John Duns Scotus
John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308) was a Scottish Franciscan friar and one of the most original and technically sophisticated philosophers and theologians of the High Middle Ages. Educated and active in the great studia of Oxford, Paris, and Cologne, he belonged to the Franciscan intellectual tradition shaped by Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent, yet he decisively reworked many of their doctrines. His extensive commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences and his logical and metaphysical treatises earned him the title Doctor Subtilis, the Subtle Doctor. Scotus is best known for his doctrine of the univocity of being, his account of haecceitas or ‘thisness’ as the principle of individuation, and his theory of the formal distinction, which mediates between real and merely conceptual differences. He articulated a highly influential voluntarist ethics in which God’s will and human freedom play central roles, and he offered one of the most sophisticated medieval defenses of the Immaculate Conception of Mary. Though his Latin style is notoriously dense, his thought shaped late medieval scholasticism, inspired the later school of Scotism, and influenced figures ranging from Suárez to modern analytic metaphysicians. In contemporary philosophy, Scotus is often seen as a key bridge between classical medieval metaphysics and later developments in ontology, modality, and philosophy of language.
At a Glance
- Born
- c. 1266(approx.) — Duns, Berwickshire, Kingdom of Scotland
- Died
- 1308-11-08 — Cologne, Holy Roman EmpireCause: Unknown (traditional sources simply report his death while teaching in Cologne)
- Floruit
- c. 1295–1308Period of major teaching and writing activity in Oxford, Paris, and Cologne.
- Active In
- Scotland, England, France, Holy Roman Empire (Cologne)
- Interests
- MetaphysicsPhilosophy of GodLogicEpistemologyEthicsNatural theologyPhilosophical theologyPhilosophy of language
John Duns Scotus articulates a highly technical metaphysics in which being (ens) is said in a univocal sense of both God and creatures, allowing for a rigorous science of being as being, while at the same time preserving divine transcendence through the doctrines of formal distinction and haecceitas; this ontological framework undergirds a voluntarist theology in which God’s free will is the ultimate source of contingent reality and moral law, yet human beings possess an irreducible freedom of will ordered to the intuitive, non-necessitated love of God.
Ordinatio (Opus oxoniense), Commentaria in quattuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi
Composed: c. 1300–1308 (reworking Oxford lectures during his Paris and Cologne years)
Lectura in librum primum et secundum Sententiarum
Composed: c. 1293–1299
Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis
Composed: c. 1295–1300
Quaestiones in libros Porphyrii Isagoge et Praedicamenta Aristotelis
Composed: c. 1295–1300
Quaestiones super Praedicamenta et Perihermeneias Aristotelis
Composed: c. 1295–1300
Collationes parisienses (Collationes in Hexaëmeron and other collations)
Composed: c. 1300–1307
Reportatio parisiensis (Reportata parisiensia) in Sententias
Composed: c. 1302–1304 (report of Paris lectures)
Theoremata
Composed: c. 1298–1304 (uncertain)
Being is that which is first conceived by the intellect; for everything that is conceived either is being, or can be reduced to being as to something prior.— Ordinatio I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 26
States Scotus’s foundational thesis that ‘being’ (ens) is the primary and most universal object of the intellect, grounding his univocal metaphysics.
The concept of being is univocal with respect to God and creature, not merely equivocal or analogous.— Ordinatio I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 38–39
Articulates his doctrine of the univocity of being, opposing purely analogical accounts and enabling a strict science of metaphysics.
The individual has something positive that is beyond the nature and contracts it to this here and now, and this is what I call a ‘thisness’ (haecceity).— Ordinatio II, d. 3, pars 1, q. 6 (paraphrastic translation of Scotus’s account of haecceitas)
Explains his theory of individuation by haecceitas, a positive formal entity grounding the uniqueness of each individual.
The will is of itself indeterminate with respect to opposites, and by its liberty it can will or not will, even when all conditions on the part of the object are fulfilled.— Ordinatio II, d. 25, q. un.
Expresses Scotus’s strong account of libertarian free will, central to his ethics and theology of grace and merit.
It was fitting that the Blessed Virgin be preserved from original sin by a most perfect Redeemer, who in a more sublime way prevented her from falling, rather than merely raising her up after a fall.— Ordinatio III, d. 3, q. 1
Classic formulation of his argument for the Immaculate Conception, emphasizing the perfection of Christ’s redemptive work.
Formation and Early Franciscan Training (c. 1279–1293)
As a young friar, Scotus received his basic education in Franciscan studia in Britain, probably at Dumfries and then Oxford, absorbing Augustinian, Bonaventurian, and Aristotelian materials and preparing for theological lecturing.
Oxford Lectures and First Systematic Work (c. 1293–1301)
While lecturing on Peter Lombard’s Sentences at Oxford, Scotus developed key positions on universals, individuation, divine ideas, and cognition; this period yields the Lectura and early questions on the Metaphysics and logical works.
Parisian Maturity and the Ordinatio (1302–1307)
As a master at Paris, Scotus reworked and systematized his Oxford teaching into the Ordinatio, refined his doctrines of univocity, formal distinction, will and intellect, and defended controversial theses such as the Immaculate Conception.
Cologne Teaching and Late Influence (1307–1308)
Transferred to Cologne, Scotus continued teaching and revising his thought; although he died young, this phase disseminated his ideas in the German provinces and helped lay the foundations for later Scotist schools.
Posthumous Systematization and Scotist School (14th–17th centuries)
Students and later followers edited, completed, and standardized his works, shaping ‘Scotism’ as a distinct scholastic current that influenced Catholic theology and early modern metaphysics.
1. Introduction
John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308) was a Franciscan friar and scholastic thinker whose work reshaped late medieval discussions in metaphysics, theology, and ethics. Active primarily at Oxford, Paris, and Cologne, he became known among later scholastics as the Doctor Subtilis (“Subtle Doctor”) because of the extraordinary precision and density of his arguments. His major writings are commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, reworked into the Ordinatio and associated reportations, along with questions on logic and Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
Scotus is most often associated with three interlocking doctrines:
- The univocity of being, according to which the concept of being (ens) applies in the same formal sense to God and creatures.
- The theory of haecceity (haecceitas or “thisness”) as a positive principle of individuation in addition to shared natures.
- The formal distinction, a middle way between purely conceptual and fully real distinctions, used to analyze both divine attributes and created natures.
These positions, together with his strong account of divine and human will, form a systematic framework that differs in important ways from the more widely known Thomistic synthesis. Proponents of “Scotism” later developed this framework into a recognizable school, while critics often took Scotist doctrines as foils in debates over analogy, freedom, and the structure of reality.
The encyclopedic sections that follow treat his life and historical setting, the formation and transmission of his texts, and the major areas of his thought, tracing both medieval reception and modern reinterpretations. Throughout, the aim is to situate Scotus’s distinctive claims within the broader scholastic landscape and to outline the main lines of scholarly disagreement about their meaning and significance.
