Error Theory

1. Introduction

Error Theory is a position in metaethics that combines two core theses about ordinary moral discourse. First, it holds that everyday moral judgments—claims such as “murder is wrong” or “charity is good”—function as cognitive, truth-apt assertions that purport to describe how things are in a robustly objective, stance-independent moral realm. Second, it maintains that there are no such objective moral facts or properties, so these assertions are systematically false.

The view is typically classified as:

• Cognitivist about moral language: moral sentences express beliefs and have truth-values.
• Anti-realist about moral facts: there are no stance-independent moral truths.
• Nihilist in its verdict on moral truth: no positive moral propositions are true in the intended robust sense.

Error Theory is most closely associated with J. L. Mackie, whose book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977) gave the position its canonical formulation. Mackie’s influential “argument from queerness” and “argument from relativity” aim to show that positing objective moral values is metaphysically extravagant and explanatorily unnecessary. Later theorists, such as Richard Joyce and Jonas Olson, have defended, refined, or extended error-theoretic claims.

Within the broader landscape of metaethics, Error Theory contrasts with:

Error theorists often acknowledge that moral discourse plays important psychological and social roles, and they differ over what, if anything, should replace it. Some recommend moral fictionalism, others abolitionism, and still others propose revisionary ways of talking about reasons and value. The central idea, however, remains that ordinary moral thought is built around a systematic mistake about the world’s normative structure.

2. Origins and Founding Figures

Early Precursors

Error-theoretic themes appear prior to the explicit label “Error Theory.” Several thinkers articulated forms of moral skepticism that later error theorists draw upon:

• David Hume raised doubts about deriving “ought” from “is” and emphasized the dependence of moral evaluation on human sentiments.
• Friedrich Nietzsche offered genealogical critiques of Christian and bourgeois morality, suggesting that many moral values are historically contingent constructions serving particular power dynamics.
• Some logical positivists (e.g., A. J. Ayer) denied that moral judgments describe facts, though their emotivism was noncognitivist rather than error-theoretic.

These figures did not endorse a full-blown error theory as later defined, but they supplied key skeptical and genealogical resources.

J. L. Mackie as Canonical Founder

The systematic formulation of Error Theory is widely attributed to J. L. Mackie (1917–1981). In Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong he argues that:

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“There are no objective values.”

— J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977)

Mackie combines a semantic thesis (ordinary moral judgments purport to ascribe objective values) with an ontological denial (no such values exist), yielding the central error-theoretic conclusion. His “arguments from relativity and queerness” have become touchstones for subsequent discussion.

Later Developers

In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, several philosophers developed and diversified error-theoretic approaches:

Critics such as Terence Cuneo have also been central by formulating sophisticated objections—especially via “companions in guilt” strategies in defense of moral realism—thereby shaping the contemporary contours of error-theoretic debate.

3. Etymology of the Name "Error Theory"

The label “Error Theory” (often “the error theory” in context) is a descriptive term within analytic philosophy rather than a historical self-designation of a movement. It combines two elements:

• “Error” highlights the claim that ordinary moral judgments are not merely occasionally mistaken but involve a systematic, pervasive misrepresentation of reality. On this view, everyday moral thought attributes properties—objective rightness, wrongness, obligation—that do not exist.
• “Theory” signals that this is not just a negative denial but a positive explanatory account of moral discourse. Error theorists propose a systematic model of what moral language does (semantically and psychologically) and why it persists despite its falsity.

The term is sometimes capitalized (Error Theory) when referring to the specific metaethical position, and left in lower case when used generically (an “error theory” in some other domain).

Mackie himself did not consistently use “Error Theory” as a proper name, but he described his view as one in which moral judgments “are all false” because they posit objective values. Subsequent commentators and defenders consolidated this under the heading “Mackie’s Error Theory,” and the more general phrase “moral error theory” became standard to distinguish it from possible error theories about other domains (e.g., epistemic norms, reasons, or modality).

