anti-realism
“Anti-realism” is formed in modern English from the prefix “anti-” (from Greek ἀντί, ‘against, opposite, in response to’) attached to “realism.” “Realism” in philosophical usage derives from Late Latin realis (‘relating to a thing, res’) plus the nominalizing suffix -ism. The composite term “anti-realism” thus literally designates any position that stands in opposition to, or is defined in contrast with, a corresponding form of realism, especially about truth, existence, or value.
At a Glance
- Origin
- Modern English (with roots in Latin via “realism” < res + -alis + -ismus)
- Semantic Field
- anti-, opposition, negation, denial; realism, res, reality, thing, existence, truth, objectivity, independence, mind-dependence, constructivism, idealism, irrealism, non-realism, fictionalism, verificationism, constructivism.
The main difficulty is that “anti-realism” is inherently contrastive and family-resemblance based: its precise sense shifts depending on which specific realism is at issue (metaphysical, scientific, moral, mathematical, modal, semantic, theological, etc.). Many languages render it with a direct calque (e.g., German Anti-Realismus, French anti-réalisme), but these can misleadingly suggest a single, unified doctrine rather than a cluster of positions united only by opposition to some form of realism. Moreover, “anti-realism” ranges from strong ontological denial (there are no such entities) to purely epistemic or semantic theses (our access, evidence, or truth-conditions are constrained by verification or practices), which can be flattened in translation. In some traditions, the closest native terms connote “idealism,” “constructivism,” or “irrealism,” each carrying historical baggage that may not match contemporary analytic uses. Finally, the hyphenated English form invites nuance (e.g., “anti‑realist about X but realist about Y”) that may be harder to convey succinctly in morphologically different languages.
Before its technical philosophical usage, the components of “anti-realism” functioned in ordinary and polemical discourse: “anti-” signaled opposition or resistance (as in ‘anti-war’, ‘anti-clerical’), and “realism” named a pragmatic or sober outlook (e.g., in politics or literature, where ‘realism’ denotes fidelity to everyday life). These non-technical uses created a general connotation of being ‘against what is real’ or ‘against practical sobriety,’ which lingers as a potential misunderstanding when the term is imported into philosophy. There was no stable pre-philosophical single word for a unified anti-realist attitude toward reality; instead, earlier European thought used contrasting pairs such as ‘idealism vs realism’, ‘nominalism vs realism’, and ‘spiritualism vs materialism’.
The philosophical crystallization of “anti-realism” emerges in the late 19th and especially the 20th century as analytic philosophy formalizes realism debates in semantics, metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of science. Early roots lie in the medieval controversy between realists and nominalists about universals, but the explicit label “anti-realism” becomes widespread only when philosophers such as Dummett, Putnam, and van Fraassen systematically oppose specific realist theses (about truth, unobservables, or metaphysical independence). Dummett’s program in particular crystallizes anti-realism as a central semantic and logical stance, characterized by the rejection of classical truth-conditions in favor of proof- or verification-based notions of meaning; this provided a unifying framework under which diverse positions about mathematics, modality, time, and morality could be described as ‘anti-realist’ in a structurally similar way. Over the 1970s–1990s, the term is increasingly used as an organizing label in Anglo-American debates about scientific theories, moral facts, mathematical entities, and even everyday objects.
In contemporary philosophy, “anti-realism” functions as a highly context-dependent umbrella term for any view that, relative to a particular subject matter, denies that the relevant truths or entities exist, or hold, in a fully mind-, language-, or practice-independent way. It now appears in many hyphenated or domain-specific forms: semantic anti-realism (e.g., Dummettian verificationism), scientific anti-realism (e.g., constructive empiricism), moral anti-realism (e.g., expressivism, error theory, constructivism), mathematical anti-realism (e.g., nominalism, fictionalism), modal and temporal anti-realism (e.g., ersatzism, presentism), and anti-realism in aesthetics, theology, and social ontology. The term is also used more loosely in continental and postmodern contexts to describe positions skeptical of strong metaphysical presence or determinate reality (e.g., certain constructivist, deconstructive, or anti-foundational philosophies). Despite its ubiquity, there is ongoing debate over whether ‘anti-realism’ marks a single, substantive philosophical kind, or merely a convenient way of grouping heterogeneous positions that are unified only by their contrast with correspondingly heterogeneous realisms.
1. Introduction
Anti-realism is a family of positions defined in opposition to corresponding forms of realism about truth, existence, and value. Rather than asserting a single doctrine, the term groups together views that, in different ways and to different degrees, deny that certain domains are fully independent of minds, language, or social practices.
Across philosophical areas, realism typically claims that:
- There are facts or entities in the relevant domain (e.g., physical objects, moral properties, numbers).
- These are what they are independently of our attitudes or conceptual schemes.
- Our best theories aim to describe these facts or entities as they are “in themselves.”
Anti-realist views, by contrast, challenge at least one of these claims. Some deny the existence of the relevant entities (for example, certain nominalist views about abstract objects). Others retain the entities but revise how truth about them is understood, tying it to verification, justification, practice, or conceptual scheme. Still others hold that the facts are in some sense constructed, response-dependent, or stance-dependent.