2. Life and Historical Context
2.1 Biographical Outline
Scotus was probably born around 1266 near the village of Duns in Berwickshire, in the Scottish Borders. He entered the Franciscan Order as a youth and was ordained priest in 1288 at Northampton. His adult life was largely spent in university studia: first in England (most likely Oxford and possibly Cambridge), then at Paris, and finally at Cologne, where he died on 8 November 1308. The surviving evidence suggests a brief but intense academic career of roughly fifteen years.
Key attested milestones are summarized below:
| Year | Event | Location |
|---|---|---|
| c. 1266 | Probable birth | Duns (Scotland) |
| 1288 | Ordination as priest | Northampton |
| c. 1293 | Begins lecturing on Sentences | Oxford |
| 1302 | Regent master of theology | Paris |
| 1303 | Temporary exile over papal–royal conflict | Paris |
| 1304 | Returns to Paris chair | Paris |
| 1307 | Transfer to Franciscan studium | Cologne |
| 1308 | Death and burial | Cologne |
2.2 Intellectual and Ecclesial Setting
Scotus’s career unfolded during the high scholastic period, when Aristotelian philosophy had been largely integrated into the curriculum of arts and theology faculties. He worked in an environment shaped by earlier Franciscans such as Bonaventure and by contemporaries including Thomas Aquinas’s followers, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, and emerging nominalists.
Theologically, he lived in the aftermath of the Condemnations of 1277, which sanctioned certain Aristotelian and Averroist theses. Some historians argue that this context encouraged more robust assertions of divine omnipotence and contingency, themes prominent in Scotus’s thought. Others caution against drawing direct causal lines, noting that many of Scotus’s positions develop intra-Franciscan debates rather than reacting explicitly to the condemnations.
2.3 Political and Institutional Context
Scotus’s Paris career intersected with the conflict between Pope Boniface VIII and King Philip IV of France over taxation and papal authority. A document lists Scotus among friars who supported the pope and were consequently expelled from France in 1303. He returned after the political situation shifted and resumed his teaching. Scholars differ on how far this episode influenced his theological positions on the Church and papacy; most agree that his extant works show relatively little direct engagement with contemporary ecclesiastical politics.
Within the universities, he operated in a competitive structure of mendicant orders, secular masters, and evolving academic regulations. His transfer to Cologne in 1307 is sometimes interpreted as an honorific appointment to strengthen Franciscan studies in the German provinces, though the precise motives remain uncertain.
3. Education and Franciscan Background
3.1 Early Formation in the Franciscan Order
Scotus’s early education took place within the Franciscan studia of Britain. While exact locations are disputed, many scholars propose an initial formation at a minor studium (possibly Dumfries) followed by advanced study at Oxford, the principal Franciscan center in England. The Franciscan curriculum integrated:
- Augustinian and Bonaventurian theology,
- newly translated Aristotelian works,
- and a strong emphasis on Scripture and the Sentences.
This background exposed Scotus to a characteristic Franciscan synthesis, prioritizing divine will, exemplar causality, and an affective orientation to God, which he later reworked in more technical form.
3.2 Franciscan Intellectual Traditions
Scotus’s teachers and near predecessors likely included figures such as Richard of Middleton and, indirectly, Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent. Within the order, debates concerned:
| Issue | Typical Franciscan Emphasis |
|---|---|
| Divine attributes | Exemplarism and divine ideas |
| Grace and charity | Primacy of love and will |
| Knowledge | Illumination and dependence on God |
Scotus often appropriates these themes while modifying their philosophical underpinnings. For example, he retains a strong doctrine of divine freedom but introduces a more elaborate metaphysics of formalities and univocal concepts than earlier Franciscans had employed.
3.3 Academic Training and Degrees
The standard route for a friar aspiring to the theology faculty involved:
- Arts training in logic, natural philosophy, and Aristotle.
- A period as baccalaureus sententiarum, lecturing on Lombard’s Sentences.
- Advancement to regent master in theology.
Scotus followed this path, lecturing on the Sentences at Oxford around 1293. There is discussion among historians about whether he obtained an arts degree in the strict sense; the majority view holds that, regardless of formal degree status, his mastery of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics presupposes an education equivalent to it.
3.4 Franciscan Identity and Vows
Scotus’s membership in the Order of Friars Minor shaped his life as a mendicant preacher, bound by vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. Some interpreters suggest that his insistence on the freedom and primacy of the will reflects a Franciscan spirituality focused on voluntary poverty and loving conformity to Christ. Others caution that such biographical explanations remain speculative, arguing that his positions are better traced to academic controversies than to spiritual ideals alone.
4. Oxford Period and Early Work
4.1 Teaching at Oxford
By the early 1290s, Scotus was lecturing on Peter Lombard’s Sentences at Oxford, probably as a bachelor of theology. These lectures constitute his earliest extensive theological work and reveal the emergence of key themes later refined in Paris. The Oxford environment featured intense debates among Franciscans, Dominicans, and secular masters over issues such as universals, divine knowledge, and grace.
4.2 The Lectura and Related Questions
The main textual witness to this phase is the ** Lectura on the first two books of the Sentences**, which preserves a relatively “raw” form of his Oxford teaching. Scholars generally date it to c. 1293–1299. It is often contrasted with the later Ordinatio:
| Feature | Lectura (Oxford) | Ordinatio (later revision) |
|---|---|---|
| Status | Initial report of lectures | Revised and systematized |
| Style | More compressed, exploratory | More elaborate, structured |
| Doctrinal development | Earlier formulations | Mature, sometimes divergent views |
In addition to the Lectura, a set of logical questions and questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics is traditionally linked to his Oxford years. Their attribution is partly disputed, but many scholars treat at least a core as authentically Scotist.
4.3 Doctrinal Developments in the Oxford Phase
In Oxford, Scotus began articulating preliminary versions of doctrines later associated with him:
- A nuanced treatment of universals and common natures, already moving beyond simple realism or nominalism.
- Early formulations of divine ideas and exemplar causality.
- Discussions of cognition that distinguish more carefully between abstractive and other modes of knowing.
Debate persists over how far central theses such as the univocity of being and the full theory of haecceity are already present at Oxford or emerge only in the Parisian revisions. Some scholars read the Lectura as containing the essential lines of these doctrines; others see the Paris texts as introducing significant innovations.
4.4 Transition Toward Paris
By the close of his Oxford period, Scotus had established himself as a formidable theologian. His move to Paris around 1302 appears to have been part of the normal progression for a promising Franciscan to the preeminent university of Latin Christendom. The Oxford writings then served as the basis for the more ambitious reworking that would become the Ordinatio.