In contemporary literature, related labels include:

Some philosophers use “error theory” more broadly to describe any account on which a domain’s central claims are uniformly false, but in metaethics it is predominantly associated with the Mackian-style account of moral discourse.

4. Historical and Intellectual Context

Error Theory emerged within mid-20th-century analytic metaethics, shaped by debates about the nature of moral language and the status of moral facts. Several overlapping developments form its intellectual backdrop.

From Noncognitivism to Cognitivist Anti-Realism

In the early 20th century, noncognitivist views—especially emotivism and prescriptivism—dominated Anglophone metaethics. Figures like A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson held that moral utterances primarily express emotions or prescriptions and are not truth-apt. Error Theory arose partly as a cognitivist alternative: it agreed with noncognitivists that there are no objective moral facts, but insisted that ordinary speakers nevertheless mean to state facts when making moral claims.

Engagement with Moral Realism and Intuitionism

Error Theory also developed in response to moral realism, including non-naturalist intuitionism (e.g., G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross) and emerging naturalist realist theories. Mackie’s work can be read as:

• Accepting realists’ semantic claim that moral language is descriptive.
• Rejecting their metaphysical claim that there are corresponding moral properties.
• Using realist-friendly semantics as a premise in an argument for nihilism.

Scientific Naturalism and Metaphysical Scruples

The rise of scientific naturalism in mid-century philosophy contributed to skepticism about sui generis, irreducibly normative facts. Many error theorists adopt a relatively sparse ontology, favoring entities posited by successful natural sciences. The idea that objective values would be “queer”—metaphysically and motivationally unlike anything in the natural order—reflects this broader naturalistic sensibility.

Post-War Moral and Political Reflection

The devastation of the World Wars and decolonization prompted intensive reflection on morality, human rights, and political legitimacy. While Error Theory is not reducible to historical trauma, some commentators suggest that a heightened awareness of deep moral disagreement and ideological conflict made skeptical metaethical positions more salient.

By the late 20th century, Error Theory occupied a distinctive niche between realism and noncognitivism, contributing to a more pluralistic metaethical landscape in which sophisticated forms of expressivism, quasi-realism, and constructivism also developed.

5. Core Doctrines and Central Maxims

Error Theory is typically characterized by a set of interconnected theses about moral language, moral metaphysics, and truth.

Cognitivist Semantics

Error theorists endorse cognitivism about ordinary moral discourse:

• Moral sentences (e.g., “Lying is wrong”) conventionally aim to state facts.
• Moral judgments express beliefs that can be true or false.
• The content of these beliefs is robustly objective or stance-independent: they purport to describe how things are independently of any particular person’s attitudes or cultural norms.

This semantic thesis is often shared with moral realists, marking a significant departure from noncognitivism.

Ontological Denial

The central ontological claim is that there are no objective moral facts or properties that match the commitments of ordinary moral judgments. Error theorists typically deny:

• Intrinsic prescriptivity: properties that not only describe but inherently command or obligate.
• Irreducible normativity: sui generis moral features that cannot be captured in purely naturalistic terms.
• Stance-independence: moral truths that hold regardless of human attitudes, desires, or social practices.

Global Falsity of Positive Moral Judgments

From the combination of cognitivist semantics and ontological denial, error theorists infer that:

• All positive moral propositions (e.g., “Cruelty is wrong”) are, strictly speaking, false.
• Negative existential claims (e.g., “There are no objective moral facts”) may be true, but they are not standard first-order moral judgments.

Some error theorists discuss exceptions or special cases (e.g., analytic truths, or trivial conditionals), but the view is usually framed as global or “wholesale” concerning ordinary substantive morality.

Explanatory Ambition

Finally, many proponents present Error Theory not only as a denial but as an explanatory theory of moral practice. They aim to account for:

• The persistence and psychological force of moral beliefs.
• The variability of moral codes across cultures.
• The role of morality in coordination, social control, and motivation.

These explanatory ambitions prepare the ground for debates about what, if anything, should replace or reinterpret moral discourse, while leaving the core maxims themselves metaethical rather than prescriptive.