Anti-realism is often domain-specific. A philosopher might be an anti-realist about moral facts but a realist about physical objects, or realist about mathematics but anti-realist about modality. In analytic philosophy, the label has been especially prominent in debates over:
- Semantics and logic, particularly following Michael Dummett’s work on meaning, verification, and intuitionistic logic.
- Science, in disputes over whether unobservable entities posited by theories (like electrons or quarks) should be regarded as real.
- Normativity, including moral, aesthetic, and epistemic domains.
- Abstracta, such as numbers, sets, possible worlds, and properties.
Later sections examine how anti-realism emerged historically, how it is articulated in specific domains, and how it relates to concepts such as mind-dependence, truth, and ontology, while presenting major arguments both for and against anti-realist approaches.
2. Etymology and Linguistic Origins
The term “anti-realism” is a modern English formation built from the prefix “anti-” and the noun “realism.” Its etymological components come from Greek and Latin but acquire their philosophical significance only in recent centuries.
2.1 Morphology and Historical Sources
| Element | Origin and base meaning | Philosophical relevance |
|---|---|---|
| anti- | Greek ἀντί: ‘against, opposite, in response to’ | Signals opposition or contrast to a corresponding realism about some domain. |
| real- | Latin res (‘thing, matter, affair’) → realis (‘pertaining to things’) | Suggests concern with things, reality, or what there is. |
| -ism | From Greek -ισμός via Latin -ismus, marking doctrines or movements | Indicates a systematic position or school of thought. |
Thus, “anti-realism” literally means “doctrine opposed to realism,” with the precise content determined by the specific realism being targeted (metaphysical, semantic, moral, etc.).
2.2 Shifts in Meaning
Outside technical philosophy, “realism” has long described:
- A literary style aiming at accurate depiction of everyday life.
- A political attitude emphasizing pragmatism and power (“political realism”).
- A colloquial virtue: being “realistic” as opposed to idealistic or fanciful.
“Anti-realism” in these broader contexts may suggest being “unrealistic” or “detached from reality,” a connotation that does not map cleanly onto philosophical usage. In philosophical English and its close cognates (e.g., German Anti-Realismus, French anti-réalisme), the term instead marks positions that deny certain independence or robustness claims about truth and existence.
2.3 Family-Resemblance and Context-Dependence
Because realism itself is highly polysemous, “anti-realism” functions as a contrastive label rather than a fixed theory. Its meaning is typically disambiguated by context or modifiers, as in:
- semantic anti-realism
- scientific anti-realism
- moral anti-realism
- mathematical anti-realism
This context-sensitivity underlies later translation and interpretation challenges, especially in traditions where competing terms—such as “idealism” or “constructivism”—carry different historical and doctrinal associations.
3. Pre-Philosophical and Historical Precursors
Although the explicit term “anti-realism” is modern, many earlier debates anticipate its central themes: the dependence of reality, truth, or value on mind, language, or practice, and skepticism about robustly independent entities.
3.1 Ancient and Classical Antecedents
In ancient philosophy, several positions are retrospectively seen as proto-anti-realist:
- Sophistic and skeptical traditions (e.g., Protagoras’ “man is the measure”) raised doubts about objective truth and suggested that appearances or human conventions play a constitutive role.
- Platonic realism vs. nominalist-leaning critics: Plato’s robust realism about Forms prompted responses that minimized or denied separate abstract entities, foreshadowing later disputes about universals.
- Pyrrhonian skepticism suspended judgment about the nature of reality, which some interpreters read as undermining strong metaphysical realism, though it does not straightforwardly endorse any alternative ontology.
3.2 Medieval Debates on Universals
Medieval controversies over universals involve positions that resemble later anti-realisms about abstract objects:
| Position (anachronistically) | Core idea about universals |
|---|---|
| Realism (Aquinas, some earlier scholastics) | Universals have a real status, either in things or in the mind of God. |
| Conceptualism (Abelard, some nominalists) | Universals exist only as concepts in the mind. |
| Nominalism (Ockham) | Only individuals exist; universals are mere names (flatus vocis). |
Nominalist and conceptualist views, while not labeled “anti-realist,” anticipate later skepticism about the independent reality of abstracta.
3.3 Early Modern Idealism and Empiricism
Early modern philosophy contributed further precursors:
- Berkeleyan idealism grounded reality in perceptions and spirits, denying material substance, a move often retrospectively classified as an anti-realist stance about matter.
- Kant’s transcendental idealism distinguished phenomena (objects as experienced) from noumena (things in themselves), combining a form of realism about a mind-independent source with an insistence that objectivity is structured by our cognitive faculties.
Empiricists such as Hume questioned necessary connections and robust metaphysical structures, challenging the scope of realist metaphysics even while remaining naturalistic about ordinary objects.
3.4 Nineteenth-Century Currents
In the nineteenth century, movements like German idealism, positivism, and conventionalism further prepared the ground. Positivists tied meaning and knowledge to observable phenomena, while conventionalists (e.g., Poincaré) suggested that parts of scientific theory reflect conventions rather than discoveries about an independent structure. These strands would later inform twentieth-century anti-realist positions in semantics, science, and mathematics.
