Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre
Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre (b. 1929) is a Scottish-born moral and political philosopher whose work has profoundly reshaped late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century ethics. Trained within the British analytic tradition yet deeply informed by Marxism, theology, and the history of philosophy, MacIntyre became best known for his 1981 book After Virtue, which catalyzed the contemporary revival of virtue ethics. There he argues that modern moral discourse is fragmented and emotivist because it has been severed from the teleological and communal contexts that once gave ethical concepts their intelligibility. MacIntyre’s mature position is a neo-Aristotelian and Thomistic account of the virtues, rooted in the idea of practices, narrative unity of a life, and historically embodied traditions of rational enquiry. He maintains that rationality itself is tradition-constituted and that moral justification must be pursued within, and between, such rival traditions. After youthful involvement with Marxist and socialist politics, he later converted to Roman Catholicism, integrating his Aristotelianism with the thought of Thomas Aquinas. His work has influenced debates on communitarianism, liberalism, professional ethics, education, and the role of practices and institutions in sustaining human flourishing, making him one of the central critics of Enlightenment moral theory and modern liberal individualism.
At a Glance
- Born
- 1929-01-12 — Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom
- Died
- Floruit
- 1953–presentActive publishing and teaching career from the early 1950s onward
- Active In
- Scotland, United Kingdom, United States, Ireland
- Interests
- EthicsMoral philosophyPolitical philosophyPhilosophy of social practicesPhilosophy of religionHistory of philosophyMarxism and its critiqueEpistemology of traditions
Alasdair MacIntyre argues that moral reasoning and rationality are intelligible only within historically extended, socially embodied traditions of enquiry, and that a defensible ethics must be a neo-Aristotelian account of the virtues grounded in practices, the narrative unity of a human life, and a teleological understanding of human flourishing, against the fragmented and emotivist character of modern liberal moral discourse.
Marxism: An Interpretation
Composed: 1952–1953
The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis
Composed: 1956–1958
A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century
Composed: 1964–1966
Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy
Composed: 1967–1970
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory
Composed: late 1970s–1981
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
Composed: mid-1980s–1989
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition
Composed: late 1980s–1990
Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues
Composed: late 1990s–1999
Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative
Composed: 2010s–2016
What we possess, if this account is correct, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived.— Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), p. 2.
From the opening chapter of After Virtue, where MacIntyre introduces the image of moral discourse as surviving fragments of a once coherent ethical tradition.
I can only answer the question 'What am I to do?' if I can answer the prior question 'Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?'— Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), p. 216.
Expresses his thesis that practical reasoning is embedded in the narrative unity of a life and in the histories of communities and traditions.
A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of one’s own performance as judged by them.— Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), p. 190.
Classic formulation of his concept of practices and internal goods, central to his virtue-ethical framework.
There is no standing ground, no place for enquiry, no way to engage in the practices of advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting reasoned argument apart from that which is provided by some particular tradition or other.— Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 350.
States his influential view that rationality itself is tradition-constituted rather than tradition-independent.
It is because we are dependent rational animals that the virtues which enable us to flourish are those which enable us to receive as well as to give, to be cared for as well as to care.— Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), p. 119.
Summarizes his later account of human beings as vulnerable, dependent creatures whose flourishing requires networks of care and the virtues of acknowledged dependence.
Early Marxist and Analytic Phase (1950s–mid-1960s)
In his early career MacIntyre worked within the analytic tradition while being strongly engaged with Marxism and Christian theology. Works such as *Marxism: An Interpretation* (1953) and *The Unconscious* (1958) show him exploring the philosophical foundations of Marxist theory, psychoanalysis, and the social sciences. He was active in leftist politics and sceptical of both traditional theism and liberalism, seeking a critical, historically sensitive social theory.
Historical and Critical Transition (mid-1960s–late 1970s)
With *A Short History of Ethics* (1966), MacIntyre turned decisively toward the historical study of moral concepts, arguing that ethical notions only make sense within determinate social and historical contexts. During this period his political and philosophical outlook became increasingly critical of both liberalism and orthodox Marxism. He gradually distanced himself from both the secular left and from the dominant analytic approach that abstracted moral questions from historical practices and institutions.
After Virtue and the Turn to Virtue Ethics (late 1970s–mid-1980s)
The publication of *After Virtue* (1981) marks MacIntyre’s emergence as the leading proponent of a revived Aristotelian virtue ethics. He offers a genealogical critique of modern moral discourse as emotivist and fragmented, and introduces his influential concepts of practices, internal goods, and the narrative unity of a human life. The book argues that the loss of a shared teleological framework undermines the possibility of rational moral argument, proposing Aristotelian tradition-based ethics as the best alternative.
Tradition-Constituted Rationality and Thomism (mid-1980s–1990s)
Following his conversion to Roman Catholicism (1984), MacIntyre deepened his engagement with Thomas Aquinas and developed a sophisticated theory of rationality as tradition-constituted. In *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (1989) and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (1990), he defends the Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition against enlightenment encyclopaedism and Nietzschean genealogy. He argues that rational comparison between traditions is possible, though always from within a particular historically extended community of enquiry.
Later Work on Practices, Institutions, and Dependent Rational Animals (2000s–present)
In works such as *Dependent Rational Animals* (1999) and later essays, MacIntyre refines his account of human flourishing by emphasizing our animal nature, vulnerability, and dependence on networks of care. He explores the ethical significance of practices, institutions, and local communities, criticizes the modern university and managerialism, and defends forms of common-life politics oriented toward the development of the virtues. His later thought integrates Aristotelian biology, Thomistic metaphysics, and a realistic account of human dependence across the life cycle.
1. Introduction
Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre (b. 1929) is widely regarded as one of the most influential moral philosophers of the late twentieth and early twenty‑first centuries, best known for reviving virtue ethics within a broadly Aristotelian–Thomistic framework. His work combines rigorous analytic argument, historical narrative, and social critique to challenge dominant Enlightenment and liberal conceptions of morality, rationality, and politics.
Across his major works—especially After Virtue (1981), Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1989), and Dependent Rational Animals (1999)—MacIntyre advances a unified but evolving project. He contends that:
- Modern moral discourse is fragmented and often emotivist, lacking a shared conception of the human good.
- Moral reasoning and justification are tradition‑constituted, emerging from historically extended, socially embodied forms of enquiry.
- Ethical evaluation must be grounded in practices, internal goods, the narrative unity of a life, and a teleological understanding of human flourishing.
- Political and social institutions can either sustain or corrupt the practices and communities required for the virtues.