6. Metaphysical Views: The Ontology of Value

Error Theory’s metaphysical stance concerns what kinds of value properties and normative facts exist. Its distinctive claim is that the world lacks the sort of moral facts presupposed by ordinary discourse.

Rejection of Objective, Intrinsically Normative Properties

Error theorists typically deny that there are:

• Objective moral values (e.g., “goodness” or “wrongness”) that exist independently of any mind.
• Intrinsically prescriptive properties that both describe and categorically guide action.
• Queer properties that would be, in Mackie’s phrase, “of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.”

On this view, nothing in the natural world has the property of being, in itself, morally required or morally forbidden.

Naturalistic and Sparse Ontology

Most error theorists adopt a form of ontological naturalism:

• They accept entities and properties posited by well-confirmed natural and social sciences.
• They resist positing additional irreducibly normative facts unless compelled by strong explanatory need.

Value-like phenomena—desires, preferences, sufferings, social norms—are treated as natural or psychological facts, not as bearers of objective moral status. The metaphysical picture is often described as sparse: it includes physical, biological, psychological, and social properties but excludes sui generis moral properties.

Distinguishing Descriptive from Normative Facts

Error theorists distinguish:

Some proponents allow relational or conditional norms (e.g., “If you want X, you ought to do Y”) grounded in desires or institutional rules, but they interpret these as hypothetical or practice-relative, not as categorical moral truths.

Scope Beyond Morality

There is disagreement about how far this ontological skepticism extends. Some philosophers defend moral error theory while accepting other normative domains (e.g., prudential reasons, epistemic norms). Others argue that similar metaphysical concerns apply broadly, leading to global normative error theories. This raises further questions about the consistency of rejecting moral properties while retaining non-moral normativity, which are explored in later discussions of “companion in guilt” arguments.

7. Epistemological Views and Moral Knowledge

Error Theory’s epistemological stance follows from, and also independently motivates, its ontological claims. If there are no objective moral facts, then knowledge of such facts is impossible. Yet error theorists also address how moral belief and disagreement should be understood.

Denial of Moral Knowledge

On a standard formulation:

• To know that an act is objectively wrong would require there to be a fact of the matter—an objective property of wrongness—that the belief correctly represents.
• Because error theorists deny the existence of such properties, they conclude that humans have no knowledge of stance-independent moral truths.

This is sometimes expressed as a kind of moral skepticism, though it differs from agnostic skepticism by claiming that there is nothing moral to be known.

Critique of Moral Intuition and A Priori Justification

Many error theorists are skeptical about moral intuition as a route to knowledge. They argue that:

• Disagreement about putatively self-evident moral truths is widespread.
• The best explanation of intuitive moral beliefs may be psychological, evolutionary, or cultural, not tracking objective moral facts.

Some deploy evolutionary debunking arguments, suggesting that our evaluative dispositions were shaped by fitness-enhancing pressures that are epistemically insensitive to moral truth. On this picture, even if moral facts existed, our intuitions would not be reliably connected to them.

Reliance on Empirical and Conceptual Knowledge

Proponents typically emphasize that rejecting moral knowledge does not entail global skepticism. They allow for:

• Rich empirical knowledge about human psychology, social institutions, and consequences of actions.
• Conceptual and logical knowledge about the meanings of words, practical reasoning, and decision theory.

This information can guide action and policy without being construed as knowledge of objective moral truths.

Disagreement and Explaining Apparent Objectivity

Error theorists often treat pervasive moral disagreement as an epistemic datum better explained without positing moral facts. They suggest that:

• The appearance of objectivity in moral discourse is a feature of our language and psychology.
• The persistence of disagreement, despite shared non-moral facts, indicates that divergent attitudes, traditions, and interests underlie moral beliefs.

Different epistemological reactions to this situation—e.g., revisionary semantics, fictionalist stances, or abolitionism—shape subsequent debates about how to understand and possibly reform our evaluative talk.

