Moral Intuitionism

1. Introduction

Moral intuitionism is a family of meta-ethical and normative views united by the claim that at least some moral truths are known directly, or non‑inferentially, through something called moral intuition. These intuitions are typically described as intellectual or evaluative “seemings” that certain actions are right or wrong, or that certain states of affairs are good or bad, without our reaching these judgments solely by empirical observation, calculation of consequences, or appeal to social conventions.

Most historical forms of moral intuitionism combine this epistemological thesis with moral realism: the view that there are objective moral facts or properties, such as rightness and goodness, that do not depend on individual or collective attitudes. Intuitions are taken to give us at least prima facie justification for beliefs about those facts. Classic intuitionists also tend to reject the idea that morality can be fully captured by a single supreme principle (such as maximizing happiness), favoring instead a pluralist picture of many basic duties or values.

The tradition has roots in early modern rationalism and Scottish “common-sense” philosophy, but is most closely associated with a group of British analytic philosophers in the early twentieth century—especially G. E. Moore, H. A. Prichard, W. D. Ross, and C. D. Broad—and with several contemporary defenders who have revived and revised intuitionist ideas.

In contemporary usage, “moral intuitionism” can refer to:

• A narrow, Moore–Ross style view combining non‑naturalist realism with self‑evident moral principles; or
• A broader family of positions that grant justificatory force to intuitive moral judgments, including some phenomenological and moral-perception accounts.

Debates about moral intuitionism centre on questions about the nature and reliability of intuition, the status of moral properties, and the role of intuitions in moral theory construction and practical ethics.

2. Origins and Historical Background

Early Modern and Scottish Roots

Many historians trace moral intuitionism’s roots to early modern moral rationalists such as Samuel Clarke and Richard Price, who argued that moral rightness is grasped by reason in a way analogous to mathematical truths. The Scottish Common Sense tradition, especially Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart, also defended the idea that ordinary people have an immediate awareness of basic moral principles, treating these as part of common sense rather than esoteric theory.

These thinkers did not always use the term “intuitionism,” but later writers interpreted their views as proto‑intuitionist, especially in their appeal to self‑evident moral principles and their opposition to reductive naturalism or sentimentalism.

Kantian and Continental Influences

Some scholars see a partial precursor in Immanuel Kant’s claim that the moral law is known a priori through pure practical reason. Although Kant did not describe this knowledge as “intuition” in the later Moore–Ross sense, his emphasis on non‑empirical moral knowledge and the authority of reason influenced many later intuitionists.

On the Continent, the Brentano school and early phenomenologists such as Franz Brentano, Max Scheler, and Dietrich von Hildebrand developed accounts of value “givenness” in emotional or axiological intuition. These approaches evolved somewhat independently of the British analytic tradition but share the idea of an immediate apprehension of value.

Systematic Formulation in British Analytic Philosophy

Moral intuitionism crystallized as a named school in late nineteenth‑ and early twentieth‑century British moral philosophy, especially at Cambridge and Oxford. G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica (1903) articulated a non‑naturalist, intuitionist theory of goodness. H. A. Prichard and later W. D. Ross and C. D. Broad developed intuitionist accounts of obligation and duty, explicitly contrasting their views with utilitarianism and naturalistic ethics.

The period from roughly 1900 to the 1940s is often described as the classical intuitionist era in Anglophone ethics, during which intuitionism was a leading meta‑ethical and normative position.

Mid‑Century Decline

From the 1940s to the 1960s, intuitionism’s influence diminished in the Anglophone world. Factors commonly cited include the rise of logical positivism and emotivism, skepticism about non‑natural properties, and concerns about the epistemic status of intuition. Nevertheless, the tradition did not disappear entirely; it persisted in some deontological and phenomenological currents, setting the stage for later revival.

3. Etymology of the Name

The expression “moral intuitionism” combines two Latin-derived terms:

• “Moral” from moralis (“pertaining to customs or character”), traditionally used to designate questions of right and wrong action, character, and value.
• “Intuition” from intuitio (“a looking upon”, “immediate insight”), which in philosophical Latin and later European languages came to denote a kind of direct, non‑discursive grasp of an object or truth.

