George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne

1. Introduction

George Berkeley (1685–1753), Bishop of Cloyne, was an Irish philosopher and Anglican churchman whose work reshaped early modern debates about perception, reality, and the basis of human knowledge. Best known for his doctrine of immaterialism—the view that so‑called material objects are nothing over and above ideas in minds—he offered a radical alternative to the dominant mechanistic and materialist philosophies of the 17th and 18th centuries.

Operating within the broadly empiricist tradition after John Locke, Berkeley combined close attention to experience with a systematic critique of notions he regarded as obscure or unnecessary, such as material substance, absolute space, and abstract ideas. His famous slogan esse est percipi (“to be is to be perceived”) encapsulates his claim that the being of sensible things consists in their being perceived by conscious spirits. At the same time, he insisted on the reality of minds (or spirits) and posited an omnipresent God whose perception and volition secure the stability and order of nature.

Berkeley’s writings span several areas:

Scholars often distinguish between his early “classical” immaterialism and later writings that seem to introduce stronger Neoplatonic and theological themes. Interpretations vary over how unified his system is, whether his philosophy is primarily epistemological, metaphysical, or theological in motivation, and how far his critiques of science and mathematics are destructive or constructive.

This entry surveys Berkeley’s life and context, the development and content of his major works, and the principal themes and debates surrounding his philosophy, with attention to both sympathetic and critical interpretations.

2. Life and Historical Context

2.1 Biographical Outline

George Berkeley was born on 12 March 1685 at Dysert Castle, near Thomastown in County Kilkenny, Ireland, into a Protestant Anglo‑Irish family. He entered Trinity College Dublin in 1700, became a fellow in 1707, and pursued an academic and clerical career that combined teaching, writing, and travel. His early philosophical publications appeared between 1709 and 1713. Periods in London and on the European continent, including extended stays in Italy, broadened his intellectual and ecclesiastical contacts.

In the late 1720s Berkeley launched a plan for a missionary college in Bermuda, leading him to reside in Rhode Island (1728–1731) while awaiting funding that never fully materialized. On his return he was appointed Dean of Derry (1724) and later, in 1734, consecrated Bishop of Cloyne in the Church of Ireland. He died in Oxford on 14 January 1753, likely of heart failure, while listening to his wife read.

2.2 Irish, British, and European Context

Berkeley’s life unfolded against the backdrop of a confessional and colonial Ireland, dominated politically by a Protestant ascendancy and marked by tensions between Anglican, Presbyterian, Catholic, and dissenting communities. As a Church of Ireland cleric, he participated in a state‑supported religious establishment and wrote about Irish social and economic problems.

Intellectually, Berkeley belonged to the early Enlightenment. He engaged with:

Historians differ over whether Berkeley should be seen primarily as a critic within the Enlightenment or as a counter‑Enlightenment defender of traditional religion. Many emphasize that his work combines innovative philosophical strategies with a commitment to Christian theism, framed within the political and ecclesiastical structures of the British Isles and their colonies.

3. Early Education and Trinity College Dublin

3.1 Schooling and Entry into Trinity

Evidence about Berkeley’s earliest schooling is limited, but he appears to have received a solid classical education, likely at Kilkenny College or another local grammar school, where he would have studied Latin, Greek, and basic logic. He entered Trinity College Dublin in 1700 at the age of fifteen, an institution that followed a traditional curriculum combining Aristotelian scholasticism with newer Cartesian and mechanical philosophy.

3.2 Curriculum and Intellectual Milieu

At Trinity, Berkeley encountered a mixture of:

Trinity’s fellows and tutors introduced students to the works of Descartes, Locke, and contemporary natural philosophers. Berkeley’s notebooks and later reminiscences suggest that Locke’s Essay and the emerging Newtonianism formed key points of reference for his own reflections.

3.3 Fellowship, Teaching, and Early Reputation

Berkeley completed his B.A. in 1704, gained a fellowship in 1707, and proceeded to M.A. in 1707/1708. As a fellow he lectured in theology and the humanities, supervised students, and participated in college governance. During this period he began compiling the Philosophical Commentaries, revealing his early move away from scholastic and Cartesian metaphysics toward a distinctive form of empiricism.

Some historians stress Trinity’s role as a relatively peripheral but intellectually lively institution, where engagement with continental and English thought occurred at a slight remove from metropolitan centers. Others underline the college’s function in consolidating the Protestant elite in Ireland, shaping Berkeley’s later concern with social reform and ecclesiastical policy.

These formative years at Trinity provided the immediate institutional and intellectual context for Berkeley’s first published work, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, and for the development of his immaterialist philosophy.

