Occasionalism

1. Introduction

Occasionalism is a family of metaphysical doctrines according to which God alone is the true efficient cause of every event in the universe, while created things are merely occasions on which God acts. On this view, when one billiard ball strikes another, or when a decision seems to move an arm, no genuine causal power resides in the ball or in the human will; rather, these are circumstances under which God directly produces the relevant effects.

The doctrine appears in distinct but related forms in classical Islamic kalām and early modern Christian philosophy. In both settings, it is closely tied to strong accounts of divine omnipotence and providence, and to skepticism about necessary connections among created things. Proponents often present occasionalism as a consistent way to affirm that:

• conservation of the world is a form of continuous creation;
• what are commonly called “laws of nature” are expressions of divine volitions or custom;
• mind–body correlations require a transcendent mediator.

Occasionalism stands in systematic tension with traditions that affirm secondary causes, such as Aristotelian–Avicennian metaphysics, Thomistic scholasticism, and later Leibnizian and empiricist accounts of causation. Some interpreters treat it as a radicalization of older doctrines of divine concurrence; others see it as a distinct alternative that effectively replaces all creaturely causality with divine agency.

Historically, occasionalism flourishes from roughly the 11th to 18th centuries, with major formulations in Ashʿarite theology and in the rationalist system of Nicolas Malebranche. It later declines as a live metaphysical option but continues to inform debates in philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, and the interpretation of scientific laws, where “neo‑occasionalist” positions or analogies are sometimes identified.

The following sections survey its historical development, central claims, internal variations, and interactions with rival theories of causation.

2. Historical Origins and Early Formulations

The historical emergence of occasionalism is usually traced to two broad contexts: classical Islamic theology (kalām) and early modern European rationalism. Scholars debate the degree of continuity between these strands, but most agree that they share key motifs.

Early Islamic Background

Within 9th–11th century kalām, debates about divine power, human freedom, and the nature of atoms foster views that later commentators describe as occasionalist. Ashʿarite theologians such as Abū al‑Ḥasan al‑Ashʿarī and his successors deny that accidents (properties, events) can subsist from one instant to the next or that they have independent efficacy. The world is composed of atoms and momentary accidents created and annihilated at every instant by God.

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“No act occurs except by God’s creating it at the moment of its occurrence.”

— Attributed to Ashʿarite kalām manuals

This framework implies that apparent causal sequences—fire burning cotton, for example—are not driven by powers in fire but by God’s habitual willing. Al‑Ghazālī’s Tahāfut al‑Falāsifa (11th c.) sharply criticizes philosophers’ belief in necessary causation and is often treated as a classical crystallization of occasionalist reasoning.

Medieval and Patristic Precursors

Earlier Christian thinkers such as Augustine and medieval scholastics develop doctrines of divine concurrence and conservation as continuous creation. While they typically affirm real secondary causes, occasionalists later draw on these ideas to argue that if God is already doing everything necessary to sustain an effect, there is no work left for creatures to perform as genuine causes.

Early Modern European Formulations

The mind–body dualism of René Descartes raises the problem of how res cogitans and res extensa can interact. Some of his followers, notably Arnold Geulincx, argue that because we do not understand how our volitions move our bodies, we cannot be their true causes, preparing the way for a more systematic occasionalism.

In the late 17th century, Nicolas Malebranche develops the most detailed early modern occasionalist system, extending the thesis of divine sole causality from mind–body interaction to all natural processes. His synthesis of Augustinian theology and Cartesian physics becomes the primary Western reference point for the doctrine.

3. Etymology of the Name "Occasionalism"

The term “Occasionalism” is a relatively late, largely scholarly label applied to doctrines whose original authors usually employed different terminology.

Latin and Vernacular Roots

The word derives from New Latin and early modern philosophical Latin occasio (“occasion, opportunity”) plus the suffix “-ism”, forming a name for the view that events we call causes are merely occasions for divine action. In French, occasionnalisme comes to be used particularly for Malebranche’s system and related Cartesian developments; German authors speak of Okkasionalismus.

Indigenous Terminology

In Islamic kalām, no direct equivalent of “occasionalism” is used by classical authors. Instead, scholars refer to:

• ʿāda (divine custom), denoting God’s habitual mode of action;
• doctrines of atomism and continuous creation;
• descriptions of God as the sole fāʿil (agent).