Historical Usage of “Intuition”

In early modern philosophy, “intuition” frequently designated a non‑inferential mode of knowing. Rationalists such as Descartes used intuitus mentis to describe a clear and distinct intellectual apprehension. In the moral context, British rationalists and Scottish philosophers sometimes spoke of “self‑evidence”, “immediate” or “direct” perception of rightness, even when they did not standardize the term “intuition.”

When G. E. Moore, Prichard, and Ross wrote of moral “intuitions,” they generally meant direct awareness or seeming of moral truth, not a mysterious faculty. Over time, critics sometimes caricatured this as appeal to a special “moral faculty,” while defenders stressed continuity with ordinary rational insight and evaluative judgment.

Emergence of “Intuitionism” as a Label

The suffix “-ism” marks a doctrinal or theoretical orientation. “Intuitionism” became established as a label in early twentieth‑century ethics to denote positions that:

1. Attribute a justificatory role to moral intuitions; and
2. Often (though not always) affirm self‑evident basic moral principles or properties.

The label was used both by proponents (e.g., Ross self‑described his view as intuitionist) and by critics (notably emotivists and naturalists) as a way of grouping together Moore, Prichard, and their allies. Later authors extended the term to include phenomenological intuitionism and some forms of moral perception theory, though there is debate about how far this extension should reach.

Thus, the name “moral intuitionism” reflects a core commitment to immediate moral insight as a source of justification, while allowing for significant diversity in how “intuition” is interpreted.

4. Key Figures and Intellectual Lineage

Early Precursors

Several earlier philosophers are commonly treated as forerunners:

These figures influenced later British intuitionists both directly and via the broader climate of rationalist and common-sense moral philosophy.

Classical British Intuitionists

The canonical intuitionists in twentieth‑century analytic ethics include:

• G. E. Moore (1873–1958): In Principia Ethica, presented an intuitionist account of intrinsic value, arguing that “good” denotes a simple, non‑natural property known by intuition.
• H. A. Prichard (1871–1947): Emphasized the non‑inferential character of our knowledge that certain acts are our duty, contending that attempts to derive duty from other considerations fail.
• W. D. Ross (1877–1971): In The Right and the Good and later works, developed a systematic list of prima facie duties, combining intuitionist epistemology with a pluralist deontological theory.
• C. D. Broad (1887–1971): Provided detailed analyses of moral knowledge and defended a broadly intuitionist, yet cautious, approach to both value and obligation.

Phenomenological Intuitionists

In parallel, the phenomenological tradition produced key figures often classified as intuitionist:

• Franz Brentano (1838–1917): Proposed a theory of value grounded in the correct emotion of “love” and “hate,” understood through inner perception.
• Max Scheler (1874–1928): Argued that values are given in emotional intuition, with a stratified hierarchy of values apprehended by a kind of value‑perception.
• Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889–1977): Developed a rich account of value-response and moral insight, treating values as objectively “given” to the subject.

Contemporary Revivalists

From the late twentieth century, several philosophers have explicitly revived and refined intuitionism:

This lineage shows both continuity—especially regarding non‑inferential moral justification—and diversification in metaphysical and psychological interpretations of intuition.

5. Core Doctrines of Moral Intuitionism

Although there is substantial internal diversity, most accounts of moral intuitionism identify a cluster of characteristic doctrines. Different intuitionists endorse these to varying degrees, but together they mark off the intuitionist family.

Non‑Inferential Moral Justification

A central commitment is that some moral beliefs are justified non‑inferentially. When a competent agent considers claims such as “torturing for fun is wrong,” it can seem obviously true in a way that does not depend on explicit argument or empirical induction. Intuitionists treat such seemings as conferring prima facie justification, analogous to how perceptual experiences justify beliefs about the external world.

Self‑Evident Moral Propositions

Many intuitionists maintain that certain basic moral propositions are self‑evident: understanding them suffices for being justified in believing them, absent defeaters. These may concern:

• Basic moral principles (e.g., “promise-keeping is, other things equal, right”);
• Fundamental value claims (e.g., “pleasure is, in itself, good,” according to some value theorists).

There is debate within the tradition about how many such propositions there are and how determinate they are.