4. Intellectual Development and Philosophical Commentaries

4.1 The Philosophical Commentaries (Commonplace Book)

Berkeley’s Philosophical Commentaries (c. 1707–1708), sometimes called his Commonplace Book, are a series of numbered notebook entries in which he explores metaphysical, epistemological, and theological themes. They were not published in his lifetime but are now central for understanding his development.

The entries show him grappling with:

• The status of ideas and the possibility of abstract ideas
• The nature of material substance and whether it is intelligible
• The relation between perception, language, and thought
• The existence and knowledge of God and other spirits

4.2 From Skepticism to Immaterialism

Interpreters often describe the notebooks as charting a path from worries about skepticism to the formulation of immaterialism. Berkeley repeatedly questions the notion of a material substratum underlying sensible qualities and experiments with formulations that anticipate his mature slogan esse est percipi.

Some scholars emphasize a gradual, exploratory process, with Berkeley trying out competing lines of thought. Others argue that a recognizable immaterialist position appears quite early, with the notebooks mainly refining its details and implications.

4.3 Method and Style

The aphoristic and self‑addressed style of the Commentaries differs from the polished arguments of the Principles and Three Dialogues. Berkeley writes in a mix of English and occasional Latin, records doubts and self‑corrections, and links metaphysical claims with practical and religious concerns (such as combating atheism and irreligion).

A common scholarly view is that the Commentaries reveal Berkeley’s conviction that philosophical problems often arise from linguistic confusion—an idea later elaborated in his works on perception and language. They also illustrate his strategy of pushing opponents’ assumptions (about matter, abstraction, or infinite divisibility) to what he takes to be absurd consequences.

4.4 Relation to Later Works

There is debate about how directly the Commentaries feed into later texts. Many commentators see them as a blueprint for the Part I of A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, while noting that some themes (such as free will and the nature of moral good) receive less prominence in the published works. Others suggest that shifts between the notebooks and later writings indicate changes of emphasis, particularly regarding the role of God and the scope of immaterialism.

Overall, the Philosophical Commentaries mark the transition from Berkeley’s student training to the systematic philosophy that would soon appear in print.

5. Major Works and Their Publication History

5.1 Chronological Overview

Berkeley’s main philosophical writings appeared over more than three decades. Key works and their approximate dates are:

5.2 Publication Contexts and Revisions

Berkeley often published in response to specific audiences and controversies:

• The New Theory of Vision appeared in Dublin and quickly attracted attention among scientists and philosophers interested in optics. A revised edition was later appended to the 1732 edition of Alciphron, suggesting Berkeley’s continued interest in its themes.
• The Principles (Part I) was printed in Dublin in 1710. A planned Part II, dealing more extensively with natural philosophy, never appeared, leading to scholarly conjectures about its content and reasons for its absence.
• Three Dialogues were published in London in 1713, partly to reach an English audience and to clarify or popularize the more technical arguments of the Principles.

5.3 Later Works and Reception

De Motu was submitted to an academic prize competition in Florence and printed in Latin, reflecting Berkeley’s engagement with continental scientific debates. Alciphron was published during his American and post‑American years and targets English deists and “minute philosophers.” The Analyst and subsequent pamphlet exchanges drew responses from prominent mathematicians, including Colin Maclaurin and others, and formed part of a broader discussion about the rigor of calculus.

The Querist appeared anonymously as a series of pamphlets, each consisting entirely of questions, and circulated mainly within Ireland. Siris was published in London and went through several editions, puzzling contemporaries and later readers with its movement from medical observations about tar‑water to high metaphysics.

Scholars note that many of Berkeley’s works initially met with limited or mixed reception, only gaining sustained philosophical attention in the 19th and 20th centuries as idealism and analytic philosophy revived interest in his arguments.

6. Core Philosophy and the Thesis of Immaterialism

6.1 Central Claim: Esse est Percipi

Berkeley’s core philosophical thesis, immaterialism (often labeled “idealism”), states that there are no mind‑independent material substances. What are ordinarily called physical objects consist of ideas in minds. His famous formulation is:

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“Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.”

— George Berkeley, Principles, §3

For Berkeley, the esse (being) of sensible things like tables or trees is percipi (being perceived). Beyond the realm of ideas, he recognizes only spirits—active, perceiving, willing beings, including finite human minds and God.

6.2 Motivations and Arguments

Berkeley presents immaterialism as solving or dissolving several problems:

• Against skepticism: If objects are ideas directly given in perception, there is no gap between appearance and reality of the sort that fuels skeptical doubt.
• Against material substance: He argues that the notion of a material substratum underlying sensible qualities is incoherent or unintelligible.
• Against abstract ideas: He claims that philosophers’ talk of “matter” often rests on illegitimate abstraction.