Modern historians sometimes speak of “Islamic occasionalism” or al‑jabriyyat al‑sababiyya (“deterministic causality”) to capture these themes, though such terms are largely retrospective.

Historical Development of the Label

In early modern Europe, critics and followers of Malebranche begin to distinguish his theory of causes as mere “occasions” from other Cartesian positions, leading to the formation of the family name “occasionalism.” Only in the 19th and 20th centuries do historians extend this label back to Ashʿarite theology and to non‑Malebranchean thinkers like Geulincx.

Some scholars caution that this retroactive application may obscure important differences, while others argue that the shared emphasis on God as unique cause justifies a unified term despite local variations.

4. Classical Islamic Occasionalism in Kalām

In classical Ashʿarite kalām, a set of interlocking doctrines yields what many historians characterize as an occasionalist metaphysics.

Atomism and Continuous Creation

Ashʿarite theologians typically adopt a form of atomism: the physical world consists of indivisible atoms and momentary accidents (properties, states) that do not endure from instant to instant. God creates both atoms and their accidents at every moment; conservation is thus equivalent to ongoing re‑creation.

Because accidents cannot subsist or transfer their qualities, they cannot serve as efficient causes. Fire’s “heat” at one moment does not persist to produce burning in the next; instead, God newly creates the burning when the appropriate circumstances—also created by Him—are present.

Denial of Intrinsic Causal Powers

Ashʿarites reject the claim, common in Aristotelian–Avicennian philosophy, that things possess necessary natures that entail specific effects. They hold that any supposed causal connection between created events is contingent upon divine will.

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“The connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary.”

— Al‑Ghazālī, Tahāfut al‑Falāsifa

The regularities we observe are explained through ʿāda (divine custom): God freely chooses to act in consistent ways, such that fire is usually followed by burning. Miracles occur when God departs from this custom.

Human Action and Acquisition

Regarding human acts, Ashʿarites typically maintain that God creates both the power and the act, while humans “acquire” (kasb) the act and are thereby responsible. Interpretations vary on how this acquisition is understood, but the dominant view assigns all real causal efficacy to God.

Diversity and Interpretation

Later Ashʿarites like Fakhr al‑Dīn al‑Rāzī refine these positions, sometimes allowing more nuanced accounts of modality and natural order. Modern scholars differ on whether Islamic kalām should be labeled “occasionalist” in a strict sense; some emphasize continuities with later Christian occasionalism, while others stress doctrinal and conceptual differences, especially in epistemology and the status of natural norms.

5. Malebranche and Early Modern Christian Occasionalism

Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), a French Oratorian priest, formulates the most systematic early modern version of occasionalism, integrating Cartesian metaphysics with Augustinian theology.

God as Sole Cause

Malebranche argues that only God has true causal power, because genuine causation requires a necessary connection between cause and effect. Created things, being finite and contingent, cannot guarantee their effects; therefore they cannot be real causes. They serve merely as occasions on which God exercises His will.

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“A true cause… is one such that the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effect. Now there is only God whose will is necessarily efficacious.”

— Malebranche, The Search After Truth

General and Particular Volitions

Malebranche distinguishes between general volitions, whereby God wills to act according to simple and intelligible laws of nature, and particular volitions, where God departs from these laws (e.g., miracles). For reasons of wisdom and simplicity, God normally governs the world via general volitions; apparent causal regularities express this order of nature.

Mind–Body and Natural Causation

Malebranche extends occasionalism to both mind–body interaction and intra‑physical causation. A volition to raise one’s arm is only the occasion for God to move the body; likewise, one body’s motion is merely the circumstance in which God produces motion in another. This unifies the explanation of metaphysical, physical, and psychological processes under a single principle of divine agency.

Spiritual and Doctrinal Motivations

Malebranche’s occasionalism is closely linked to:

• an Augustinian doctrine that we “see all things in God,” grounding knowledge in divine ideas;
• a theocentric ethics in which proper love is directed primarily to God;
• an emphasis on grace and dependence characteristic of Jansenist‑influenced spirituality.

Early modern contemporaries—including Arnauld, Locke, Leibniz, and others—extensively debate Malebranche’s system, which becomes the primary Western reference point for the term “occasionalism,” and influences related positions among Cartesians such as Arnold Geulincx and Géraud de Cordemoy, though these figures develop distinct versions.

6. Core Doctrines and Central Maxims

Although Islamic and Christian forms of occasionalism differ in detail, most share a set of core theses about God, causation, and the created order.