4. Philosophical Crystallization in the 20th Century
The explicit, systematic use of “anti-realism” emerged in twentieth-century analytic philosophy, where debates about language, science, and mathematics prompted precise contrasts with various realisms.
4.1 From Logical Positivism to Post-Positivist Debates
Logical positivists tied meaning to verification, a stance that foreshadowed later anti-realist semantics. However, their program largely focused on eliminating metaphysics rather than framing positions as “anti-realist.” As that program waned, philosophers sought more nuanced accounts of truth, reference, and ontology, setting the stage for self-consciously realist and anti-realist alignments.
4.2 Dummett and Semantic Anti-Realism
Michael Dummett played a central role in crystallizing “anti-realism” as a technical label. In essays later collected in Truth and Other Enigmas and in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, he proposed that realism about a domain is best understood as a semantic thesis: roughly, that statements in the domain have truth-conditions independent of our capacity to recognize or verify them, and that classical logic is correct.
Anti-realism, in this framework, involves explaining meaning in terms of conditions of verification or warranted assertibility, typically associated with intuitionistic rather than classical logic. This reconceptualization transformed disputes about metaphysics into disputes about meaning and logical law.
4.3 Scientific Anti-Realism and Constructive Empiricism
Around the same period, Bas C. van Fraassen’s The Scientific Image articulated constructive empiricism, a prominent form of scientific anti-realism. Van Fraassen distinguished between observables and unobservables, and argued that the aim of science is empirical adequacy rather than literal truth about unobservable entities. Acceptance of a theory thus requires belief only that it correctly describes what is observable.
This view crystallized “scientific anti-realism” as a live alternative to scientific realism, especially in reaction to arguments from the success of science.
4.4 Internal Realism and Related Developments
Hilary Putnam’s internal realism (or “pragmatic” realism) contested a “God’s-eye” metaphysical realism that posits a wholly scheme-independent reality with a single, fixed correct description. Putnam argued that truth and reference are partly constrained by conceptual schemes and ideal rational acceptability. While Putnam resisted global relativism, his work contributed to framing realism/anti-realism as a central axis of debate about truth and objectivity.
Meanwhile, developments in mathematical philosophy (e.g., Hartry Field’s fictionalism, intuitionism), metaethics (error theory, expressivism, constructivism), and modal metaphysics (ersatzism, actualism) adopted or were described with the “anti-realist” label, extending it across domains and solidifying its status as an organizing concept in late twentieth-century philosophy.
5. Semantic and Logical Anti-Realism
Semantic and logical anti-realism concerns the nature of meaning, truth, and logical validity, rather than (or in addition to) what exists. It centers on whether truth outstrips what can in principle be known, verified, or justified.
5.1 Dummett’s Semantic Characterization
Dummett proposed that realism about a class of statements involves:
- A truth-conditional semantics: each statement has a determinate truth-value, independent of our capacity to recognize it.
- Endorsement of classical logic, especially the unrestricted law of excluded middle (LEM): for any statement P, either P or not-P is true.
By contrast, semantic anti-realism holds that the meaning of statements is explained via verification or warranted assertibility. Truth is not an unconstrained correspondence notion but is tied, in some way, to what we can establish.
“The thesis of realism… is that statements of the disputed class possess an objective truth-value, independently of our knowledge; the anti-realist denies this.”
— Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas
5.2 Intuitionistic Logic and Proof-Theoretic Semantics
Anti-realists often favor intuitionistic logic, which:
- Rejects the general validity of LEM.
- Treats a statement as true only when there is (or could in principle be) a construction or proof of it.
In proof-theoretic semantics, meaning is determined by the rules governing the introduction and elimination of logical constants in proofs. On anti-realist views, to understand a statement is to grasp what counts as a justification or proof of it, not to associate it with a verification-transcendent truth-condition.
5.3 Domains of Application
Semantic anti-realism has been applied to:
- Mathematics: intuitionists (e.g., Brouwer, Heyting) and Dummettians deny that every mathematical statement has a determinate classical truth-value.
- Statements about the past or future: some argue that not all such statements are determinately true or false if no evidence could in principle settle them.
- Vagueness and indeterminacy: anti-realists sometimes claim that borderline cases lack determinate truth-values.
5.4 Critiques and Alternatives
Realist critics argue that semantic anti-realism:
- Confuses meaning with epistemic status.
- Struggles to account for apparently true but forever unknowable claims.
- Must either restrict classical logic or explain why classical reasoning remains so successful.
Alternatives include deflationary or minimalist theories of truth, which often seek to sidestep robust realist vs. anti-realist construals of the truth predicate, while still engaging with the issues raised by Dummett’s program.
6. Scientific Anti-Realism and Constructive Empiricism
Scientific anti-realism addresses whether scientific theories aim at truth about unobservables or only at empirical adequacy in describing observable phenomena.
6.1 Realism vs. Anti-Realism in Science
Scientific realists typically maintain that:
- Well-confirmed theories are approximately true.
- Central theoretical entities (electrons, genes, curved spacetime) really exist.
- The success of science is best explained by the truth (or near-truth) of its theories.