Moral Realism and Objectivity

Classical versions typically combine epistemic intuitionism with moral realism: moral statements purport to describe objective facts, and some of them are true. Intuitions are taken as a route to knowledge of these facts. Some later authors retain epistemic intuitionism while adopting more modest or deflationary metaphysics; others keep robust non‑naturalist realism.

Pluralism about Moral Principles

Many intuitionists, especially in the Rossian line, defend intuitionist pluralism: there are multiple, irreducible moral principles or values that cannot be derived from a single master principle such as utility. These include duties related to fidelity, justice, beneficence, and so forth, each knowable at least partly by intuition.

Prima Facie vs. All‑Things‑Considered Duties

Another frequent doctrine is the distinction between prima facie and all‑things‑considered duties. Intuitionists hold that basic principles specify pro tanto reasons that may conflict; actual obligation in particular cases results from weighing these reasons, not from any one principle always overriding the others.

Fallibility and Revision

Contemporary intuitionists almost universally stress the fallibility of intuitions. They treat intuitive judgments as starting points that may be revised in light of further reflection, empirical information, and considerations of coherence with other beliefs. This gives intuitionism a role within broader reflective equilibrium approaches, even when it insists that some non‑inferential justification remains fundamental.

6. Metaphysical Commitments

Moral intuitionism, in its classic forms, is closely associated with ethical non‑naturalism and moral realism, though there is variation among proponents and some more recent attempts to weaken or reinterpret these commitments.

Moral Realism

Most intuitionists are realists: they hold that moral statements aim to describe facts and that some such statements are literally true. Claims like “lying is wrong” are about how things are, not merely about emotions, prescriptions, or social conventions. Intuitions are treated as our epistemic access to these facts.

Non‑Natural Moral Properties

A central strand of intuitionist metaphysics is the claim that at least some moral properties are non‑natural:

• G. E. Moore argued that goodness is a simple, non‑natural property that cannot be analyzed in terms of any natural or psychological property.
• Other intuitionists, such as Prichard and Ross, were sometimes less explicit, but typically rejected straightforward reductions of rightness or duty to natural facts like pleasure, desire satisfaction, or evolutionary fitness.

Proponents often appeal to the Open Question Argument to support the irreducibility of moral properties: for any proposed naturalistic identification of “good,” one can still intelligibly ask whether that thing is really good.

Value Ontology and Axiology

Some intuitionists, especially in the phenomenological tradition, articulate a richer ontology of values. For example:

• Scheler posits a stratified order of values (sensory, vital, spiritual, holy) that are “given” in emotional intuition.
• Von Hildebrand treats values as real features of the world that call for appropriate responses.

In these accounts, values have a quasi‑Platonic or sui generis status, not reducible to empirical properties.

Moderate or Quietist Metaphysics

Contemporary intuitionists sometimes temper robust non‑naturalism:

• Minimalist realists may say that there are moral truths and facts but decline to posit a special metaphysical realm, instead treating moral facts as higher‑level or supervenient on natural facts without strict reduction.
• Some combine intuitionist epistemology with quasi‑naturalist metaphysics, suggesting that moral properties are constituted by natural relations but still known through intuition, not empirical science alone.

Supervenience and Dependence

Even non‑naturalist intuitionists typically accept that moral properties supervene on natural properties: there can be no moral difference without some natural difference. The metaphysical claim is not that moral properties float free of the natural world, but that they are not identical to, or reducible without remainder to, purely natural properties.

These metaphysical commitments provide the background for intuitionism’s epistemological and ethical theses, shaping how intuitions are understood as tracking an objective moral reality.

7. Epistemological Views and the Nature of Intuition

Moral intuitionism’s most distinctive claims are epistemological. It posits that certain moral beliefs are justified, and possibly known, through moral intuition, a form of non‑inferential cognition.

Intuition as Intellectual Seeming

Many contemporary intuitionists define intuition as an intellectual seeming: it appears or seems to one that a proposition is true. This is analogous to perceptual seeming (“it looks red to me”), but applied to abstract or evaluative contents (“it seems wrong to break a promise merely for convenience”).

On this view:

• Intuitions are occurrent mental states with a characteristic phenomenology of obviousness or clarity.
• They are not necessarily irresistible, incorrigible, or infallible.
• They can be overridden or defeated by contrary evidence, argument, or further reflection.