God as Unique Efficient Cause

The central claim is that God alone is the true and efficacious cause of every event. Created substances—whether atoms, bodies, or minds—have no autonomous power to produce effects. This is often summarized in the maxim:

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“No power and no act except by God”
(a paraphrase of recurrent formulas in kalām and Christian theology)

Occasions vs. Causes

Created things are said to be “occasions”: their states provide the conditions under which God chooses to act, but they do not contribute any causal efficacy. A spark’s contact with gunpowder, or a decision to speak, is thus interpreted as a sign or circumstance coinciding with God’s production of the explosion or the utterance.

Laws of Nature as Divine Custom or General Volitions

What non‑occasionalists call laws of nature are reinterpreted as:

• ʿāda (divine custom) in Islamic thought, a stable but contingent pattern in God’s willing;
• general volitions in Malebranche, broad decisions by which God acts uniformly.

In both cases, regularity is attributed to God’s wisdom and freedom, not to inherent natural powers.

Continuous Creation

Occasionalists typically affirm that God’s conservation of the world is identical with continuous creation. Nothing persists or acts without being newly produced or upheld by God at each instant. This underwrites both the denial of secondary causes and the radical dependence of all things on divine agency.

Freedom and Responsibility (Programmatic Maxims)

A recurrent maxim, especially in early modern occasionalism, is that “we can be causes only where we understand how the effect is produced” (Geulincx). Since finite minds do not comprehend the mechanism of bodily or natural change, they cannot be true causes. Human moral responsibility is instead located in intention, consent, or “acquisition”, while causal efficacy is reserved for God.

7. Metaphysical Views on Causation and Creation

Occasionalist metaphysics reshapes standard categories of cause, substance, power, and creation.

Efficient Causation and Necessary Connection

For many occasionalists, real efficient causation requires a necessary connection between cause and effect. Since finite beings are contingent, they lack the power to guarantee their effects. Thus:

• in Islamic kalām, any perceived link between events is contingent upon God’s will, with no necessity inhering in created natures;
• in Malebranche, only God’s will is necessarily efficacious; creatures are incapable of necessitating anything.

This yields a strong asymmetry: created events correlate, but do not cause one another.

Substances, Accidents, and Powers

Ashʿarite occasionalists conceive the world as atoms plus accident‑events, without enduring causal powers. Accidents cannot subsist or migrate; they are created ex nihilo at each instant. In Malebranche’s system, bodies have extension and motion, and minds have ideas and volitions, but none of these attributes includes active power. Created substances are thus ontologically real but causally inert.

Conservation as Continuous Creation

A pivotal metaphysical thesis is that to conserve is to create continually. If conservation were anything less than full creative activity, creatures might possess some independent power to persist or act. By identifying conservation with ongoing creation, occasionalists ensure that no creature exists or endures without God’s concurrent, causally complete action.

Modal Structure of the World

Occasionalists typically adopt a strongly voluntarist view of modality. What is possible or necessary in the created order depends on divine choice, not on the autonomous natures of things. Natural regularities are therefore contingent, even if they are stable in practice because of God’s faithful custom or adherence to simple laws.

These commitments shape occasionalist treatments of miracles, providence, and the ontology of time and change.

8. Epistemological Views and the Role of Experience

Occasionalist metaphysics has distinctive implications for knowledge, evidence, and the status of experience.

Limits of Empirical Knowledge of Causation

Because occasionalists deny intrinsic causal connections among creatures, they generally hold that experience cannot reveal necessary causation. Observation yields only sequences and conjunctions:

• Ashʿarite theologians treat what is learned from experience as recognition of ʿāda—God’s habitual modes of action;
• they often argue that inferring necessity from constant conjunction would improperly attribute divine prerogatives to creatures.

Thus, empirical science, while useful, provides knowledge of how God customarily acts, not of powers inhering in things.

Malebranche’s “Seeing All Things in God”

Malebranche develops a more explicit epistemology. He holds that:

• we know eternal truths and essences by “seeing all things in God,” i.e., by accessing divine ideas;
• sense experience is a confused and often deceptive occasion that merely directs our attention to those ideas.

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“We see all things in God, because it is in Him that we see the ideas which represent them.”

— Malebranche, The Search After Truth

Causal judgments thus rest not on sensory impressions of one object producing another, but on rational insight into the nature of omnipotent will and the absence of necessary connections in creatures.

