William of Ockham
William of Ockham (c. 1287–c. 1347) was an English Franciscan friar, theologian, and logician whose razor-sharp criticism of metaphysical excess reshaped medieval philosophy. Educated within the Franciscan tradition, probably at Oxford, he absorbed and then challenged the realist metaphysics of thinkers like Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. Ockham is best known for the methodological maxim later dubbed “Ockham’s razor”: do not multiply entities beyond necessity. In his hands, this became a powerful tool for trimming universal natures, abstract entities, and speculative constructs from philosophy, yielding a robust form of nominalism in which only individual substances and their qualities truly exist. Summoned to Avignon on charges of heresy, Ockham became embroiled in the conflicts of the Avignon Papacy. After fleeing to the protection of Emperor Louis IV of Bavaria, he devoted himself to political and ecclesiological writings defending Franciscan poverty and attacking papal absolutism. His contributions to logic and philosophy of language advanced the theory of supposition and mental language, while his skeptical-leaning epistemology emphasized intuitive and abstractive cognition. Ockham’s work helped loosen the hold of high scholastic metaphysics and prepared the ground for late medieval nominalism, early modern empiricism, and emerging ideas of limited government and church–state separation.
At a Glance
- Born
- c. 1287(approx.) — Ockham, Surrey, Kingdom of England
- Died
- c. 1347(approx.) — Munich, Duchy of Bavaria, Holy Roman EmpireCause: Probably plague or related epidemic disease
- Floruit
- c. 1317–1347Period of main intellectual and political activity as theologian, logician, and critic of papal power
- Active In
- Kingdom of England, Papal States, Holy Roman Empire
- Interests
- LogicMetaphysicsPhilosophy of languageEpistemologyTheologyPolitical philosophy
William of Ockham advances a rigorously parsimonious, theologically grounded nominalism in which only individual entities and their directly grounded qualities exist, universal terms are merely mental or linguistic signs, knowledge rests primarily on intuitive cognition of individuals, and both metaphysical and political authority must be constrained by what can be justified through evident reason and Scripture rather than by proliferating abstract entities or unchecked claims of power.
Ordinatio et Reportatio in quattuor libros Sententiarum
Composed: c. 1317–1322
Summa Logicae
Composed: c. 1323–1326
Quodlibeta septem
Composed: c. 1322–1324
Dialogus de potestate papae (often simply "Dialogus")
Composed: c. 1332–1342
Octo quaestiones de potestate papae
Composed: c. 1339–1342
De imperatoris et pontificis potestate
Composed: c. 1338–1340
Opus nonaginta dierum (along with related tractates on poverty)
Composed: c. 1332–1334
Expositio in librum Porphyrii, Expositio in Praedicamenta, Expositio in librum Perihermenias
Composed: c. 1318–1323
Nothing ought to be posited without a reason, unless it is self-evident or known by experience or established by the authority of Sacred Scripture.— William of Ockham, Ordinatio I, dist. 30, q. 1
Programmatic statement of his methodological principle of parsimony, later associated with Ockham’s razor, linking ontological economy to epistemic justification and scriptural authority.
Plurality is not to be posited without necessity.— Paraphrase of Ockham’s principle; cf. Summa Logicae I, c. 12 and related passages
Canonical formulation of the razor attributed to Ockham, expressing his view that we should not multiply entities, explanations, or principles beyond what is required to save the phenomena.
A universal is not something outside the soul existing in individual things, nor something existing in the soul as a quality; rather, it is only a mental term signifying many things.— William of Ockham, Ordinatio I, dist. 2, q. 8
Concise statement of his nominalist account of universals as signs within mental language rather than as real shared natures or abstract objects.
God cannot be proved to exist by any evident proposition of reason, yet His existence is most certain through faith.— William of Ockham, Ordinatio I, dist. 2, q. 3
Illustrates his epistemic modesty and separation of what can be strictly demonstrated by natural reason from what is held on the authority of revelation.
The pope can err, even in matters of faith and morals, when he does not adhere to the rule of Scripture and the teaching of Christ.— William of Ockham, Dialogus, Part III, Tract I
Expression of his critical stance toward papal infallibility and plenitude of power, grounding ecclesial authority in Scripture and the law of Christ rather than in an irreformable papal office.
Franciscan Formation and Early Studies (c. 1300–1317)
During his novitiate and early studies in the Franciscan Order, likely in London and Oxford, Ockham absorbed the theological and philosophical legacy of Bonaventure and Duns Scotus, grounding himself in Aristotelian logic, metaphysics, and the Sentences tradition while beginning to question realist accounts of universals.
Oxford Sentences Commentaries and Systematic Thought (c. 1317–1323)
As a bachelor of theology lecturing on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Ockham articulated many of his core philosophical positions: nominalist ontology, the primacy of intuitive cognition, his theory of supposition, and a rigorous account of divine omnipotence and freedom, earning a reputation as a daring and precise thinker.
Avignon Years and Logical Writings (1323–1328)
While under investigation at the papal court in Avignon, Ockham composed or revised major logical and philosophical works such as the Summa Logicae and Quodlibeta, refining his doctrines of mental language, signification, and parsimony in ontology, even as tensions with the papal curia intensified.
Exile and Political-Ecclesiological Writings (1328–c. 1342)
After fleeing Avignon to join Emperor Louis IV, Ockham shifted focus toward ecclesiology and political theory, arguing against papal infallibility and plenitudo potestatis, defending Franciscan poverty, and developing a theory of limited, law-bound authority for both church and empire.
Late Reflections and Influence (c. 1342–c. 1347)
In his final years in Munich, Ockham continued to defend his earlier positions and respond to critics, while his writings spread through European universities, catalyzing the rise of via moderna nominalism and reshaping debates about logic, metaphysics, and church–state relations.
1. Introduction
William of Ockham (c. 1287–c. 1347) was an English Franciscan friar, theologian, and philosopher whose work helped reshape late medieval scholasticism. Active primarily in Oxford, Avignon, and the imperial court at Munich, he is most commonly associated with nominalism and the methodological maxim later dubbed Ockham’s razor, often summarized as the injunction not to multiply entities or principles beyond necessity.
Ockham’s thought spans several domains. In metaphysics, he rejected robust realist accounts of universals, arguing that only individual substances and qualities exist extra-mentally and that universals are merely signs in thought and language. In logic and philosophy of language, he systematized a theory of supposition and developed a sophisticated account of mental language (lingua mentalis) that underlies spoken and written discourse. In epistemology, he distinguished sharply between intuitive and abstractive cognition, combining confidence in sensory-based knowledge of individuals with a cautious, sometimes skeptical attitude toward sweeping metaphysical claims.