His work is situated at the intersection of analytic philosophy, Marxist and post‑Marxist theory, Aristotelian ethics, and Catholic Thomism. It has shaped debates in moral and political philosophy, theology, education, and professional ethics, and has prompted extensive discussion about the nature of rationality, traditions, and the possibility of objectivity in ethics.
Scholars interpret MacIntyre variously as a central figure in the virtue ethics revival, a major critic of liberal individualism, an exponent of communitarian themes (though he himself resists that label), and a leading contemporary Thomist. His proposals have generated both enthusiastic uptake and substantial criticism, making his corpus a focal point for ongoing debates about ethics, rational justification, and the role of historical traditions in philosophical inquiry.
2. Life and Historical Context
MacIntyre’s life and career are closely intertwined with major intellectual and political developments of the twentieth century, shaping the trajectory of his thought.
2.1 Biographical Overview
| Period | Location(s) | Intellectual/Institutional Context |
|---|---|---|
| 1929–1950s | Glasgow, London, Manchester | Education in classics and philosophy; exposure to Marxism and Christian theology |
| 1950s–1960s | UK universities (Manchester, Leeds, Oxford, Essex) | Early analytic work; engagement with Marxism, psychoanalysis, and the social sciences |
| 1971–1980s | United States (Brandeis, Boston University, Vanderbilt) | Transition to historical and Aristotelian themes; composition of After Virtue |
| 1980s–present | Primarily United States and Ireland (Notre Dame, other posts) | Development of Thomistic Aristotelianism; work on traditions, rationality, and dependence |
Born in Glasgow in 1929 to Scottish parents, MacIntyre grew up between Scotland and England, in a context marked by interwar politics, the Second World War, and postwar reconstruction. Commentators often note that the crises of the mid‑twentieth century, including the perceived failures of liberal democracies and Marxist regimes, formed part of the background against which his mature critique of modernity emerged.
2.2 Intellectual and Political Milieu
MacIntyre’s early work developed within the British analytic tradition, then dominated by logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy. Simultaneously, he was deeply engaged in Marxist politics and involved in left‑wing organizations in the 1950s and 1960s. This dual formation—analytic philosophy and radical politics—motivated his early attempts to give Marxism a more rigorous philosophical basis and to critique ideology.
The broader Cold War context, decolonization, and debates over welfare capitalism, socialism, and Christianity’s public role provided the political backdrop for his evolving stance. His later move to the United States exposed him to different academic cultures, the rise of Rawlsian liberalism, and new forms of analytic moral philosophy, all of which he engaged critically.
2.3 Historical Setting of His Project
Scholars typically situate MacIntyre among late twentieth‑century philosophers who reacted against Enlightenment rationalism and modern individualism, alongside figures such as Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel, though their views diverge in important respects. MacIntyre’s emphasis on tradition, narrative, and community is often read as part of a broader “communitarian” challenge to liberalism; at the same time, his rigorous engagement with Aristotle, Aquinas, and Augustine situates him within a revived interest in classical and medieval sources.
His 1984 conversion to Roman Catholicism occurred amid wider debates about the place of religion in public life and the viability of natural law traditions, reinforcing the theological dimension of his later work. Overall, MacIntyre’s biography and historical context are widely viewed as integral to understanding the successive phases of his philosophical development.
3. Early Marxist and Analytic Period
MacIntyre’s early period (roughly the early 1950s to mid‑1960s) is characterized by an attempt to reconcile Marxist social theory with the conceptual tools of analytic philosophy, alongside a critical engagement with Christian theology and psychoanalysis.
3.1 Marxism and Social Critique
In Marxism: An Interpretation (1953) and subsequent essays, MacIntyre offered a sympathetic yet critical exposition of Marx’s thought. He aimed to clarify Marxist concepts within an analytic framework, focusing on:
- The relation between historical materialism and moral evaluation.
- The nature of ideology and false consciousness.
- The prospects for socialist politics in postwar Britain.
Proponents of this early phase emphasize his commitment to a revolutionary critique of capitalist society and his belief that Marxism could provide a scientifically grounded, emancipatory theory. Critics argue that he was already exhibiting scepticism about Marxism’s coherence, foreshadowing later breaks.
3.2 Analytic Method and the Social Sciences
During the 1950s and early 1960s, MacIntyre worked within mainstream analytic philosophy, applying its methods to ethics, religion, and the human sciences. In The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis (1958), he examined Freud and psychoanalysis, arguing that many psychoanalytic claims are best understood as conceptual rather than empirical hypotheses. This reflected a broader concern with how explanatory frameworks in the social sciences shape our understanding of action and responsibility.
He also contributed to debates about reductionism, behaviorism, and the logical structure of explanations in psychology and sociology. Commentators note that these interests prefigure his later insistence that moral and social concepts are embedded in wider forms of life.
3.3 Christianity, Secularism, and Moral Theory
In this period MacIntyre was critical both of traditional theism and of secular liberal morality. Essays later collected in Against the Self‑Images of the Age (1971) show him challenging:
- Liberal conceptions of the autonomous individual.
- Secular accounts of morality detached from substantive views of the good.
- Certain ecclesiastical and theological positions he viewed as politically conservative.
Some interpreters describe this as a radically critical phase, in which MacIntyre sought an alternative to both bourgeois liberalism and conventional Christianity, while remaining committed to a broadly socialist agenda. Others stress continuities with his later work: the early concern with ideology, practices, and the social embedding of belief is seen as an initial step toward his historical and neo‑Aristotelian turn.
4. Turn to the History of Ethics
From the mid‑1960s to the late 1970s, MacIntyre increasingly approached moral philosophy through historical narratives and conceptual genealogy, culminating in A Short History of Ethics (1966). This period marks a transition from system‑building within Marxism to a critical examination of how moral concepts evolve.
4.1 A Short History of Ethics
A Short History of Ethics surveys Western moral philosophy from Homer to the twentieth century, arguing that moral concepts gain their intelligibility only within specific social and institutional contexts. MacIntyre maintains that:
- Terms such as “virtue,” “duty,” and “rights” change meaning across historical settings.
- Philosophical ethics must therefore be a historical inquiry into practices and forms of life, not merely abstract argument.
The book was widely recognized as a significant contribution to both ethics and the history of philosophy, and it anticipated themes later developed in After Virtue.
4.2 Critique of Modern Moral Discourse
During this phase, MacIntyre became increasingly critical of modern moral theory, particularly Kantian and utilitarian frameworks that aspire to universal, context‑independent principles. He argued that:
- Modern moral discourse has lost the teleological background that once unified ethical concepts.