Key argumentative strategies include:

There is debate among commentators about the structure and strength of these arguments. Some see a single “master argument”; others identify several independent lines of reasoning.

6.3 Relation to Empiricism and Theology

Berkeley positions immaterialism as a consistent extension of empiricism: since all content of thought derives from experience of ideas, positing matter adds an unverifiable, unnecessary entity. At the same time, he connects his thesis with theology: the continued existence and regular order of the world are grounded in the perception and volitions of God.

Interpretations differ on whether Berkeley’s primary motive is:

• Epistemological (removing skeptical gaps between ideas and objects),
• Metaphysical (eliminating what he regards as empty entities), or
• Theological (defending providence and divine activity against materialist explanations).

Most accounts view these strands as interrelated, though they disagree about which is most fundamental.

7. Metaphysics: Spirits, Ideas, and God

7.1 Ontological Scheme

Berkeley’s metaphysics distinguishes sharply between two kinds of entity:

He rejects material substance as an intelligible category, holding that talk of bodies is ultimately reducible to ordered collections of ideas perceived by spirits.

7.2 Ideas and Their Types

Ideas include colors, sounds, tastes, tactile qualities, as well as more complex structures (e.g., “this tree” as a coherent cluster of sensory ideas). Berkeley distinguishes:

• Sensible ideas, given passively in perception.
• Imagined or remembered ideas, which depend on a spirit’s activity but remain passive objects.

He insists that ideas themselves are causally inert: they cannot act on each other. Causation belongs properly to spirits.

7.3 Spirits and Agency

Spirits are knowable not by ideas but by notions—a non‑sensory, reflexive awareness of oneself as an active perceiver and willer, extended analogically to other minds and to God. Human spirits can:

• Perceive ideas of sense and imagination,
• Will changes in their own imaginative trains of ideas,
• Experience regular sequences of sensible ideas that they interpret as signs of God’s activity.

Berkeley maintains that finite spirits do not create or destroy ideas of sense; they receive them.

7.4 God as Supreme Spirit

Central to Berkeley’s metaphysics is God, an infinite spirit who:

• Continuously perceives all ideas, securing their existence when finite minds are not attending to them.
• Orders sensory ideas into regular, law‑like patterns that constitute the course of nature.
• Causes sensible ideas in finite minds, while allowing them limited agency over their own volitions and imaginings.

In this framework, the stability and intersubjective consistency of the world are explained by God’s constant perception and governance.

7.5 Interpretative Disputes

Scholars disagree about the exact status of bodies in Berkeley’s ontology:

• Some read him as a phenomenalist, treating objects as logical constructions out of actual and possible ideas of sense.
• Others emphasize his commitment to substantial spirits, portraying him as a spiritual realist rather than a mere phenomenalist.
• Debate also surrounds the strength and nature of our notion of God and other minds, and whether Berkeley can justify these notions without falling into the kind of abstraction he criticizes.

Despite these debates, most interpreters agree that the dualism of active spirits and passive ideas, underwritten by a theistic framework, is the cornerstone of his metaphysics.

8. Epistemology and Critique of Abstract Ideas

8.1 Empiricist Starting Point

Berkeley shares with other early modern empiricists the view that all the content of human cognition derives from experience. Ideas of sense, reflection, memory, and imagination provide the materials of knowledge. He endorses a broadly anti‑skeptical epistemology: once one abandons material substance and certain abstract entities, he maintains, skepticism loses its grip.

8.2 Attack on Abstract Ideas

A central element of Berkeley’s epistemology is his critique of abstract ideas, directed especially against Locke. Philosophers, he argues, often suppose that we can form an idea of, say, triangle in general, which is neither equilateral nor scalene, neither right‑angled nor oblique. Berkeley contends that such abstraction is impossible: any idea actually before the mind is always particular and determinate.

Instead, he explains generality in terms of:

• General names (words) that are used to stand indifferently for many particular ideas.
• A capacity to consider or use a particular idea without attending to its more specific features.

On this view, the “general” is a function of linguistic and attentional practices, not of distinct abstract ideas.

8.3 Epistemic Consequences

Berkeley believes that rejecting abstract ideas clarifies many philosophical puzzles. For example:

• The notion of material substance arises, he claims, from illegitimate abstraction from sensible qualities.
• Difficulties about infinite divisibility and space are aggravated by positing abstract extensions beyond any possible perception.

His positive epistemology emphasizes clear and distinct ideas grounded in actual or possible sense experience, and notions of spirits derived from self‑awareness.

8.4 Knowledge, Belief, and Certainty

Berkeley distinguishes between:

He holds that we have immediate knowledge of our own ideas and of ourselves as perceiving spirits. Our knowledge of God and other minds is more indirect, based on inference from the order and regularity of ideas.