Theologically, Ockham placed strong emphasis on divine omnipotence and voluntarism, drawing a clear line between what can be demonstrated by natural reason and what is known only by revelation. He also developed influential arguments about divine power and the contingency of the created order. Politically, his later writings criticized expansive papal claims to plenitudo potestatis and defended limits on ecclesiastical and secular power, contributing to later debates about church–state relations and constitutionalism.
Scholars differ on how radical Ockham was: some portray him as a decisive break from high scholastic realism and a precursor of modern empiricism and secular politics; others emphasize continuities with earlier Franciscan thought and stress his commitment to orthodox doctrine. His work became a cornerstone of the via moderna in late medieval universities and continues to be a major point of reference in discussions of medieval logic, metaphysics, theology, and political theory.
2. Life and Historical Context
Biographical Outline
Most details of Ockham’s life are reconstructed from scattered documentary references and internal evidence from his works. He was likely born around 1287 in Ockham, Surrey (England). He entered the Franciscan Order as a youth, studied in England (probably at the London studium and then Oxford), and lectured on Peter Lombard’s Sentences around 1317–1319. He never completed the formal requirements for the doctorate in theology, which earned him the title Venerabilis Inceptor (“Venerable Beginner”) rather than doctor.
In 1323 he was summoned to Avignon, seat of the papal court, to answer charges of doctrinal error. There he spent several years under investigation while composing major logical and philosophical treatises. In 1328, amid escalating conflicts between Pope John XXII and the Franciscan leadership, Ockham fled Avignon with the minister general Michael of Cesena and sought protection from Emperor Louis IV of Bavaria, first in Pisa and later in Munich. He spent his remaining years in imperial territory, producing extensive political and ecclesiological writings, and probably died during a plague outbreak around 1347.
Historical and Intellectual Setting
Ockham worked within late scholasticism, a period marked by intensive engagement with Aristotle, the established commentary tradition, and intra-scholastic disputes. He inherited a landscape shaped by Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and especially John Duns Scotus, whose sophisticated realism and metaphysics of formal distinction he would critically revise.
Politically and ecclesiastically, Ockham’s career unfolded during the Avignon Papacy and amid tensions between papal and imperial authority. Disputes over Franciscan poverty, papal claims to plenary power, and the boundary between spiritual and temporal jurisdiction formed the backdrop of his exile. His political writings respond directly to these controversies, but they also reflect broader debates about canon law, conciliarism, and the nature of sovereignty in the Holy Roman Empire.
The reception of Ockham’s ideas occurred in a university environment increasingly divided between the older via antiqua (associated with realist metaphysics) and the emerging via moderna, within which his positions on logic, language, and ontology became central reference points.
3. Franciscan Formation and Oxford Years
Entry into the Order and Early Training
Ockham’s entry into the Franciscans around 1300–1309 placed him within a tradition emphasizing evangelical poverty, affective devotion, and a distinctive theological perspective. He likely underwent basic training in grammar, logic, and philosophy at the London Franciscan studium, where Aristotelian texts and commentaries by figures such as Bonaventure and Scotus were standard.
Franciscan education stressed both fidelity to the Rule of St Francis and engagement with contemporary scholastic debates. Ockham’s later writings suggest familiarity with intra-Franciscan tensions over poverty and obedience, which would later color his political and ecclesiological positions.
Oxford Studies and Sentences Lectures
By the late 1310s, Ockham was at Oxford, serving as a bachelor of theology and lecturing on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, the core theological textbook. His Ordinatio (revised commentary) and Reportatio (student report) on the four books of the Sentences preserve much of his early systematic thought.
Key themes emerge during this period:
- A developing nominalist stance on universals and categories of being.
- A refined theory of supposition and early reflections on mental terms.
- A methodological emphasis on parsimony and scriptural warrant in theology.
- Doctrines on divine power, grace, and the sacraments that later drew suspicion.
Ockham did not proceed to the doctoral degree at Oxford, possibly owing to intra-order politics or emerging controversies about his teachings. This unfinished status is reflected in his honorary title Venerabilis Inceptor rather than magister.
Intellectual Milieu at Oxford
Oxford in Ockham’s time was a vibrant center of logical and theological innovation, with strong Franciscan and Merton College traditions in natural philosophy and mathematics. Ockham’s views developed in conversation, and sometimes in tension, with:
- Duns Scotus and his followers, whose subtle distinctions Ockham frequently criticized.
- English logicians exploring obligationes, consequences, and semantic theories.
- Dominican and secular masters defending various forms of moderate realism.
Scholars disagree on how integrated Ockham was into specific Oxford schools, but there is broad agreement that his Oxford years formed the crucible for the logical and metaphysical positions that would later define him.
4. Avignon, Condemnation, and Exile
Summons to Avignon and Investigation
In 1323, Ockham was ordered to appear before the papal court at Avignon to answer accusations of doctrinal error, particularly concerning his teaching in the Sentences and related works. The precise list of charges is not fully preserved, but later accounts point to disputes over:
- The nature of universals and knowledge of God.
- Aspects of ecclesiology and sacramental theology.
- His strong emphasis on divine omnipotence and contingency.
At Avignon, Ockham lived under a form of supervised residence for several years while theologians examined his writings. During this period he composed or revised major logical works, including the Summa Logicae and Quodlibeta, which circulated beyond the papal curia.
Conflict over Franciscan Poverty
Simultaneously, the papacy under John XXII was embroiled in a controversy with the Franciscan Order over the doctrine of evangelical poverty—specifically, whether Christ and the apostles owned property. The Franciscan minister general Michael of Cesena defended a strict interpretation denying ownership, while John XXII rejected this as heretical.
Ockham, already at Avignon, came to side with Michael and the “Spiritual” interpretation of Franciscan poverty. He studied papal bulls and canon law, concluding that John XXII’s position conflicted with earlier papal decisions and, in his view, with the Gospel.
Flight and Exile with the Emperor
In 1328, fearing condemnation and convinced that the pope had fallen into heresy, Ockham fled Avignon with Michael of Cesena and other allies. They sought protection from Emperor Louis IV of Bavaria, who was then in conflict with John XXII over imperial rights.
Ockham reportedly declared: “I appeal from you, John, to a future general council,” symbolizing his break with papal authority as then exercised.