Reason, Revelation, and Custom

Islamic occasionalists typically view reason and revelation as primary avenues to understanding that God is the sole agent. Empirical regularities support this view indirectly by displaying the reliability of divine custom, but they do not ground metaphysical necessity. In some kalām traditions, rational reflection on the contingency and composition of the world leads to inference of God’s continuous creative activity.

Attitudes toward Science and Induction

Most occasionalists do not reject empirical investigation. They reinterpret its achievements as:

• mapping the order of nature understood as divine habit or law;
• strengthening expectations about future events, without establishing metaphysical necessity.

Some modern commentators see in occasionalism a precursor to regularity theories of causation, though occasionalists themselves insist on an additional, non‑empirical element: the underlying agency of God as the unobservable but real cause.

9. Ethical Thought and the Problem of Responsibility

Occasionalism poses special challenges for ethics and moral responsibility, since it attributes all causal efficacy to God.

Theocentric and Voluntarist Ethics

In both Islamic and Christian settings, occasionalism tends to support a theocentric ethic:

• moral norms are grounded in divine will and wisdom, not in autonomous natural ends;
• virtues such as trust (tawakkul), humility, and obedience are emphasized as responses to radical dependence on God.

Because creatures lack independent power, reliance on self‑sufficiency is often portrayed as illusory or spiritually dangerous.

Human Agency: Acquisition and Consent

To reconcile divine sole causality with responsibility, occasionalists develop models in which human agency is interpreted in terms of acquisition or consent:

• In Ashʿarite kalām, humans “acquire” (kasb) acts that God creates in them at the moment of their willing. Responsibility attaches to the relation between human will and the divinely created act, rather than to an independent causal contribution.
• In Malebranche, God causes both the movement of the body and the occurrence of ideas; human beings are responsible for how they direct their attention and order their love, i.e., for consenting or resisting divine grace.

These accounts attempt to preserve a domain of moral freedom distinct from physical efficacy.

Determinism and Freedom

Interpreters debate whether occasionalism implies a strong form of theistic determinism. Some argue that if God causes every event, including every choice, then human freedom is merely nominal. Occasionalists respond with various compatibilist strategies, for instance:

• distinguishing between God’s causation of the existence of volitions and the normative status of those volitions;
• emphasizing the difference between necessity of consequence (given God’s will, events follow) and constraint or coercion.

Practical Morality

In practice, occasionalist ethics tends to encourage:

• reliance on divine grace rather than confidence in human powers;
• reinterpretation of successes and failures as gifts or tests from God;
• acceptance of worldly outcomes as part of a comprehensive divine plan, while still affirming obligations derived from revelation or reason.

Critics contend that such views risk undermining motivation for moral effort, whereas proponents claim that recognizing dependence on God purifies intention and deepens responsibility.

10. Political and Social Implications

Occasionalism does not prescribe a unified political program, but its emphasis on divine omnipotence and creaturely dependence has influenced political and social thought in various ways.

Attitudes toward Authority and Providence

In Islamic contexts, occasionalist kalām often coexists with diverse political theories. Some interpreters argue that the stress on God’s comprehensive control can foster:

• quietist attitudes, accepting political outcomes as expressions of divine decree;
• a tendency to interpret social change and calamities as signs of God’s will rather than as products of human planning alone.

At the same time, juristic traditions allow for active resistance to injustice when sanctioned by religious law, so occasionalism does not uniformly entail political passivity.

In early modern Europe, Malebranche’s vision of an ordered universe governed by general volitions resonates with hierarchical and providential conceptions of society. Political authority is sometimes seen as derivative of divine sovereignty, reinforcing notions of duty and obedience.

Human Agency and Social Reform

Critics contend that if all events, including political actions, are directly caused by God, then the scope for human agency in social reform seems reduced. Proponents respond that:

• humans remain morally responsible for choices, even if God is their ultimate cause;
• recognition of dependence can encourage humility in rulers and solidarity among subjects, by undermining pretensions to self‑made power.

Some contemporary scholars explore whether occasionalist themes could support egalitarian or anti‑idolatrous critiques of political power, by denying any absolute authority to human institutions.