8.5 Scholarly Assessments

Commentators diverge on the success and scope of Berkeley’s anti‑abstractionism:

• Some praise it as a powerful critique of confused metaphysical concepts, anticipating later philosophy of language.
• Others argue that it may be self‑undermining if Berkeley himself relies on notions (such as spirit or cause) that seem to require some form of abstraction.

There is ongoing discussion about whether Berkeley offers primarily an account of concept formation, a semantic theory of general terms, or both.

9. Philosophy of Perception and New Theory of Vision

9.1 Perception as Foundational

Berkeley’s philosophy of perception plays a central role in his overall system. He treats perception as our primary mode of access to ideas and builds his immaterialism partly on claims about what is and is not given in sense experience.

9.2 The New Theory of Vision

In An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709), Berkeley advances a detailed account of visual perception, focusing on distance, magnitude, and situation. His principal thesis is that distance is not immediately seen:

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“Distance, of itself and immediately, cannot be seen.”

— George Berkeley, New Theory of Vision, §2

Instead, we learn to judge distance by interpreting certain visual cues—such as the convergence of the eyes, the distinctness of objects, and changes in appearance—as signs of how far things are, based on prior associations with tactile and motor experiences.

9.3 Visual–Tactile Correlation

Berkeley extends this account to argue that many features we associate with sight (such as three‑dimensional shape and solid extension) are actually understood through learned correlations between visual and tactual/kinesthetic ideas. For example:

• A flat retinal image corresponds, via learned habits, to a perception of a solid object in space.
• Visual experience gives us only a two‑dimensional array of colors and lights; the sense of depth derives from touch and movement.

This leads some commentators to view Berkeley as an important precursor to later psychology of perception.

9.4 Immediate vs. Mediate Perception

Berkeley distinguishes between:

For Berkeley, only the former are strictly speaking objects of vision; the latter are judgments based on learned associations.

9.5 Relation to Immaterialism

The New Theory of Vision does not explicitly present immaterialism, and some of Berkeley’s contemporaries read it as compatible with materialism. Later works tie the theory more closely to his metaphysics, especially through the idea that visual ideas function as signs instituted by God of other ideas, rather than resembling external objects.

Scholars debate whether Berkeley’s theory is primarily:

• A psychological account of how humans visually perceive,
• A conceptual analysis of what it means to say we “see” distance, or
• A step toward undermining the notion that vision reveals a world of material objects existing in absolute space.

Regardless, the New Theory of Vision has been widely discussed in the history of optics and perception.

10. Philosophy of Language and the Sign Theory of Perception

10.1 Language as Sign‑Use

Berkeley’s interest in language emerges in his accounts of abstraction, general terms, and perception. He conceives words as signs that stand for ideas and facilitate communication and thought. Meaning arises from conventional associations between words and ideas, not from any intrinsic resemblance.

In his anti‑abstractionist discussions, he emphasizes:

• The pragmatic use of words in reasoning and science.
• The dangers of verbal disputes where terms lack clear, associated ideas.

10.2 Sensory Ideas as Divine Signs

Building on his theory of vision, Berkeley extends the notion of signification from words to sensory ideas themselves. In later works, especially the Principles and Three Dialogues, he presents a sign theory of perception:

• Sensible ideas (particularly visual ideas) function as signs.
• They are arbitrarily but regularly connected by God to other ideas (e.g., tactile experiences, bodily motions).
• Through experience, we learn to interpret these signs, enabling practical interaction with the world.

On this view, just as words do not resemble their referents, visual ideas need not resemble the tactile or practical outcomes they signify.

10.3 Lawlike Regularity and Natural Language

Berkeley compares the laws of nature to the grammar of a language: a systematic set of rules by which God “speaks” to us through sensory appearances. Studying nature is therefore akin to learning a language of signs.

This analogy supports both his:

• Anti‑skeptical stance (perception reliably conveys information through divinely ordered signs), and
• Instrumentalist attitude toward certain scientific concepts, which may function as useful “short‑hand” within this language without corresponding to independent entities.

10.4 Theory of Meaning and Theology

In Alciphron, Berkeley develops a more explicit theory of religious language. He argues that religious terms and doctrines may convey meaningful content even when they do not correspond to distinct, picturable ideas. Their significance lies in their practical and devotional roles and in the broader system of discourse and practice in which they are embedded.

This leads some interpreters to see Berkeley as anticipating later views (e.g., in pragmatism or ordinary‑language philosophy) that stress use over representation in understanding meaning.

10.5 Interpretative Debates

Scholars differ on several points:

• Whether Berkeley’s sign theory of perception is best viewed as a semantic theory (about meaning) or as a causal‑psychological theory (about learned associations).
• The extent to which his views on language are systematic or developed piecemeal in response to specific issues.
• Whether his allowance for meaningful, non‑imagistic religious terms sits comfortably with his demand that philosophical terms be associated with clear ideas.

