Coincidence

Literally: "falling together"

From Medieval Latin coincidentia, from co- (together) + incidere (to fall upon, to happen), meaning events that ‘fall together’ in time or circumstance.

At a Glance

Philology
Origin
Latin
Evolution of Meaning
Modern

Today, coincidence straddles everyday language, probability theory, and metaphysics. In ordinary speech it names strikingly unlikely concurrent events that appear to lack causal connection. In statistics and analytic philosophy it is treated as the conjunctive occurrence of events whose joint probability is small, often used to illustrate cognitive biases and the misinterpretation of randomness. In theology, psychology, and some strands of continental thought, coincidence is contrasted with fate or providence, and sometimes reinterpreted as meaningful pattern (e.g., synchronicity) rather than mere chance.

Definition and Etymology

Coincidence ordinarily denotes the striking concurrence of events that appear to lack a direct causal connection yet are experienced as noteworthy or surprising. Philosophically, the term marks a contested boundary between chance, necessity, and meaning.

Etymologically, “coincidence” stems from Medieval Latin coincidentia, from co- (“together”) and incidere (“to fall upon, to happen”). Literally, it refers to things that “fall together” in time, space, or circumstance. This root sense is preserved in geometry (e.g., two lines coinciding) and extended in metaphysics to designate events whose simultaneity or correlation seems accidental rather than essential.

The concept itself is closely related to, but not identical with, contingency, accident, and randomness. In many philosophical discussions, “coincidence” highlights an unexpected conjunction against a background of presumed independence: one would not, in advance, have reason to predict that these particular events would occur together.

Metaphysical and Theological Perspectives

In classical metaphysics, coincidence is often treated through the lens of accident and contingency rather than as a primary concept. Aristotelian and scholastic traditions distinguish what happens by nature or for an end from what happens by chance (tyche). A frequently cited example is the meeting of a debtor and creditor at the market: each goes there for a reason, but their meeting is an accidental concurrence. Later interpreters treat such cases as paradigmatic coincidences—events that share spatiotemporal overlap without being ordered to a single, unified causal end.

In Leibnizian rationalism, the notion of coincidence is constrained by the principle of sufficient reason, according to which nothing happens without a reason. From this perspective, apparent coincidences are only epistemic: they appear unmotivated because human knowers lack access to the full web of determining causes or divine decrees. Theologically, this connects with doctrines of providence: for many theists, what is called “coincidence” in ordinary speech may be reinterpreted as the hidden orchestration of an omniscient deity.

By contrast, Humean empiricism is wary of reading causal necessity into mere conjunctions of events. Hume analyzes causation as constant conjunction plus psychological expectation. Coincidences become instructive because they reveal how easily humans infer causal connections from limited observations. A one-off conjunction that feels striking may tempt us to posit a cause, though, strictly speaking, experience has only revealed a single pairing, not a robust regularity.

In contemporary metaphysics, coincidences figure in debates about laws of nature, determinism, and fine-tuning. Some cosmological arguments appeal to the “coincidental” alignment of physical constants or initial conditions whose joint occurrence seems extremely improbable. Critics reply that such appeals may involve anthropic selection effects or ill-defined probability spaces. The term “cosmic coincidence” thus marks contested claims about whether certain large‑scale features of the universe are reasonably viewed as brute facts, law-governed necessities, or indicators of design.

Coincidence, Probability, and Cognition

Within probability theory and analytic philosophy, coincidence is generally characterized as a low-probability conjunction of events assumed to be independent. On this view, there is nothing metaphysically special about coincidences; they are simply improbable but possible outcomes of random processes. Coincidences thereby serve as intuitive illustrations of formal results about large numbers, combinatorics, and independence.

Prominent analyses examine why humans often misjudge coincidences:

  • Base-rate neglect: People are impressed by a shared birthday between two individuals without appreciating the high probability of at least one shared pair in reasonably large groups (the “birthday problem”).
  • Multiple comparisons: When many opportunities for matches exist (e.g., many acquaintances, many days, many locations), the chance that at least one striking coincidence occurs can be quite high, even if any specific coincidence is unlikely.
  • Clustering illusion: Random sequences produce runs and clusters that observers misinterpret as non-random patterns.

Philosophers of mind and psychology treat these errors as evidence of pattern-seeking cognitive architecture. Coincidences are salient because they violate our informal expectations about randomness. Some theorists, influenced by Bayesian approaches, understand this salience in terms of model comparison: a conjunction appears coincidental when its occurrence substantially lowers the plausibility of a “pure chance” model relative to a “structured cause” model, even if the observer does not explicitly compute probabilities.

This has implications for epistemology. Coincidences underlie famous inference-to-the-best-explanation scenarios: if a friend appears independently in several of the same remote cities as oneself, the hypothesis of “mere coincidence” may seem less plausible than hypotheses about coordination or surveillance. Debates focus on when appeals to coincidence are legitimate default explanations and when they function as ad hoc dismissals of otherwise compelling patterns.

Meaningful Coincidence and Synchronicity

Some thinkers distinguish between mere coincidence and meaningful coincidence. The former is treated as an impersonal conjunction of events, while the latter involves an experienced significance that seems disproportionate to any ordinary causal narrative.

The most influential articulation of this distinction is C. G. Jung’s concept of synchronicity. For Jung, synchronicities are events that are connected not by causal chains but by meaningful correspondence—for example, a patient’s dream of a scarab-like beetle coinciding with the physical appearance of a similar insect in the consulting room. Jung characterizes such cases as acausal connecting principles, challenging a worldview that identifies explanation exclusively with efficient causation.

Critics from analytic and scientific perspectives often interpret such accounts as misread coincidences, shaped by selective attention, confirmation bias, and the retrospective construction of narratives. They argue that once the vast number of unnoticed non-coincidences is taken into account, the observed frequency of apparently meaningful coincidences is compatible with chance.

Proponents of synchronicity, or more generally of non-reductive accounts of meaning, maintain that coincidences may disclose symbolic or existential significance, regardless of whether they exhibit new causal laws. In existential and phenomenological approaches, coincidence can become a way of describing how events are lived as meaningful conjunctions, embedded in a personal or cultural horizon, rather than merely logged as neutral data.

Contemporary philosophy thus treats coincidence at several levels:

  • as a statistical phenomenon explicable within probability theory,
  • as a metaphysical puzzle about chance, necessity, and explanation,
  • and as a phenomenological datum about how humans experience and interpret unexpected convergences.

Whether coincidences are ultimately “just” random overlaps, clues to hidden structures, or irreducibly meaningful events remains a live question spanning metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind.

How to Cite This Entry

Use these citation formats to reference this term entry in your academic work. Click the copy button to copy the citation to your clipboard.

APA Style (7th Edition)

Philopedia. (2025). coincidence. Philopedia. https://philopedia.com/terms/coincidence/

MLA Style (9th Edition)

"coincidence." Philopedia, 2025, https://philopedia.com/terms/coincidence/.

Chicago Style (17th Edition)

Philopedia. "coincidence." Philopedia. Accessed December 11, 2025. https://philopedia.com/terms/coincidence/.

BibTeX
@online{philopedia_coincidence,
  title = {coincidence},
  author = {Philopedia},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://philopedia.com/terms/coincidence/},
  urldate = {December 11, 2025}
}