Secularization and Political Thought

As doctrines of secondary causation and natural law gained prominence in the 17th–19th centuries, occasionalism’s influence in explicit political theory waned. However, its prior presence shaped contrasts between:

Modern discussions sometimes revisit occasionalist ideas when analyzing theology of history, political providentialism, or the role of divine action in social events, but typically without adopting full occasionalist metaphysics.

11. Internal Debates and Variants of Occasionalism

Within the broad occasionalist tradition, there are significant variants and internal controversies about the extent and form of divine causation.

Degrees of Occasionalism

Some thinkers are characterized as “partial” or “restricted” occasionalists:

• Certain Cartesians (e.g., Géraud de Cordemoy, sometimes Geulincx) are read as occasionalist mainly regarding mind–body interaction, while allowing genuine causation within the physical world.
• Others adopt occasionalism for created mental causation but leave room for natural powers in bodies.

By contrast, systematic occasionalists like Malebranche and many Ashʿarites extend the thesis of divine sole causality to all domains, denying any finite efficient causes whatsoever.

Disagreements on Human Freedom

Occasionalists differ in their solutions to the freedom–dependence problem:

• In kalām, competing interpretations of kasb range from strongly determinist readings to more libertarian ones, depending on how tightly God’s creative act is linked to human volition.
• Among Christian occasionalists, some stress compatibilist freedom (freedom as acting according to one’s will, even if divinely caused), while others highlight the role of grace and the mystery of predestination.

Varieties of Divine Willing

There are also debates about the structure of divine willing:

• Islamic occasionalists discuss the relationship between God’s eternal will and the temporal sequence of created events.
• Malebranche’s distinction between general and particular volitions is criticized by contemporaries who question whether it adequately safeguards both divine simplicity and the possibility of miracles.

Ontological and Modal Nuances

Later Ashʿarites such as Fakhr al‑Dīn al‑Rāzī introduce more complex analyses of modality, raising questions about how possibility and necessity relate to God’s decrees. Some scholars argue that these refinements soften straightforward occasionalism by acknowledging robust patterns or dispositional language, even if causal power remains formally with God.

Historiographical Disputes

Modern scholars disagree over:

• how strictly “occasionalist” to classify particular authors;
• whether Islamic and Christian forms share a single core doctrine or only family resemblances;
• whether occasionalism should be seen as an internally unified “school” or as a set of overlapping strategies for safeguarding divine omnipotence.

These debates shape contemporary reconstructions of the tradition and assessments of its philosophical coherence.

12. Rival Theories of Causation and Critiques

Occasionalism has been opposed by a range of rival accounts of causation, each offering systematic critiques.

Aristotelian–Avicennian Causal Realism

Aristotelian and Avicennian philosophers affirm that substances possess intrinsic powers grounded in their natures. On this view:

• fire necessarily burns because of what fire is;
• causal necessity resides in the essence of things.

Critics argue that occasionalism undermines the intelligibility of the world and makes explanation rely solely on inscrutable divine will, rather than on knowable natures.

Thomistic and Scholastic Concurrence

Thomistic scholasticism maintains that God is the primary cause, but creatures are genuine secondary causes. God cooperates with their actions without displacing them. Thomists object that:

• denying secondary causes collapses the distinction between Creator and creation;
• it makes God the direct cause of evil acts, challenging divine goodness.

Occasionalists respond by appealing to divine permission and complex accounts of moral vs. physical causation, but many critics find these distinctions unstable.

Leibnizian Pre‑established Harmony

Leibniz proposes that each substance acts according to its own internal principles, while God synchronizes them through a pre‑established harmony at creation. He criticizes occasionalism as implying a “perpetual miracle,” with God continuously intervening rather than creating a self‑sufficient, well‑ordered universe.

Empiricist and Regularity Theories

Later empiricists (e.g., Hume) develop regularity theories of causation, treating causation as constant conjunction plus psychological expectation, without positing hidden powers or divine agency. From this angle, occasionalism is seen as metaphysically extravagant, adding an unobservable cause where empirical description suffices.

Internal Philosophical Objections

Common philosophical criticisms include:

• Problem of evil: if God directly causes all events, reconciling this with moral and natural evil becomes more difficult.
• Overdetermination: some argue that if God is a complete cause, creaturely “occasions” become explanatorily redundant.
• Pragmatic skepticism: if all efficacy belongs to God, it is unclear why we should treat any particular means as more effective than others.

Occasionalists reply that their view preserves divine omnipotence, simplifies causal ontology, and aligns with religious commitments, but rivalry with other theories remains a central axis of debate.