Settling eventually in Munich, Ockham entered a long period of exile under imperial protection. There he devoted himself to extensive political and ecclesiological writings, attacking papal claims to plenitudo potestatis and defending the Franciscan understanding of poverty as well as the autonomy of secular rulers.
Condemnations and Aftermath
Ockham himself was never subjected to a formal, comprehensive doctrinal condemnation comparable to that of some contemporaries, though specific propositions associated with his thought were criticized in university statutes and later censures. His continued status vis-à-vis the Franciscan Order and the papacy remained irregular.
Historians debate whether his exile radically altered his intellectual trajectory or simply redirected it. Some emphasize continuity between his Oxford theology and his later political arguments; others see the Avignon crisis as a decisive turning point that pushed him toward more systematic critiques of ecclesiastical authority.
5. Major Works and Their Transmission
Principal Works
Ockham’s surviving corpus spans logic, theology, and political theory. Key works include:
| Domain | Work (Latin / English) | Approx. Date | Notes on Content |
|---|---|---|---|
| Theology | Ordinatio & Reportatio on the Sentences | c. 1317–1322 | Core doctrinal and philosophical views; based on Oxford lectures. |
| Logic | Summa Logicae (Sum of Logic) | c. 1323–1326 | Systematic treatise on terms, supposition, consequences, and sophisms. |
| Logic/Theology | Quodlibeta septem (Seven Quodlibetal Questions) | c. 1322–1324 | Public disputations covering a range of theological and philosophical questions. |
| Exegesis/Logic | Expositiones on Porphyry, Categories, On Interpretation | c. 1318–1323 | Commentaries integrating logical theory with Aristotelian texts. |
| Ecclesiology | Dialogus (Dialogus de potestate papae) | c. 1332–1342 | Dialogue on papal power, heresy, and church governance. |
| Political Theory | De imperatoris et pontificis potestate | c. 1338–1340 | On the respective powers of emperor and pope. |
| Poverty | Opus nonaginta dierum (Work of Ninety Days) | c. 1332–1334 | Defense of Franciscan poverty and critique of papal teaching. |
| Papal Power | Octo quaestiones de potestate papae | c. 1339–1342 | Eight questions focusing on limits of papal authority. |
Scholars generally accept the authenticity of these works, though some minor treatises and letters are debated.
Manuscript Tradition and Early Reception
Ockham’s writings circulated widely in manuscript form in the later 14th and 15th centuries, especially in university centers such as Paris, Oxford, and Cologne. His logical works, particularly the Summa Logicae, were copied extensively and used for teaching within the via moderna; they influenced generations of logicians and philosophers.
The theological and political writings had a more complex transmission. The Dialogus and related political works often circulated in partial or abridged versions and were sometimes transmitted anonymously or under generic rubrics (e.g., “tractatus de potestate papae”), leading to later uncertainties about attribution and dating.
Print and Modern Editions
With the advent of printing, selected logical works appeared early in the 16th century, but comprehensive critical editions are largely a product of modern scholarship. Major modern editorial projects include:
- Critical editions of the Ordinatio and Reportatio by various scholarly teams.
- The Opera Politica series, assembling the political and ecclesiological writings.
- Modern Latin and bilingual editions of the Summa Logicae and Aristotelian commentaries.
These editions have enabled more precise study of Ockham’s development and the relationship between his Oxford, Avignon, and Munich writings, though debates remain about the chronology of some texts and their internal revisions.
6. Method, Ockham’s Razor, and Theological Commitments
Methodological Principles
Ockham’s approach combines logical rigor with a distinctive view of the sources of certainty. A programmatic statement appears in the Ordinatio:
“Nothing ought to be posited without a reason, unless it is self-evident or known by experience or established by the authority of Sacred Scripture.”
— William of Ockham, Ordinatio I, dist. 30, q. 1
He distinguishes:
- Evident principles of reason (e.g., logical truths).
- Empirical knowledge grounded in intuitive cognition.
- Revealed truths accepted on the authority of Scripture.
Non-evident metaphysical postulates lacking support from these sources are treated with suspicion.
Ockham’s Razor
The principle commonly called Ockham’s razor condenses his methodological economy. A canonical formulation is paraphrased as:
“Plurality is not to be posited without necessity.”
— Paraphrase of Ockham’s methodological maxim; cf. Summa Logicae I, c. 12
Ockham deploys this maxim in several ways:
- Ontological parsimony: rejecting extra entities such as real universals, species, or intermediary forms when explanatory work can be done by individuals and their qualities.
- Explanatory restraint: preferring simpler accounts of mental and linguistic phenomena that appeal to fewer kinds of entities or relations.
- Theological caution: avoiding speculative constructions (e.g., elaborate hierarchies of forms) not required by Scripture or evident reason.
Commentators debate whether the razor is primarily an epistemic principle (minimizing unjustified assumptions), an ontological thesis (affirming a sparse ontology), or a methodological rule of thumb. Many agree that in Ockham’s practice these aspects are closely intertwined.
Theological Commitments and Constraints
Ockham insists that theology is grounded in revelation rather than in demonstrative science. He holds that central Christian doctrines—such as the Trinity, Incarnation, and Eucharist—cannot be strictly proved by natural reason, even if they are not contrary to it.
“God cannot be proved to exist by any evident proposition of reason, yet His existence is most certain through faith.”
— William of Ockham, Ordinatio I, dist. 2, q. 3
He thereby separates the domains of philosophy and theology while allowing philosophical tools to clarify revealed truths without claiming to demonstrate them.
Scholars differ on how radical this separation is. Some see in Ockham an early form of fideism; others emphasize that he still uses philosophical argumentation extensively in theology, but under the constraint that speculative claims may not override clear scriptural testimony.
In ethical and ecclesiological matters, Ockham holds that God’s will, as expressed in Scripture and right reason, sets binding norms. His methodological suspicion toward unnecessary postulates also informs his critique of expansive claims to ecclesiastical authority that, in his view, lack clear scriptural or rational grounding.
7. Metaphysics and Nominalism
Ontological Commitments
Ockham’s metaphysics is often characterized as a strict nominalism, though interpretations vary. At its core is the claim that only individual entities (singular substances and their particular qualities or actions) exist in the extra-mental world. Universal natures or forms are denied independent reality.
Key terms such as ens (being) and res (thing) apply, in Ockham’s view, primarily and univocally to individuals, not to overarching essences. He rejects real distinctions beyond those grounded in distinct individual entities or in clearly different intrinsic properties.