8. Ethical System and Practical Implications

Error Theory is a metaethical position and does not, by itself, prescribe a substantive first-order ethical system. However, its denial of objective moral facts has implications for how agents might understand and structure practical decision-making.

Distinguishing Metaethics from Normative Ethics

Error theorists generally insist on a conceptual distinction:

• Metaethically, they deny that actions are objectively right or wrong in the robust sense.
• Practically, they allow that agents and communities can adopt norms, rules, or goals based on preferences, interests, coordination needs, or prudential reasons.

Thus, an error theorist might continue to support, say, prohibitions on violence, but would interpret such support as grounded in non-moral considerations (e.g., mutual advantage, empathy, social stability).

Instrumental and Conventional Norms

Various strategies have been proposed for structuring practical life without objective moral truths:

• Appeals to instrumental rationality: actions are evaluated relative to agents’ aims or collective goals.
• Emphasis on social conventions and legal norms: rules are justified by their role in coordination and conflict resolution rather than by moral rightness.
• Reliance on personal or communal values understood as attitudes or commitments, not as tracking stance-independent moral facts.

These approaches aim to preserve many familiar practices (e.g., cooperation, criticism, praise) while reinterpreting their grounding.

Emotional and Motivational Considerations

Error theorists acknowledge that moral beliefs often play strong motivational and emotional roles. The practical question is whether—and how—agents can be similarly motivated once they view moral claims as false. Responses include:

• Maintaining moral language as a useful fiction (moral fictionalism).
• Seeking non-moral bases for concern, such as empathy, personal projects, or enlightened self-interest.
• Accepting a degree of disillusionment, while relying on socialization and habit to sustain pro-social behavior.

Diversity of Practical Outlooks

There is significant diversity among self-described error theorists regarding:

These are not dictated by the core metaethical thesis but represent different attempts to navigate its practical implications.

9. Political Philosophy and Social Critique

Error Theory’s denial of objective moral facts extends to many claims central to political philosophy, such as assertions about justice, rights, and legitimacy. While it does not entail a specific political ideology, it encourages certain ways of theorizing about political structures.

Deflationary Attitude Toward Political Morality

From an error-theoretic perspective:

• Statements like “all persons have inherent human rights” or “the state ought to promote equality” are, taken literally, false if they presuppose stance-independent moral properties.
• Political theories that rest on such claims are viewed as relying on fictional or constructed foundations, though they may still be instrumentally valuable.

This stance can prompt a deflationary approach: political concepts are treated as tools for coordination, advocacy, and critique rather than as reflections of objective moral order.

Pragmatic Justification of Institutions

Error theorists often turn to prudential, contractual, or consequentialist reasoning shorn of robust moral realism:

• Institutions may be defended because they promote stability, reduce conflict, or enhance welfare, not because they are “just” in an objective sense.
• Rights-talk can be interpreted as a convenient shorthand for entrenched protections and expectations that serve widely shared interests.

Such approaches can converge, in practice, with some forms of political constructivism or instrumentalism, though the underlying metaethical commitments differ.

Critical Potential

The error-theoretic perspective can also be used to critique political rhetoric and ideology:

• Proponents suggest that appeals to “natural rights” or “moral authority” sometimes function as rhetorical devices masking power relations or contingent interests.
• Recognizing the lack of objective moral backing may, on this view, encourage more transparent negotiation and compromise, or more radical questioning of entrenched norms.

Critics worry that this undercuts resources for robust criticism of oppression or injustice. Error theorists respond by exploring whether effective criticism can be grounded in non-moral values, such as autonomy, suffering, or mutual advantage, understood naturalistically.

Variation Among Error Theorists

There is no unified “error-theoretic politics.” Some proponents emphasize continuity with liberal-democratic institutions under a pragmatic rationale; others see the view as opening conceptual space for non-moral radicalism or value pluralism. The core metaethical claims set constraints (e.g., no appeal to objective justice), but the political elaborations remain diverse and contested.