- As a result, many contemporary debates are intractable, because participants appeal to incommensurable premises.
These themes appear in essays from the period and in Against the Self‑Images of the Age, where he criticizes contemporary culture’s self‑understanding as rational and progressive.
4.3 Distance from Marxism and Analytic Orthodoxy
MacIntyre gradually distanced himself from both orthodox Marxism and the prevailing forms of analytic moral philosophy. He questioned:
- The adequacy of Marxism’s economic determinism and its neglect of virtues and character.
- The tendency of analytic ethics to treat moral problems in a timeless, ahistorical way.
Some scholars emphasize this as a disillusionment phase, in which earlier political hopes are tempered by historical scepticism. Others highlight it as a constructive move towards a historically informed and practice‑centered understanding of ethics, paving the way for his Aristotelian revival.
4.4 Emergence of Aristotelian Themes
Even before After Virtue, MacIntyre’s writings began to emphasize:
- The centrality of practices and forms of life.
- The idea that moral reasoning is embedded in traditions.
- A renewed interest in Aristotle as a theorist of virtue and teleology.
Commentators differ on the exact timing of this shift, but there is broad agreement that the turn to the history of ethics provided the methodological and substantive foundation for his later neo‑Aristotelian project.
5. After Virtue and the Revival of Virtue Ethics
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (1981) is MacIntyre’s most influential work and a central text in the contemporary virtue ethics revival. It combines historical narrative, conceptual analysis, and social critique.
5.1 Diagnosis of Modern Moral Fragmentation
MacIntyre opens After Virtue with a thought experiment of a world where moral language survives while the practices that gave it sense have been destroyed. He argues that this resembles our own condition:
“What we possess, if this account is correct, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived.”
— Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 2
According to his analysis:
- Modern moral discourse is dominated by emotivism, the view that moral judgments express preferences rather than objective claims.
- This leads to managerial and bureaucratic forms of power, since public moral argument cannot rationally resolve conflicts.
5.2 Genealogy of the Enlightenment Project
MacIntyre traces this fragmentation to the Enlightenment’s attempt to justify morality independently of any shared conception of the human telos. He surveys figures such as Hume, Kant, and Kierkegaard, arguing that:
- Each tried, and ultimately failed, to ground morality in reason, sentiment, or choice alone.
- The failure of this project explains the apparent incommensurability of contemporary moral claims.
Some commentators interpret this as a genealogical critique influenced by Nietzsche, though MacIntyre’s aim is to reopen the question of teleology rather than to abandon moral objectivity.
5.3 Recovery of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics
In response, MacIntyre turns to Aristotelian virtue ethics, emphasizing:
- Human beings as teleological creatures whose flourishing (eudaimonia) provides a standard for evaluating practices and institutions.
- The virtues as traits that enable individuals to achieve the internal goods of practices and to sustain the narrative unity of a life.
He proposes that a coherent moral framework must link:
- Practices and internal goods
- The unity of a human life
- The traditions of moral enquiry that shape and justify these standards.
5.4 Impact on Virtue Ethics
After Virtue played a major role in the late twentieth‑century revival of virtue ethics, alongside works by Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot. It reoriented ethical debate from rules and consequences to character, practices, and communities.
Supporters view the book as a powerful critique of modern moral theory and an original development of Aristotelian ideas. Critics contend that its historical narrative oversimplifies Enlightenment thought, that its depiction of emotivism is too sweeping, and that its proposed alternative relies on contentious metaphysical and theological assumptions. Nonetheless, After Virtue is widely recognized as a landmark that reshaped the landscape of Anglophone moral philosophy.
6. Practices, Internal Goods, and Institutions
A distinctive contribution of MacIntyre’s philosophy is his account of practices, internal goods, and institutions, first systematically presented in After Virtue and refined in later writings.
6.1 Definition of Practices
MacIntyre defines a practice as:
“Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized…”
— Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 187
Examples often cited include chess, physics, music, medicine, and various crafts.
Key features include:
- Complexity and standards: Practices involve standards of excellence that participants must learn and internalize.
- Socially established: They are sustained by communities over time.
- Cooperative: They require shared activity, not merely individual performance.
6.2 Internal vs External Goods
MacIntyre distinguishes:
| Type of Good | Characteristics | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Internal goods | Achievable only by participating in a given practice; contribute to excellence in that practice and to the practitioner’s flourishing | Understanding in science, artistic creativity, skillful medical diagnosis |
| External goods | Contingent rewards obtainable by many routes; typically scarce and competitive | Money, prestige, power, status |
He argues that the virtues are necessary to order external goods to internal goods, preventing practices from being corrupted by the pursuit of wealth or status.
6.3 Role of Institutions
Practices must be housed within institutions (e.g., universities, hospitals, markets, churches). Institutions:
- Provide material support (funding, organization, infrastructure).
- Inevitably pursue external goods, such as financial stability or reputation.
MacIntyre contends that there is a structural tension between practices and institutions: institutions are necessary to sustain practices but also pose the primary threat of corruption. The virtues of justice, courage, and integrity are therefore required to protect practices from institutional distortion.
6.4 Interpretations and Applications
This framework has been widely applied in fields such as:
- Professional ethics (medicine, law, business).
- Education and the philosophy of the university.
- Organizational studies and critiques of managerialism.
Supporters hold that MacIntyre’s account clarifies how genuine excellence depends on social forms that cultivate internal goods. Critics argue that:
- The practice/institution distinction may be too sharp or idealized.
- It can be difficult to classify activities (e.g., business, politics) as practices or merely institutional.
- The framework may understate the potential of institutions to embody and transmit internal goods themselves.
Nevertheless, the triad of practices, internal goods, and institutions remains central to understanding MacIntyre’s approach to ethics and social life.
7. Narrative, Identity, and Human Flourishing
MacIntyre places narrative at the heart of his account of moral agency, arguing that human lives are intelligible only as stories shaped by social roles and traditions.
7.1 Narrative Unity of a Life
In After Virtue and later works, MacIntyre claims that to understand an action, one must situate it within a narrative:
“I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’”
— Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 216
He maintains that:
- Human beings are “story‑telling animals” whose actions acquire meaning from their place in a temporally extended life.
- A good life is one that exhibits narrative unity, where projects and relationships cohere around a conception of flourishing.
7.2 Identity and Social Roles
For MacIntyre, personal identity is not merely psychological continuity but also:
- Being located within socially defined roles (e.g., parent, citizen, practitioner).