Despite these disputes, Berkeley’s treatment of language is widely regarded as a significant and sometimes underappreciated dimension of his philosophy.

11. Natural Philosophy, De Motu, and Newtonian Science

11.1 Berkeley’s Engagement with Natural Philosophy

Berkeley was well‑versed in the new science of his day, especially the works of Newton and his followers. Rather than rejecting science, he aimed to reinterpret its concepts in line with his immaterialism and his views on meaning. He accepted the predictive success of mechanics and optics while questioning the metaphysical status of certain theoretical entities.

11.2 De Motu (On Motion)

In De Motu (1721), a Latin treatise submitted to a prize competition in Florence, Berkeley addresses the nature of motion, force, and space within Newtonian mechanics. He distinguishes between:

He argues that:

• The true causes of motion are spirits (ultimately God), not forces inhering in bodies.
• Mechanics should be understood as a mathematical science of signs, correlating measurable quantities rather than revealing the intrinsic nature of reality.

11.3 Critique of Newtonian Absolutes

Berkeley takes issue with Newton’s notion of absolute space, which exists independently of bodies and provides their true motions. He regards such absolutes as unintelligible abstractions with no basis in experience. Motion, on his view, is always relative—defined with respect to other bodies or to a chosen frame of reference.

His stance has been compared to later relational theories of space and motion, though scholars debate the extent of any direct anticipation.

11.4 Science as Practical and Predictive

Berkeley characterizes natural philosophy as concerned with:

• The regular conjunctions of ideas of sense.
• The formulation of laws of nature, understood as descriptions of God’s customary ways of acting.

He thus sees scientific theories as economical descriptions and predictive tools, not as literal descriptions of hidden mechanisms in matter. This outlook has led some commentators to classify him as an early instrumentalist or operationalist about scientific theories.

11.5 Scholarly Assessments

Interpretations diverge on Berkeley’s relation to Newtonianism:

• Some view him as a moderate critic, accepting most of Newton’s results while rejecting certain metaphysical interpretations.
• Others see a more radical reconstruction of natural philosophy, subordinating it to a theistic and idealist metaphysics.
• There is also debate over whether his insistence on spiritual causation undermines or simply relocates the explanatory aims of physics.

In any case, De Motu provides a key link between Berkeley’s immaterialist metaphysics and his views on the nature and limits of physical theory.

12. The Analyst and the Foundations of Mathematics

12.1 Context and Aims

The Analyst: A Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician (1734) is Berkeley’s most famous contribution to the philosophy of mathematics. It responds to what he perceived as the confidence of mathematicians who criticized religion for lack of rational foundation, while, in his view, relying on dubious assumptions in their own field—particularly in the calculus developed by Newton and Leibniz.

12.2 Critique of Infinitesimals and Fluxions

Berkeley targets concepts such as infinitesimals and Newton’s fluxions, arguing that they are obscure and possibly self‑contradictory. He famously describes them as:

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“the ghosts of departed quantities”

— often paraphrased from The Analyst, §35

His complaints include:

• Infinitesimals are treated as both non‑zero (to justify algebraic manipulations) and vanishingly small or zero (when discarded at the end of calculations).
• Explanations of fluxions rely on unclear talk of “moments” of quantities or of motion “in an instant,” which he finds unintelligible.

Berkeley does not deny the correctness of results obtained by calculus; rather, he challenges the logical rigor and clarity of the methods used.

12.3 Philosophical and Theological Dimensions

The work has a dual thrust:

• Philosophical/logical: To show that respected branches of knowledge can involve implicit contradictions or idealizations, suggesting that standards of rigor must be carefully examined.
• Theological/apologetic: To argue that critics of religious mysteries have no grounds to demand greater clarity from theology than from successful scientific or mathematical practice.

Berkeley thus invites a comparison between faith in mathematical methods and faith in religious doctrines, though he does not equate them.

12.4 Impact on the Development of Analysis

Historians of mathematics often credit The Analyst and the ensuing controversy (including responses by mathematicians like Maclaurin) with stimulating work that eventually led to:

• More rigorous definitions of limits,
• The arithmetization of analysis in the 19th century,
• The abandonment of naive infinitesimals in favor of epsilon‑delta methods.

There is disagreement about how direct this influence was. Some scholars view Berkeley’s role as catalytic but indirect, while others caution against overstating his impact, noting that internal mathematical developments also pushed toward greater rigor.

12.5 Interpretative Debates

Commentators differ over whether Berkeley’s criticism aims to:

• Undermine the metaphysical status of infinitesimals while allowing their instrumental use, or
• Demand full conceptual clarity as a condition for legitimate mathematics.