10. Key Arguments: Queerness, Relativity, and Disagreement

Error Theory is commonly supported by a family of arguments aiming to show both that ordinary moral discourse commits us to objective values and that such values are unlikely to exist.

Argument from Queerness

Mackie’s argument from queerness has two strands:

• Metaphysical queerness: If there were objective moral values, they would be unlike any other known properties—intrinsically prescriptive, necessarily connected to reasons for action, and perhaps non-natural. Proponents argue that this posits an ontologically extravagant category of facts.
• Motivational queerness: Objective values would have to be such that apprehending them inherently motivates rational agents. Error theorists question whether any plausible account of motivation supports this.

The conclusion drawn is that the existence of such queer properties is implausible given a broadly naturalistic worldview.

Argument from Relativity (and Disagreement)

Mackie’s argument from relativity (often reformulated today as an argument from disagreement) begins from the observation of extensive, persistent moral diversity:

• Different cultures and eras have held conflicting views on slavery, gender roles, punishment, and more.
• Even among well-informed, reflective individuals sharing non-moral facts, deep moral disagreements remain.

Error theorists contend that the best explanation is that moral judgments reflect varying forms of life, interests, and attitudes, not the tracking of objective values. By contrast, if robust moral facts existed and were epistemically accessible, we might expect greater convergence.

Explanatory Debunking

Later authors, such as Richard Joyce, extend these ideas into debunking arguments:

• Evolutionary accounts suggest that our moral dispositions were shaped to enhance cooperation and survival, not to detect moral truths.
• Therefore, even if objective values existed, our moral beliefs would be epistemically unreliable indicators of them.

This supports a skeptical stance about the truth of moral claims.

Structure of the Inference

While formulations vary, many error-theoretic arguments share a structure:

Critics challenge each step—questioning the semantics, defending the metaphysics of value, or offering realist-friendly explanations of disagreement and evolution—but these arguments remain central to the error-theoretic case.

11. Error Theory, Noncognitivism, and Moral Realism

Error Theory occupies a distinctive position in relation to moral realism and noncognitivism, sharing features with each while rejecting key commitments.

Agreement with Realism on Semantics

With moral realists, error theorists typically agree that:

• Moral utterances are cognitive: they express beliefs and are truth-apt.
• Ordinary speakers take moral sentences to describe objective features of the world.
• Moral disagreement often appears genuinely factual in character (e.g., disputants think they cannot both be right).

The primary point of divergence is over ontology: realists affirm objective moral facts; error theorists deny them.

Agreement with Noncognitivism on Ontology (Broadly)

With noncognitivists, error theorists agree that:

• There are no robust, stance-independent moral facts corresponding to ordinary moral claims (or at least none of the sort posited by robust realism).
• Appeals to such facts are not required to explain moral practice, motivation, or disagreement.

However, noncognitivists hold that moral statements primarily express non-cognitive attitudes (e.g., emotions, prescriptions), whereas error theorists maintain that they express false beliefs.

Comparative Overview

Interactions and Hybrid Views

The relations among these positions have prompted several hybrid or alternative views:

• Quasi-realism aims to vindicate much realist-seeming discourse within an ultimately noncognitivist framework, in part to avoid the error-theoretic conclusion.
• Some philosophers explore expressivist-friendly error theories, where certain uses of moral language are treated as noncognitive, while core assertoric uses remain truth-apt and false.
• Realist critics argue that if error theorists accept realist semantics, they incur a burden to explain why realism about moral facts should be rejected while realism about other domains is retained.

Debates among these camps focus on which combination of semantic, metaphysical, and psychological claims best captures ordinary practice while avoiding explanatory and theoretical difficulties.

12. Fictionalism, Abolitionism, and Responses to Error Theory

Once the error-theoretic thesis is accepted or taken seriously, a further question arises: what should be done with moral discourse? Several responses have been developed, both by error theorists themselves and by critics who aim to undercut or accommodate their arguments.