- Inheriting traditions that shape how one understands obligations and goods.
He argues that agents always find themselves in “networks of narratives” that precede their choices and condition their practical reasoning. This challenges views that treat the self as fundamentally prior to or independent of social attachments.
7.3 Narrative and Practical Reasoning
Narrative structure influences practical reasoning in two main ways:
- Evaluation of actions: Actions are judged as successes or failures relative to the unfolding story of a life and its goods.
- Deliberation: Agents must integrate diverse desires, commitments, and roles into a coherent life‑plan, rather than maximizing isolated preferences.
MacIntyre’s account thereby links ethics to questions about life‑plans, quests, and the interpretation of one’s past.
7.4 Reception and Critique
Philosophers and theologians have extensively discussed MacIntyre’s narrative account of identity. Supporters see it as a powerful alternative to atomistic or purely psychological conceptions of the self and as a resource for understanding moral education, psychotherapy, and communal memory.
Critics raise several concerns:
- Some argue that narrative unity is not necessary for moral agency and may exclude lives marked by disruption or fragmentation.
- Others worry that emphasizing social roles and inherited narratives risks conservatism, limiting critical distance from oppressive traditions.
- There is debate about how MacIntyre’s narrative framework handles plural and conflicting identities in modern societies.
Despite these discussions, the idea of the narrative unity of a life remains a central and widely influential aspect of MacIntyre’s thought.
8. Tradition-Constituted Rationality and Epistemology
MacIntyre’s epistemological views, especially in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1989), center on the claim that rationality is tradition‑constituted. He rejects the idea of a neutral, universal standpoint from which all beliefs can be assessed.
8.1 Traditions as Contexts of Rational Enquiry
MacIntyre defines a tradition as a historically extended, socially embodied argument about the goods that should shape a community’s life. Within such traditions:
- Standards of evidence, coherence, and justification develop over time.
- Rational enquiry is continuous and self‑correcting, as internal debates refine or revise those standards.
He argues:
“There is no standing ground… apart from that which is provided by some particular tradition or other.”
— Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, p. 350
8.2 Rationality Without Neutrality
Against Enlightenment projects aiming at tradition‑independent reason, MacIntyre maintains that:
- All reasoning presupposes background commitments and conceptual schemes.
- Appeals to “universal” reason often disguise the particular assumptions of specific historical traditions.
However, he does not endorse relativism. Instead, he proposes that:
- Traditions can be rationally evaluated by examining their ability to handle internal epistemic crises, explain their own development, and account for the successes and failures of rival traditions.
- One tradition may prove epistemically superior if it can interpret both its own history and that of its rivals more adequately.
8.3 Incommensurability and Translation
MacIntyre acknowledges that different traditions may employ incommensurable concepts of justice, rationality, and the good. Nonetheless, he suggests that:
- Extended dialogue and interpretive work can achieve partial translation between traditions.
- Comparative evaluation is possible, though always from within the standpoint of a particular tradition.
This view has been applied to debates among Aristotelian, liberal, Marxist, and Nietzschean outlooks, among others.
8.4 Responses and Debates
Supporters of MacIntyre’s epistemology argue that it offers a realistic account of how reasoning actually occurs in science, morality, and politics, and that it avoids both foundationalist and relativist extremes.
Critics contend that:
- The notion of “tradition‑constituted” rationality may underplay genuinely cross‑cultural universals in reasoning.
- His criteria for the rational superiority of one tradition over another can appear circular, since they are themselves tradition‑bound.
- The account might not adequately accommodate individual dissent within traditions or rapid changes in belief.
Nonetheless, the concept of tradition‑constituted rationality has been highly influential in discussions of epistemology, hermeneutics, and the philosophy of the social sciences.
9. Metaphysics, Teleology, and Thomistic Aristotelianism
From the mid‑1980s onward, especially after his conversion to Catholicism, MacIntyre increasingly identifies his position as Thomistic Aristotelianism, combining Aristotle’s teleology with Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysics and theology.
9.1 Revival of Teleology
Central to MacIntyre’s metaphysics is a teleological view of human beings:
- Human nature is ordered toward certain ends (telē), such as rational deliberation, social cooperation, and the virtues.
- These ends provide an objective standard for evaluating actions, institutions, and forms of life.
He contrasts this with modern mechanistic and Humean views that deny inherent purposes in nature. For MacIntyre, abandoning teleology leads to the moral fragmentation diagnosed in After Virtue.
9.2 Thomistic Framework
MacIntyre turns to Thomas Aquinas as offering the most developed synthesis of Aristotelian teleology with a Christian understanding of creation and grace. Key elements include:
- A metaphysics of act and potency, form and matter, grounding a robust account of substances and their natural ends.
- A hierarchical conception of goods culminating in the beatific vision (for Aquinas), which MacIntyre presents as a theologically informed account of ultimate human flourishing.
- The idea that natural law expresses the rational creature’s participation in eternal law.
MacIntyre adopts much of this framework while emphasizing that Aquinas’s position is itself a historically situated tradition of enquiry.
9.3 Nature, Biology, and Human Animals
In Dependent Rational Animals (1999), MacIntyre supplements Thomistic metaphysics with a close engagement with Aristotelian biology and contemporary ethology. He argues that:
- Humans are dependent rational animals, sharing vulnerabilities and needs with other intelligent mammals.
- Ethical norms must take seriously our animal condition, including stages of dependence (infancy, illness, old age) and the need for networks of care.
This biological emphasis is intended to give his teleology an empirical grounding, though some critics question how fully it aligns with modern evolutionary theory.
9.4 Debates on Metaphysical Commitments
Reception of MacIntyre’s Thomistic Aristotelianism is mixed:
- Supporters claim it supplies the metaphysical depth needed to sustain his earlier ethical and epistemological theses, grounding virtues and practices in a determinate human nature.
- Critics argue that the appeal to robust essences and final causes is difficult to reconcile with contemporary natural science and may limit the attractiveness of his overall project to non‑theists.
- Some interpreters treat his Thomism as one tradition among others, valuable even for those who do not share its theological commitments, while others hold that his later work is inseparable from its specifically Catholic metaphysical assumptions.
Despite disagreements, MacIntyre’s integration of teleology and Thomism is widely regarded as a defining feature of his mature philosophy.
10. Ethics, Virtues, and Dependent Rational Animals
MacIntyre’s ethical theory culminates in an account of human beings as dependent rational animals, whose flourishing requires the cultivation of virtues within networks of care and cooperation.