Some see him as anticipating later constructivist or finitist attitudes; others argue that his main concern is consistency with his broader empiricist and immaterialist framework, which resists commitment to infinitely small or abstract entities not grounded in experience.

13. Religion, Theology, and the Role of God

13.1 Theistic Framework

Berkeley was an Anglican clergyman, and theism is integral to his philosophy. God, as an infinite spirit, plays multiple roles:

• Metaphysical: The ultimate cause and sustainer of all ideas of sense.
• Epistemological: The guarantor of the orderliness and reliability of experience.
• Ethical and religious: The object of worship and the source of moral obligation.

He holds that nature is a system of signs through which God communicates with finite spirits, reinforcing a view of the world as imbued with divine meaning.

13.2 Arguments for God’s Existence

Berkeley offers several lines of reasoning for belief in God, including:

• From the order and regularity of sensory ideas: the complex, lawlike structure of experience is said to require an intelligent, active cause.
• From the passivity of ideas: since ideas cannot cause themselves, and finite spirits lack the power to produce sensory ideas at will, a superior spirit must be responsible.
• From design: features of the natural world are interpreted as indicative of benevolent design.

These arguments are developed in the Principles, Three Dialogues, and especially Alciphron.

13.3 Anti‑Freethinking and Apologetics

In Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1732), Berkeley stages dialogues between Christian spokesmen and various freethinkers, including deists and skeptics. He defends:

• The reasonableness of Christianity,
• The moral and social value of religious belief,
• The meaningfulness of key Christian doctrines, even when they surpass complete human comprehension.

He criticizes forms of religious enthusiasm and superstition but is more concerned with combating irreligion and moral laxity he associates with fashionable skepticism.

13.4 Religion and Moral Order

Berkeley connects religion closely to morality and social cohesion. He holds that:

• Belief in a just and providential God underwrites moral accountability.
• Religious practices and institutions promote virtue and public order.

In his sermons and practical writings, he advocates for piety, charity, and reform, particularly in the Irish context.

13.5 Interpretative Issues

Scholars debate how to rank the importance of theology within Berkeley’s system:

• Some portray his immaterialism as primarily a defense of religion, designed to weaken materialist and atheistic philosophies.
• Others argue that his religious commitments are compatible with, but not strictly foundational for, his metaphysical innovations.
• A further line of interpretation stresses the integration of his philosophical, scientific, and theological views in a unified vision of a God‑governed, meaning‑laden world.

There is also discussion about his stance toward doctrinal controversies of his time; while broadly orthodox within Anglicanism, his writings sometimes emphasize practical piety and moral improvement over detailed dogmatic disputes.

14. Social, Political, and Economic Thought

14.1 Irish Context and Practical Concerns

As an Anglican clergyman and later Bishop of Cloyne, Berkeley wrote extensively on Irish social and economic conditions. Ireland in his time faced poverty, underdevelopment, and political subordination within the British Empire. Berkeley addressed these issues in sermons, pamphlets, and especially in The Querist.

14.2 The Querist and Economic Reflections

The Querist (1735–1737) consists entirely of numbered questions, addressing topics such as:

• The nature and function of money,
• Trade, industry, and national improvement,
• Education, morals, and public policy.

Key ideas include:

• Money as a symbol or “ticket” facilitating exchange rather than wealth in itself.
• The importance of domestic industry and discouraging over‑reliance on imports.
• Encouraging frugality, industry, and patriotism among the Irish population.

Some commentators see Berkeley as an early contributor to political economy, anticipating later discussions of credit, circulation, and the relationship between moral character and economic prosperity.

14.3 Political and Colonial Views

Berkeley’s famous plan for a Bermuda college aimed to educate both colonial youth and Indigenous peoples in the Americas. He envisioned a religiously grounded education that would promote moral and civil improvement. Modern scholars offer differing assessments:

• Some view the project as missionary idealism, motivated by philanthropic and religious goals.
• Others critique it as part of a colonial civilizing mission, operating within imperial frameworks that marginalized Indigenous cultures.

Politically, Berkeley generally supports existing monarchical and ecclesiastical structures, emphasizing social order, obedience to legitimate authority, and gradual reform rather than radical change.

14.4 Social Reform and Morality

Throughout his practical writings, Berkeley associates national prosperity with:

• Moral virtue (sobriety, honesty, diligence),
• Religious practice,
• Education and improvement of manners.

He proposes measures ranging from agricultural enhancement and manufacturing to schemes for public work and education. His tone often combines moral exhortation with economic analysis.