5. Paris Career and the Ordinatio
5.1 Appointment and Teaching Role
In 1302 Scotus was appointed regent master of theology at the University of Paris, the highest academic rank in that faculty. As regent, he presided over lectures, disputed questions, and formal exercises in the Franciscan chair. His Paris tenure was interrupted in 1303, when he was temporarily exiled for supporting Pope Boniface VIII in the conflict with Philip IV; he returned by 1304 and resumed his mastership until his transfer to Cologne in 1307.
5.2 Composition of the Ordinatio
During the Paris years Scotus undertook a systematic revision of his Oxford Sentences lectures, producing the ** Ordinatio (also called Opus oxoniense)**. This work aimed to present a more ordered, carefully argued version of his theology. It is generally regarded as expressing his mature thought, though not all parts were completed before his death.
Key features include:
- Reorganization and expansion of earlier material.
- Integration of additional disputed questions and Parisian insights.
- Frequent engagement with contemporaries, especially Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and various anonymous Parisian masters.
Because the Ordinatio was left incomplete, later editors and disciples contributed to its final shape, leading to ongoing debates over the precise extent of Scotus’s own hand in particular distinctions and questions.
5.3 Parisian Disputations and Reportatio
Alongside the Ordinatio, Scotus’s Paris teaching was also recorded in student reports or reportationes. The ** Reportatio parisiensis on the Sentences** preserves another layer of his Paris lectures, sometimes diverging from the Ordinatio in structure or argument. Scholars dispute how much these variations reflect development in Scotus’s views as opposed to differing reporting practices.
Paris was also the setting for his collations (informal conferences), including the Collationes in Hexaëmeron. Their authenticity is contested, but many interpreters use them to illuminate his views on creation, divine ideas, and the spiritual life.
5.4 Paris Context and Controversies
The Paris faculty was an arena for intricate controversies over:
| Topic | Parisian Debates Relevant to Scotus |
|---|---|
| Analogy and univocity | Predication of being and attributes of God |
| Grace and merit | Role of will vs intellect, divine foreknowledge |
| Ecclesiology | Limits of papal and royal authority (in background) |
Scotus’s arguments on univocity, formal distinction, and divine will must be read against this backdrop of competing Thomist, Augustinian, and emerging nominalist positions. Some scholars emphasize his role as a critic of Thomas Aquinas, while others stress his engagement with Henry of Ghent and internal Franciscan debates.
6. Cologne Years and Death
6.1 Transfer to Cologne
In 1307 Scotus was transferred from Paris to the Franciscan studium at Cologne, likely as a lector in theology. The reasons for this move are not fully documented. Common hypotheses include:
- Strengthening the intellectual prestige of the Cologne studium by assigning a leading master.
- Responding to internal Franciscan administrative needs.
- Possible political considerations following the earlier Paris conflicts.
No consensus has emerged, and evidence for any specific motive remains circumstantial.
6.2 Teaching Activity in Cologne
At Cologne, Scotus continued to teach theology and apparently worked on revising his writings. The Cologne studium became a significant center for the later Scotist tradition, in part because of its role in preserving and transmitting his texts. However, the surviving record of his specific lectures in Cologne is sparse. Some scholars think that portions of the Ordinatio and related questions show signs of late revision that might reflect this final phase; others are more cautious, attributing many redactional features to posthumous editors.
6.3 Death and Burial
Scotus died in Cologne on 8 November 1308. The immediate cause of death is unknown; medieval sources simply report his passing while in active teaching. He was buried in the Minorite church there, and his tomb later became a site of local veneration. Over time, an aura of sanctity grew around his memory within the Franciscan Order, culminating in his beatification by Pope John Paul II in 1993.
Legends later arose around his death—most famously, the story that he was buried alive—which modern historians generally regard as apocryphal and unsupported by contemporary evidence.
6.4 Cologne and the Emergence of Scotism
Following his death, the Cologne friary housed manuscripts and traditions associated with Scotus’s teaching. Students and successors in the German provinces contributed to the early formation of Scotism as a distinct line within scholasticism. The precise extent to which this early Cologne reception shaped later editorial practices on Scotus’s texts remains an open question in textual scholarship.
7. Major Works and Textual Tradition
7.1 Principal Works
Scotus’s corpus is dominated by theological commentaries and quaestiones, many of which survive in multiple redactions:
| Work | Type | Approx. Date | Authorship Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ordinatio on the Sentences | Revised commentary | c. 1300–1308 | Generally authentic, partially unfinished |
| Lectura on Books I–II of the Sentences | Oxford lectures | c. 1293–1299 | Authentic |
| Reportatio parisiensis | Student report of Paris lectures | c. 1302–1304 | Partially disputed |
| Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum | Metaphysics questions | c. 1295–1300 | Authorship contested |
| Logical quaestiones (Porphyry, Categories, Perihermeneias) | Logic questions | c. 1295–1300 | Largely disputed, some likely Scotist core |
| Collationes parisienses (esp. in Hexaëmeron) | Informal talks | c. 1300–1307 | Authorship debated |
| Theoremata | Theological theorems | c. 1298–1304 | Fragmentary, authenticity disputed |
7.2 Manuscript Transmission
The textual tradition of Scotus is complex and layered:
- Many works exist in multiple redactions (authorial drafts, student reports, later editorial compilations).
- Manuscripts were copied in Franciscan centers across Europe, often with glosses and interpolations from later Scotists.
- The incomplete state of the Ordinatio led disciples to fill gaps using the Reportatio and other material, blurring lines between Scotus’s own writing and later additions.
Scholars distinguish between:
| Category | Description |
|---|---|
| Authorial text | Passages demonstrably written or dictated by Scotus |
| Authentic redactions | Early reworkings within his circle, possibly supervised by him |
| Later Scotist additions | Material added by followers to harmonize or systematize doctrines |
7.3 Modern Critical Editions
From the late nineteenth century, critical editions have attempted to disentangle these layers. The Vatican edition of the Opera omnia and subsequent projects apply philological methods to:
- Compare manuscript families,
- Identify later interpolations,
- Reconstruct likely original sequences of questions.
Debates continue over particular passages central to Scotist doctrines (for example, key texts on univocity and intuitive cognition), where variant readings may affect interpretation.
7.4 Authenticity Debates
The authenticity of the Metaphysics and logic questions, the collations, and the Theoremata is especially controversial. Positions include:
- A restrictive view, attributing only the core Sentences works and a subset of questions to Scotus.
- A more expansive view, which sees stylistic and doctrinal continuities sufficient to accept a broader corpus.
- Intermediate positions, differentiating between layers within the same work.
These disputes significantly influence reconstructions of Scotus’s development, especially regarding his metaphysics and theory of knowledge.
8. Core Themes of Scotist Philosophy
8.1 Systematic Orientation
Scotus’s philosophy is often read as a highly systematic project in which metaphysics, theology, and ethics are tightly interwoven. Many scholars emphasize his attempt to articulate a scientia transcendens, a science of being as being, that can include both God and creatures under a single univocal concept of being while preserving divine transcendence.
