ἐπιστήμη

1. Introduction

The Greek term ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē) occupies a central place in the history of Western reflection on knowledge. In classical philosophy it typically designates a high-grade, reliable, and systematically structured form of cognition, distinguished from more ordinary belief, opinion, or practical skill. Its fortunes span several major transformations: from early Greek usages linked to competence or know‑how, through the technical theories of Plato and Aristotle, to its Latin reception as scientia, its role in medieval systems of learning, and its re-emergence in modern philosophy and contemporary theory.

Ancient authors do not employ ἐπιστήμη in a single, uniform sense. Plato often associates it with insight into immutable intelligible realities, whereas Aristotle develops a more formal account in terms of demonstrative systems anchored in first principles. Later schools reinterpret the notion according to their own psychological, logical, and ethical frameworks, with some (notably the Skeptics) withholding the term altogether as part of a critique of strong knowledge claims.

In the medieval Latin tradition, ἐπιστήμη is transmitted primarily as scientia, which shapes scholastic accounts of the organization of disciplines and the status of theology and natural philosophy. Early modern thinkers both inherit and contest this legacy when redefining “science” and certainty. In contemporary discourse, the term survives indirectly in derivatives such as epistemology and epistemic, and directly—though with a significantly altered sense—in Michel Foucault’s notion of épistémè as an historical configuration of knowledge.

This entry examines ἐπιστήμη diachronically and conceptually: its linguistic roots, its shifting meanings across major philosophical traditions, its contrasts with neighboring notions like δόξα and τέχνη, and its continuing influence on how “science” and “knowledge” are understood.

2. Etymology and Linguistic Origins of ἐπιστήμη

2.1 Morphological Composition

The noun ἐπιστήμη is commonly analyzed as derived from:

• ἐπί (epi) – “upon, over, on”
• A verbal root related to ἵστημι (histēmi) – “to stand, set, make firm”

On this analysis, ἐπιστήμη literally evokes a “standing upon” or “firm standing,” suggesting a stable or well-grounded grasp. The cognate verb ἐπίσταμαι (epistamai) means “to know, to understand, to be skilled at.”

Some philologists note possible mediation by στάσις (“standing, position”), but the core idea in all proposals is that of firm positioning or secure stance, which later philosophical authors exploit when characterizing ἐπιστήμη as stable or unshakable knowledge.

2.2 Early Greek and Dialectal Evidence

In early Greek (Homeric and archaic poetry), ἐπίσταμαι appears more frequently than the noun ἐπιστήμη. The verb covers a broad range from “be acquainted with” to “know how to do,” often in practical contexts. The nominal ἐπιστήμη emerges more clearly in classical prose (historians, orators, medical writers), where it can mean “expert knowledge” or “technical understanding.”

Attested forms and relatives include:

2.3 From Common Greek to Technical Term

Classical philosophers inherit an already meaningful everyday term and sharpen it into a more technical concept. Plato and Aristotle retain the associations of firmness and mastery but link them to distinct theoretical projects (knowledge of Forms, demonstrative sciences). Later Greek and Byzantine writers continue to use ἐπιστήμη in both everyday and specialized senses.

Modern European languages reintroduce the word, often in transliterated forms like episteme, chiefly through scholarly discussion of Greek philosophy. The adjective epistemic and the noun epistemology derive from late formations based on the same root.

3. Semantic Field and Related Greek Terms

3.1 Position within a Network of Cognitive Terms

In classical Greek, ἐπιστήμη belongs to a dense semantic field of words for knowing, understanding, and reasoning. It is often distinguished from, but also related to, several key notions:

3.2 Overlaps and Contrasts

Authors exploit these contrasts differently. Some treat γνῶσις as encompassing both lower and higher forms of cognition, with ἐπιστήμη marking a more rigorous, systematic subset. τέχνη may be coordinated with ἐπιστήμη as another form of disciplined understanding but oriented toward production or practice. σοφία can be presented as superior to particular sciences by virtue of its greater generality or its concern with first principles.

3.3 Shifting Hierarchies

The relative ranking of terms in this field is not fixed. For example:

• In certain contexts, γνῶσις can name salvific or religious knowledge, outranking technical ἐπιστήμη.
• φρόνησις is sometimes valued more than theoretical ἐπιστήμη for ethical and political life.
• νοῦς may be regarded as more fundamental than ἐπιστήμη, because it apprehends the starting points upon which ἐπιστήμη depends.