13. Occasionalism, Science, and Laws of Nature

Occasionalism offers a distinctive account of scientific laws and their relation to divine agency.

Laws as Expressions of Divine Will

Rather than viewing laws as descriptions of inherent natural powers, occasionalists interpret them as:

• ʿāda (divine custom) in Islamic contexts—stable patterns in God’s creative activity;
• general volitions in Malebranche—simple, general decisions by which God orders the world.

On this view, the order of nature is the regular, intelligible manifestation of God’s will. Scientific investigation maps these regularities without uncovering intrinsic necessities in things.

Compatibility with Empirical Science

Many occasionalists affirm the value of empirical inquiry:

• It helps predict future events by discerning stable patterns in God’s action.
• It reveals the wisdom and simplicity of divine government (e.g., through mathematical laws in physics).

In early modern Europe, some historians suggest that occasionalism could encourage a mechanistic picture of nature as passive matter moved according to divine laws, though others argue that its emphasis on divine freedom complicates mechanistic determinism.

Miracles and Exceptions to Laws

Because laws are expressions of divine will, miracles are interpreted as cases in which God departs from His usual custom or general volitions. Laws of nature thus have a contingent rather than absolute status:

Critics argue that this framework makes laws less secure and could undermine confidence in uniformity; occasionalists reply that God’s faithfulness ensures practical stability.

Natural Theology and Scientific Explanation

Occasionalists often integrate science into natural theology: the discovery of orderly laws supports arguments for a wise, powerful deity. However, because causality is reserved to God, explanations at the scientific level are typically construed as descriptive and predictive, not as ultimate metaphysical accounts.

In modern philosophy of science, some commentators draw analogies between occasionalism and instrumentalist or regularity views, while emphasizing that occasionalists add an explicitly theological layer absent from secular accounts.

14. Occasionalism in Philosophy of Mind

Occasionalism plays a prominent role in debates about the mind–body problem and mental causation.

Mind–Body Interaction

Within a Cartesian dualist framework, minds are immaterial and unextended, while bodies are material and extended. It is difficult to explain how such radically different substances could causally interact. Occasionalists propose that:

• there is in fact no direct interaction between mind and body;
• when a mental event occurs (a decision, sensation), God causes the corresponding bodily or sensory change;
• conversely, bodily events are only occasions for God to produce perceptions in the mind.

This solution aims to preserve dualism while avoiding mysterious “contact” between heterogeneous substances.

Early Modern Variants

Several early modern thinkers offer occasionalist‑style solutions:

• Malebranche extends divine causation to all domains, including mind–body correlations;
• Geulincx famously declares that “where we do not know how something is done, we do not do it,” concluding that since we do not understand the mechanism by which will moves body, we are not its cause;
• other Cartesians develop limited occasionalist accounts focused on psychophysical processes.

These views compete with Leibniz’s pre‑established harmony and with interactionist dualism.

Mental Causation and Freedom

By assigning all physical efficacy to God, occasionalism raises questions about:

• whether mental states have any causal role in bringing about bodily actions;
• how to understand agency and responsibility if God is the immediate cause of both volitions and movements.

Occasionalists typically locate human agency in intention, attention, and consent, treating bodily motions as the divinely governed expression of these inner states rather than their products.

Contemporary Resonances

In modern philosophy of mind, some authors describe certain non‑reductive theist or interventionist models as “neo‑occasionalist” when they:

• treat God as mediating mind–body or mind–world relations;
• emphasize that natural laws and physical processes are insufficient to account for mental phenomena without divine concurrence.

Others draw analogies between occasionalism and secular accounts that downplay mental causation (e.g., epiphenomenalism), though the theological commitments differ sharply.

15. Modern Reinterpretations and Neo‑Occasionalism

While few contemporary philosophers endorse classical occasionalism in full, its themes have been reinterpreted and revived in several areas.

Analytic Philosophy of Religion and Mind

Some theistic philosophers develop neo‑occasionalist models of divine action, especially regarding:

• the causal closure of the physical world and how God might act without violating physical laws;
• the relation between mental events, free will, and divine causation.

These accounts often adapt occasionalist insights—such as God’s pervasive sustenance and the contingency of natural laws—without denying all secondary causes. The label “neo‑occasionalism” is sometimes applied to such positions, though proponents may not use it themselves.