8.2 Key Metaphysical Ideas
Central metaphysical themes include:
- Univocity of being: The claim that the concept of being is predicated in the same formal sense of God and creatures, enabling demonstrative reasoning about God.
- Haecceity and individuation: The idea that individuals possess a positive thisness in addition to a common nature, grounding numerical distinction.
- Formal distinction and formalities: A nuanced account of internal differences within a single subject, used to analyze both divine attributes and aspects of created substances.
These ideas are treated in more detail in subsequent sections, but they function together to provide an ontology capable of handling divine–creature relations, universals, and individuality.
8.3 Epistemology and Cognition
In epistemology, Scotus distinguishes abstractive cognition, which grasps natures without commitment to existence, from intuitive cognition, which apprehends an actually existing object as present. This distinction underlies his views on human knowledge, divine knowledge of future contingents, and the beatific vision. Interpretations differ on how far intuitive cognition is possible in this life and how it relates to sense perception.
8.4 Will, Freedom, and Ethics
Scotus advances a strong form of voluntarism:
- The will is an active power with genuine indifference to opposites (synchronic contingency).
- Moral goodness is closely tied to the rectitude of the will and to divine commands.
- God’s will freely establishes contingent moral norms, while certain fundamental principles (such as love of God) are often regarded as necessary.
His ethics and legal theory develop these points into an account of natural and positive law.
8.5 Theological Themes
Theologically, Scotus is known for:
- A sophisticated doctrine of God’s knowledge and will,
- Arguments about the Incarnation and predestination of Christ,
- A distinctive defense of the Immaculate Conception of Mary.
Interpretations diverge over whether his system marks a decisive break with earlier medieval thought (for example, by “modernizing” metaphysics) or represents a variation within the larger scholastic framework. Subsequent sections explore these areas and their reception in more detail.
9. Metaphysics: Being, Univocity, and Individuation
9.1 Being as the First Object of the Intellect
Scotus holds that being (ens) is “that which is first conceived by the intellect”:
“Being is that which is first conceived by the intellect; for everything that is conceived either is being, or can be reduced to being as to something prior.”
— Ordinatio I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 26
From this he infers that metaphysics studies being as being, including both finite and infinite being, under the most general concepts and transcendentals (one, true, good, etc.).
9.2 Univocity of Being
Against views that treat predications about God and creatures as merely equivocal or strictly analogical, Scotus argues for the univocity of the concept of being:
“The concept of being is univocal with respect to God and creature, not merely equivocal or analogous.”
— Ordinatio I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 38–39 (paraphrastic)
Rationale
Proponents of this interpretation emphasize Scotus’s claims that:
- Demonstrative science requires a middle term common in concept to subject and predicate; thus metaphysical proofs about God demand a univocal concept of being.
- Without some univocal core, analogy collapses into equivocity, undermining rational theology.
Critics maintain that:
- Scotus overstates the incompatibility between analogy and science, misreading earlier thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas.
- His univocity risks “flattening” the distinction between Creator and creature, despite his insistence that univocity concerns the concept of being, not the mode of being.
Contemporary scholarship is divided over whether Scotus’s position should be read as purely logical/semantic or as implying deeper ontological commitments.
9.3 Transcendentals and Supertranscendentals
Scotus expands the traditional list of transcendentals (being, one, true, good) and elaborates “supertranscendental” notions—such as infinite and finite, or prior and posterior—that further articulate the domain of being. These are also treated as univocal, allowing metaphysics to classify both God (as infinite being) and creatures (as finite being) within a common semantic framework.
9.4 Common Nature and Individuation by Haecceity
To explain how many individuals share the same essence while being numerically distinct, Scotus distinguishes:
- A common nature (e.g., humanity) that is neither universal nor individual “in itself”.
- An individuating principle, haecceity (haecceitas), a positive formal entity that contracts the common nature to “this” singular.
In his view, individuation cannot be explained solely by matter, quantity, or existence; otherwise immaterial beings or individuals with identical qualitative features would be indistinguishable. Haecceity provides a non-qualitative, non-repeatable principle grounding strict numerical difference.
Alternative readings of Scotus’s account emphasize:
| Interpretation | Main Claim |
|---|---|
| Strong haecceity realism | Haecceities are really distinct formal entities present in individuals. |
| Moderate reading | Haecceity is a formal aspect inseparable from the individual but not an additional “thing”. |
| Conceptualist critique | Later critics argue that Scotus reifies individuality unnecessarily; numerical difference suffices without a positive principle. |
The debate centers on how to understand the metaphysical “positivity” of haecceity and its status relative to the common nature.
10. Theory of Distinctions and Common Natures
10.1 Types of Distinction
Scotus develops a nuanced taxonomy of distinctions to analyze how different aspects can be said to differ:
| Type | Characterization |
|---|---|
| Real distinction | Between two entities that can exist separately (e.g., Socrates and Plato). |
| Purely conceptual distinction (distinctio rationis) | Due solely to the mind’s activity, with no basis in reality. |
| Formal distinction “on the side of the thing” (distinctio formalis a parte rei) | Intermediate: grounded in the thing, but not between separable entities. |
The formal distinction is Scotus’s most distinctive contribution. It applies where there are multiple formalities or “ways of being” in one subject that are not reducible to each other yet inseparable in existence.
10.2 Formalities in God and Creatures
Scotus uses formal distinction to address two principal domains:
- Divine attributes: God’s justice and mercy, for example, are formally distinct aspects of the one simple divine essence. This aims to reconcile divine simplicity with rich, non-redundant predication.
- Created substances: In humans, the rational and sensitive aspects of the soul can be formally distinct, as can the common nature and haecceity within an individual.
Proponents argue that the formal distinction allows one to recognize genuine multiplicity of aspects without postulating multiple things in the subject, thereby respecting both unity and diversity.
Critics, especially some Thomists and later nominalists, contend that:
- The formal distinction either collapses into a merely conceptual distinction or secretly introduces real composition.
- It risks making divine simplicity purely nominal if too many internal formalities are posited.
There is disagreement among modern interpreters about whether Scotus’s formal distinction is best seen as an ontological thesis or as a sophisticated account of intensional structure.
10.3 Common Nature (Natura Communis)
Scotus’s doctrine of common natures analyzes what is shared by individuals of the same species:
- The common nature (e.g., “humanity”) considered in itself is neither universal (in many) nor singular (in one); these further determinations arise from external factors:
- Universality from the intellect considering the nature as predicable of many.
- Singularity from haecceity contracting the nature to one individual.
This allows Scotus to maintain a robust realism about natures without identifying them with universals as such. The same nature can be instantiated in individuals and also considered by the mind under universal concepts.