Universals and Mental Signs
Ockham’s best-known thesis in metaphysics concerns universals. He denies that there are real common natures shared by many individuals either:
- As entities existing outside the mind (extra animam), or
- As distinct qualitative forms in the soul.
Instead, universals are mental terms or concepts that can be predicated of many individuals:
“A universal is not something outside the soul existing in individual things, nor something existing in the soul as a quality; rather, it is only a mental term signifying many things.”
— William of Ockham, Ordinatio I, dist. 2, q. 8
On this account, the unity of a universal lies in the single act of understanding that can refer to many, not in a shared metaphysical essence.
Rejection of Excessive Entities and Distinctions
Ockham systematically employs his parsimonious method to critique various scholastic constructs, including:
- Substantial forms beyond the minimal required for explaining natural change.
- Habits and powers postulated as distinct entities when they may be reducible to the soul or to acts.
- The formal distinction of Scotus, which posits intermediate distinctions between real and purely conceptual ones.
He tends to reduce such items either to the subject itself (e.g., the soul) or to its individual qualities and acts, provided explanatory adequacy is preserved.
Causality, Individuation, and Modality
In causality, Ockham upholds efficient causes while eschewing robust metaphysical frameworks of final causes and substantial forms, arguing that many explanatory roles attributed to them can be handled by laws of nature and divine concourse.
On individuation, he rejects theories positing an individuating “haecceity” (thisness). For Ockham, individuality is primitive: each entity is this individual simply by being numerically distinct, without an added individuating principle.
Regarding modality, he emphasizes the contingency of created reality, connecting metaphysical possibility and necessity to divine power and will rather than to an independently structured realm of essences. Critics contend that this undercuts the stability of natural kinds; proponents argue that it underscores the dependence of creation on God.
Assessments of Ockham’s Nominalism
Historians disagree on whether Ockham should be read as an extreme nominalist, a conceptualist, or a moderate realist about certain structures. Some stress that his recognition of stable mental concepts and natural similarities among individuals preserves a form of order akin to moderated realism. Others emphasize his rejection of universals and many traditional metaphysical entities as marking a significant departure from high scholastic realism.
8. Logic, Language, and Mental Terms
Logic as Instrument and Science
For Ockham, logic is both an instrument for correct reasoning and a theoretical discipline concerned with the properties of terms, propositions, and inferences. His Summa Logicae offers a systematic account encompassing:
- Terms and categoremata/syncategoremata
- Supposition theory
- Consequences (consequentiae) and syllogistic
- Treatment of fallacies and sophisms
Logical analysis is carried out with minimal ontological commitments, in line with his nominalist metaphysics.
Supposition Theory
Central to Ockham’s semantics is suppositio (supposition), the way a term “stands for” things in a given context. He distinguishes, among others:
- Personal supposition: a term stands for the individuals it signifies (“man” for particular men).
- Simple supposition: a term stands for a concept or term (“‘man’ is a species”).
- Material supposition: a term stands for itself as a word (“‘man’ has three letters”).
This framework allows detailed analysis of quantification, reference, and scope in natural language and scholastic Latin.
Mental Language (Lingua mentalis)
Ockham posits an internal mental language composed of simple and complex concepts or mental terms that directly signify things. Spoken and written languages are conventional signs built upon this natural mental system.
Features of mental language include:
- Structured syntax paralleling that of spoken propositions.
- Natural signification: concepts signify their objects not by convention but by a natural relation arising from cognition.
- Universality: all rational beings share, in principle, the same mental language, even though their spoken tongues differ.
This theory allows Ockham to explain meaning and inference without positing extramental universals: the primary bearers of logical properties are propositions in mental language.
Consequences and Inference
Ockham provides a refined account of logical consequence (consequentia). He distinguishes, for example:
- Formal consequences: valid in virtue of logical form alone.
- Material consequences: depend also on contingent truths about the world.
His analysis covers conditionals, modal propositions, and inferences involving terms with different kinds of supposition. Later medieval logicians built extensively on Ockham’s classifications and tests for validity.
Interpretative Debates
Scholars discuss whether Ockham’s mental language implies a kind of conceptual realism (since concepts have structured roles and necessary relations) or reinforces strict nominalism by treating concepts as acts without additional ontological status. Others examine the extent to which his theory anticipates later ideas about logical form, semantic content, and internal representation in the philosophy of mind and language.
9. Epistemology and Theories of Cognition
Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition
Ockham distinguishes two primary types of cognition:
- Intuitive cognition (intuitiva cognitio): a direct awareness of an individual object that includes, in normal cases, knowledge of its existence and certain contingent features.
- Abstractive cognition: consideration of an object’s nature or properties without determining whether the object exists.
Intuitive cognition grounds our knowledge of present singulars and provides the basis for empirical science. Abstractive cognition allows us to think about non-existent or merely possible objects and underlies the formation of universal concepts.
Knowledge of the External World
Ockham maintains that intuitive cognition, under ordinary circumstances, yields certain knowledge of present external objects and their states. This confidence is partly rooted in his theological conviction that God, as truthful and omnipotent, does not habitually deceive creatures in their basic cognitive operations.
Nevertheless, he acknowledges logical possibilities in which God could cause an intuitive cognition without a corresponding object (e.g., in a miraculous deception). Some interpreters see in this an early form of epistemic skepticism; others argue that Ockham treats such scenarios as merely hypothetical and not undermining everyday certainty.
Concepts and Mental Acts
For Ockham, concepts are mental acts rather than distinct entities or species. They function as natural signs of things, emerging through cognitive processes involving intuitive and abstractive cognition. The mind can form complex concepts and combine them into propositions within mental language.
This view avoids positing intelligible species or intermediary entities mediating between mind and object. Instead, the direct relation of cognition to objects, especially in intuitive awareness, is emphasized.
Scientific and Theological Knowledge
Ockham distinguishes between:
- Scientia (scientific knowledge) in the Aristotelian sense: demonstrative knowledge of necessary connections, primarily within mathematics and certain aspects of natural philosophy.
- Opinion or probable belief about contingent matters.
- Faith, grounded in revelation, which may concern truths not accessible to natural reason.
He is cautious about claims to necessary knowledge in theology and much of natural philosophy, often relegating them to the realm of faith or probable reasoning due to the pervasive contingency of created reality under God’s absolute power.
Debates on Ockham’s Epistemology
Interpretations divide on the extent of Ockham’s empiricism and skeptical tendencies. Some emphasize his reliance on intuitive cognition and experience as anticipating modern empiricist epistemology. Others highlight his insistence that many traditional metaphysical and theological claims cannot be demonstrated, seeing in this a limiting of reason’s scope rather than a thoroughgoing skepticism about ordinary knowledge.