Scientific anti-realists question one or more of these commitments, emphasizing the role of observables, predictive success, or instrumental use rather than ontological commitment.
6.2 Constructive Empiricism
Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is a leading form of scientific anti-realism. It is characterized by three main theses:
- Aim of science: to produce theories that are empirically adequate—i.e., all observable phenomena are correctly described.
- Acceptance of a theory: involves believing only that it is empirically adequate, not that it is true about unobservables.
- Epistemic modesty: belief about unobservables is not required for successful scientific practice.
“To accept a theory is to believe that it is empirically adequate; that is, that what it says about observable things and events is true.”
— Bas C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image
6.3 Other Forms of Scientific Anti-Realism
Constructive empiricism coexists with other anti-realist positions:
| Position | Core idea |
|---|---|
| Instrumentalism | Theories are calculation devices or instruments for prediction, not descriptions of reality. |
| Logical empiricism (later forms) | Emphasized observables and non-cognitive roles of theoretical terms. |
| Entity realism | Selective realism about some entities but skepticism about full theory truth. |
| Structural realism (sometimes classified as intermediate) | Reality is captured at the level of structure or relations, not necessarily objects as conceived by theories. |
These positions differ on how much of scientific discourse is taken literally and what aspects, if any, are regarded as mind-independent.
6.4 Arguments and Counterarguments
Supporters of scientific anti-realism often cite:
- The pessimistic meta-induction: many past successful theories are now regarded as false; hence, current success does not warrant belief in truth about unobservables.
- Underdetermination: multiple, empirically equivalent theories may posit different unobservables.
Realist critics argue that:
- The success of science is best explained by assuming approximate truth about unobservables.
- Empirical adequacy itself may presuppose some commitment to theoretical structure.
Constructive empiricism positions itself between radical skepticism and full-blooded realism, preserving empirical science while restricting ontological and epistemic commitments.
7. Moral and Normative Anti-Realism
Moral and normative anti-realism concerns the status of value-laden and normative claims, such as those about right and wrong, reasons, or obligations. It contrasts with moral realism, which holds that there are objective, stance-independent moral facts or properties.
7.1 Varieties of Moral Anti-Realism
Several major types are commonly distinguished:
| Type | Core thesis |
|---|---|
| Error theory | Ordinary moral claims purport to state objective facts, but there are no such facts; hence all positive moral judgments are (strictly) false. |
| Non-cognitivism / expressivism | Moral utterances primarily express attitudes, emotions, or prescriptions rather than describe facts; they are not truth-apt in the usual sense. |
| Constructivism | Moral truths are constructed by idealized procedures (e.g., rational agreement, contractualist tests) rather than discovered as independent facts. |
| Response-dependence / projectivism | Moral properties depend on, or are projections of, human responses or sensibilities. |
These positions differ in how they treat the semantics of moral language, the metaphysics of moral properties, and the epistemology of moral judgment.
7.2 Error Theory
J. L. Mackie’s influential error theory argues that:
- Moral discourse is cognitivist: it aims to state facts.
- If there were objective moral properties, they would be “queer” in their intrinsic normativity and motivational force.
- No such properties exist; hence moral claims are systematically in error.
“There are no objective values.”
— J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Error theorists typically retain moral talk for pragmatic or practical purposes, sometimes suggesting a fictionalist reinterpretation.
7.3 Expressivism and Non-Cognitivism
Expressivist theories (e.g., Ayer’s emotivism; later developments by Blackburn, Gibbard) hold that moral judgments primarily express conative states (approval, commitment, plans) rather than represent moral facts. Logical features of moral discourse (e.g., embedding in conditionals) are then explained via sophisticated semantic tools (e.g., quasi-realism, plan-laden contents).
7.4 Constructivism and Other Normative Domains
Moral constructivism (e.g., Rawls, Scanlon, Korsgaard in different ways) treats moral truths as outcomes of procedures of rational reflection, agreement, or practical identity. This does not necessarily deny objectivity but relocates it to the results of appropriately constrained construction.
Analogous anti-realist or constructivist views have been developed about:
- Epistemic normativity (what one ought to believe).
- Practical rationality (what reasons one has).
- Aesthetic value (beauty and artistic merit).
Debates continue over whether such views count as full-fledged anti-realism or as moderate, practice- or response-dependent realisms.
8. Mathematical, Modal, and Abstract Object Anti-Realism
This section concerns anti-realist positions about abstract entities—particularly in mathematics, modality, and related areas—where realism typically posits non-spatiotemporal, mind-independent objects or facts.
8.1 Mathematical Anti-Realism
Mathematical realism (or platonism) holds that mathematical entities (numbers, sets, functions) exist independently of minds and language. Anti-realist alternatives include:
| View | Core anti-realist commitment |
|---|---|
| Nominalism | Denies the existence of abstract mathematical objects; seeks to paraphrase or reinterpret mathematics without ontological commitment to them. |
| Fictionalism | Treats mathematical discourse as a useful fiction: statements are systematically useful but not literally true about existing abstracta. |
| Structuralism (non-platonist forms) | Takes mathematics to be about structures or positions within them, sometimes without committing to independently existing objects. |
| Intuitionism / constructivism | Connects mathematical existence to mental construction or proof, often rejecting classical logic. |
Hartry Field’s fictionalism is a prominent example: in Science Without Numbers, he argues that mathematics can be shown to be a conservative extension of physical theories, allowing us to use it without ontological commitment to abstract numbers or sets.
