blame already tolerate extensive luck, raising questions about whether the Luck Argument sets a higher bar for control than other areas of moral theorizing.

Some philosophers, such as Neil Levy, integrate these strands, arguing that when we reflect systematically on both moral luck and the metaphysical luck highlighted by the Luck Argument, deep challenges to traditional notions of desert‑based responsibility emerge. Others attempt to insulate responsibility from these worries by weakening control requirements or by reframing the aims of moral evaluation (e.g., toward forward‑looking or relational considerations).

13. Current Status and Ongoing Controversies

In contemporary philosophy, the Luck Argument is widely regarded as a central, yet unresolved, component of the free will debate. It functions less as a settled result and more as a standing challenge that any comprehensive theory must address.

Status Across Theoretical Camps

• Libertarians generally acknowledge the force of luck worries but argue that refined models (event‑causal, agent‑causal, SFA‑based, or “modest” libertarianism) can accommodate indeterminism without surrendering control.
• Compatibilists and semicompatibilists often treat the Luck Argument as a powerful critique of libertarianism, supporting their shift away from alternative‑possibility requirements and toward guidance‑based conceptions of control.
• Skeptics and revisionists see the Luck Argument, especially when combined with the Consequence Argument and moral luck, as evidence that traditional, desert‑based responsibility may be unattainable or in need of significant reconceptualization.

No consensus has emerged on whether the Luck Argument is ultimately sound, or even on its best formulation.

Points of Continuing Dispute

Ongoing controversies concentrate on several questions:

• Nature of responsibility‑undermining luck: Is decision luck fundamentally different from the background luck everyone faces, and if so, how?
• Standards of control: How demanding should the control condition be? Are modest, reasons‑responsive accounts sufficient, or does responsibility require stronger, luck‑resistant authorship?
• Effectiveness of libertarian replies: Do strategies such as Self‑Forming Actions, agent‑causation, or probabilistic explanations genuinely explain why one outcome occurs rather than another, or do they merely redescribe the problem?
• Symmetry with compatibilism: To what extent do luck‑based concerns apply equally to compatibilist accounts, given the pervasive role of constitutive and circumstantial luck in shaping agents?

Empirical and interdisciplinary work—e.g., in psychology, neuroscience, and legal theory—has also begun to interact with these debates, though the Luck Argument itself remains a largely conceptual and normative dispute within analytic philosophy.

14. Legacy and Historical Significance

The Luck Argument has had a substantial impact on the shape and vocabulary of contemporary free will debates, influencing both the development of detailed libertarian theories and critiques of free will more generally.

Reshaping Libertarianism

Historically, libertarianism could be framed relatively simply as the conjunction of:

1. Incompatibilism about free will and determinism.
2. The claim that humans (at least sometimes) act freely.

The rise of the Luck Argument has pressed libertarians to articulate far more sophisticated accounts of agency, including:

• Intricate models of indeterministic deliberation and decision.
• Theories of agent‑causation and primitive powers.
• Narrative accounts of agency centered on Self‑Forming Actions.

In this sense, the Luck Argument has been a driving force behind the systematization and diversification of libertarian theories in the late twentieth and early twenty‑first centuries.

Framing Responsibility Debates

Beyond libertarianism, the Luck Argument has:

• Helped crystalize the importance of control conditions and the need to distinguish various types of luck in assessing responsibility.
• Contributed to the popularity of guidance control and reasons‑responsiveness frameworks, as alternatives to more demanding freedom‑as‑alternative‑possibility approaches.
• Encouraged closer connections between the metaphysics of free will and broader discussions of moral luck, fairness, and desert.

Influence Across Fields

The argument’s legacy extends into adjacent areas:

• In philosophy of law, questions about how much control is required for criminal responsibility increasingly intersect with luck‑based concerns.
• In theology and philosophy of religion, assessments of divine foreknowledge, providence, and grace sometimes appeal to the Luck Argument when evaluating libertarian views of human freedom.
• In moral philosophy, it provides a bridge between debates over free will and discussions of blameworthiness, punishment, and moral standing.

Overall, the Luck Argument has become a standard reference point in the literature: new accounts of free will, whether libertarian, compatibilist, or skeptical, are typically expected to state how they respond to, incorporate, or sidestep the challenges it raises. As such, its historical significance lies less in settling the free will question than in reconfiguring the terms on which that question is now discussed.