The semantic field therefore provides a flexible vocabulary in which ἐπιστήμη is one, albeit important, node among several partially overlapping ways of “knowing.”

4. Pre-Philosophical and Everyday Greek Usage

4.1 Practical Know-How and Competence

Before being theorized by philosophers, ἐπιστήμη and especially ἐπίσταμαι frequently denote practical capability or expertise. In early epic and lyric, characters are said to “know how to” steer ships, sing, heal, or fight. The focus lies on effective performance rather than abstract justification.

Examples from non-philosophical prose (historians, orators, medical writers) show similar patterns: a general “knows” warfare, a physician possesses ἐπιστήμη of bodily conditions, an artisan is ἐπιστήμων in his craft. The term can be nearly synonymous with τέχνη, emphasizing reliable mastery.

4.2 Everyday Cognitive Uses

Beyond specialized skills, ἐπίσταμαι also expresses ordinary factual and interpersonal knowledge:

• familiarity with persons (“I know him”),
• acquaintance with places or customs,
• understanding of rules or laws.

In such contexts, ἐπιστήμη may simply mean “knowledge” without strong connotations of certainty or formal structure. Ordinary speakers did not necessarily mark a sharp boundary between everyday knowledge and ἐπιστήμη, though contexts of expertise (medicine, navigation, rhetoric) often invited the stronger term.

4.3 Social and Rhetorical Valence

Calling someone ἐπιστήμων served as a social credential: it located individuals within professions or roles that claimed specialized understanding. Orators could invoke their own or others’ ἐπιστήμη to bolster authority, or deny an opponent’s ἐπιστήμη to undermine credibility.

This pre-philosophical landscape supplies much of the background against which later theoretical refinements occur. Philosophers both draw on and transform the everyday associations of ἐπιστήμη with mastery, reliability, and socially recognized expertise.

5. Plato’s Theory of ἐπιστήμη and Its Objects

5.1 ἐπιστήμη and the Divided Line

In Plato, ἐπιστήμη is prominently situated within a hierarchy of cognitive states. In Republic VI (509d–511e), the “Divided Line” distinguishes:

Plato sometimes uses ἐπιστήμη broadly for the upper, intelligible segment (νόησις and διάνοια together), sometimes more narrowly for stable, reasoned grasp of Forms. In all such uses it stands in contrast to δόξα, which concerns the changing sensible world and lacks the requisite stability and explanatory depth.

5.2 Objects: Forms and What “Truly Is”

Plato frequently ties ἐπιστήμη to the Forms (εἴδη/ἰδέαι):

"

ἐπιστήμη is set over that which is, δόξα over that which is between being and not-being.

— Plato, Republic 478d–e (paraphrased)

The Forms are described as unchanging, intelligible, and the ultimate realities that sensibles “participate in.” Because they “truly are,” they are considered proper objects of ἐπιστήμη. In Meno and Phaedo, the theory of recollection suggests that knowledge of such objects involves the soul’s grasp of eternal truths rather than empirical learning alone.

5.3 ἐπιστήμη, True Belief, and Explanation

In Meno (97d–98a), Plato notably distinguishes true belief from ἐπιστήμη. True beliefs can guide action successfully but are likened to “untethered statues” that may escape; when “tied down” by an account (λόγος) of the reason why, they become ἐπιστήμη. This introduces an explanatory and justificatory dimension: ἐπιστήμη is not just correctness but understanding of causes or reasons.

In Theaetetus, Plato explores, and leaves unresolved, various definitions of ἐπιστήμη (as perception, true belief, true belief with an account). Scholars disagree on whether Plato reaches a definitive positive theory there; many interpret the dialogue as aporetic, highlighting the difficulty of pinning down ἐπιστήμη.

5.4 Method: Dialectic and Mathematics

Plato connects ἐπιστήμη with specific methods. Mathematics exemplifies a high level of disciplined reasoning, yet in Republic VII it is said to fall short of full dialectical ἐπιστήμη because it proceeds from unexamined hypotheses. Dialectic, by contrast, seeks un-hypothetical first principles, culminating in knowledge of the Form of the Good. Thus, for Plato, ἐπιστήμη is most fully realized in philosophical dialectic directed at intelligible realities.