8.2 Modal Anti-Realism
Modal realism holds that claims about possibility and necessity are made true by robust modal facts or by concrete possible worlds (as in David Lewis’s view). Anti-realist alternatives include:
- Modal fictionalism: speaks “as if” there were possible worlds, treating them as part of a useful fiction.
- Ersatzism / abstractionist views: analyze possible worlds as abstract entities like sets of propositions, often aiming to reduce modal talk to non-modal bases.
- Modal expressivism or inferentialism: interprets modal language as reflecting rules of inference, counterfactual reasoning, or conceptual constraints, not a separate realm of modal facts.
8.3 Other Abstract Objects
Anti-realist or deflationary treatments also target:
- Properties and universals: trope theories or nominalisms that deny multiply instantiable universals.
- Propositions: deflationary accounts that replace propositions with sentence-types, cognitive events, or other surrogates.
- Sets and classes: systems like predicative or constructivist set theories that limit existence claims.
These views vary in strength: some deny the relevant entities altogether; others aim to re-interpret discourse so that its truth does not require commitment to robust abstracta. The resulting landscape is highly diverse, unified mainly by resistance to a platonist-style ontology.
9. Conceptual Analysis: Mind-Dependence, Truth, and Ontology
Anti-realism is often articulated through three interconnected notions: mind-dependence, truth, and ontology. Different forms of anti-realism can be classified by how they treat each.
9.1 Mind-Dependence
A central question is whether certain facts or entities exist, or are what they are, independently of minds, languages, or practices.
- Strong mind-dependence: facts or entities are constituted by mental states or social practices (e.g., some constructivist accounts of norms, or social facts like money).
- Weak or scheme-dependence: facts are not “made” by minds but can only be described or individuated within conceptual schemes (e.g., Putnam’s internal realism).
- Mind-independence: characteristic realist claim; denial or restriction of this claim marks anti-realist positions.
Anti-realists may hold that, for certain domains, questions about what is “really” the case outside all possible perspectives are ill-posed or empty.
9.2 Conceptions of Truth
Different theories of truth underpin realist and anti-realist stances:
| Conception | Typical realist/anti-realist use |
|---|---|
| Correspondence | Realists often invoke a truth-maker relation between language and a mind-independent world. |
| Verificationist / assertibility-based | Anti-realists (e.g., Dummett) tie truth to what could be verified or justifiably asserted. |
| Coherence / pragmatic | Some internalist or constructivist views appeal to coherence within a system of beliefs or to what would be accepted under ideal conditions. |
| Deflationary / minimalist | Attempts to treat “true” as a logical device, sometimes aiming to sidestep heavy realist vs. anti-realist commitments. |
Anti-realists commonly resist a verification-transcendent notion of truth in at least some domains, while realists insist that truth can outrun what we can in principle know.
9.3 Ontology and Existence Claims
Ontological commitment is another axis:
- Ontological anti-realism: denies that certain putative entities exist at all (e.g., numbers, moral properties).
- Ontologically conservative anti-realism: allows discourse to be true (in some deflated sense) while resisting robust ontological commitment (e.g., fictionalism or some forms of structuralism).
- Metaphysical anti-realism: questions the very idea of a fixed, scheme-independent “ready-made” world with determinate structure.
These distinctions allow for mixed positions, such as believing in a mind-independent physical world while holding that moral facts or mathematical objects are constructed, fictional, or otherwise mind-dependent. The interplay between mind-dependence, truth, and ontology thus structures much of the contemporary landscape of realist and anti-realist theories.
10. Major Thinkers and Schools
Several philosophers and schools have been especially influential in formulating, defending, or criticizing anti-realist positions across domains.
10.1 Key Figures
| Thinker | Domain(s) | Characteristic contribution |
|---|---|---|
| Michael Dummett | Semantics, logic, metaphysics | Developed semantic anti-realism; linked realism to classical logic and verification-transcendent truth. |
| Bas C. van Fraassen | Philosophy of science | Formulated constructive empiricism; argued that science aims at empirical adequacy, not truth about unobservables. |
| Hilary Putnam | Metaphysics, semantics | Proposed internal realism; challenged metaphysical realism and “God’s-eye” perspectives on truth and reference. |
| J. L. Mackie | Metaethics | Developed moral error theory, denying objective moral values while analyzing moral discourse as cognitivist. |
| Hartry Field | Philosophy of mathematics | Advanced mathematical fictionalism; argued for doing science “without numbers.” |
| L. E. J. Brouwer, Arend Heyting | Logic, mathematics | Founded intuitionism; rejected classical logic’s law of excluded middle in mathematics. |
| A. J. Ayer and logical positivists | Early semantics, science | Promoted verificationist criteria of meaning, which influenced later anti-realist semantics. |
10.2 Schools and Traditions
- Intuitionist and constructivist mathematics: Treats mathematical objects as mental constructions; emphasizes proof over classical truth.