Michael Huemer’s “phenomenal conservatism” is a prominent articulation: if it seems to one that P and there are no defeaters, one has prima facie justification for believing P.

Self‑Evidence and A Priori Justification

Many intuitionists hold that certain moral truths are self‑evident and knowable a priori. Understanding the propositions (e.g., that one ought, ceteris paribus, to keep one’s promises) is sufficient for justified belief, without reliance on empirical data. Disagreement does not preclude self‑evidence; intuitions can be clouded or underdeveloped.

There is debate over:

• How many moral truths are self‑evident;
• Whether self‑evidence requires some level of reflective understanding;
• The relationship between self‑evidence and conceptual analysis.

Foundationalism in Moral Epistemology

Intuitionists often endorse a form of foundationalism: some moral beliefs are properly basic, not justified by inference from more fundamental moral claims, and they in turn support more complex moral judgments. For example, Rossian prima facie duties are commonly treated as such foundations.

Other moral beliefs—particularly about concrete cases—may be justified inferentially, by applying or balancing these more basic principles.

Moral Perception and Emotion

Some accounts, especially phenomenological and virtue-ethical, interpret intuition as a kind of moral perception:

• Agents with appropriate sensitivity and experience “see” that a situation involves cruelty, injustice, or generosity.
• Emotions (e.g., indignation, compassion) may play a role in revealing value or reasons.

Proponents argue that this view explains how intuitions are closely tied to concrete contexts. Critics worry about distinguishing genuine perception from mere projection of attitudes.

Reliability, Disagreement, and Debunking

Intuitionists confront questions about the reliability of intuition, particularly in the face of cross‑cultural disagreement and psychological studies suggesting biases in moral judgment. Responses include:

• Restricting evidential weight to “considered” or idealized intuitions—those formed under conditions of reflection, information, and absence of distortion;
• Integrating intuitions into reflective equilibrium, where they are tested against principles and empirical knowledge;
• Arguing that evolutionary or cultural explanations of intuitions do not automatically undermine their justificatory status.

These epistemological debates are central to contemporary assessments of intuitionism.

8. Ethical System and Rossian Pluralism

While moral intuitionism is primarily a meta‑ethical position, several of its most influential exponents, especially W. D. Ross, developed distinctive normative theories closely tied to intuitionist epistemology.

Ross’s Prima Facie Duties

Ross’s system is the paradigmatic example of intuitionist pluralism about duties. He proposed that there are several basic kinds of prima facie duty—reasons that count in favor of actions but may be overridden:

Ross claimed that reflection on ordinary moral convictions reveals these as self‑evident. He emphasized that this list is open to refinement and may not be exhaustive.

Prima Facie vs. All‑Things‑Considered Duty

Ross distinguished between:

• Prima facie duty: a duty that has genuine moral weight in virtue of a certain relation (e.g., having promised);
• All‑things‑considered duty (actual duty): what one ought to do overall in a particular situation, after weighing all relevant prima facie duties.

For example, a duty of fidelity (keeping a promise) may be overridden by a stronger duty of beneficence (saving a life). Intuitions guide both the identification of basic duties and the judgment of which duty is more stringent in a given case.

Contrast with Monistic Theories

Ross and other pluralist intuitionists opposed monistic norms, such as classical utilitarianism’s principle of maximizing overall happiness. They argued that:

• Diverse moral phenomena (e.g., promise‑keeping, justice, gratitude) resist reduction to a single value;
• Our intuitive judgments about cases often support constraints on promoting aggregate good (e.g., prohibitions on harming an innocent person even for great benefit).

Intuitionists use these case-based intuitions as evidence for pluralism and side‑constraints, while acknowledging that weighing plural duties is sometimes opaque and may not yield precise decision procedures.

Other Intuitionist Ethical Systems

Moore’s ethical system focused on intrinsic value rather than duty, using the method of isolation to intuit which states of affairs (e.g., aesthetic enjoyment, personal affection) are good in themselves. Obligations then depend on promoting such goods. Phenomenological intuitionists, by contrast, ground ethics in a hierarchy of objective values and fitting emotional responses.