Moral Fictionalism

Moral fictionalism proposes that, although moral claims are strictly false, we should continue to use them “as if” they were true, much like we use fictional stories or idealizations:

• Moral language remains a pragmatically valuable tool for coordination, motivation, and self-regulation.
• Speakers engage in a kind of make-believe or pretence, without committing to the existence of objective moral facts.

Richard Joyce and Mark Kalderon are prominent defenders of fictionalist strategies, though they differ on details (e.g., whether ordinary speakers must be conscious of the fiction).

Moral Abolitionism

By contrast, moral abolitionism maintains that moral discourse is sufficiently misleading or harmful that we should seek to reduce or eliminate its use:

• Abolitionists argue that moralized thinking can fuel condemnation, resentment, and intractable conflict.
• They advocate replacing moral vocabulary with non-moral evaluative terms (e.g., about harm, preference, legality) that more accurately reflect the world.

Some error theorists lean toward abolitionism; others see it as psychologically or socially unrealistic.

Revisionism and Minimalism

A further family of responses aims to revise or reinterpret moral talk rather than discard or fictionalize it:

• Revisionist proposals suggest altering the meaning of moral terms so they no longer purport to track objective facts (e.g., tying “right” to what would be endorsed under certain procedures).
• Minimalist or deflationary approaches about truth and normativity claim that once we adopt a thin, deflationary notion of truth, the threat of Error Theory is mitigated; moral claims may count as “true” in a minimal sense even without robust moral facts.

These strategies are often developed by critics of Error Theory who accept some of its worries but resist its global falsity conclusion.

Realist and Noncognitivist Rebuttals

Moral realists and noncognitivists also offer direct responses:

• Realists challenge the arguments from queerness, relativity, and debunking, arguing that objective moral facts are neither metaphysically problematic nor unsupported.
• Noncognitivists contend that if moral discourse does not, at its core, purport to describe objective facts, then the error-theoretic premise about semantics is mistaken, and wholesale falsity does not follow.

Together, these responses create a complex landscape in which Error Theory is not only defended or rejected but also appropriated, softened, or redirected into alternative accounts of moral practice.

13. Extensions: Companion in Guilt and Other Normative Domains

Error Theory was initially articulated about morality, but its rationale has been extended or challenged through consideration of other normative domains, such as reasons, value, and epistemic norms.

Companion in Guilt Arguments Against Error Theory

Some critics use “companion in guilt” strategies to argue that if error-theoretic objections succeed against morality, they threaten to undermine other areas we are unwilling to abandon:

• If objective moral facts are rejected as “queer,” then, by parity of reasoning, objective epistemic norms (e.g., “one ought to believe in accord with evidence”) or practical reasons might also appear queer.
• Since abandoning all normativity would be untenable (e.g., it would undercut rational inquiry itself), critics contend that we should instead retain moral realism along with these other normative commitments.

Terence Cuneo, among others, has developed such arguments in defense of moral realism.

Companion Error Theories

In response, some philosophers embrace the symmetry and advocate normative companion error theories:

• They extend error-theoretic reasoning beyond morality to practical reasons, value, or even epistemic norms, claiming that these too involve a systematic error.
• Jonas Olson has explored how a global normative error theory might be formulated and what its implications would be.

This raises questions about how agents could coherently think, reason, or inquire if all normative domains are subject to error theory.

Restricted and Hybrid Approaches

Other theorists aim to limit the scope of error theory:

• Some argue for moral error theory while defending a realist account of epistemic or rational norms, often by proposing asymmetries between moral and non-moral normativity.
• Others propose hybrid views where certain thin or structural norms (e.g., requirements of logical consistency or instrumental rationality) are preserved, while richer substantive norms (especially moral ones) are rejected.

Debates focus on whether such distinctions are principled or ad hoc.

Beyond Normativity: Analogues in Other Domains

Philosophers also note that error theories have been proposed in other areas (e.g., about modality, time, or ordinary objects). While these are conceptually distinct from moral error theory, cross-domain comparisons feed into broader discussions about:

• When a domain’s discourse is best treated as fictional, revised, or eliminated.
• How to evaluate the trade-off between ontological parsimony and preserving pre-theoretic commitments.