- Logical positivism / logical empiricism: Early twentieth-century movement that tied meaning to verification or confirmation, prefiguring later anti-realist approaches despite significant differences.
- Pragmatism (Peirce, James, Dewey, later Putnam): Stressed the role of practical consequences and inquiry in shaping truth and meaning; some strands are read as anti-realist about certain metaphysical commitments.
- Non-cognitivist and expressivist metaethics: Views moral discourse as primarily expressive or practical rather than representational.
- Post-positivist empiricism: Includes van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and related views, maintaining strong empiricist commitments without the more radical positivist doctrines.
These figures and movements do not always self-identify as “anti-realist” in a uniform way; in some cases, the label is partly retrospective. Nevertheless, their work has been central in shaping contemporary understandings of anti-realism and its relationship to realism, especially in English-speaking analytic philosophy.
11. Related and Contrasting Concepts
Anti-realism intersects with, but is not identical to, several other philosophical notions. Distinguishing these helps clarify its scope.
11.1 Idealism and Irrealism
- Idealism traditionally holds that reality is in some sense mental or mind-dependent. Certain forms (e.g., Berkeleyan) can be classed as strongly anti-realist about matter, though idealism may still affirm robust objectivity within the mental realm.
- Irrealism is a broad label for denying that there are facts of a certain kind. It overlaps with strong anti-realism (e.g., error theory about morality), but some use “irrealism” more narrowly in specific traditions (e.g., Goodman’s irrealism about worlds).
11.2 Non-Cognitivism, Expressivism, and Fictionalism
These semantic stances often support anti-realist conclusions:
| Concept | Relation to anti-realism |
|---|---|
| Non-cognitivism / expressivism | Treats discourse (e.g., moral) as not primarily truth-apt; often associated with anti-realism about the corresponding facts. |
| Fictionalism | Allows continued use of a discourse (e.g., mathematical, modal) “as if” true while denying literal truth or ontological commitment. |
However, some theorists combine these with realist-sounding elements (e.g., quasi-realism), blurring boundaries.
11.3 Relativism and Constructivism
- Relativism holds that truth or justification is relative to frameworks, cultures, or individuals. Some anti-realist views (e.g., certain forms of conceptual scheme dependence) share affinities with relativism, though many anti-realists resist full relativistic implications.
- Constructivism (moral or epistemic) maintains that certain facts are constructed by idealized procedures or agreements. Depending on formulation, this may be interpreted as a moderate form of realism (facts are still “real” once constructed) or as anti-realism (no independent facts prior to construction).
11.4 Deflationism and Quietism
Deflationary views about truth (e.g., minimalism) and quietist attitudes toward metaphysics often aim to dissolve, rather than resolve, debates between realism and anti-realism. They are related in that they frequently question whether substantial metaphysical theses about truth or existence are needed or coherent.
11.5 Metaphysical Realism and Correspondence Theories
Metaphysical realism—the view that there is a mind-independent, fully determinate world with a unique correct description—serves as the primary foil for many anti-realist positions. Correspondence theories of truth are often associated with this outlook, though some philosophers endorse correspondence-style truth without strong metaphysical realism. Anti-realism typically involves rejecting at least some aspects of this package, while occasionally retaining others (for example, local correspondence relations within a broadly anti-realist framework).
12. Translation Challenges and Cross-Linguistic Variants
Because “anti-realism” is a contrastive and family-resemblance term, its translation and cross-linguistic usage present several difficulties.
12.1 Direct Calques and Their Limits
Many European languages employ near-direct counterparts:
| Language | Common term | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| German | Anti-Realismus | Used in similar analytic contexts; may be associated with debates on Realismus in theology and literature. |
| French | anti-réalisme | Appears in discussions of analytic philosophy and in aesthetics; may evoke artistic movements. |
| Spanish | antirrealismo | Used in analytic and theological debates; sometimes overlaps with idealismo or constructivismo. |
| Italian | anti-realismo / antirealismo | Parallels English usage; may be contrasted with realismo metafisico or realismo scientifico. |
These calques can obscure that English “anti-realism” covers a wide range of positions, from semantic verificationism to ontological nominalism.
12.2 Overlap with “Idealism,” “Constructivism,” and Local Terms
In some intellectual traditions, the closest native categories are:
- Idealism (e.g., in German: Idealismus), which historically carries strong metaphysical theses about the fundamentally mental nature of reality.
- Constructivism (e.g., Kontruktivismus, constructivisme), emphasizing the role of social or cognitive construction.
- Tradition-specific notions such as Madhyamaka “emptiness” in Buddhist philosophy, which some Western interpreters analogize to anti-realism but which has distinct doctrinal commitments.
Using these terms as translations can mislead readers into conflating contemporary analytic anti-realism with much older or broader metaphysical systems.
12.3 Polysemy of “Realism”
“Realism” itself is highly polysemous across languages and disciplines:
- In art and literature, it denotes stylistic fidelity to everyday life.
- In politics, it can mean power-focused pragmatism.
- In theology, it may concern the real presence of the divine.