10.1 Dependent Rational Animals
In Dependent Rational Animals (1999), MacIntyre emphasizes that humans:
- Are rational, capable of practical reasoning and self‑evaluation.
- Are also vulnerable and dependent, needing care from others during significant phases of life.
- Share many features with other social mammals, such as cooperative behavior and vulnerability to injury and deprivation.
He argues:
“It is because we are dependent rational animals that the virtues which enable us to flourish are those which enable us to receive as well as to give, to be cared for as well as to care.”
— Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, p. 119
10.2 Virtues of Acknowledged Dependence
Building on his earlier account of the virtues linked to practices and traditions, MacIntyre introduces virtues of acknowledged dependence, including:
- Just generosity: A disposition to give and receive in ways responsive to genuine need and desert.
- Misericordia (mercy or compassionate responsiveness): Attentive concern for the suffering and vulnerability of others.
- Truthfulness and humility about one’s own limits and need for assistance.
These virtues are necessary for both individual flourishing and the sustenance of communities capable of caring for their most vulnerable members.
10.3 Integration with Earlier Virtue Theory
MacIntyre integrates three strands:
- Practice‑based virtues (excellences needed to achieve internal goods of practices).
- Narrative virtues (traits enabling the coherent pursuit of a good life over time).
- Dependence‑related virtues (required for networks of giving and receiving care).
Together, these form a comprehensive picture in which ethical life is inseparable from:
- Participation in practices.
- Membership in communities structured by shared goods.
- Recognition of mutual dependence across the life cycle.
10.4 Engagements and Criticisms
MacIntyre’s later ethics has been influential in:
- Bioethics and disability studies, where his emphasis on vulnerability and dependence is seen as a corrective to autonomy‑focused models.
- Social and political philosophy concerned with care, solidarity, and social justice.
Critics raise questions about:
- The universality of the specific virtues he highlights, given cultural variation.
- How his framework addresses conflicts of obligation between different communities or practices.
- Whether his grounding of the virtues in a teleological and often theologically inflected account of human nature is acceptable to secular or non‑Thomist audiences.
Despite these debates, the notion of humans as dependent rational animals has become a central reference point in contemporary virtue ethics and care ethics.
11. Political Philosophy, Community, and Critique of Liberalism
MacIntyre’s political philosophy develops from his ethical and epistemological views, offering a sustained critique of liberalism and emphasizing the importance of communities and local practices.
11.1 Critique of Liberal Individualism
From After Virtue onward, MacIntyre argues that liberal modernity:
- Portrays individuals as unencumbered selves, free to choose their own conceptions of the good.
- Structures politics around the management of competing preferences, often through bureaucratic and managerial mechanisms.
- Undermines the conditions for shared practices, virtues, and traditions.
He contends that liberal institutions tend to fragment moral discourse and weaken the communities necessary for genuine practical reasoning.
11.2 Community and Common Goods
In response, MacIntyre emphasizes:
- Local communities organized around shared practices and common goods.
- The role of traditions in sustaining standards of excellence and shaping citizens’ character.
- The importance of political participation oriented not just to individual rights but to the flourishing of the community as a whole.
He often appeals to historical examples, such as Aristotelian polis life or certain monastic communities, as paradigms of integrated social orders, while acknowledging contemporary constraints.
11.3 Relation to Communitarianism
MacIntyre is frequently associated with communitarian critiques of liberalism, alongside figures like Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor. Comparisons often highlight:
| Theme | MacIntyre | Other Communitarians (generalized) |
|---|---|---|
| Source of critique | Aristotelian–Thomistic tradition, virtue ethics | Varied (Hegelian, phenomenological, republican) |
| Emphasis | Practices, virtues, traditions of enquiry | Recognition, dialogical self, civic republicanism |
| Attitude to liberalism | Deep structural critique | Often reformist or balancing |
MacIntyre himself has sometimes resisted the communitarian label, arguing that it can obscure the specifically Aristotelian–Thomistic basis of his political thought.
11.4 Politics of Localism and Institutions
In later writings, MacIntyre advocates for:
- Building and sustaining local forms of community where practices and virtues can flourish.
- Critical engagement with large‑scale institutions (e.g., states, corporations, universities) that may impede such communities.
- A form of politics that is neither liberal individualist nor centralized socialist, but oriented toward subsidiarity and common goods.
Critics question the feasibility and inclusiveness of this localist vision in complex, pluralistic societies, and whether it adequately addresses issues of structural injustice and global interdependence. Supporters view it as a realistic strategy for cultivating virtue within the constraints of modernity.
12. Religion, Conversion, and Catholic Thought
Religion, especially Roman Catholicism, plays an increasingly explicit role in MacIntyre’s later work, shaping his ethical, metaphysical, and political commitments.
12.1 Path to Conversion
MacIntyre’s early writings show ambivalence toward Christianity, alternating between criticism and selective appropriation. In the 1960s and 1970s, he engaged with:
- Christian socialism and radical theology.
- The moral and political implications of Christian doctrine.
His formal conversion to Roman Catholicism in 1984 marked a significant biographical and intellectual development, though commentators disagree on how abrupt or gradual the underlying shift was.
12.2 Catholic Thomism and Moral Enquiry
Following his conversion, MacIntyre increasingly identifies with a Catholic Thomist tradition of moral enquiry. In Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990), he contrasts:
- Encyclopaedic projects (Enlightenment rationalism).
- Genealogical approaches (Nietzsche, Foucault).
- A Thomistic tradition that integrates faith and reason within a historical community of enquiry.
He presents Thomism as a living, self‑correcting tradition able to respond to modern challenges while remaining rooted in Catholic doctrine and sacramental practice.
12.3 Ecclesial Community and Practices
MacIntyre emphasizes the role of the Church as:
- A community sustaining practices (liturgy, spiritual disciplines, works of mercy) that shape virtues and identities.
- A bearer of a long, argumentative tradition about the good and the just.
Some scholars interpret his localist and communal politics as implicitly modeled on monastic or parish forms of life, though he does not reduce politics to ecclesial structures.
12.4 Reception Across Religious and Secular Contexts
MacIntyre’s turn to Catholic thought has elicited diverse responses:
- Catholic and other Christian thinkers often see his work as a major contemporary articulation of natural law and virtue ethics, bridging philosophy and theology.
- Secular philosophers may appropriate his analyses of practices, traditions, and emotivism while bracketing or contesting his theological commitments.
- Critics argue that his reliance on a specifically Catholic framework limits the appeal or neutrality of his proposals in pluralistic societies.