6. Aristotle’s Account of ἐπιστήμη and Demonstration

6.1 ἐπιστήμη as a State (Hexis)

In Aristotle, ἐπιστήμη is defined both in epistemic and psychological terms. In Posterior Analytics I.2 (71b9–16) and Nicomachean Ethics VI.3 (1139b18–36), it is a hexis (stable disposition) by which one:

• knows that something is so,
• and knows the cause why it is so,
• and knows that it cannot be otherwise.

The emphasis falls on necessity, causal understanding, and stability of grasp.

6.2 Demonstrative Structure

Aristotle develops a systematic account of demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) as the characteristic method of ἐπιστήμη:

"

We think we understand a thing when we know its cause, that it is its cause, and that it cannot be otherwise.

— Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.2, 71b9–12

A demonstrative science consists of:

A proposition is known scientifically when it is deduced in the appropriate way from first principles within a given domain.

6.3 Domain-Specific Sciences

Aristotle conceives of multiple ἐπιστῆμαι, each with its own subject-matter and principles (e.g., geometry, optics, harmonics, natural science). In Metaphysics A.1 (981b25–982a3), he characterizes ἐπιστήμη as aiming at universal knowledge through causes; “experience” provides knowledge of particulars, but ἐπιστήμη transcends this by grasping general explanatory patterns.

6.4 Relation to Other Intellectual Virtues

In Nicomachean Ethics VI, Aristotle situates ἐπιστήμη among the intellectual excellences:

Aristotle thus embeds ἐπιστήμη in a broader architecture of rational capacities, distinguishing it especially by its concern with what is necessary and its reliance on demonstrative proof.

7. Hellenistic Reinterpretations: Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics

7.1 Stoic ἐπιστήμη

Stoic philosophers adopt ἐπιστήμη as a rigorous state of cognition tied to their theory of impressions. According to reports in Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus:

• Cognitive impressions (φαντασίαι καταληπτικαί) present objects in a way that is clear and distinct.
• When assented to correctly and stably, such impressions can form ἐπιστήμη.

For the Stoics, ἐπιστήμη is:

Stoic authors often reserve full ἐπιστήμη to the ideal wise person; ordinary people at best have incomplete or unstable cognition.

7.2 Epicurean ἐπιστήμη

Epicureans conceive ἐπιστήμη in relation to their empiricist epistemology. Key sources include Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus and Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura (Latin scientia):

• All knowledge begins from sensations, which are taken to be incorrigible as mere appearances.
• Preconceptions (προλήψεις) and feelings contribute to forming general beliefs.
• ἐπιστήμη consists in secure understanding of nature (especially atomism and the swerve) and of the limits of fear and desire.

The Epicurean ideal is not purely theoretical; correct ἐπιστήμη about the gods, death, and the natural world underpins tranquillity (ataraxia).

7.3 Skeptical Attitudes toward ἐπιστήμη

Skeptical schools—particularly Pyrrhonian Skeptics—critically target strong notions of ἐπιστήμη. Sextus Empiricus, in Against the Logicians, reports and contests dogmatic claims to ἐπιστήμη, arguing that:

• For any proposed criterion of truth, equally powerful counterarguments can be raised.
• Disagreement among philosophers undermines confident claims to ἐπιστήμη.
• Suspension of judgment (epochē) leads to tranquillity more reliably than dogmatic pursuit of knowledge.

Some Academic Skeptics (following Arcesilaus and Carneades) maintain that ἐπιστήμη, understood as infallible knowledge, is unattainable, and instead develop a notion of the probable (πιθανόν) as a guide to action.

Thus, Hellenistic discussions simultaneously refine, reorient, and in some cases reject the classical ideal of ἐπιστήμη.

8. From ἐπιστήμη to scientia: Medieval and Scholastic Transformations

8.1 Translation into Latin: scientia

With the translation of Greek philosophical texts into Latin, ἐπιστήμη is commonly rendered as scientia. This occurs in late antiquity and becomes standard in medieval scholasticism. Latin scientia preserves many Aristotelian connotations:

• demonstrative knowledge,
• organization into disciplines,
• grounding in first principles.

Yet it also acquires new associations through integration with Christian theology and Latin intellectual traditions.