Translating “anti-realism” without specifying the domain can therefore invite misunderstanding, e.g., whether the subject is metaphysics, ethics, science, art, or religion. Many authors explicitly qualify terms (e.g., realismo científico, réalisme moral) to avoid confusion.
12.4 Conceptual Non-Equivalence
Some languages and traditions lack a direct native equivalent for anti-realism as a unifying category. Instead, they may have:
- Distinct debates about idealism vs. materialism, nominalism vs. realism, or objectivity vs. relativism.
- Less emphasis on sharp realism/anti-realism dichotomies, focusing instead on gradations of dependence, construction, or emptiness.
Consequently, translators and commentators often have to provide expository glosses, explaining that “anti-realism” in contemporary analytic philosophy functions as a flexible label for multiple, domain-relative positions, rather than a single, tightly defined doctrine.
13. Critiques and Defenses of Anti-Realism
Debates over anti-realism involve both global challenges to the coherence of anti-realist views and local arguments within specific domains.
13.1 Common Critiques
Key lines of criticism include:
- Self-refutation worries: Critics argue that if anti-realism about truth or reality is itself put forward as true, it seems to presuppose the very notion it undermines. Anti-realists respond by distinguishing domains or adopting deflationary accounts of their own claims.
- Epistemic collapse: Some maintain that tying truth to verification or justification leads to epistemic idealism, making it hard to explain error, disagreement, or apparent truths that exceed our capacities.
- Explanatory deficits: Scientific realists contend that anti-realism cannot adequately explain the success, progress, and predictive power of science without appealing to the approximate truth of theories.
- Moral objectivity: Moral realists argue that anti-realist views struggle to account for the apparent seriousness and authority of moral judgments, especially in cases involving injustice or harm.
13.2 Anti-Realist Responses
Defenders of anti-realism offer various replies:
- Domain-specificity: Many adopt selective anti-realism, targeting particular domains (e.g., morality or mathematics) while preserving realist commitments elsewhere, thereby avoiding fully global conclusions.
- Refined notions of truth: Semantic anti-realists refine verificationist or assertibility-based accounts to handle embedded discourse, past-tense statements, and other problematic cases.
- Alternative explanations: Scientific anti-realists propose that empirical adequacy, theoretical virtues, and pragmatic success can explain scientific practice without positing truth about unobservables.
- Normative reconstruction: Moral anti-realists develop sophisticated models (e.g., quasi-realism, constructivism) that aim to preserve much of the phenomenology of moral discourse—such as disagreement and normativity—without positing robust moral facts.
13.3 Intermediate and Hybrid Positions
Some philosophers advocate middle-way positions:
- Structural realism seeks to capture the realist intuition that science tracks reality while conceding anti-realist worries about theoretical entities.
- Internal realism and related views accept objective constraints but deny a completely scheme-independent, “ready-made” world with a unique description.
- Quietist and deflationary approaches argue that many realism/anti-realism debates are misguided or merely verbal.
The result is a complex landscape in which anti-realism is neither universally rejected nor universally accepted, but continually refined in response to these critiques.
14. Applications in Specific Philosophical Domains
Anti-realism has been developed and contested in multiple domains, often yielding domain-specific theories tailored to local phenomena.
14.1 Metaphysics and Ontology
In general metaphysics, anti-realist approaches question robust commitments to:
- Universals and properties, favoring nominalist or trope-theoretic accounts.
- Possible worlds and modal facts, leading to modal fictionalism or abstractionist ersatzism.
- A “ready-made” world with fixed structure, as criticized by internal realists and some pragmatists.
These views often prioritize conceptual schemes, linguistic practices, or explanatory utility over straightforward ontological enumeration.
14.2 Philosophy of Science
Beyond constructive empiricism, anti-realist themes appear in:
- Instrumentalist interpretations of specific theories (e.g., quantum mechanics), where formalism is used to predict observations without strong claims about underlying reality.
- Social constructivist approaches in science studies, which emphasize the role of social negotiation, power structures, and historical context in shaping scientific “facts.”
Applications vary in strength, from modest caution about ontological inference to more radical claims about the constructed nature of scientific objects.
14.3 Ethics, Law, and Social Ontology
In ethics, anti-realism informs debates on moral motivation, disagreement, and the nature of normativity. In legal theory, anti-realist or constructivist accounts (e.g., legal positivism with strong conventionalist elements) treat legal facts as dependent on social practices, rules, or institutional recognition.
In social ontology, anti-realism and constructivism intersect in analyses of:
- Money, corporations, borders, and institutions as status functions or constituted facts.
- Gender, race, and other social categories, where some theorists emphasize social construction while differing on the degree and type of mind-dependence involved.
14.4 Aesthetics and Religion
In aesthetics, anti-realist views about beauty and artistic value often stress:
- Dependence on audience responses or cultural norms.
- The role of interpretive practices in constituting artworks and their properties.
In philosophy of religion, anti-realist interpretations (e.g., some strands of non-realist theology) treat religious discourse as expressing commitments, practices, or forms of life rather than reporting facts about a supernatural realm.
14.5 Logic, Language, and Mathematics
In logic and language, anti-realism informs:
- Intuitionistic and substructural logics.
- Inferentialist or use-based semantics, where meaning is grounded in inferential roles rather than correspondence.