Debate continues over whether MacIntyre’s project is best understood as a confessional Catholic philosophy or as a more broadly accessible contribution to moral and political theory informed, but not wholly determined, by his religious commitments.
13. Major Works and Their Reception
MacIntyre’s corpus spans seven decades and includes monographs, essay collections, and numerous articles. Several works stand out for their influence and the debates they have generated.
13.1 Key Monographs
| Work | Main Focus | Noted Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Marxism: An Interpretation (1953) | Philosophical analysis of Marxism | Early attempt to systematize Marxist theory in analytic terms |
| The Unconscious (1958) | Conceptual analysis of psychoanalysis | Influential in philosophy of psychology and critique of Freudian theory |
| A Short History of Ethics (1966) | Historical survey of moral philosophy | Established MacIntyre as a leading historian of ethics |
| After Virtue (1981) | Critique of modern moral theory, revival of virtue ethics | Landmark in virtue ethics and communitarian debates |
| Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1989) | Tradition‑constituted rationality | Foundational for debates on relativism, rationality, and traditions |
| Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990) | Encyclopaedia, genealogy, Thomistic tradition | Examines competing modes of moral enquiry |
| Dependent Rational Animals (1999) | Dependence, vulnerability, and virtues | Integrates biology with virtue ethics; influential in care ethics |
| Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity (2016) | Desire, practical reasoning, narrative | Further development and application of his mature framework |
13.2 Reception in Philosophy
Across these works, reception has been substantial:
- Supportive readings view MacIntyre as revitalizing Aristotelian virtue ethics, offering a powerful alternative to dominant consequentialist and deontological frameworks, and providing a nuanced account of rationality and tradition.
- Critical responses focus on alleged historical oversimplifications (especially in After Virtue), concerns about relativism or traditionalism in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, and questions about the plausibility of his Thomistic metaphysics.
His work has influenced not only ethics and political philosophy but also theology, education, business ethics, and social theory.
13.3 Interdisciplinary Impact
MacIntyre’s concepts of practices, internal goods, and institutions have been widely used in:
- Management and organizational studies (e.g., critiques of managerialism).
- Professional ethics in medicine, law, and education.
- Discussions of character education and the aims of the university.
Some scholars adapt these ideas without endorsing their Aristotelian or Thomistic basis, indicating a degree of modularity in his framework.
13.4 Ongoing Scholarship
A substantial secondary literature has developed, including introductory texts, critical companions, and collections devoted to specific works. Debates persist over:
- The coherence and development of MacIntyre’s thought across periods.
- The compatibility of his early Marxist concerns with his later Thomism.
- The applicability of his ideas to contemporary global and multicultural contexts.
Overall, his major works are widely regarded as essential reading for understanding late twentieth‑century debates in moral and political philosophy.
14. Criticisms and Debates
MacIntyre’s philosophy has generated extensive criticism and debate across multiple fronts. These discussions often focus on the coherence, historical accuracy, and political implications of his project.
14.1 Historical and Genealogical Critiques
Historians of philosophy and ethicists have questioned aspects of MacIntyre’s historical narratives, particularly in After Virtue:
- Some argue that his portrayal of Enlightenment moral theory as doomed to failure is overly schematic and neglects internal complexities.
- Others contend that his story of the decline from classical to modern ethics simplifies medieval and early modern developments.
Defenders reply that MacIntyre’s account is a diagnostic narrative rather than a comprehensive history, aimed at illuminating structural shifts.
14.2 Rationality, Relativism, and Traditions
MacIntyre’s notion of tradition‑constituted rationality has raised concerns about relativism:
- Critics argue that if all reasoning is tradition‑bound, there may be no non‑circular way to adjudicate conflicts between traditions.
- Questions arise about whether his criteria for a tradition’s superiority (e.g., ability to resolve epistemic crises) can be accepted by those outside that tradition.
Supporters maintain that his framework offers a fallibilist but robust account of rational judgement, avoiding both foundationalism and relativism, though debate continues over its adequacy.
14.3 Liberalism and Pluralism
Political theorists have debated MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism and his advocacy of local, tradition‑based communities:
- Some argue that he underestimates the achievements of liberal institutions in protecting individual rights, minority groups, and freedom of conscience.
- Others worry that his emphasis on tradition and community could legitimate authoritarian or patriarchal structures.
Sympathetic interpreters often present his position as a call for communal renewal within or alongside liberal frameworks, rather than a straightforward rejection of liberal democracy.
14.4 Metaphysics and Theological Commitments
MacIntyre’s Thomistic Aristotelianism has been criticized for:
- Relying on metaphysical assumptions (e.g., robust essences, final causes) that some regard as incompatible with contemporary natural science.
- Integrating Catholic theology in ways that may limit the accessibility of his arguments to non‑theists or adherents of other religions.
Others see these commitments as a coherent deepening of his earlier project, arguing that critics can still engage with many of his insights without adopting his full metaphysical or theological framework.
14.5 Feminist and Care Ethics Perspectives
Feminist philosophers and care ethicists have both critiqued and drawn on MacIntyre:
- Early critics claimed his emphasis on tradition and virtue risked reinforcing gendered roles and overlooking systemic inequalities.
- Later work, especially on dependence and care, has been praised as convergent with care ethics, though debates persist about how fully it addresses power relations and intersectional concerns.
These varied criticisms have contributed to a dynamic interpretive field in which MacIntyre’s ideas are contested, revised, and extended.
15. Legacy and Historical Significance
MacIntyre’s legacy spans multiple domains of philosophy and beyond, with ongoing influence in ethics, political theory, theology, and social thought.
15.1 Role in the Virtue Ethics Revival
MacIntyre is widely regarded as a central figure in the late twentieth‑century revival of virtue ethics. His work:
- Provided a comprehensive narrative explaining the marginalization and recovery of virtue‑based ethics.
- Influenced major subsequent virtue ethicists and helped establish virtue as a primary alternative to deontology and consequentialism.
His framework continues to shape debates about character, moral education, and the structure of ethical theory.
15.2 Impact on Political and Social Thought
In political philosophy, MacIntyre’s critique of liberal individualism and his emphasis on community and common goods have significantly influenced:
- Communitarian and neo‑Aristotelian theories of citizenship.
- Discussions of localism, civic participation, and institutional design.
His ideas have also been used in critiques of bureaucracy, managerialism, and the modern university, particularly through the lens of practices and internal goods.
15.3 Influence in Theology and Religious Ethics
Within Christian theology, especially Catholic moral theology, MacIntyre’s Thomistic Aristotelianism has:
- Contributed to renewed interest in virtue, natural law, and tradition‑based enquiry.
