Australian Materialism

Historical Background and Origins

Australian Materialism is a family of views in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics that emerged in Australian universities in the 1950s and 1960s. It is most closely associated with J. J. C. Smart, U. T. Place, D. M. Armstrong, and C. B. Martin. The label refers less to a formal school or institution and more to a style of hard‑nosed, scientifically oriented materialism that became influential in analytic philosophy.

The immediate context was postwar analytic philosophy, particularly debates about the relationship between mind and body. Logical positivism and behaviorism had encouraged philosophers to avoid talk of inner mental entities. However, many found behaviorism too revisionary, since it seemed to deny that we have genuine inner experiences like pain, sensations, and thoughts.

Australian philosophers sought a way to respect ordinary mental language while remaining thoroughly naturalistic. They rejected dualism—the view that mind and body are fundamentally different kinds of substances—and also rejected purely behaviorist accounts that identified mental states with patterns of behavior or dispositions to behave. Their solution was the mind–brain identity theory: the claim that mental states are, in fact, identical with brain states.

Key early statements include U. T. Place’s 1956 article “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” and J. J. C. Smart’s 1959 paper “Sensations and Brain Processes.” These works helped define Australian Materialism as a significant position in the philosophy of mind.

Core Doctrines: Identity Theory and Physicalism

At its center, Australian Materialism defends a version of materialism (or physicalism): the view that everything that exists is ultimately physical. What is distinctive is its specific treatment of the mind–body problem.

1. The Mind–Brain Identity Theory

The core thesis is that mental states are identical to brain states. When a person feels pain, according to this view, that feeling is not merely caused by a brain event, nor is it something “over and above” the physical process. It simply is a particular kind of neural process.

Proponents often compare this to scientific identifications in other domains, such as:

• “Water is H₂O”
• “Lightning is an electrical discharge”
• “Heat is molecular motion”

In each case, two descriptions refer to the same thing at different levels. Likewise, the sentence “I am in pain” and the sentence “My C‑fibers are firing” (a simplified neuroscientific example) are taken to describe one and the same event from different perspectives—one phenomenal and one physiological.

Importantly, Australian materialists insist this is a claim of identity, not mere correlation. The view is sometimes called type identity theory, because it identifies types of mental states (like “pain”) with types of physical states (like “C‑fiber firing”), not just individual occurrences.

2. Rejection of Dualism and Behaviorism

Australian Materialism opposes:

• Substance dualism: the idea that minds are non‑physical substances distinct from bodies. Proponents argue this conflicts with modern science and raises problems about mind–body interaction.
• Property dualism: the view that mental properties are non‑physical features of physical systems. Australian materialists tend to see this as an unnecessary multiplication of entities.
• Behaviorism: the view that mental states are nothing over and above behavioral dispositions. While influenced by behaviorism’s focus on observables, Australian materialists argue that it fails to account adequately for inner conscious experience.

3. Naturalism and Scientific Orientation

A hallmark of Australian Materialism is its strong naturalism. It treats philosophy as continuous with the natural sciences and expects theories about the mind to be constrained by neuroscience, psychology, and physics. Metaphysical speculation that cannot be reconciled with empirical science is generally regarded with suspicion.

In the hands of D. M. Armstrong, Australian Materialism is embedded in a broader systematic metaphysics. Armstrong defends:

• States of affairs as the basic building blocks of reality
• Universals (repeatable properties) as real, physical features
• Laws of nature understood as relations between universals

Within this framework, mental states are among the physical properties realized in the brain, subject to the same kind of lawlike regularities as other physical phenomena.

4. Consciousness and Qualia

One of the most challenging issues is consciousness, especially so‑called qualia—the “what it is like” aspect of experience (e.g., the redness of red, the painfulness of pain). Australian materialists maintain that these qualitative aspects are not non‑physical additions to brain processes; they are simply how certain brain processes appear from the inside.

Critics argue that identity theory leaves an “explanatory gap” between physical descriptions and subjective experience. Australian materialists typically reply that this gap reflects our limited concepts and explanatory tools, not a metaphysical divide between mind and matter.

Influence, Criticisms, and Legacy

Australian Materialism has had a lasting impact on philosophy of mind and analytic metaphysics, even among those who reject its central claims.

1. Influence on Later Physicalist Theories

The identity theory inspired or shaped several subsequent approaches:

• Functionalism: emphasizes what mental states do (their causal and functional roles) rather than their specific physical realization. Some later Australian philosophers adopted or integrated functionalist ideas.
• Non‑reductive physicalism: accepts that everything is physical but denies that mental properties can be neatly reduced to physical ones.
• Australian metaphysical realism: Armstrong and Martin contributed to robust realist accounts of universals, laws, and causation that continue to influence contemporary metaphysics.

Even where later theories depart from strict type identity, they often retain the Australian naturalist spirit: respect for ordinary talk, commitment to science, and suspicion of non‑physical entities.

2. Major Criticisms

Australian Materialism has faced several important objections:

• Multiple realizability: Critics (especially functionalists) note that the same mental state—say, pain—could be realized by very different physical structures in different species or artificial systems. This challenges the idea that there is one brain state type corresponding to each mental state type.
• Qualia and the explanatory gap: Some argue that no purely physical description can capture the qualitative character of experience. Thought experiments like the knowledge argument (Mary the color scientist) and zombie arguments are often directed against views like Australian Materialism.
• Strict type identity: The strong claim that mental types are identical to brain types is seen by many as too rigid, especially given the diversity of nervous systems and the complexity of neural processes.

Proponents respond that identity claims can be refined (for instance, by allowing species‑specific identities) and that many objections rest on intuitions about conceivability rather than on scientific evidence.

3. Continuing Legacy

While few contemporary philosophers endorse the classical, unmodified identity theory in its original form, Australian Materialism remains historically significant. It:

• Marked a turn away from dualism and behaviorism toward robust physicalism.
• Helped shape the methodological style of analytic philosophy in Australia: empirically informed, metaphysically realist, and resistant to purely linguistic or conceptual solutions.
• Provided a model of how a national philosophical community could make a distinctive contribution to global debates.

In contemporary philosophy, Australian Materialism is studied both as a milestone in philosophy of mind and as a key episode in the development of analytic metaphysics, illustrating how a local intellectual culture helped crystallize a broader shift toward scientific naturalism.