In mathematics, nominalism, fictionalism, and constructivism affect foundational programs, influencing how mathematicians and philosophers understand proof, existence, and abstraction.
These applications illustrate how anti-realism functions less as a single doctrine and more as a pattern of response—reinterpreting or restricting realist claims about independence, truth, and existence in ways sensitive to the particularities of each domain.
15. Legacy and Historical Significance
Anti-realism has left a substantial mark on twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy, reshaping debates about meaning, knowledge, and existence.
15.1 Reframing the Realism Debate
By emphasizing semantics and epistemology, figures such as Dummett shifted focus from purely metaphysical assertions about what there is to questions about:
- How language hooks onto the world.
- What counts as understanding a statement.
- Whether truth can transcend all possible evidence.
This reframing influenced not only logic and philosophy of language but also discussions in metaphysics, where disputes increasingly turned on issues of representation, reference, and conceptual scheme.
15.2 Influence Across Subfields
Anti-realist ideas have:
- Shaped philosophy of science, making the realism vs. anti-realism debate a central organizing framework.
- Structured metaethics, where realist, expressivist, error-theoretic, and constructivist options are now standard positions.
- Guided foundational work in mathematics, inspiring programs in intuitionistic logic, constructive analysis, and nominalist reconstructions of scientific theories.
- Informed social and political philosophy, particularly in discussions of construction, ideology, and the status of social kinds.
The notion of domain-relative realism—being realist in some areas and anti-realist in others—has become a widely accepted methodological possibility.
15.3 Methodological and Meta-Philosophical Effects
Anti-realism has contributed to broader methodological shifts:
- Reinforcing the importance of formal methods (e.g., non-classical logics, model theory) in philosophical argument.
- Encouraging modest, practice-sensitive ontologies that take scientific or social practices as starting points rather than speculative metaphysics.
- Motivating deflationary or quietist reactions, as some philosophers question whether deep metaphysical disputes about realism and anti-realism are resolvable or even substantive.
15.4 Ongoing Debates and Future Directions
Contemporary work continues to refine and reassess anti-realist positions, especially in light of developments in:
- Formal semantics and logic.
- Cognitive science and theories of representation.
- Social epistemology and the study of scientific practice.
The legacy of anti-realism thus lies not only in specific doctrines but also in a lasting sensitivity to the conditions under which talk of truth, existence, and objectivity is warranted, and to the possibility that these conditions may vary systematically from one domain to another.
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@online{philopedia_anti_realism,
title = {anti-realism},
author = {Philopedia},
year = {2025},
url = {https://philopedia.com/terms/anti-realism/},
urldate = {December 10, 2025}
}Study Guide
Realism
The view that certain entities, facts, or truths exist and are what they are independently of our minds, language, or conceptual schemes; our best theories aim to describe them as they are “in themselves.”
Semantic Anti-Realism
A position that explains truth in terms of verification, justification, or conditions of warranted assertibility, often rejecting a fully bivalent, classical truth-conditional semantics for some domains.
Metaphysical Realism
The thesis that there is a mind-independent, fully determinate world with a fixed structure and a unique, scheme-independent true description that our theories aim to capture.
Mind-Dependence
The condition of a fact, property, or entity existing or being what it is partly or wholly in virtue of mental states, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, or social institutions.
Warranted Assertibility
A Dummettian notion that explains the status of a statement in terms of when it is rationally or justifiably assertible, used by semantic anti-realists as a surrogate or explanatory basis for truth.
Verificationism
The doctrine that the meaning or truth of a statement is essentially tied to conditions under which it can be verified, confirmed, or warrantedly asserted.
Constructive Empiricism
Van Fraassen’s scientific anti-realism according to which the aim of science is empirical adequacy with respect to observables, not truth about unobservable entities; theory acceptance requires belief only in empirical adequacy.
Moral Anti-Realism (including Error Theory and Fictionalism)
Any view denying that moral facts or properties are objective, stance-independent features of the world in roughly the way scientific facts are; error theory holds that all ordinary moral claims are false, while fictionalism treats moral discourse as a useful fiction.
How does Dummett’s semantic characterization of realism and anti-realism (in terms of truth-conditions and the law of excluded middle) differ from a purely metaphysical characterization focused only on what exists?
In what sense can van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism be seen as a ‘middle way’ between full scientific realism and radical skepticism about scientific knowledge?
Is moral error theory a purely semantic thesis about moral language, a metaphysical thesis about moral properties, or both? How does this classification affect whether you consider it a form of anti-realism?
Can an anti-realist about mathematical objects still treat mathematics as indispensable to science? How do fictionalism or nominalism attempt to reconcile mathematical practice with ontological caution?
Does tying truth to verification or warranted assertibility (as in semantic anti-realism) inevitably lead to relativism? Why or why not?
In what ways do social facts (like money, borders, or corporations) illustrate forms of mind- or practice-dependence? Do these examples support a broader anti-realism about social ontology, or are they compatible with a restricted realism?
Is it coherent to be a realist about the physical world and scientific observables, an anti-realist about unobservables and mathematics, and a constructivist about morality? What would justify such a mixed, domain-relative stance?