- Informed discussions of ecclesial practices, moral formation, and the relation between faith and reason.
His work is also engaged by theologians in other traditions and by scholars of comparative religious ethics exploring tradition‑constituted rationality.
15.4 Interdisciplinary Reach
MacIntyre’s concepts have been employed in:
- Business and professional ethics, analyzing how organizations support or corrupt practices.
- Education theory, including debates about the aims of schooling and higher education.
- Bioethics and disability studies, particularly through the lens of dependence and care.
This interdisciplinary uptake indicates that his ideas function as a shared vocabulary across diverse fields, even where his full philosophical system is not adopted.
15.5 Place in Twentieth- and Twenty-First-Century Philosophy
Historians of philosophy typically situate MacIntyre as:
- A major post‑analytic thinker who integrates analytic methods with historical and continental themes.
- A key interlocutor in debates over modernity, rationality, and tradition, alongside figures such as Rawls, Habermas, and Taylor.
Assessments of his long‑term significance vary. Some portray him as a foundational figure whose integration of ethics, epistemology, and social theory will remain central; others regard his project as a powerful but ultimately contested contribution, particularly given its strong metaphysical and theological commitments. What is widely agreed is that MacIntyre’s work has reshaped the terms of discussion about virtue, community, and the rationality of moral traditions in contemporary philosophy.
Study Guide
intermediateThe biography assumes some familiarity with basic ethical theories, the Enlightenment, and major historical figures like Aristotle and Aquinas. The narrative is accessible to motivated undergraduates but contains technical notions (e.g., tradition‑constituted rationality, teleology, Thomism) that may challenge complete beginners without prior philosophy exposure.
- Basic ethical theory (virtue ethics, deontology, consequentialism) — MacIntyre is centrally involved in the late 20th‑century revival of virtue ethics and is arguing against dominant deontological and consequentialist approaches; knowing these frameworks helps you see what is distinctive about his project.
- Introductory knowledge of the Enlightenment and modern political liberalism — Much of MacIntyre’s work is a critique of Enlightenment moral theory and liberal individualism; understanding the basic ideals of autonomy, rights, and neutrality clarifies his objections.
- Very basic familiarity with Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas — MacIntyre’s mature view is a Thomistic Aristotelianism; knowing that Aristotle emphasizes teleology and virtue, and that Aquinas integrates this with Christian theology, makes his metaphysical and ethical commitments easier to follow.
- Awareness of Marxism as a social and political theory — MacIntyre’s early phase is Marxist and his later work remains in dialogue with Marxist themes of ideology, capitalism, and social critique; basic familiarity helps you track continuities and breaks in his development.
- Aristotle — Provides the classical background for virtue ethics, teleology, and the concept of human flourishing that MacIntyre revives and develops.
- Thomas Aquinas — Gives context for Thomistic Aristotelianism and natural law, which shape MacIntyre’s mature metaphysics, ethics, and theology‑inflected views.
- Virtue Ethics — Offers an overview of virtue‑ethical approaches in modern philosophy, situating MacIntyre among other key figures such as Anscombe and Foot.
- 1
Get the big picture of MacIntyre’s project and why he matters in contemporary ethics and political philosophy.
Resource: Sections 1 (Introduction) and 2 (Life and Historical Context)
⏱ 30–45 minutes
- 2
Trace the development of MacIntyre’s thought from early Marxism and analytic work to his historical approach to ethics.
Resource: Sections 3 (Early Marxist and Analytic Period) and 4 (Turn to the History of Ethics)
⏱ 45–60 minutes
- 3
Study his central ethical framework: the critique of modern moral theory and the revival of virtue ethics through practices, narrative, and traditions.
Resource: Sections 5 (After Virtue and the Revival of Virtue Ethics), 6 (Practices, Internal Goods, and Institutions), and 7 (Narrative, Identity, and Human Flourishing)
⏱ 60–90 minutes
- 4
Deepen your understanding of his epistemology and metaphysics, and how these support his ethics.
Resource: Sections 8 (Tradition‑Constituted Rationality and Epistemology) and 9 (Metaphysics, Teleology, and Thomistic Aristotelianism)
⏱ 60–90 minutes
- 5
Explore his mature account of the virtues, dependence, and political and religious implications.
Resource: Sections 10 (Ethics, Virtues, and Dependent Rational Animals), 11 (Political Philosophy, Community, and Critique of Liberalism), and 12 (Religion, Conversion, and Catholic Thought)
⏱ 60–90 minutes
- 6
Consolidate your understanding by examining how his major works were received, and by engaging with key criticisms and his legacy.
Resource: Sections 13 (Major Works and Their Reception), 14 (Criticisms and Debates), and 15 (Legacy and Historical Significance)
⏱ 60 minutes
Virtue ethics
An approach to ethics that focuses on the cultivation of stable character traits (virtues) and the idea of a flourishing human life, rather than on rules (deontology) or consequences (consequentialism).
Why essential: MacIntyre’s entire project is framed as a revival and radical development of virtue ethics; understanding virtue ethics is necessary to grasp both his critique of modern moral theory and his positive alternative.
Practice (MacIntyrean sense)
A coherent, complex, socially established cooperative human activity (such as chess, medicine, or physics) with internal goods and standards of excellence that can only be realized through sustained participation in that activity.
Why essential: Practices are the foundation of MacIntyre’s account of internal goods, virtues, and institutions; they explain how shared standards of excellence shape character and communal life.
Internal and external goods
Internal goods are those achievable only through engagement in a particular practice and contribute to its excellence and the practitioner’s flourishing; external goods are contingent rewards like money, prestige, or power that can be gained in many ways and are often competitive.
Why essential: The distinction explains how practices can be corrupted by institutions that prioritize external goods and why virtues are needed to properly order external to internal goods.
Narrative unity of a life
The idea that a human life is intelligible as an unfolding story or quest in which actions, roles, and commitments gain meaning from their place in a temporally extended narrative shaped by communities and traditions.
Why essential: MacIntyre’s account of moral agency, identity, and practical reasoning depends on the claim that we are ‘story‑telling animals’; without this, his critique of atomistic selves and his conception of the virtues are incomplete.
Emotivism
The metaethical view that moral judgments primarily express the speaker’s preferences or attitudes rather than objective truths about human goods, and that moral language often functions as a tool of influence.
Why essential: MacIntyre’s diagnosis of modern moral fragmentation hinges on the claim that contemporary discourse is in practice emotivist, even when it presents itself as rational and objective.