14.5 Scholarly Perspectives

Analyses of Berkeley’s social thought vary:

• Some highlight his contributions to early Irish nationalism and economic self‑reliance.
• Others stress the paternalistic and hierarchical aspects of his proposals.
• There is also interest in how his idealism and sign theories intersect with his understanding of money as a symbolic medium.

Overall, Berkeley’s social, political, and economic writings reflect an attempt to apply philosophical and theological principles to concrete problems of his society.

15. Late Philosophy: Siris and Neoplatonic Themes

15.1 Siris and Its Structure

Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries (1744) is Berkeley’s major late work. It begins with practical reflections on tar‑water as a medicinal remedy and gradually ascends through a “chain” of numbered sections to topics in natural philosophy, metaphysics, and theology. The work engaged contemporary interest in panaceas while surprising readers with its expansive philosophical reach.

15.2 Neoplatonic Influences

In Siris, Berkeley draws heavily on Neoplatonic and Platonic sources, citing figures such as:

• Plotinus
• Proclus
• Numenius
• Late antique commentators on Plato and Aristotle

He explores themes of:

• The hierarchical structure of reality, moving from material things through souls to the divine.
• The notion of intelligible forms or archetypes.
• The idea of the world as an emanation or expression of the divine intellect.

This has led many scholars to describe Berkeley’s late thought as showing a pronounced Neoplatonic turn.

15.3 Continuity and Change with Earlier Thought

Debate centers on how Siris relates to Berkeley’s earlier immaterialism:

• Some argue for continuity, claiming that Siris elaborates and deepens the spiritual and theistic dimensions already present, without abandoning the core thesis that reality consists of spirits and ideas.
• Others detect shifts or tensions, suggesting that the talk of degrees of being, intelligible light, or a chain of realities moves beyond the strict two‑category ontology of spirits and ideas.

There is also discussion about whether Berkeley in Siris reintroduces forms of abstraction or metaphysical entities that his earlier works had rejected.

15.4 Tar‑Water and Natural Philosophy

The medical focus of Siris is not merely incidental. Berkeley treats tar‑water as a vehicle for reflecting on:

• The subtle fluids and “virtues” he posits in nature,
• The relation between physical cures and spiritual well‑being,
• The broader idea that material things are signs and instruments of divine goodness.

Some interpreters view his enthusiasm for tar‑water as continuous with his view of nature as a beneficent system ordered by God; others see it as a speculative or even credulous episode.

15.5 Interpretative Controversies

Commentators remain divided on several issues:

• Whether Siris represents a culmination of Berkeley’s thought or a departure from his earlier philosophy.
• The extent to which its Neoplatonic language should be taken literally or metaphorically.
• How to integrate its discussions of light, fire, and spirit with his previous rejection of material substances.

Despite such disputes, Siris is widely recognized as an essential source for understanding the late Berkeley and the evolution of his metaphysical and theological outlook.

16. Criticisms, Misunderstandings, and Contemporary Debates

16.1 Early Reactions and Misunderstandings

From the outset, Berkeley’s immaterialism attracted charges of paradox or absurdity. Critics often claimed that:

• His view denies the reality of the external world.
• It leads to solipsism, since only one’s own ideas seem certain.
• It undermines common‑sense beliefs about bodies and their persistence.

Berkeley insisted that he did not deny the existence of tables and chairs, but only of material substance as a supposed underlying support distinct from ideas.

16.2 Classic Philosophical Critiques

Notable critics include:

Reid, for example, maintained that we are directly aware of external objects, not merely of ideas, and charged Berkeley with a “theory of ideas” that distorts the phenomenology of perception.

16.3 Modern Analytic Debates

In the 20th and 21st centuries, Berkeley’s philosophy has been revisited in light of developments in analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Contemporary debates focus on questions such as:

• Is Berkeley best interpreted as a phenomenalist, a subjective idealist, or a spiritual realist?
• Does his so‑called master argument against matter succeed, or does it rest on a confusion between imagining and conceiving?
• Can his theory of notions provide an adequate account of our knowledge of other minds and God?

Some philosophers find in Berkeley resources for defending direct realism (about ideas or experiences) and opposing representationalist accounts of perception; others see him as exemplifying the very idea‑theory they reject.

16.4 Critiques of the Sign Theory and Science

Berkeley’s sign theory of perception and his views on natural philosophy have prompted further criticism:

• Instrumentalist readings of science are sometimes accused of undervaluing explanation in favor of prediction.
• His reduction of forces and absolute space to constructs is seen by some as diminishing the ontological commitments of successful theories.

Defenders reply that Berkeley offers an insightful account of how scientific concepts function as tools rather than mirrors of reality.

16.5 Ongoing Scholarly Disputes

Current scholarship remains divided on several interpretative issues:

• The coherence of Berkeley’s overall system, especially the relation between early and late works.
• The priority of epistemological versus theological motives.
• The compatibility of his empiricism with his appeal to notions of spirits and to Neoplatonic themes.