10. Theology, Divine Power, and Voluntarism
Divine Omnipotence and the Two Powers of God
Ockham develops a nuanced account of divine power, distinguishing:
- Absolute power (potentia Dei absoluta): what God could do, considered simply as omnipotent, unconstrained by the current order.
- Ordained power (potentia Dei ordinata): what God actually wills and does according to the existing order of creation and the laws He has freely established.
This distinction allows Ockham to affirm that God could have created different worlds, different natural laws, or different economies of salvation, while maintaining that in fact God has chosen a specific, contingent order.
Voluntarism and Moral Law
Ockham is often described as a leading proponent of voluntarism, the view that God’s will is primary in determining moral and legal norms. He holds that:
- Certain moral precepts (e.g., love of God) are necessary given God’s nature.
- Many other moral rules (e.g., specific property arrangements or ceremonial laws) are contingent on God’s free commands and could have been otherwise.
This position supports his emphasis on the freedom of God and the contingency of created institutions. Critics argue that it risks making morality arbitrary; defenders contend that Ockham still anchors key norms in God’s good and wise will.
Grace, Predestination, and Merit
In soteriology, Ockham aligns with the broader scholastic tradition while stressing divine freedom. He affirms:
- The necessity of grace for salvation.
- That God freely establishes the conditions under which human acts become meritorious.
- That predestination is grounded in God’s will, foreknowing but not coercing human free choices.
Ockham often frames these doctrines with reference to the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power, underscoring that the present economy of salvation is contingent on divine decision.
Theology and the Limits of Reason
Ockham insists on the non-demonstrability by natural reason of many central Christian doctrines, including the Trinity and Incarnation. They are accepted on the authority of Scripture and the Church, not on philosophical proof.
He also applies parsimony to theology: speculative constructions not clearly warranted by revelation or necessary reasoning are avoided. For instance, he is critical of elaborate metaphysical explanations of the Eucharist that go beyond the requirements of faith and ecclesial teaching.
Interpretations of Ockham’s Voluntarism
Scholars diverge on how far Ockham’s voluntarism extends. Some see it as radical, making almost all moral and natural order contingent on arbitrary divine choice. Others argue that Ockham preserves significant constraints in God’s nature (e.g., truthfulness, goodness) and that his emphasis on will primarily guards against subordinating God to independently necessary patterns of rationality.
In contemporary discussions, Ockham’s views on divine power and law continue to be central reference points in debates about divine command theory, moral realism, and the relation between theology and philosophy.
11. Ethics, Law, and Moral Theory
Natural Law and Divine Commands
Ockham’s ethical thought is closely connected to his theology of divine will. He holds that natural law consists of moral principles that are, in part, knowable by reason but ultimately grounded in God’s commands.
He distinguishes:
- Necessary precepts: such as the obligation to love God above all, which follow from God’s nature and cannot be otherwise.
- Contingent precepts: many specific moral and legal norms that God could have legislated differently.
This leads many interpreters to classify Ockham as a representative of divine command ethics, though debates persist about the extent to which he allows independent rational insight into moral goodness.
Human Freedom and Responsibility
Ockham affirms robust freedom of the will. The human will can choose between alternatives, including contrary moral options, even in the presence of strong inclinations. This freedom underwrites moral responsibility and the possibility of merit or demerit.
He emphasizes that God, in the present ordained order, has bound Himself to reward certain acts and dispositions (e.g., acts performed in charity) and to punish others, though in absolute power God could have arranged matters otherwise.
Property, Poverty, and Use of Goods
In debates over Franciscan poverty, Ockham develops a detailed analysis of property rights and use. He distinguishes:
- Dominion (ownership): legal right to dispose of goods.
- Use (usus): factual enjoyment of goods without ownership.
He argues, in line with the stricter Franciscan position, that it is possible to have use without ownership, and that evangelical perfection can involve the renunciation of property. At the same time, he acknowledges the legitimacy of secular property arrangements as part of the ordained order willed by God.
These reflections contribute to a broader theory of positive law, custom, and natural right, used later in his political writings.
Law, Conscience, and Authority
For Ockham, law is fundamentally a product of the will of a superior (ultimately God) binding inferiors. Human and ecclesiastical laws derive their authority either from divine delegation or from rationally-warranted communal decisions consistent with divine law.
He grants a significant role to conscience: individuals must obey God rather than human authorities if the latter command what is contrary to divine law. This plays a role in his defense of resistance to papal commands perceived as violating Christ’s teaching.
Interpretative Issues
Scholars debate:
- Whether Ockham allows any intrinsic moral values accessible to reason independently of divine commands.
- How his analysis of property and use relates to emerging notions of subjective rights in late medieval legal theory.
- The extent to which his stress on freedom and divine legislation anticipates later contractualist or rights-based ethical frameworks.
While there is no consensus on these questions, Ockham’s ethical and legal reflections are widely recognized as significant for the evolution of medieval theories of law, rights, and moral obligation.
12. Political Philosophy and Critique of Papal Authority
Context: Empire, Papacy, and Franciscan Poverty
Ockham’s political writings emerge from concrete conflicts: the struggle between Emperor Louis IV and Pope John XXII, and the controversy over Franciscan poverty. His works such as the Dialogus, De imperatoris et pontificis potestate, and Octo quaestiones address broader issues of sovereignty, church governance, and limits on authority.
Limits of Papal Power
Ockham contests expansive claims that the pope possesses plenitudo potestatis (fullness of power) over both spiritual and temporal matters. He argues that:
- The pope’s authority is ministerial, not absolute, and derived from Christ and the Church.
- The pope can err, even in matters of faith, when departing from Scripture and the tradition of the Church.
“The pope can err, even in matters of faith and morals, when he does not adhere to the rule of Scripture and the teaching of Christ.”
— William of Ockham, Dialogus, Part III, Tract I
Ockham maintains that a pope who persistently teaches heresy or abuses power can be resisted and, under certain conditions, deposed by the Church, often represented through a general council.
Authority of Councils and the Community
Ockham gives a significant role to the universitas fidelium (community of the faithful) and to general councils as expressions of the Church’s ultimate authority under Christ. While not fully developing a systematic conciliarism, he provides arguments later used by conciliarist thinkers to justify the superiority of councils over a wayward pope.
He also emphasizes the role of canon law, tradition, and earlier papal decisions as constraints on current papal action, arguing that popes are bound by prior legitimate determinations.