Alternative readings emphasize different aspects:
| View | Emphasis |
|---|---|
| Strong realism | The common nature has mind-independent being distinct from both individuals and universals. |
| Moderate realism | The nature’s status “in itself” is a conceptual tool; its real being is always as individualized. |
| Nominalist critique | Later critics argue that talk of natures “in themselves” is unnecessary; only individuals and concepts exist. |
10.4 Relation between Natures and Individuals
Scotus’s framework posits a layered structure:
- Common nature: metaphysical content.
- Haecceity: individuating formal principle.
- Individual: composite of nature plus haecceity.
Whether this should be taken as literal composition or as an analysis of different formal aspects remains debated. Many contemporary philosophers of metaphysics draw on Scotus’s theory to discuss issues of essentialism, identity conditions, and the ontology of properties.
11. Epistemology and Intuitive Cognition
11.1 Abstractive and Intuitive Cognition
Scotus distinguishes two fundamental kinds of cognitive acts:
- Abstractive cognition: grasps the nature (e.g., humanity) without determining whether the object exists. It is typical of conceptual and scientific knowledge.
- Intuitive cognition: apprehends an object as actually existing and present, including its concrete state (for example, that Socrates exists here and now).
This distinction structures his account of human, angelic, and divine knowledge.
11.2 Intuitive Cognition in This Life
A central question is whether humans in the present life can have genuine intuitive cognition not reducible to sense perception. Scotus argues that:
- In principle, the intellect can receive an intuitive act directly from God, even without corresponding sensory input (e.g., an angelic or divine vision).
- Ordinary human knowledge relies heavily on the senses and abstractive intellection, but does not exclude special intuitive acts, particularly in prophetic or miraculous contexts.
Some interpreters stress that Scotus is mainly concerned with modal possibility—what God can cause—rather than describing typical human experience. Others argue that he implies a more systematic place for intuitive acts even in ordinary cognition, through the intellect’s dependence on the presence of the object.
11.3 Intuitive Cognition and Contingency
Scotus uses intuitive cognition to explain knowledge of contingent truths, including:
- God’s knowledge of future free acts.
- The blessed’s vision of God in heaven.
- Human awareness of changing states (e.g., that something begins or ceases to exist).
Because abstractive cognition does not entail existence, it cannot by itself guarantee knowledge that a contingent object is. Intuitive cognition, by contrast, is inherently tied to the object’s actual existence and temporal status.
This plays a role in his account of synchronic contingency: God’s and the will’s knowledge of alternatives “at the same instant” depends on modes of cognition capable of tracking contingent being.
11.4 Objective Being and Divine Ideas
Scotus also develops a doctrine of objective being (esse obiectivum), the mode in which objects exist in the intellect as known. In God, the divine ideas of creatures have objective being prior to their creation. This framework allows him to explain:
- How God can know possible and future things without their actual existence.
- How our concepts can accurately represent natures while differing in mode of being from their extra-mental instances.
Interpretive debates focus on whether Scotus’s account anticipates later “intentionality” theories or remains within a more traditional species-based epistemology. Some scholars see his emphasis on objective being as a significant shift toward a more representationalist model; others regard it as an elaboration of standard scholastic terminology.
12. Theology of God, Will, and Freedom
12.1 Divine Simplicity and Attributes
Scotus affirms classical divine simplicity—God is not composed of parts—while employing the formal distinction to articulate real diversity of attributes within the one essence (see Section 10). God is infinite being, possessing all perfections in an eminent way. The multiplicity of attributes (wisdom, power, justice, mercy) reflects distinct formalities that are inseparable in reality but not reducible to one another.
Critics argue that this may compromise simplicity; defenders claim it secures rich predication about God without introducing real composition.
12.2 Primacy of the Divine Will
A hallmark of Scotus’s theology is the primacy of the will in God:
- God’s intellect knows possible and actual creatures; God’s will freely chooses which possibilities to actualize.
- Many features of the created order, including specific moral norms and historical contingencies, depend on free divine decree, not necessary emanation from the divine essence.
This position is often labeled theological voluntarism. Scotus distinguishes between:
| Category | Example | Necessity Status |
|---|---|---|
| Metaphysically necessary | God’s existence, primary moral principles (e.g., love of God) | Absolutely necessary |
| Contingently willed | Particular commandments, sacramental economy, specific orders of nature | Dependent on free will |
Alternative readings dispute the extent of this voluntarism; some emphasize that Scotus still roots many truths in the divine nature and not solely in arbitrary choice.
12.3 Human Will and Freedom
Scotus extends his voluntarism to the human will, describing it as:
- A rational appetite with intrinsic indifference to opposites,
- Capable of willing or not willing a given object even when all conditions are satisfied.
“The will is of itself indeterminate with respect to opposites, and by its liberty it can will or not will, even when all conditions on the part of the object are fulfilled.”
— Ordinatio II, d. 25, q. un. (paraphrastic)
His theory of synchronic contingency holds that at a given instant the will retains a genuine power for contrary choices, under the same prior causal conditions. This is often taken as an early form of libertarian freedom.
Critics from more intellectualist traditions argue that Scotus underestimates the determinative role of the intellect’s last practical judgment; defenders reply that he preserves moral responsibility and contingency more robustly.
12.4 Divine Knowledge and Future Contingents
Scotus combines his accounts of intuitive cognition and will to explain God’s knowledge of future contingents:
- God infallibly knows future free acts because God’s eternal will freely decrees and intuitively cognizes them.
- This knowledge does not cause necessity in the acts themselves; they remain contingent because God’s willing them is itself free.
Debates persist over whether this results in a “Boethian” eternalist model or something closer to Molinism; most scholars see Scotus as maintaining a distinct position centered on the priority of divine will and intuitive knowledge.
13. Ethics, Law, and the Role of the Will
13.1 Structure of Moral Goodness
In Scotus’s ethics, moral goodness is rooted in the rectitude of the will rather than in the perfection of the intellect alone. Actions are morally good when they conform to right reason and, more fundamentally, to divine law. He distinguishes:
- Affective inclinations in the will: one toward advantage (amor concupiscentiae), another toward justice or uprightness (amor iustitiae).
- The higher inclination toward justice, which grounds truly moral acts.
13.2 Natural Law and Divine Commands
Scotus offers a layered account of natural law:
| Tier | Content | Necessity |
|---|---|---|
| First table | Fundamental precepts such as “love God above all” and “do not hate God” | Absolutely necessary; even God cannot will their opposite |
| Second table | Many duties toward neighbor (e.g., prohibitions on theft, certain aspects of justice) | Contingent in principle; God could dispense in some cases |
| Positive divine law | Specific ceremonial and ecclesial norms | Fully contingent, dependent on free divine will |
This has led many to characterize him as a divine command theorist. Proponents argue that Scotus secures both necessary moral truths and divine freedom. Critics worry that making large portions of morality contingent risks arbitrariness; Scotists reply that God’s wise and loving nature guides divine commands, even where they are not strictly necessary.