Across these variations, intuitionist normative theories share a reliance on:

• Basic moral considerations taken as self‑evident or directly known;
• Case‑by‑case deliberation informed by intuitive judgment, rather than a single overarching formula.

9. Political Philosophy and Applied Ethics

Moral intuitionism does not prescribe a single political program, but its epistemological and normative commitments have influenced a variety of views in political and applied ethics.

Role of Intuitions in Political Morality

Intuitionists typically treat widely shared, stable moral judgments about political practices as data for normative theory. Examples include:

• The wrongness of slavery, genocide, or arbitrary discrimination;
• The importance of basic liberties, fair procedures, and respect for persons.

Such judgments are seen as at least prima facie justified by moral intuition and as constraints on acceptable political arrangements.

Rights, Duties, and Constraints

Rossian pluralism readily generates a framework of political rights and duties:

• Duties of justice and non‑maleficence support constraints against harming or exploiting individuals, even for aggregate welfare.
• Duties of beneficence and self‑improvement can ground social obligations to provide education, healthcare, or welfare, subject to competing duties and resource limits.

Some contemporary theorists use intuitionist ideas to argue for rights‑based liberalism or to bolster contractualist theories that appeal to intuitive judgments about what free and equal persons could reasonably reject.

Case‑Based Reasoning in Applied Ethics

In applied ethics, intuitionist methodology encourages attention to concrete cases and thought experiments. Proponents use intuitive responses to cases to evaluate and refine principles in areas such as:

• Medical ethics (e.g., euthanasia, informed consent, allocation of scarce resources);
• Just war theory (e.g., non‑combatant immunity, proportionality);
• Business and professional ethics (e.g., conflicts of interest, whistleblowing);
• Bioethics (e.g., reproductive technologies, genetic enhancement).

Intuitive judgments about particular scenarios are treated as starting points that may support mid‑level principles (e.g., respect for autonomy, non‑maleficence) and interact with domain‑specific facts.

Pluralism and Political Disagreement

Because many intuitionists endorse pluralism about values and duties, they tend to recognize the complexity of political decision‑making, where different prima facie duties (e.g., beneficence vs. respect for liberty) may conflict. This has led some to see intuitionism as compatible with a range of political positions—from libertarianism to welfare-state liberalism—depending on how individuals or societies weigh competing duties.

Others highlight the role of moral intuition in public justification, arguing that political principles should be acceptable to citizens’ considered moral judgments, even if these judgments are diverse. Intuitionism thus contributes methodological tools rather than a uniform ideological outcome.

10. Varieties and Sub-Schools of Intuitionism

Within moral intuitionism, several distinct strands can be identified, differing in their metaphysics, psychology, and understanding of intuition.

Classical Analytic Intuitionism

This sub‑school, associated with Moore, Prichard, Ross, and Broad, combines:

• Non‑naturalist realism about moral properties;
• A priori knowledge of self‑evident moral truths;
• Emphasis on rational insight rather than emotion.

Moore focuses on intrinsic goodness, while Prichard and Ross emphasize obligation. All appeal to reflection on considered judgments to identify basic moral truths.

Phenomenological Intuitionism

Influenced by Brentano and Scheler, phenomenological intuitionists construe intuition as a form of value‑perception:

• Values are given in emotional or axiological experiences;
• Moral knowledge arises from intentional acts such as loving, hating, or preferring;
• There is often a hierarchy of values (e.g., sensory vs. spiritual vs. holy) discerned through refined intuition.

This approach integrates affective life more centrally than classical analytic intuitionism, while still affirming objective values.

Moral Perception and Virtue‑Ethical Intuitionism

Some contemporary theorists describe moral intuition in quasi‑perceptual terms:

• Agents with the right virtues and experience are said to literally perceive reasons or values in situations (e.g., seeing an action as cruel).
• Intuitions are context‑sensitive, trained through moral education, and closely linked to character.

This line often intersects with Aristotelian or virtue‑ethical frameworks, while remaining compatible with broader intuitionist epistemology.

Moderate, Naturalist‑Friendly Intuitionism

A number of recent authors maintain the epistemic thesis that intuitions provide non‑inferential justification, while loosening metaphysical commitments:

• They may accept that moral properties supervene on natural properties or are constituted by them;
• They sometimes adopt minimalist semantics about moral facts;
• They emphasize the continuity of moral intuition with ordinary evaluative and cognitive processes.