8.2 Scholastic Structures of scientia

Medieval thinkers, drawing heavily on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, systematize scientia within comprehensive educational and metaphysical schemes. For example, Thomas Aquinas holds that:

"

Scientia proceeds from principles known by themselves, evident to the intellect, or received by a higher knowledge.

— Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q.1, a.2 (paraphrased)

Key features include:

8.3 Theological Dimensions

A notable medieval development concerns sacra doctrina (holy teaching). Some scholastics argue it qualifies as scientia in a special sense, because:

• its first principles are not self-evident but revealed,
• it draws demonstrative consequences from those revealed axioms.

Others dispute whether this fits Aristotle’s original account of ἐπιστήμη, leading to nuanced categories such as subalternated sciences that depend on superior sciences for their principles.

8.4 Shifts Toward Early Modernity

Late medieval and early Renaissance debates about certainty, method, and the status of various disciplines gradually modify the Aristotelian-Scholastic model of scientia. Nominalist, voluntarist, and humanist currents raise questions about:

• the extent of necessary knowledge in nature,
• the role of mathematical method,
• the compatibility of Aristotelian scientia with Christian doctrines of divine freedom.

These developments set the stage for early modern reconfigurations of “science,” while continuing to rely on the inherited vocabulary of scientia/ἐπιστήμη.

9. Modern Epistemology and the Legacy of ἐπιστήμη

9.1 Early Modern Reinterpretations

In the early modern period, the Latin scientia and its vernacular derivatives begin to shift in meaning. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, among others, still use scientia for systematically demonstrable knowledge, often idealizing mathematical method. Yet they modify key assumptions inherited from ancient ἐπιστήμη:

• The scope of necessary truths is sometimes restricted (e.g., to mathematics and metaphysics).
• Empirical investigation acquires a more prominent role.
• Methodological doubt and the search for indubitable foundations replace Aristotelian appeals to evident first principles.

9.2 Emergence of “Epistemology”

The term epistemology (from Greek ἐπιστήμη + λόγος) emerges in modern philosophy (especially in German and English) to denote the systematic study of knowledge itself. This new discipline:

• abstracts from particular sciences to analyze conditions of justified belief,
• investigates skepticism, certainty, and sources of knowledge,
• often retains, implicitly or explicitly, a heightened ideal of rigorous knowledge influenced by classical ἐπιστήμη.

In analytic philosophy, derivatives such as epistemic (epistemic justification, epistemic norms, epistemic luck) generalize the root to a wide range of evaluative concepts.

9.3 Continuities and Departures

Modern epistemologists inherit several themes traceable to ancient uses of ἐπιστήμη:

At the same time, many contemporary theories relax or reject the strong conditions associated with ἐπιστήμη, allowing for fallible yet warranted knowledge. Discussions of “scientific knowledge” in philosophy of science also diverge from Aristotelian models, while still, in some views, echoing the aspiration to systematic, explanatory understanding.

10. Foucault’s épistémè and Historical A Priori

10.1 Reorientation of the Concept

Michel Foucault reintroduces the term épistémè in a distinct sense, largely detached from individual cognition. In Les mots et les choses (The Order of Things), he uses épistémè to denote the underlying set of relations that, in a given historical period, make certain statements intelligible and acceptable as knowledge.

"

By épistémè, we mean... the totality of relations that can unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems.

— Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (paraphrased from ch. 5)

Here, épistémè is not a mental state but a historical configuration of rules, practices, and institutions.

10.2 Historical A Priori

Foucault characterizes the épistémè as a kind of historical a priori:

• It sets the conditions under which objects, concepts, and theories can appear as thinkable.
• Unlike Kant’s transcendental a priori, it is historically variable: different epochs (Renaissance, Classical age, modern era) have distinct épistémès.

This concept is used to analyze discontinuities in the history of the human sciences and natural history. Foucault argues that shifts in the épistémè can radically transform what counts as “knowledge,” even when actors are unaware of these underlying changes.

10.3 Reception and Debates

Foucault’s reworking of episteme/épistémè has generated various interpretations:

Some commentators view Foucault’s épistémè as a radical departure from traditional ἐπιστήμη because it shifts the locus of analysis from the justification of beliefs to the historical conditions of their possibility. Others note family resemblances in the continued concern with what structures and legitimizes “knowledge,” albeit now at a supra-individual, historical level.