13.3 Merit, Grace, and Charity
In soteriology, Scotus emphasizes:
- The centrality of charity as a habit of love toward God.
- The role of freely willed acts in meriting reward, always under the influence of grace.
- The idea that God freely accepts certain acts as meritorious in relation to eternal life, a notion often described as acceptation.
He maintains that even if an act is proportionate only in a finite way, God can, by a free decree, accept it as worthy of an infinite reward, given the dignity of the person of Christ and the order God has established.
13.4 Political and Legal Thought
Scotus’s explicit political writings are limited, but his general theory of law has implications for political authority:
- Human positive law derives its binding force from conformity to natural and divine law, and from legitimate authority.
- Because many aspects of natural law’s “second table” are contingent, there is room for diversity in concrete legal and political arrangements.
Interpretations vary on how far Scotus anticipates later contractarian or rights-based theories. Some see him as contributing to a stronger concept of individual right through his emphasis on will and haecceity; others maintain that his outlook remains primarily theological and communitarian.
14. Mariology and the Immaculate Conception
14.1 The Medieval Debate
In Scotus’s time, the doctrine that Mary was conceived without original sin—the Immaculate Conception—was widely discussed but not yet defined. Many theologians, including some within the Franciscan order, hesitated to affirm it, fearing it might conflict with the universality of Christ’s redemption.
14.2 Scotus’s Argument
Scotus famously articulates a defense that became paradigmatic for later supporters. A central line of reasoning is often summarized as the “potuit, decuit, ergo fecit” (“God could do it; it was fitting; therefore he did it”) principle:
- God could preserve Mary from original sin by applying Christ’s merits in advance.
- It would be most fitting (decuit) that Christ, as the perfect Redeemer, confer on his mother the highest possible grace.
- Therefore, it is reasonable to affirm that God did so.
He emphasizes that Mary is still redeemed by Christ, but in a more excellent way—by preservation rather than liberation:
“It was fitting that the Blessed Virgin be preserved from original sin by a most perfect Redeemer, who in a more sublime way prevented her from falling, rather than merely raising her up after a fall.”
— Ordinatio III, d. 3, q. 1 (paraphrastic)
14.3 Mediation Between Positions
Scotus’s solution attempts to reconcile:
- The intuition of Mary’s exceptional holiness,
- The doctrine that all humans need Christ’s redemption,
- And the emerging devotional practice surrounding Mary’s conception.
By framing Mary’s privilege as a preemptive application of Christ’s merits, Scotus avoids implying any exception to universal redemption.
14.4 Reception and Debates
Within the medieval period:
- Many Franciscans adopted Scotus’s position, making it a hallmark of Scotism.
- Some Dominican theologians, following Thomas Aquinas’s earlier reservations, remained critical or cautious, questioning the scriptural and traditional basis.
Modern historians debate:
| Question | Range of Views |
|---|---|
| Originality | Some see Scotus as innovating a new conceptual framework; others find important precedents in earlier authors. |
| Logical structure | There is discussion over whether “potuit, decuit, ergo fecit” is a strict argument or a heuristic of fittingness. |
| Influence on dogma | Many hold that his reasoning significantly shaped later theological consensus, culminating in the 1854 definition of the dogma; others stress broader devotional and ecclesial factors. |
Scotus’s Mariology thus exemplifies his broader theological method: combining subtle metaphysical distinctions, a strong account of divine freedom, and arguments from convenientia (fittingness).
15. Scotism and Later Scholastic Reception
15.1 Emergence of Scotism
After Scotus’s death, his followers developed Scotism as a recognizable school within scholasticism. Early centers included Cologne, Paris, and several Italian studia. Major figures such as Francis of Meyronnes, Antonius Andreae, and later John of Bassolis and Nicholas of Orbellis commented on and systematized his doctrines.
Characteristic Scotist positions included:
- Defense of univocal concepts of being and transcendental notions.
- Use of the formal distinction.
- Emphasis on haecceity and individuation.
- Strong voluntarism in theology and ethics.
- Support for the Immaculate Conception.
15.2 Relations with Other Schools
Scotism interacted competitively with other scholastic currents:
| School | Typical Orientation vs. Scotism |
|---|---|
| Thomism | Emphasized analogy, stronger role of intellect, different accounts of law and grace; often opposed key Scotist theses. |
| Nominalism (e.g., Ockham) | Shared some voluntarist tendencies but rejected many Scotist metaphysical entities (common natures, formalities, haecceities). |
| Augustinianism | Overlapped on issues of exemplarism and grace, differing on technical metaphysics. |
In university curricula, chairs were sometimes explicitly designated as Thomist or Scotist, and students were trained within these traditions.
15.3 Early Modern Developments
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Scotism remained influential especially among Franciscans and some Jesuits. Notable early modern Scotists include:
- Francisco Suárez, who, though not a pure Scotist, appropriated and modified numerous Scotist ideas.
- Commentators such as Luke Wadding, who edited Scotus’s works and promoted his theological positions.
Scotist doctrines influenced debates on:
- Metaphysical categories and being.
- Divine concurrence and freedom.
- Law and rights, in conversation with emerging early modern legal theory.
15.4 Decline and Partial Eclipse
From the late seventeenth century onward, various factors contributed to a relative decline of Scotism:
- The rise of Cartesian and later Enlightenment philosophies, which displaced scholastic frameworks.
- Institutional shifts in Catholic education favoring Thomism, especially after Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879), which promoted Thomas Aquinas as the primary doctrinal standard.
Nevertheless, Scotist themes persisted in certain seminaries and Franciscan houses, and his reputation as the Doctor Subtilis survived, even if his texts were less read.
16. Modern Interpretations and Debates
16.1 Twentieth-Century Revival
The twentieth century saw a renewed scholarly interest in Scotus, driven by:
- Critical editions of his works.
- Historians of medieval philosophy reexamining non-Thomist traditions.
- Theological interest following his beatification in 1993.
Researchers such as Étienne Gilson, Allan Wolter, and Richard Cross contributed major studies, while others debated Scotus’s role in the transition to modernity.
16.2 Scotus and the “Birth of Modernity”
A prominent debate concerns whether Scotus’s univocity of being and voluntarism prepared the way for modern secular ontology and subjectivism:
| Interpretation | Main Claim |
|---|---|
| Continuity thesis | Scotus remains within classical metaphysics; his innovations are refinements, not ruptures. |
| Proto-modern thesis | Univocity, haecceity, and strong will contribute to later individualism and metaphysical flattening. |
| Nuanced mediation | Scotus provides resources both for and against certain modern developments; causal lines are complex. |
Figures such as Hans Urs von Balthasar and John Milbank have criticized Scotus as inaugurating problematic shifts, while others argue these readings oversimplify his thought and underplay his traditional commitments.
16.3 Analytic Engagement
Contemporary analytic philosophers have engaged Scotus on:
- Modal metaphysics (possible worlds, essences, necessity).