Secular Power and the State
In relation to the state and secular rulers, Ockham holds that:
- Secular authority stems from God but is mediated through the people or political community.
- The emperor and kings have independent jurisdictions not subject to direct papal control in temporal matters, except in extraordinary cases.
He defends the right of secular rulers to govern civil affairs, levy taxes, and administer justice without papal interference, as long as they do not contravene divine law.
This position supports a clearer distinction between spiritual and temporal power, anticipating later theories of limited government and church–state separation, though framed within a medieval Christian context.
Resistance and Obedience
Ockham’s own resistance to John XXII informs his theoretical reflections. He argues that Christians must disobey commands from ecclesiastical superiors that are manifestly contrary to Scripture or right reason. However, he also stresses ordinary obligations of obedience to legitimate authority in both church and state when acting within its proper bounds.
Interpretations and Influence
Scholars differ on how far Ockham’s political thought anticipates modern constitutionalism or rights theory. Some see him as an early architect of limited, law-bound authority and a source for later notions of popular sovereignty. Others caution that his primary aim was the defense of traditional doctrine and Franciscan poverty against what he considered papal innovation, rather than a systematic political liberalism.
Nevertheless, his analyses of papal fallibility, council authority, and the distinction between spiritual and temporal powers were influential in late medieval disputes and beyond.
13. Relation to Earlier Scholastics and the Via Moderna
Engagement with Earlier Scholastics
Ockham’s thought develops in dialogue with earlier scholastic figures:
| Thinker | Aspect Engaged by Ockham | Ockham’s Typical Response |
|---|---|---|
| Thomas Aquinas | Moderate realism, natural theology | Critiques proofs of God’s existence; rejects real universals. |
| Henry of Ghent | Illuminationism, unicity of truth | Opposes special divine illumination as necessary for certainty. |
| Duns Scotus | Formal distinction, haecceities, univocity | Rejects formal distinction and haecceities; adapts univocity of being. |
| Giles of Rome | Strong papal monarchy | Challenges plenitudo potestatis; limits papal power. |
Ockham often admires Scotus’s rigor yet targets Scotistic metaphysical constructs such as formal distinctions and haecceities as unnecessary entities. He shares with Scotus a univocal concept of being, but uses it within a more parsimonious ontology.
He opposes Henry of Ghent’s reliance on divine illumination for certain knowledge, favoring a more naturalistic account grounded in intuitive cognition.
From Via Antiqua to Via Moderna
In the 14th and 15th centuries, scholastic thought was often divided between the via antiqua (“old way”) and via moderna (“modern way”). The via antiqua was associated with realist metaphysics (Aquinas, Scotus, some Thomists and Scotists), while the via moderna emphasized nominalist or conceptualist approaches.
Ockham became a key reference point for the via moderna, particularly in:
- Logic: his Summa Logicae and semantic theories were widely taught.
- Metaphysics: the denial of real universals and reduction of ontological categories.
- Epistemology: stress on intuitive cognition and limits of demonstrative knowledge.
Later thinkers such as John Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen, and Gabriel Biel adopted and adapted Ockhamist themes, though they also modified or criticized aspects of his system.
Continuities and Breaks
Historians debate whether Ockham marks a sharp break with the scholastic tradition or represents an internal development. Some emphasize:
- Continuity: he shares many scholastic methods, accepts core doctrines, and works within the Sentences commentary framework.
- Innovation: his consistent application of parsimony and critique of realist metaphysics produce a significantly different intellectual landscape.
The extent to which the via moderna should be seen as a “school” versus a loose family of thinkers influenced by Ockham is also contested. While university statutes sometimes distinguished Ockhamist or nominalist positions from Thomist or Scotist ones, there was considerable diversity within each camp.
Retrospective Assessments
In early modern and modern historiography, Ockham has been variously portrayed as:
- A destroyer of metaphysics and the high scholastic synthesis.
- A reformer who purified scholasticism of speculative excess.
- A transitional figure bridging medieval and modern thought.
Contemporary scholarship tends to present a more nuanced picture, situating Ockham firmly within the scholastic tradition while acknowledging his significant role in shaping the via moderna and subsequent philosophical developments.
14. Reception, Controversies, and Misattributions
Immediate and Late Medieval Reception
Ockham’s ideas spread quickly in the 14th century, especially through his logical works. University curricula in Paris, Oxford, and German centers incorporated Ockhamist or nominalist texts, sometimes alongside Thomist or Scotist materials. His influence was particularly strong in:
- Logic and semantics: shaping discussions of supposition, consequence, and mental language.
- Metaphysics: prompting debates over universals and individuation.
- Theology: stimulating responses to his views on divine power and the limits of reason.
At the same time, some university statutes and condemnations targeted propositions associated with Ockham or “modern” theologians, reflecting concern about perceived doctrinal or philosophical implications of his ideas.
Controversies and Criticisms
Ockham’s positions provoked criticism on multiple fronts:
- Realist theologians argued that his nominalism undermined the intelligibility of theology and natural law.
- Opponents of voluntarism contended that his emphasis on divine will threatened the stability of moral norms.
- Supporters of strong papal monarchy accused his political writings of fostering disobedience and weakening church unity.
Specific doctrinal points—such as his views on intuitive cognition, the non-demonstrability of God’s existence, or the possibility of divine deception—were scrutinized and sometimes censured in local academic contexts, though he was not the subject of a single, definitive papal condemnation.
Ockham in the Early Modern Period
In the 16th and 17th centuries, Ockham’s name continued to be associated with the via moderna, especially among certain late scholastic theologians (e.g., Gabriel Biel) who transmitted and modified his ideas. Reformers and humanists occasionally referenced Ockham, sometimes approvingly for his critiques of papal power, sometimes dismissively as emblematic of scholastic subtleties.
His logical and metaphysical doctrines were both utilized and attacked in early modern philosophy. Some historians see echoes of Ockhamist parsimony and skepticism about universals in thinkers such as Hobbes or Locke, though the direct lines of influence are debated.
Misattributions and the “Razor”
Over time, various views and sayings have been attributed to Ockham with uncertain or no textual basis. The phrase “entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity” is widely linked to him, though its exact wording does not occur in his extant works; rather, it condenses themes and scattered formulations present in his writings.
Some political and theological tracts circulated under his name in the later Middle Ages and early modern period that modern scholarship regards as spurious or of doubtful authorship. Conversely, several anonymous works once detached from him have been tentatively reattributed on the basis of style, doctrine, and manuscript evidence, though such attributions often remain contested.