This approach seeks to reconcile intuitionist epistemology with scientifically informed understandings of human cognition.

Methodological Intuitionism

Some use “intuitionism” in a methodological sense, referring to the practice of treating carefully considered moral intuitions (especially about cases) as evidence in theory construction, even without commitment to robust non‑naturalism. On this broader understanding, views that combine reflective equilibrium with a serious role for intuitions may count as intuitionist in method, though not in ontology.

There is ongoing debate about how inclusive the label “intuitionism” should be, with some reserving it for robust Moore–Ross style positions, and others extending it to a wider family of theories that grant intuitions a foundational epistemic role.

11. Methodology: Cases, Thought Experiments, and Reflective Equilibrium

Moral intuitionism is closely associated with particular methods of moral reasoning, especially the use of cases and the treatment of intuitive judgments as evidence.

Use of Particular Cases

Intuitionists often begin with judgments about specific scenarios, sometimes real, sometimes hypothetical. For example, they might consider a case where breaking a promise would save a life, or where harming one person would prevent greater harms to many.

These judgments serve to:

• Reveal which considerations (promises, harms, distributions) we treat as morally salient;
• Test proposed principles (e.g., strict promise‑keeping, utility maximization);
• Highlight tensions between competing intuitions.

Ross’s articulation of prima facie duties relies heavily on reflection over such ordinary-case judgments.

Thought Experiments

More stylized thought experiments are frequently used to elicit and clarify intuitions. Famous later examples—such as trolley problems—were not devised by classical intuitionists but fit naturally with intuitionist methodology. Proponents contend that:

• Carefully constructed scenarios help isolate particular moral factors;
• Our intuitive responses provide evidence about basic moral principles or constraints.

Critics worry that intuitions about highly artificial cases may be unreliable or culturally parochial; intuitionists respond by distinguishing between central and peripheral intuitions, or by focusing on widely shared, stable responses.

Reflective Equilibrium and Intuitionism

Although reflective equilibrium is often associated with John Rawls, many intuitionists see it as compatible with, or naturally extending, their own methodology. In this setting:

1. One starts from initial intuitions about cases and some candidate principles;
2. One adjusts either the intuitions (by reconsideration) or the principles (by revision) to achieve greater coherence;
3. The resulting network of beliefs, if stable and well‑informed, is regarded as justified.

Distinctively intuitionist versions usually maintain that some intuitions retain non‑inferential justificatory force even within equilibrium, rather than being justified solely by coherence.

Role of Critical Reflection and Dialogue

Intuitionist methodology typically emphasizes:

• Critical scrutiny of one’s own intuitions, checking for bias, inconsistency, or ignorance of relevant facts;
• Engagement with the intuitions of others, including cross‑cultural or interdisciplinary perspectives;
• Willingness to revise or downgrade particular intuitions when they conflict with more secure ones or with well‑established empirical findings.

This reflective stance is presented as a way of harnessing the epistemic value of intuition while acknowledging its fallibility.

12. Criticisms and Objections

Moral intuitionism has faced extensive criticism on conceptual, epistemological, and empirical fronts. Different intuitionists respond in various ways, and some revise their views to address these concerns.

The “Queerness” and Metaphysical Objections

Critics influenced by J. L. Mackie argue that non‑natural moral properties are metaphysically and epistemologically “queer”: unlike anything else in the universe and mysterious in how we could know them. This is said to challenge both intuitionist realism and the idea of a special faculty of moral intuition.

Intuitionists reply by:

• Denying that moral properties are more mysterious than other abstract entities (e.g., numbers, modal facts);
• Interpreting intuition as ordinary rational insight or perception‑like awareness, not a sui generis faculty.

The Epistemic Challenge: Reliability and Disagreement

A common objection questions how intuitions can be justified or reliable:

• People’s intuitions often conflict, both within and across cultures;
• Psychological research suggests that many intuitions are influenced by irrelevant factors (framing, emotions, heuristics).

Some debunking arguments claim that if intuitions are shaped by evolutionary pressures unrelated to moral truth, this undermines their evidential value.