- Individuation and haecceities.
- Divine simplicity, omniscience, and freedom.
Some see him as a medieval ally of haecceitism and libertarian freedom; others question whether these labels fit his original context. The debate often hinges on how strictly one translates Scotist terminology into modern categories.
16.4 Theological Assessments
In theology, Scotus is reassessed as:
- A key voice on Christology, Mariology, and grace.
- A significant alternative to Thomism within Catholic thought.
- A resource for ecumenical dialogue, given his distinctive treatments of predestination and atonement.
Scholars disagree on whether his strong voluntarism and views on law should be celebrated for emphasizing divine freedom and love or critiqued for potentially undermining rational moral order.
16.5 Ongoing Textual and Historical Research
Current work continues on:
- Refining the textual base of Scotus’s writings.
- Clarifying his relationship to predecessors such as Henry of Ghent and contemporaries like Ockham.
- Exploring under-studied areas, such as his logic, philosophy of language, and political implications.
These investigations frequently revise earlier reconstructions, suggesting that the understanding of Scotus remains an evolving scholarly enterprise.
17. Legacy and Historical Significance
17.1 Place in Medieval Philosophy
Scotus is widely regarded as one of the three most influential scholastic thinkers of the High Middle Ages, alongside Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham. His work marks a pivotal stage in the development of:
- Transcendental metaphysics, through univocal concepts of being and expanded transcendentals.
- Theories of individuation, via haecceity and common natures.
- Accounts of freedom, emphasizing synchronic contingency and the autonomy of the will.
He both extended and revised the Franciscan tradition, leaving a legacy that shaped theological and philosophical debates well into the early modern period.
17.2 Influence on Later Traditions
Scotus’s legacy operates on several levels:
| Domain | Examples of Influence |
|---|---|
| Scholastic schools | Development of Scotism as an institutionalized current in universities and religious orders. |
| Early modern metaphysics | Impact on thinkers like Suárez and, indirectly, on discussions of being, essence, and modality. |
| Catholic doctrine | Contribution to the theological trajectory culminating in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. |
Some historians also trace aspects of later rights theory and individualism to Scotist emphases on will and individuality, though this remains contested.
17.3 Contemporary Relevance
In present-day philosophy and theology, Scotus is invoked:
- In analytic metaphysics, as a source for robust essentialism, haecceitism, and nuanced discussion of identity.
- In philosophical theology, for models of divine simplicity, omniscience, and freedom that differ from Thomistic paradigms.
- In ethics and legal theory, as an early proponent of a voluntarist, law-centered conception of morality.
Interpretations diverge on whether his system offers constructive resources for addressing modern questions or illustrates tensions inherent in late medieval thought.
17.4 Assessment of Historical Impact
Scholars generally agree that Scotus:
- Provided new conceptual tools (formal distinction, haecceity, univocal transcendental concepts) that reshaped scholastic discourse.
- Influenced how later thinkers understood the relationship between God and creatures, nature and individuality, and law and freedom.
- Remains a central figure for understanding the diversity of medieval scholasticism beyond Thomism.
The overall evaluation of his long-term impact—whether as a bridge to modernity, a culmination of classical metaphysics, or both—continues to be a subject of active historical and philosophical debate.
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@online{philopedia_john_duns_scotus,
title = {John Duns Scotus},
author = {Philopedia},
year = {2025},
url = {https://philopedia.com/philosophers/john-duns-scotus/},
urldate = {December 10, 2025}
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Study Guide
advancedThe biography presupposes familiarity with medieval theology and contains dense discussions of metaphysics (univocity, formal distinction, haecceity), epistemology, and theology of will and grace. It is suitable for upper-level undergraduates in philosophy/theology, graduate students, or serious independent readers with prior exposure to scholastic thought.
- Basic structure of medieval Western Christianity (papacy, religious orders, universities) — Scotus’s life and work are embedded in the Franciscan order and the university system of Oxford, Paris, and Cologne; understanding these institutions helps make sense of his career and controversies.
- Introductory Aristotelian philosophy (substance, essence, universals, causality) — Scotus’s metaphysics is a technical reworking of Aristotelian concepts like being, substance, and universals, so basic familiarity prevents his innovations from seeming completely opaque.
- Foundational Christian theological ideas (creation, grace, sin, redemption, Trinity) — His major works are commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences; many arguments presuppose doctrines such as original sin, redemption, and divine attributes.
- Very basic logic and the idea of a ‘scientific’ demonstration — Many of Scotus’s distinctive claims (e.g., univocity of being) are motivated by what is needed for demonstrative science; understanding terms, middle terms, and inference helps in following his reasoning.
- Medieval Scholasticism — Provides a big-picture view of scholastic method, university life, and the role of commentaries on the Sentences, within which Scotus’s work is situated.
- Thomas Aquinas — Aquinas is Scotus’s most important foil, especially on analogy vs univocity, divine simplicity, and natural law; seeing the Thomist synthesis makes Scotus’s alternative clearer.
- William of Ockham — Reading about Ockham helps in understanding how a later nominalist Franciscan responded to and modified key Scotist ideas about universals, individuation, and voluntarism.
- 1
Skim the basic narrative of Scotus’s life and context to anchor names and dates.
Resource: Sections 1–3 (Introduction; Life and Historical Context; Education and Franciscan Background)
⏱ 40–60 minutes
- 2
Trace his career and writings to see how his major works fit into his life.
Resource: Sections 4–7 (Oxford Period; Paris Career and the Ordinatio; Cologne Years; Major Works and Textual Tradition)
⏱ 60–90 minutes
- 3
Study Scotus’s core philosophical framework with special attention to terminology (using the glossary alongside).
Resource: Sections 8–11 (Core Themes; Metaphysics; Theory of Distinctions and Common Natures; Epistemology and Intuitive Cognition)
⏱ 2–3 hours
- 4
Examine his theology of God, freedom, ethics, and law, connecting it back to his metaphysics.
Resource: Sections 12–13 (Theology of God, Will, and Freedom; Ethics, Law, and the Role of the Will)
⏱ 90–120 minutes
- 5
Focus on Scotus’s Mariology and the Immaculate Conception as a case study of his method and voluntarism.
Resource: Section 14 (Mariology and the Immaculate Conception)
⏱ 45–60 minutes
- 6
Situate Scotus in the broader history of ideas and engage with modern debates about his legacy.
Resource: Sections 15–17 (Scotism and Later Scholastic Reception; Modern Interpretations and Debates; Legacy and Historical Significance)
⏱ 90–120 minutes
Univocity of being (univocitas entis)
The doctrine that the concept of ‘being’ (ens) is predicated in the same fundamental sense of both God and creatures, so that ‘being’ is not merely analogical or equivocal when applied to them.
Why essential: This underpins Scotus’s entire metaphysical project and his claim that metaphysics can be a strict science of being as such, including both finite and infinite being under one concept.