11. Comparing ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and τέχνη

11.1 Basic Contrasts

In classical Greek thought, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and τέχνη mark different kinds of cognitive or practical states. Their interplay is a key device for articulating standards of knowledge, belief, and skill.

11.2 ἐπιστήμη vs. δόξα

Philosophers frequently oppose ἐπιστήμη to δόξα:

• ἐπιστήμη typically requires explanatory reasons or demonstration.
• δόξα may be true or false but lacks systematic grounding.
• Some texts allow for true doxa, which can guide action but is viewed as inferior until “tethered” by an account (as in Plato’s Meno).

Interpreters debate how sharp this boundary is. Some emphasize a binary divide between infallible knowledge and fallible opinion; others highlight continuities and intermediate states.

11.3 ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη

The relationship between ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη is more complex:

• Both can involve rules, teaching, and rational justification.
• τέχνη is oriented toward production or action, whereas ἐπιστήμη concerns what is the case (often necessary truths).
• In some accounts, τέχνη is subordinated to ἐπιστήμη because it relies on more theoretical insight.
• In others, especially in practical contexts, τέχνη is valued for its effectiveness despite lacking the formal structure of a science.

11.4 Overlaps and Hybrid Cases

Certain disciplines—such as medicine, rhetoric, or navigation—are variably classified as ἐπιστήμη or τέχνη depending on the author and criteria employed. This ambiguity has led scholars to discuss:

• whether practical fields can attain the status of ἐπιστήμη,
• whether ἐπιστήμη without corresponding τέχνη is incomplete,
• and how social recognition of expertise interacts with philosophical definitions.

These comparisons help clarify what is distinctive about ἐπιστήμη while situating it among neighboring modes of understanding and practice.

12. Conceptual Analysis: Criteria and Structure of ἐπιστήμη

12.1 Core Criteria

Across many historical accounts, ἐπιστήμη is marked by several recurring criteria, though their exact formulation varies:

Not all thinkers insist on every criterion, and some broaden ἐπιστήμη to include secure knowledge of contingent matters.

12.2 Internal Structure

Aristotelian and scholastic traditions in particular propose an articulated structure for ἐπιστήμη:

• First principles (axioms, definitions) known by intuition or higher cognition.
• Derived theorems obtained by demonstrative inference.
• Organizational unity, where propositions are arranged within a domain by subject-matter and explanatory relations.

This model underpins the idea that ἐπιστήμη is more than a collection of true beliefs; it is an ordered system with explanatory architecture.

12.3 Psychological and Virtue-Theoretic Aspects

Some authors, notably Aristotle, frame ἐπιστήμη as an intellectual virtue (hexis). It involves:

• a disposition to respond correctly to evidence and reasons,
• a capacity to teach and learn systematically,
• integration with other rational excellences (νοῦς, σοφία, φρόνησις).

Later virtue-epistemological approaches draw on such ideas, though with differing emphases and without always preserving strict ancient conditions (e.g., necessity).

12.4 Idealization and Attainability

Interpreters debate whether ἐπιστήμη is:

• an ideal rarely achieved (e.g., reserved for sages),
• or a realistic goal of human inquiry.

Some ancient schools, especially Skeptics, treat strong definitions of ἐπιστήμη as unattainable, thereby questioning its usefulness as a standard. Others accept its demanding nature as a regulative ideal guiding inquiry and education.

13. Translation Challenges and Interpretive Debates

13.1 Competing Renderings

Translators of ἐπιστήμη face several competing English options:

No single term captures all nuances across authors and periods. Many scholars therefore retain the Greek episteme in specialized discussions.

13.2 Context-Sensitivity

The appropriate translation often depends on context:

• In Plato’s metaphysical passages, “knowledge” or “understanding” of Forms may be preferred.
• In Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, “scientific knowledge” or “science” may better convey the demonstrative ideal.
• In medical or rhetorical texts, “expertise” or “technical knowledge” might be more accurate.

Interpreters disagree on how strictly to differentiate ἐπιστήμη from nearby terms; some favor consistent renderings, others prioritize flexibility.

13.3 Normative Strength and Fallibilism

A major debate concerns the normative strength of ἐπιστήμη. Many influential translations and commentaries assume:

• infallibility,
• knowledge of necessary truths,
• exclusion of revision.