Reassessment of Islamic Kalām

Twentieth‑ and twenty‑first‑century scholars (e.g., Alfred Ivry, Richard M. Frank, Frank Griffel) have re‑examined Ashʿarite theology, debating:

• how strictly occasionalist its metaphysics is;
• whether its account of ʿāda prefigures modern regularity theories of laws;
• how to relate its doctrines to contemporary discussions of causation.

Some reconstruct Ashʿarite ideas as sophisticated alternatives to both Aristotelianism and Humeanism, occasionally inspiring new models in analytic metaphysics.

Process, Panentheist, and Interventionist Theologies

Certain process and panentheist thinkers engage critically with occasionalism as a foil for their emphasis on creaturely co‑agency. Others, especially in analytic theology, explore hybrid views where:

• God’s continuous sustenance is essential for every event;
• yet creatures possess derived or participatory causal powers.

These are sometimes described as “soft” occasionalist or strong concurrence models, blurring boundaries between traditional categories.

Philosophical and Theological Evaluations

Contemporary discussion often reassesses occasionalism in light of:

• debates over divine action in a law‑governed world;
• the metaphysics of powers and dispositions;
• the role of God in explanations of consciousness or cosmology.

Some find occasionalist themes useful for preserving a robust doctrine of providence, while others highlight persistent worries about freedom, evil, and explanatory redundancy.

16. Comparative Perspectives: Islamic and Christian Contexts

Comparing Islamic and Christian forms of occasionalism reveals both shared structures and significant differences.

Shared Motifs

Across traditions, occasionalists typically affirm:

• God as sole efficient cause, with creatures as occasions;
• continuous creation and radical dependence of the world on divine will;
• a re‑interpretation of natural laws as divine custom or general volitions.

Both contexts engage in polemics against Aristotelian causal realism and seek to protect strong doctrines of omnipotence and providence.

Doctrinal and Conceptual Differences

Key contrasts include:

Islamic occasionalism develops within a broader landscape of jurisprudence, kalām disputations, and Qurʾānic exegesis, while Christian occasionalism interacts primarily with scholastic theology, Cartesian philosophy, and early modern science.

Historical Relations and Debates

Scholars debate whether Malebranche and other Europeans were directly influenced by Islamic occasionalism. While some suggest possible transmission via Latin translations and medieval scholastic debates, clear lines of influence remain uncertain. Many historians instead emphasize parallel developments driven by similar theological and philosophical pressures.

Comparative work also examines how each tradition handles:

• the problem of evil under divine sole causality;
• the status of miracles within a law‑like order;
• the balance between divine sovereignty and human responsibility.

These comparisons highlight both convergent strategies and divergent doctrinal constraints.

17. Legacy and Historical Significance

Occasionalism’s historical impact extends beyond its explicit adherents, shaping debates about causation, divine action, and scientific explanation.

Influence on Theories of Causation

By sharply distinguishing between regularity and real causal power, occasionalism anticipates later questions raised by Hume and modern empiricists. Some historians see Islamic occasionalism and Malebranchean thought as important precursors to:

• regularity theories of laws;
• skepticism about necessary connections observable in experience.

Even where its theistic framework is rejected, occasionalism’s critique of causal realism remains a reference point.

Impact on Theology and Philosophy of Religion

In theology, occasionalism deepens reflection on:

• omnipotence, providence, and continuous creation;
• the tension between God’s universal causality and human freedom;
• the nature of miracles and grace.

Later doctrines of divine concurrence and various modern theologies of providence are often articulated in conscious relation to, or in contrast with, occasionalist positions.

Relation to Science and Early Modern Thought

In early modern Europe, occasionalism participates in the shift toward:

• a mechanistic understanding of nature devoid of intrinsic powers;
• a conception of laws as mathematical and universal.

Although it ultimately loses ground to rival metaphysics (e.g., Leibnizianism, Newtonian natural philosophy, empiricism), it influences the conceptual landscape in which these theories emerge.

Continuing Relevance

Contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind, metaphysics of powers, and philosophy of religion occasionally revisit occasionalist ideas, either as historical resources or as live options for modeling divine action in a scientific world. The doctrine’s radical insistence on divine sole causality remains a powerful test case for examining the coherence of theism, the structure of causation, and the limits of human agency.

As a result, occasionalism occupies an enduring place in the history of philosophy and theology, both as a distinctive system and as a foil against which alternative views define themselves.