Intuitionists respond by:

• Restricting weight to considered or idealized intuitions formed under reflection;
• Arguing that disagreement per se does not eliminate justification (analogous to disagreement in science or mathematics);
• Contending that evolutionary explanations do not automatically imply unreliability and may be compatible with truth‑tracking.

The Charge of Conservatism and Status Quo Bias

Since intuitionism gives weight to existing moral judgments, some critics worry it is conservative, entrenching prevailing norms (including oppressive ones). Historical changes in intuitions about, for example, slavery or gender roles are cited as evidence that intuitions can be badly mistaken and influenced by social power structures.

Intuitionists often emphasize:

• The role of critical reflection and confrontation with counter‑intuitions;
• That some intuitions (e.g., about equal respect or unnecessary suffering) have played a role in challenging injustices;
• The fallibilist nature of their view, which allows revision of even strongly held intuitions.

The Justification Regress and “Dogmatism” Worry

Another line of criticism alleges that intuitionism either leads to a regress in justification or stops arbitrarily. If some moral beliefs are basic and justified by intuition alone, critics ask why these beliefs, rather than competing ones, enjoy foundational status.

Intuitionists typically answer by:

• Invoking parallels with perception and memory, where some beliefs are treated as prima facie justified without further proof;
• Appealing to features such as clarity, coherence, and stability over time as indicators of better‑founded intuitions.

The Methodological Objection

Some philosophers challenge the heavy reliance on thought experiments and armchair reflection, suggesting that more weight should be given to empirical investigation or formal models. Intuitionists defend the indispensability of intuitive judgment for assessing moral significance and for evaluating the very standards by which empirical findings are interpreted.

These debates remain central to ongoing evaluations of intuitionism’s plausibility.

13. Comparisons with Rival Meta-Ethical Theories

Moral intuitionism is often defined in contrast to several rival approaches in meta‑ethics. The following table highlights key points of comparison:

Moral Naturalism

Naturalists often argue that moral facts are identical with or supervene in a reductive way on natural facts discoverable by science (e.g., facts about human flourishing). They sometimes treat moral knowledge as continuous with empirical inquiry. Intuitionists counter that attempts to define “good” or “right” in purely natural terms face the Open Question Argument and that intuition remains necessary to evaluate which natural properties are normatively significant.

Noncognitivism and Emotivism

Noncognitivists (e.g., Ayer, Stevenson) claim that moral utterances function to express approval or prescribe action. On this view, intuition has no role as evidence for truth, though it might explain emotional reactions. Intuitionists insist that moral language behaves like descriptive discourse (e.g., in supporting logical inferences) and that our experience of moral deliberation is best explained by treating moral judgments as beliefs.

Error Theory

Error theorists agree with intuitionists that moral judgments purport to state objective facts but argue that no such facts exist. They often appeal to the metaphysical and epistemological worries raised against intuitionism. Intuitionists respond by defending a less “queer” understanding of moral properties and by arguing that the phenomenology of moral experience and the practical indispensability of moral thought support realism.

Constructivism and Contractualism

Procedural constructivists ground normativity in outcomes of idealized choice or agreement. Some see this as an alternative to intuitionist realism. However, even constructivists typically rely on intuitive judgments to specify and justify the relevant procedures (e.g., which constraints on choice are reasonable), leading some commentators to view constructivism and intuitionism as sharing important methodological commitments while diverging on metaphysics.

These comparisons clarify how intuitionism positions itself in ongoing debates about the nature, truth, and knowability of moral claims.

14. Twentieth-Century Decline and Contemporary Revival

Mid‑Century Decline

After its early twentieth‑century prominence, moral intuitionism’s influence waned between the 1940s and 1960s. Several developments contributed:

• Logical positivism and analytic trends favored empirically verifiable statements, casting suspicion on non‑natural properties and a priori moral knowledge.
• Emotivism and prescriptivism treated moral language as non‑cognitive, undercutting intuitionist claims about knowledge of moral facts.
• The rise of ordinary language philosophy shifted attention away from abstract meta‑ethical theorizing toward analysis of everyday discourse.
• Concerns about the epistemic status of intuition, especially in light of disagreement and the lack of a clear faculty of moral insight, led many to view intuitionism as philosophically naive.