These debates continue to fuel interest in Berkeley as a figure whose arguments probe foundational questions about perception, reality, and the aims of philosophy.

17. Reception, Influence, and Legacy

17.1 Eighteenth‑ and Nineteenth‑Century Reception

During Berkeley’s lifetime and shortly thereafter, his immaterialism was widely regarded as ingenious but implausible. It exerted influence primarily through:

• Critical engagements by Scottish Common Sense philosophers (Reid, Beattie),
• Discussions in German philosophy, where Kant and later idealists grappled with his “dogmatic idealism,”
• Theologians and apologists who drew selectively on his anti‑materialist and anti‑skeptical arguments.

In the 19th century, British Idealists such as F. H. Bradley and T. H. Green revisited Berkeley as an important precursor, although they often adapted or transformed his doctrines.

17.2 Influence on Idealism and Phenomenalism

Berkeley’s insistence that reality is fundamentally mental contributed to later strands of idealism. Some 19th‑ and early 20th‑century philosophers developed phenomenalist accounts of physical objects as logical constructions out of sensory data, frequently citing Berkeley as an ancestor, even where they did not share his theism or his ontology of spirits.

At the same time, more metaphysically robust idealists sometimes criticized Berkeley for what they saw as an overly individualistic or psychological approach.

17.3 Role in Analytic Philosophy

In the 20th century, Berkeley became a central figure in analytic philosophy’s engagement with:

• The theory of perception (sense‑data, direct realism),
• The philosophy of language (meaning and use of general terms),
• The foundations of mathematics and science (instrumentalism, rigor in analysis).

Philosophers such as A. J. Ayer, J. L. Austin, and later John McDowell and George Pitcher have discussed Berkeley in the context of their own theories, sometimes treating him as a foil, sometimes as a source of insights.

17.4 Interdisciplinary and Historical Influence

Berkeley’s ideas have also played roles in:

• Psychology of perception, where his New Theory of Vision is seen as an early contribution to understanding depth and cue integration.
• History of science, particularly discussions of Newtonian mechanics and the rigorization of calculus.
• Economic thought, where The Querist is noted in histories of Irish political economy and monetary theory.

17.5 Contemporary Reassessments

Recent scholarship has emphasized:

• The unity of Berkeley’s philosophical, theological, and social concerns,
• His relevance to ongoing debates about realism vs. anti‑realism, representation, and concept formation,
• His place in Anglo‑Irish intellectual history and the broader Enlightenment.

Some contemporary philosophers and historians regard Berkeley as a sophisticated critic of naive realism and scientism; others continue to view his immaterialism as instructive primarily as a challenge that clarifies the commitments of more realist positions.

Across these varied receptions, Berkeley remains a key interlocutor in discussions of how experience, language, and scientific practice relate to claims about what there is.

18. Legacy and Historical Significance

18.1 Position in the Early Modern Canon

Berkeley is now widely recognized, alongside Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, and Hume, as one of the major figures of early modern philosophy. His immaterialism represents a distinctive alternative to both rationalist and empiricist materialisms, forcing later thinkers to reconsider assumptions about substance, perception, and the external world.

His work marks a critical juncture in the transition from classical metaphysics to more epistemologically oriented and language‑conscious philosophy.

18.2 Contributions Across Disciplines

Berkeley’s legacy spans several domains:

18.3 Ongoing Philosophical Relevance

Berkeley’s questions and arguments continue to resonate in contemporary debates:

• His challenge to conceive mind‑independent matter is discussed in relation to modal and conceivability arguments.
• His account of perception is invoked in discussions of direct vs. indirect realism, sense‑data, and phenomenology.
• His views on scientific theory as a system of signs inform modern anti‑realist and pragmatist positions.

Whether one accepts his conclusions or not, his system offers a rigorously developed test case for non‑materialist metaphysics.

18.4 Historical Re‑Evaluation

Historically, Berkeley’s reputation has moved from that of an ingenious but eccentric “denier of matter” to that of a central, multifaceted thinker whose work integrates philosophy, theology, and social reflection. Recent scholarship on Irish and colonial contexts has added further nuance to his image, situating him within networks of imperial, ecclesiastical, and intellectual power.

Debates about:

• The consistency of his views across his career,
• The relative weight of religious and philosophical motivations,
• The nature of his influence on later idealism and analytic philosophy,

continue to shape assessments of his significance.

In sum, Berkeley’s legacy lies not only in the specific doctrines he advanced, but also in the way his work crystallizes enduring questions about what it is to perceive, know, and describe a world whose existence is inextricably bound up with mind.