Haecceity (haecceitas) or ‘thisness’
A positive formal principle that individuates a common nature, making this individual numerically distinct from all other individuals sharing the same nature.
Why essential: Scotus’s explanation of individuation by haecceity is central to his ontology of individuals and affects how he thinks about persons, rights, and divine knowledge of particular creatures.
Formal distinction (distinctio formalis a parte rei)
A middle kind of distinction between aspects of a thing that is more than merely conceptual but less than a full real distinction between separable entities; used to analyze multiple ‘formalities’ in one simple subject.
Why essential: It allows Scotus to reconcile divine simplicity with a rich plurality of divine attributes, and to explain internal complexity in created substances without multiplying substances.
Common nature (natura communis)
The nature shared by individuals of a species (e.g., humanity) considered ‘in itself’, prior to being made universal by the mind or singular by an individuating principle.
Why essential: His account of common natures is crucial for understanding his moderate realism about universals and how it differs from both Thomism and later nominalism.
Intuitive cognition (cognitio intuitiva)
A direct act of knowledge that apprehends an object as actually existing and present, as distinct from abstractive cognition, which grasps a nature without commitment to its existence.
Why essential: Intuitive cognition underlies Scotus’s handling of knowledge of contingent truths, divine knowledge of future free acts, and the beatific vision.
Voluntarism and synchronic contingency
Voluntarism: the view that will (in God and humans) has primacy over intellect and can remain genuinely indifferent between opposites. Synchronic contingency: at a given instant, the will retains real power to choose or not choose under the same prior conditions.
Why essential: These ideas structure Scotus’s ethics, his account of freedom and moral responsibility, and his understanding of God’s free decrees in creation and law.
Objective being (esse obiectivum)
The mode of being an object has insofar as it exists as known in an intellect (especially in divine ideas), distinct from its extra-mental, formal existence in reality.
Why essential: It explains how God and humans can know things that are merely possible or future, and illuminates Scotus’s representational account of cognition.
Scotism (Scotismus)
The later scholastic movement that systematized and defended Scotus’s doctrines in metaphysics, theology, and logic, often in explicit contrast to Thomism and nominalism.
Why essential: Knowing what Scotism is helps in seeing Scotus’s historical impact and how his ideas were received, codified, and sometimes altered by later followers.
“Univocity of being makes God just one being among others, flattening the Creator–creature distinction.”
For Scotus, univocity concerns the concept of being, not the mode of being. God is ‘infinite being’ and creatures are ‘finite beings’; the ontological gap remains absolute even though the same basic concept ‘being’ applies to both.
Source of confusion: Readers often conflate semantic univocity (one shared concept) with ontological sameness of rank or nature, and read later secular uses of ‘being’ back into Scotus.
“Haecceity is just a fancy word for a bundle of qualitative properties.”
Scotus explicitly denies that individuation can be reduced to qualitative features or matter; haecceity is a non-qualitative, positive formal principle that explains strict numerical difference even between qualitatively identical individuals.
Source of confusion: Modern metaphysical frameworks often treat individuation in terms of qualitative profiles, leading readers to assimilate Scotus’s haecceity to more familiar property-based accounts.
“The formal distinction is merely a trick of language or a purely mental distinction.”
Scotus insists that a formal distinction is grounded in the thing itself (a parte rei); it reflects real, irreducible formal aspects in a subject, even though they are not separable entities.
Source of confusion: Because the formal distinction lies between conceptual and real distinctions, it can be hard to place within later metaphysical taxonomies, and is sometimes reduced to one or the other.
“Scotus’s voluntarism makes morality completely arbitrary—God could command anything whatsoever and make it good.”
Scotus holds that some primary moral precepts (e.g., love of God) are absolutely necessary and even God cannot will their opposite. Divine freedom applies mainly to secondary precepts and positive law, which God orders wisely and lovingly, not capriciously.
Source of confusion: Summaries often highlight his claim that God can dispense from many commandments without also noting his firm insistence on an immutable core of natural law anchored in God’s nature.
“The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception means Mary did not need redemption and makes Christ’s work unnecessary for her.”
Scotus’s key point is that Mary is redeemed more perfectly—by being preserved from sin through a preemptive application of Christ’s merits. She is still wholly dependent on Christ’s redemptive work, but in a preventive rather than restorative way.
Source of confusion: Equating redemption only with ‘forgiving already-committed sin’ obscures Scotus’s notion of a more excellent, preservative redemption.
How does Scotus’s claim that ‘being is that which is first conceived by the intellect’ shape his understanding of metaphysics as a science, and why does this lead him to insist on a univocal concept of being?
Hints: Consider Sections 9.1–9.2 and how demonstrative reasoning about God uses a middle term; ask why an analogical or equivocal concept might undermine such demonstrations.
In what ways does Scotus’s doctrine of haecceity solve problems about individuation that he sees in matter-based or purely qualitative accounts, and what philosophical costs might it introduce?
Hints: Review Section 9.4 and 10.3–10.4. Think about immaterial beings, qualitatively identical individuals, and whether positing a positive principle of ‘thisness’ risks multiplying entities or reifying individuality.
Explain Scotus’s formal distinction and show how he uses it both in talking about divine attributes and about human nature. Does this distinction successfully preserve divine simplicity while allowing for real multiplicity of attributes?
Hints: Use Section 10.1–10.2 and 12.1. Compare to a simple ‘real distinction’ or a ‘purely conceptual’ one; ask whether formalities look like genuine ontological components or like structured ways of conceiving the same reality.
How does Scotus’s emphasis on the freedom and indifference of the will (divine and human) affect his accounts of law, morality, and merit?
Hints: Connect Sections 12.2–12.4 and 13.1–13.3. Distinguish between necessary moral precepts and contingent ones; consider his idea of acceptation and how God freely accepts certain finite acts as meritorious.
In Scotus’s defense of the Immaculate Conception, how does the ‘potuit, decuit, ergo fecit’ pattern function as an argument, and what does it tell us about his understanding of divine power and fittingness?
Hints: Focus on Section 14.2. Identify the three steps (could, fitting, therefore did) and think about how arguments from fittingness differ from strict logical demonstrations in medieval theology.
To what extent is it accurate to see Scotus as a ‘bridge to modernity’ in metaphysics and ethics? Which specific doctrines have been taken as proto-modern, and how convincing do you find those claims?
Hints: Consult Section 16.2–16.3 and 17.2–17.3. Consider univocity, haecceity, and voluntarism in relation to later individualism, secular ontology, and rights theories.
How does the complex textual transmission of Scotus’s works (e.g., ordinatio vs lectura vs reportatio) affect the way we interpret his doctrines and their development over time?
Hints: Use Section 7.1–7.4. Think about incomplete authorial texts, later Scotist additions, and how uncertainties about authenticity might impact reconstructions of his positions on key issues.