By the mid‑century, intuitionism was often presented in textbooks as a largely superseded position, though Ross’s normative ideas and phenomenological intuitionism persisted in some circles.

Seeds of Revival

From the 1970s onward, several trends opened space for reconsidering intuitionism:

• Renewed interest in moral realism and the failure of noncognitivist programs to fully account for moral language and practice.
• The emergence of reflective equilibrium (Rawls) and case‑based methodologies that implicitly gave intuitions a central evidential role.
• Growing recognition that all ethical theories, including utilitarianism and contractualism, rely heavily on judgments about cases and principles that resemble intuitionist appeals.

Contemporary Analytic Revival

From the 1980s and 1990s, a more explicit analytic intuitionist revival took shape:

These thinkers often present intuitionism in more sophisticated epistemological terms, addressing regress, reliability, and the role of coherence. They also frequently integrate intuitionism with contemporary discussions of perception, defeasible justification, and cognitive science.

Phenomenological and Cross‑Tradition Developments

Parallel to the analytic revival, there has been renewed interest in phenomenological ethics (Scheler, von Hildebrand, Edith Stein) and its intuitionist elements. Some contemporary philosophers explore value perception and affective intuition, linking these with virtue ethics and moral psychology.

Moreover, intuitionist themes surface in non‑Western and comparative philosophy, where appeals to immediate awareness of value and duty find analogues in various traditions, though terminological and conceptual frameworks may differ.

Overall, intuitionism’s contemporary presence spans:

• Robust non‑naturalist realism;
• More modest or naturalist‑friendly epistemic intuitionism;
• Methodological uses of intuition within reflective equilibrium and case‑based reasoning.

The revival does not restore intuitionism’s earlier dominance but secures it a significant place in current meta‑ethical debate.

15. Legacy and Historical Significance

Moral intuitionism has left a lasting imprint on both the content and the methods of ethical theory, even among philosophers who reject its central theses.

Shaping Meta‑Ethical Debates

Intuitionism played a central role in articulating key distinctions that structure contemporary meta‑ethics:

• Cognitivism vs. noncognitivism;
• Moral realism vs. anti‑realism;
• Naturalism vs. non‑naturalism;
• A priori vs. empirical sources of moral knowledge.

Moore’s Open Question Argument and related critiques of naturalism continue to influence discussions of moral reduction and supervenience, even among naturalists who reject his conclusions.

Influence on Normative Ethics

Rossian pluralism has been especially influential. Many contemporary deontologists, contractualists, and theorists of reasons adopt:

• The distinction between pro tanto (prima facie) reasons and all‑things‑considered judgments;
• A commitment to multiple, irreducible duties or values;
• A case‑sensitive approach to moral deliberation, resistant to single‑principle monism.

Even when these views are not labeled “intuitionist,” their structure and concepts derive significantly from the intuitionist tradition.

Methodological Legacy

The widespread use of thought experiments, case judgments, and reflective equilibrium in moral philosophy owes much to intuitionism’s emphasis on the evidential role of considered moral intuitions. Many contemporary theorists, including those in rival camps, rely on patterns of reasoning that intuitionists helped to systematize.

Cross‑Disciplinary and Cultural Impact

Beyond philosophy:

• Intuitionist ideas inform debates in law, bioethics, and public policy, where appeals to “common sense” moral judgments and to self‑evident rights or wrongs are frequent.
• In theology and religious ethics, intuitionism overlaps with views that treat certain moral truths as immediately known by conscience or natural law.

Cross‑culturally, analogues to intuitionist notions appear in traditions that stress direct insight into Dharma, Tao, or other normative orders, though the metaphysical and epistemological frameworks differ.

Continuing Relevance

Intuitionism’s ongoing significance lies not only in active defenses of non‑inferential moral knowledge and non‑natural moral properties but also in its role as a foil: rival theories frequently define themselves in relation to intuitionist challenges about reduction, normativity, and justification.

As debates about moral psychology, evolutionary influences on morality, and the nature of normativity continue, intuitionism remains a prominent, historically rich position that both shapes and is shaped by broader developments in philosophy.