Modern Scholarship
From the 19th century onward, critical editions and systematic studies reshaped understanding of Ockham. Different interpretive schools highlight:
- His role as a precursor of empiricism and analytic philosophy (with emphasis on logic and language).
- His contribution to theology and debates on divine power.
- His significance in political thought and ecclesiology.
Disagreements persist about how to integrate these facets into a single picture and about the extent to which later “Ockhamism” accurately reflects his own positions versus developments by successors.
15. Legacy and Historical Significance
Impact on Medieval and Early Modern Thought
Ockham’s legacy in the late Middle Ages is closely tied to the rise of the via moderna. His logical works became standard teaching texts, shaping scholastic logic and semantics for centuries. His nominalist metaphysics and epistemological caution influenced a broad range of thinkers, including John Buridan and Gabriel Biel, contributing to shifts in how universals, causality, and scientific knowledge were conceived.
In political and ecclesiological debates, his critiques of papal plenitude of power and his defense of conciliar and secular authority informed later conciliarist theorists and discussions of church reform. Elements of his thought resurfaced, sometimes indirectly, in early modern controversies over sovereignty, religious authority, and the relation between church and state.
Contributions to Later Philosophy
Historians of philosophy often identify Ockham as a significant forerunner of aspects of modern philosophy:
- In metaphysics, his parsimonious ontology prefigures later strategies that limit ontological commitments to what is empirically or logically required.
- In epistemology, his emphasis on intuitive cognition and skepticism regarding speculative metaphysics anticipates some themes of early modern empiricism.
- In philosophy of language and logic, his analysis of mental language and logical form resonates with later concerns in analytic philosophy.
The degree of direct historical influence versus retrospective affinity remains debated, but his work serves as an important point of comparison.
Theological and Ethical Legacy
Within theology, Ockham’s articulation of divine omnipotence, the absolute/ordained power distinction, and voluntarist accounts of moral law continue to shape discussions in philosophical theology and ethics, particularly in relation to divine command theory and the problem of contingency in moral norms.
His insistence on the distinction between what can be demonstrated by reason and what belongs to faith has been seen as a precursor to later efforts to clarify the boundaries between philosophy and theology.
Continuing Debates
Ockham’s historical significance is itself a subject of scholarly debate. Competing assessments present him as:
- A disruptive innovator whose critiques contributed to the fragmentation of the high scholastic synthesis.
- A conservative Franciscan theologian whose primary aim was to defend orthodoxy and evangelical poverty while refining scholastic methods.
- A transitional figure whose work both culminates medieval scholasticism and prepares intellectual shifts characteristic of the early modern period.
These different narratives reflect broader questions about the continuity or rupture between medieval and modern thought.
Modern Relevance
Today, Ockham is studied across multiple disciplines—philosophy, theology, intellectual history, and political theory. His methodological maxim, Ockham’s razor, is frequently invoked (often in simplified form) in scientific and philosophical contexts as a heuristic for theory choice. His detailed analyses of language, cognition, and law continue to attract attention in specialized scholarship, while his life and controversies offer a window into the complex interplay of ideas, institutions, and power in the late Middle Ages.
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@online{philopedia_william_of_ockham,
title = {William of Ockham},
author = {Philopedia},
year = {2025},
url = {https://philopedia.com/philosophers/william-of-ockham/},
urldate = {December 10, 2025}
}Note: This entry was last updated on 2025-12-08. For the most current version, always check the online entry.
Study Guide
intermediateThe biography expects some familiarity with medieval philosophy and theology, but it is written to be accessible to advanced undergraduates or interested general readers. Students with no prior exposure may need to pause frequently to look up technical terms and historical context.
- Basic structure of medieval Western Christianity (papacy, religious orders, universities) — The biography assumes familiarity with the roles of the pope, religious orders like the Franciscans, and university theology faculties in the 13th–14th centuries.
- Introductory logic and philosophical vocabulary (e.g., proposition, inference, metaphysics, epistemology) — Ockham’s significance lies largely in logic, metaphysics, and epistemology; understanding these basic terms is necessary to follow discussions of his innovations.
- General overview of scholasticism and Aristotle’s influence on medieval philosophy — The entry frequently compares Ockham to earlier scholastics such as Aquinas and Duns Scotus and presupposes awareness of the Aristotelian commentary tradition.
- Basic medieval European political history (Holy Roman Empire vs. papacy, Avignon Papacy) — Ockham’s exile and political writings are rooted in conflicts between Pope John XXII and Emperor Louis IV, which are easier to follow with this background.
- Scholasticism — Provides the intellectual and institutional context—methods, genres (like Sentences commentaries), and main debates—within which Ockham worked.
- John Duns Scotus — Ockham develops many of his views in response to Scotus’s realism, formal distinctions, and theology; knowing Scotus clarifies what Ockham is rejecting or revising.
- The Avignon Papacy — Explains the political-ecclesiastical background (papal residence in Avignon, conflicts with the empire, Franciscan poverty controversy) that shaped Ockham’s exile and political thought.
- 1
Skim for a narrative overview of Ockham’s life and why he matters.
Resource: Sections 1–2 (Introduction; Life and Historical Context)
⏱ 30–40 minutes
- 2
Focus on Ockham’s career stages and major texts, taking brief notes on dates and locations.
Resource: Sections 3–5 (Franciscan Formation and Oxford Years; Avignon, Condemnation, and Exile; Major Works and Their Transmission)
⏱ 45–60 minutes
- 3
Build conceptual foundations by studying his method, nominalism, and logic/language theory using the glossary alongside the text.
Resource: Sections 6–8 plus relevant glossary terms (Nominalism, Ockham’s razor, Universale, Suppositio, Lingua mentalis)
⏱ 1.5–2 hours
- 4
Deepen understanding of his epistemology and theology and connect them to his view of divine power and voluntarism.
Resource: Sections 9–11 (Epistemology and Theories of Cognition; Theology, Divine Power, and Voluntarism; Ethics, Law, and Moral Theory)
⏱ 1.5–2 hours
- 5
Study his political philosophy and his relation to other scholastics, noting continuities and breaks with the broader tradition.
Resource: Sections 12–13 (Political Philosophy and Critique of Papal Authority; Relation to Earlier Scholastics and the Via Moderna)
⏱ 1–1.5 hours
- 6
Synthesize what you’ve learned by examining his reception, common misconceptions, and long-term legacy; then answer discussion questions.
