Alfred Schmidt

Life and Academic Career

Alfred Schmidt (1931–2012) was a German philosopher associated with the second generation of the Frankfurt School. Born on 19 May 1931 in Frankfurt am Main, he grew up in a society marked by the aftermath of National Socialism and the Second World War, a context that would later shape his concern with ideology, domination, and emancipation.

Schmidt studied philosophy, history, and German literature at the University of Frankfurt. There he encountered Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, leading figures of the Frankfurt School’s first generation, who became decisive intellectual influences. He completed his doctorate under Horkheimer in 1963 with a dissertation on Marx’s concept of nature, later published as Der Begriff der Natur in der Lehre von Marx (The Concept of Nature in Marx), the work that established his reputation.

From the mid‑1960s onward, Schmidt taught at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, becoming professor of philosophy. He participated in the theoretical debates surrounding the 1968 student movement, often mediating between radical political demands and the more reflective orientation of critical theory. Although close to Marxist and left‑socialist currents, he generally maintained a distance from party politics, emphasizing critical analysis over direct political agitation.

Schmidt remained academically active in Frankfurt for decades, supervising dissertations and contributing to the consolidation of critical theory as a philosophical and interdisciplinary project. He retired in the 1990s but continued to write and lecture. He died on 28 August 2012 in Frankfurt am Main.

Work on Marx, Nature, and Materialism

Schmidt’s best‑known book, Der Begriff der Natur in der Lehre von Marx (1962; English: The Concept of Nature in Marx), offers a systematic reconstruction of Karl Marx’s concept of nature. Against interpretations that understand Marx as an uncritical advocate of the domination of nature through technology, Schmidt argued that Marx treats nature as a historically mediated field of human praxis rather than as a mere external object.

For Schmidt, a central insight in Marx is that labor is a mediating relation between humans and nature. In capitalist conditions, this relation becomes distorted: nature appears as a mere resource to be exploited, and human beings themselves are reduced to instruments. Schmidt proposed that Marx’s critique of political economy also contains an implicit critique of the reification of nature, which anticipates ecological concerns. Proponents of this reading have seen Schmidt as an early contributor to what is sometimes called eco‑Marxism, even though he did not himself use that label.

In this context Schmidt defended a specific understanding of materialism. He rejected both crude economic reductionism and purely idealist readings of Marx. Instead, he developed what he once called a “critical‑theoretical materialism”: social relations are materially grounded and historically formed, but they can only be adequately grasped through conceptual, philosophical reflection that interrogates ideology and forms of consciousness.

His work on Ludwig Feuerbach, collected in studies and essays, extended this concern. Schmidt treated Feuerbach as a transitional figure between classical German philosophy and Marx, especially in the critique of religion and in the anthropological turn away from speculative metaphysics. He emphasized both Marx’s indebtedness to and critical distance from Feuerbach, helping to nuance the intellectual genealogy of Western Marxism.

Critics of Schmidt’s position have argued that he sometimes over‑philosophizes Marx, attributing to Marx more systematic conceptual clarity about nature than the texts support, or that he remains too tied to Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s pessimistic evaluation of modern rationalization. Others contend that his ecological implications remain underspecified. Nevertheless, within debates on Marx’s view of technology, nature, and human needs, his reconstruction has become a standard reference point.

Critical Theory, Anthropology, and Religion

Beyond Marx exegesis, Schmidt made important contributions to the self‑understanding of critical theory. He frequently presented critical theory not as a closed doctrine but as a historically situated, reflexive form of social philosophy, combining elements of Hegelian dialectics, Marxian critique, and Weberian rationalization theory. He insisted on retaining the universalist, emancipatory claims of the Enlightenment while critically examining the ways in which those claims become entangled with domination.

An important strand of his work concerns philosophical anthropology. In dialogue with Arnold Gehlen, Max Scheler, and Helmuth Plessner, Schmidt thematized the human being as a “Mängelwesen” (a deficient or open‑ended being) who must create a world of institutions, culture, and technology in order to survive. Where conservative anthropologists sometimes derived rigid social orders from this condition, Schmidt used it to highlight historical variability and the possibility of emancipation from specific forms of domination. For him, the openness of human nature is a condition not only for social constraint but also for critique and transformation.

Schmidt also engaged the philosophy of religion from a critical‑theoretical perspective. In essays and lectures he analyzed religion as a complex phenomenon: on the one hand, a source of consolation and meaning for those suffering under unjust social conditions; on the other hand, a vehicle of ideology when it sanctifies existing power relations. Drawing on Marx’s notion of religion as the “opium of the people” and on Adorno’s reflections on theology and metaphysics, Schmidt explored how religious symbols and narratives can both express the wish for reconciliation and inhibit practical attempts to change the world.

In these domains, his approach combined philological care—close reading of classical texts—with systematic questions of domination, freedom, and rationality. Supporters see this as exemplary of critical theory’s best method: historically grounded, philosophically ambitious, and politically alert. Detractors sometimes regard his style as excessively textual and academic, claiming that it lacks the sociological detail or empirical research found in other strands of critical social science.

Reception and Influence

Within German‑language philosophy, Schmidt is widely regarded as a major interpreter of Marx and a key voice in second‑generation Frankfurt School debates, alongside figures such as Jürgen Habermas, Albrecht Wellmer, and Claus Offe. While Habermas focused on language and communicative rationality, Schmidt remained closer to the Horkheimer‑Adorno line, emphasizing domination, political economy, and the critique of nature.

His writings have influenced discussions in social philosophy, political theory, and environmental thought, especially where scholars seek to connect Marxian critique with questions of nature and technology. Translations of The Concept of Nature in Marx introduced his ideas to an international audience, though his overall impact outside German‑speaking contexts has been more limited than that of some of his contemporaries.

In later assessments, commentators have highlighted Schmidt’s role as a bridge figure: between classical German philosophy and Marxism, between the first and second generations of the Frankfurt School, and between early ecological concerns and critical social theory. While debates continue over the adequacy of his readings and the scope of his materialism, his work remains a significant reference for anyone studying critical theory, Western Marxism, and the philosophical interpretation of Marx in the late twentieth century.