Tradition‑constituted rationality
The thesis that standards of rational justification, coherence, and evidence arise within historically extended, socially embodied traditions of enquiry, rather than from a supposedly neutral, tradition‑free standpoint.
Why essential: This concept underpins MacIntyre’s response to charges of relativism and his account of how different moral and philosophical frameworks can be compared and criticized.
Teleology and Thomistic Aristotelianism
Teleology is the view that beings have natural ends or purposes (telē) toward which they are directed; Thomistic Aristotelianism is Aquinas’s integration of Aristotelian teleology with a Christian metaphysics of creation, law, and grace.
Why essential: MacIntyre’s mature ethics and politics rely on a robust claim about human nature and its ends; without his teleological and Thomistic commitments, his defense of objective virtues and flourishing would look very different.
Dependent rational animals and virtues of acknowledged dependence
MacIntyre’s description of human beings as rational yet vulnerable creatures whose flourishing depends on networks of care; the associated virtues (such as just generosity and misericordia) enable us to give and receive care appropriately.
Why essential: This concept extends his earlier virtue theory to highlight dependence, vulnerability, and care, connecting his ethics to bioethics, disability studies, and critiques of autonomy‑centered models.
MacIntyre is simply a communitarian critic of liberalism, similar to other communitarians like Sandel or Taylor.
While MacIntyre is often grouped with communitarians, his critique of liberalism is grounded specifically in Aristotelian–Thomistic virtue ethics and tradition‑constituted rationality. He himself has resisted the communitarian label because it can obscure these distinct philosophical roots.
Source of confusion: Superficial similarities in language about community and the self, and the tendency in political theory to treat all critics of liberal individualism as part of one ‘communitarian’ camp.
Tradition‑constituted rationality makes MacIntyre a relativist who denies that one tradition can be rationally better than another.
MacIntyre explicitly rejects relativism. He argues that traditions can be rationally compared by examining how they respond to internal crises, explain their own development, and account for the successes and failures of rivals. Rational evaluation is possible, but never from a neutral, tradition‑free standpoint.
Source of confusion: The assumption that if rational standards are tradition‑dependent, then no cross‑traditional judgement is possible; misunderstanding his critique of ‘universal’ reason as a denial of any objectivity.
MacIntyre nostalgically wants to return to a past social order (e.g., the medieval polis or monastic life) as a realistic political program.
While he uses historical communities (polis, monasteries) as models to illuminate practices and common goods, he does not propose simply restoring them. His later work instead emphasizes creating and sustaining local communities and practices within the conditions of modernity.
Source of confusion: Reading his historical examples and final pages of *After Virtue* (e.g., the reference to ‘another—doubtless very different—St Benedict’) as straightforward political blueprints rather than as diagnostic and imaginative prompts.
MacIntyre’s turn to Thomism and Catholicism marks a complete break with his earlier Marxist and critical concerns.
There is significant continuity: his concern with ideology, social practices, and the critique of liberal capitalism persists, even as he comes to see Thomistic Aristotelianism as a more adequate framework than Marxism. The shift is a re‑grounding and re‑orientation, not a total abandonment of earlier themes.
Source of confusion: Focusing only on the obvious change in religious and metaphysical commitments, and not on the recurring worries about modernity, capitalism, and fragmented moral discourse that run across his career.
MacIntyre’s emphasis on tradition and social roles necessarily entails conservative endorsement of all inherited norms and hierarchies.
For MacIntyre, traditions are ongoing arguments about the good that can and must criticize their own past; they are not static. His framework allows for internal critique of unjust or oppressive practices within traditions, even if he is sometimes faulted for not developing this aspect fully.
Source of confusion: Equating ‘tradition’ with uncritical preservation of the past, and overlooking his description of traditions as historically extended conflicts of interpretation and argument.
How does MacIntyre’s concept of a ‘practice’ differ from ordinary uses of the term (e.g., ‘business practice’ or ‘teaching practice’), and why is this distinction important for his account of the virtues?
Hints: Compare his emphasis on internal goods and standards of excellence with more generic meanings of ‘practice.’ Think about examples like chess or medicine versus activities organized mainly around external goods like profit.
Why does MacIntyre think that modern moral discourse is fragmented and effectively emotivist? Do you find his diagnosis convincing when you consider contemporary public moral debates?
Hints: Review his ‘fragments of a conceptual scheme’ image in *After Virtue* and his account of the failed Enlightenment project. Consider debates about rights, freedom, or justice where participants seem to talk past one another.
In what sense is rationality ‘tradition‑constituted’ for MacIntyre, and how does he attempt to avoid both foundationalism and relativism?
Hints: Focus on the idea of traditions as historically extended arguments with evolving standards. Ask how a tradition might respond to an internal crisis, and how it might explain the strengths and weaknesses of a rival tradition.
What role does the ‘narrative unity of a life’ play in MacIntyre’s account of moral agency and identity, and how might this view handle lives marked by rupture, trauma, or multiple conflicting identities?
Hints: Start from his claim that we are ‘story‑telling animals.’ Consider whether a unified narrative is necessary for responsibility, and think about feminist or postmodern critiques of unified identity.
How does MacIntyre’s notion of humans as ‘dependent rational animals’ modify or extend more traditional Aristotelian virtue ethics?
Hints: Compare Aristotle’s focus on the virtuous citizen to MacIntyre’s emphasis on dependence, vulnerability, and care across the life cycle. Ask how virtues of acknowledged dependence relate to more familiar virtues like justice or courage.
To what extent does MacIntyre’s Thomistic metaphysics (teleology, essences, natural law) strengthen or weaken the persuasiveness of his critique of liberalism in a pluralistic society?
Hints: Consider whether his arguments against liberalism require accepting his metaphysical and theological views, or whether some of his criticisms could be reformulated in less committal terms.
Is MacIntyre’s vision of local communities centered on practices and common goods a realistic or desirable response to globalized, bureaucratic modernity?
Hints: Evaluate his critique of large‑scale institutions (states, corporations, universities) and think about contemporary examples of small‑scale communities, cooperatives, or professional practices. Consider issues of inclusion, justice, and scalability.
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@online{philopedia_alasdair_chalmers_macintyre,
title = {Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre},
author = {Philopedia},
year = {2025},
url = {https://philopedia.com/philosophers/alasdair-chalmers-macintyre/},
urldate = {December 11, 2025}
}Note: This entry was last updated on 2025-12-08. For the most current version, always check the online entry.