Resource: Sections 14–15 (Reception, Controversies, and Misattributions; Legacy and Historical Significance) plus the ‘Essential Quotes’ and glossary
⏱ 1–1.5 hours
Nominalism
The view that only individual substances and their particular qualities exist in reality, while universals are merely mental or linguistic signs without independent extra-mental existence.
Why essential: Ockham’s rejection of real universals underpins his metaphysics, logic of terms, and his use of Ockham’s razor to cut away unnecessary entities.
Ockham’s razor
A methodological maxim associated with Ockham, often summarized as ‘plurality is not to be posited without necessity,’ which counsels against multiplying entities or principles beyond what is needed to explain phenomena.
Why essential: This principle structures Ockham’s approach across metaphysics, theology, and politics; understanding it explains why he criticizes many traditional scholastic distinctions.
Universale (universal) as mental term
For Ockham, a universal is not a shared essence existing in things or a quality in the soul, but a mental term or concept that can signify many individual things.
Why essential: This concept is the linchpin of his solution to the problem of universals and connects directly to his theory of mental language and supposition.
Suppositio (supposition theory)
A semantic theory explaining how terms ‘stand for’ things in different contexts—personally (for individuals), simply (for concepts), or materially (for words)—thereby analyzing reference and truth conditions.
Why essential: Supposition theory is central to Ockham’s logic and his attempt to explain meaning and inference without positing real universals or species.
Lingua mentalis (mental language)
An internal, structured system of mental terms and propositions that naturally signify things and underlies all spoken and written languages.
Why essential: Mental language lets Ockham locate logical form and meaning in mental acts rather than in abstract entities, bridging his logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind.
Intuitiva cognitio and abstractive cognition
Intuitive cognition is direct awareness of an individual and its existence, while abstractive cognition considers an object’s nature or properties without determining whether it exists.
Why essential: This distinction is key to Ockham’s epistemology, his confidence in everyday knowledge of individuals, and his skepticism about demonstrative metaphysics and natural theology.
Potentia Dei absoluta / ordinata (absolute / ordained power of God)
The distinction between what God could do in principle as omnipotent (absolute power) and what God has in fact willed to do and bound Himself to in the existing order (ordained power).
Why essential: This framework shapes Ockham’s theology of contingency, his views on grace and salvation, and his account of how stable moral and legal norms can exist despite divine freedom.
Plenitudo potestatis and limits of papal authority
‘Fullness of power’ is the claim that the pope has supreme authority in the Church; Ockham contests expansive readings of this idea, arguing that papal power is ministerial, fallible, and bounded by Scripture and law.
Why essential: Understanding his critique of plenitudo potestatis is necessary to grasp his political writings, his break with John XXII, and his influence on conciliarism and ideas of limited government.
Ockham explicitly coined the exact phrase ‘entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity.’
The precise wording does not appear in his surviving works. Ockham articulates several principles of parsimony (e.g., ‘plurality is not to be posited without necessity’), and later tradition condensed these into the famous formula.
Source of confusion: Textbook summaries and popular accounts often treat the slogan as a verbatim quotation rather than a reconstruction of his methodological theme.
Nominalism means Ockham denies any real similarities or stable order in the world.
Ockham denies real universal essences, but he accepts real individual similarities and patterns that our concepts track; he also retains a robust created order sustained by God’s will.
Source of confusion: Equating ‘no real universals’ with ‘no real structure’ overlooks his account of natural similarities and the role of mental language in representing them.
Because Ockham stresses divine omnipotence and voluntarism, he makes morality completely arbitrary.
Ockham does hold many norms to be contingent on God’s free will, but he also affirms necessary precepts (like loving God) rooted in God’s nature and insists that God cannot will contradictions or evil as evil.
Source of confusion: Summaries of ‘divine command theory’ often oversimplify his nuanced distinction between necessary and contingent moral precepts.
Ockham rejected the use of reason in theology and was a pure fideist.
He limits what natural reason can demonstratively prove (e.g., he denies strict proofs of God’s existence) but still uses logical analysis and philosophical argument extensively to clarify and defend revealed doctrines.
Source of confusion: His denial of certain traditional proofs and stress on scriptural authority can be mistaken for a blanket rejection of reason’s role.
Ockham’s political thought is an early form of modern liberal secularism.
Ockham argues for limits on papal power and a distinction between spiritual and temporal authority, but he still grounds all legitimate power in God and operates within a medieval Christian framework.
Source of confusion: Later liberal and secular thinkers appropriated some of his arguments, leading to anachronistic readings of his intentions and conceptual framework.
How does Ockham’s nominalism about universals reshape traditional scholastic metaphysics, and what explanatory work does he think can still be done using only individuals and their qualities?
Hints: Compare his definition of universals as mental terms with realist accounts in Aquinas or Scotus; consider how he treats ens and res and what he does with haecceities and formal distinctions.
In what ways does Ockham’s principle of parsimony (Ockham’s razor) operate differently in metaphysics, theology, and political theory?
Hints: Identify at least one example from each domain (e.g., rejection of real universals, caution about speculative eucharistic theories, critique of plenitudo potestatis) and analyze how ‘not positing without necessity’ is applied in each.
What is the role of intuitive and abstractive cognition in Ockham’s epistemology, and how does this distinction support both his confidence in everyday knowledge and his skepticism about demonstrative theology?
Hints: Explain what intuitive cognition tells us about existence and contingent features, how abstractive cognition underlies universal concepts, and why this still leaves many theological truths undemonstrable.
How does Ockham’s distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power help him explain the contingency of the created order while preserving its reliability for human agents?
Hints: Contrast what God could do in absolute power with what God has in fact willed; consider implications for natural laws, moral norms, and the stability of promises about grace and salvation.
To what extent does Ockham’s critique of papal plenitudo potestatis and his appeal to councils and the universitas fidelium anticipate later conciliarist and constitutional ideas?
Hints: Use examples from his Dialogus and political treatises; distinguish between his immediate aim (defending Franciscan poverty, resisting John XXII) and longer-term institutional implications.
In what ways does Ockham remain a typical scholastic thinker, and in what ways does he break with the ‘via antiqua’ tradition represented by Aquinas and Scotus?
Hints: Consider his use of Sentences commentaries, disputational method, and acceptance of core doctrines on the one hand, and his nominalism, epistemic limits, and political radicalism on the other.
How should we assess the claim that Ockham is a precursor of modern empiricism and analytic philosophy of language?
Hints: Compare his emphasis on intuitive cognition and mental language with features of modern empiricism and analytic philosophy; discuss both similarities and important differences in aims and assumptions.