These extensions and “companion in guilt” debates illustrate how moral Error Theory connects with, and pressures, our overall picture of normativity and rational thought.

14. Major Figures and Contemporary Debates

Central Proponents

Several philosophers have played key roles in articulating and defending Error Theory:

Prominent Critics and Interlocutors

Opposition and critical engagement have come from various quarters:

• Moral realists such as Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer-Landau, and others challenge the metaphysical and epistemic arguments for error theory and advance companion-in-guilt objections.
• Noncognitivists and expressivists (e.g., Simon Blackburn, Allan Gibbard) argue that sophisticated expressivist semantics can capture the practice of moral discourse without positing false cognitions.
• Constructivists and relativists propose alternative accounts where moral truths are grounded in procedures or perspectives, seeking to preserve a form of objectivity compatible with disagreement.

Key Contemporary Debates

Current discussions center on several interlinked questions:

• Semantics: Does ordinary moral discourse truly purport to state objective facts, or is its function more complex (e.g., hybrid or contextualist)? The answer affects whether Error Theory’s semantic premise holds.
• Metaphysics of Value: Are objective values genuinely “queer,” or can robust or moderate moral realism offer a naturalistically acceptable ontology?
• Epistemic Debunking: How forceful are evolutionary and cultural explanations of moral belief as undercutting justification for moral realism?
• Practical Consequences: What follows for our lives and institutions if Error Theory is true? Debates over fictionalism vs. abolitionism vs. quietism remain active.
• Scope of Normativity: Can one coherently accept moral error theory while retaining other normative domains, or is a broader normative skepticism required?

These debates keep Error Theory at the center of contemporary metaethics, functioning both as a challenge for realist and noncognitivist theories to answer and as a live option that some philosophers continue to refine and defend.

15. Legacy and Historical Significance

Error Theory has had a significant impact on metaethical theory, methodology, and broader philosophical reflection on normativity.

Catalyst for Metaethical Refinement

The view has served as a foil for alternative positions:

• Moral realists have been prompted to provide more detailed accounts of the metaphysics and epistemology of value, addressing concerns about queerness and debunking explanations.
• Noncognitivists and quasi-realists have sharpened their semantic and pragmatic theories to explain how moral discourse can function as it does without committing to robust objective facts, partly to avoid the error-theoretic conclusion.
• Constructivists and relativists have developed intermediate positions that acknowledge some of Error Theory’s concerns while resisting global falsity.

In this way, Error Theory has contributed to a more nuanced and pluralistic metaethical landscape.

Influence on Debunking and Evolutionary Ethics

Error-theoretic reasoning has intersected with evolutionary biology, psychology, and anthropology, encouraging the development of:

• Evolutionary debunking arguments across ethics and epistemology.
• Empirically informed accounts of the origins and functions of moral belief.

These interdisciplinary connections have reshaped how philosophers think about the relationship between scientific explanations and normative justification.

Role in Discussions of Normativity

By raising questions about the coherence of objective normativity, Error Theory has influenced debates about:

• The nature and indispensability of reasons, rationality, and epistemic norms.
• The possibility of global skepticism about normativity and its implications for philosophical practice.

Even when rejected, the view serves as a boundary marker, clarifying what is at stake in defending various forms of normative realism or constructivism.

Cultural and Intellectual Resonance

Outside strictly academic circles, Error Theory aligns with broader currents of moral skepticism, relativism, and secular naturalism. It has been taken up in discussions about:

• The foundations of human rights and international law.
• The justification of punishment and responsibility.
• The prospects for ethical life in a disenchanted, scientifically oriented worldview.

Although few endorse it as a complete practical outlook, its arguments continue to inform how philosophers—and sometimes public intellectuals—frame questions about the status and authority of moral claims.

Overall, Error Theory’s historical significance lies less in the number of its adherents than in its role as a systematic, influential challenge that has shaped contemporary thinking about what, if anything, makes our evaluative discourse true, justified, and practically compelling.