Others argue that in some contexts, ἐπιστήμη may be compatible with corrigibility or with knowledge of contingent matters, especially in ethical and practical domains. This affects how ἐπιστήμη is mapped onto modern categories like “justified true belief,” “knowledge-how,” or “scientific theory.”

13.4 Foucault’s épistémè

Foucault’s épistémè introduces further complexity. Rendering it simply as “episteme” risks conflation with earlier senses. Translators and commentators variously emphasize:

• “discursive formation,”
• “knowledge configuration,”
• “historical a priori.”

Debates focus on how far Foucault’s usage should be seen as continuous with, or deliberately divergent from, classical ἐπιστήμη, and whether it justifies a distinct technical term in translation.

14. Influence on the Concept of ‘Science’ in the West

14.1 From ἐπιστήμη to scientia to “science”

The conceptual trajectory from ἐπιστήμη to modern “science” proceeds largely through Latin scientia:

Aristotle’s model of demonstrative ἐπιστήμη provided a template for what it meant to be a genuine “science” (e.g., geometry, astronomy). Medieval universities institutionalized this in curricula and disciplinary divisions.

14.2 Methodological Ideals

Key aspects of ancient ἐπιστήμη influenced later conceptions:

• Systematicity: sciences as structured bodies of propositions.
• Explanatory focus: search for causes and laws.
• Teachability: emphasis on method and demonstrable proofs.

Early modern scientists both adopted and transformed these ideals. For instance, mathematical physics retained the aspiration to deduction from principles, while experimental methods introduced new forms of justification not fully anticipated in Aristotelian accounts.

14.3 Reassessment of Necessity and Certainty

As natural philosophy developed, the demand that scientific knowledge track necessary truths was questioned. Probabilistic reasoning, hypothetical modeling, and empirical testing became central. Scholars debate:

• whether this marks a break with the ἐπιστήμη/ scientia tradition,
• or a reinterpretation of its core aim as reliable, systematic understanding rather than strict necessity.

Nonetheless, the prestige of “science” as a normatively privileged mode of knowing owes much to the earlier esteem in which ἐπιστήμη/ scientia had been held.

14.4 Semantic Narrowing of “Science”

In many modern languages, “science” narrows to mean primarily natural and sometimes social sciences, leaving humanities and philosophy outside its scope. Ancient ἐπιστήμη, by contrast, readily included mathematics, metaphysics, and often ethics or politics as sciences. This shift has prompted historical and philosophical inquiries into how far contemporary distinctions reflect or distort the older ideal of ἐπιστήμη.

15. Legacy and Historical Significance of ἐπιστήμη

15.1 Enduring Conceptual Framework

The notion of ἐπιστήμη has provided a long-lasting framework for thinking about:

• what qualifies as genuine knowledge,
• how knowledge should be structured,
• and how it differs from belief, opinion, or skill.

Even when later thinkers reject specific ancient conditions (e.g., infallibility, necessity), they often do so by contrasting their views with an ideal remarkably similar to ἐπιστήμη.

15.2 Impact on Educational and Institutional Forms

Educational systems from antiquity through the medieval universities and beyond have been shaped by the idea of distinct sciences or disciplines, each with its own subject-matter and methods. This disciplinary architecture traces in part to Aristotelian and scholastic elaborations of ἐπιστήμη/ scientia. Modern research universities, with faculties organized by “sciences” and “arts,” reflect this legacy, even as their content and methods have changed.

15.3 Influence on Epistemological Debates

Philosophical debates about knowledge—its definition, sources, and limits—frequently revisit themes first articulated around ἐπιστήμη: the relation between knowing and explaining, the role of first principles, the contrast between theoretical and practical understanding, and the challenge of skepticism. Contemporary virtue epistemology, foundationalism, and discussions of scientific explanation all engage, directly or indirectly, with lines of thought shaped by this concept.

15.4 Reinterpretation in Contemporary Theory

Modern uses of derivatives such as epistemic and epistemology, and Foucault’s distinct notion of épistémè, show how the term continues to be reinterpreted. It now functions both as:

• a historical subject of study (how ancient philosophers conceived knowledge),
• and a resource for analyzing current practices and institutions of knowing.

The historical significance of ἐπιστήμη thus lies not only in its original contexts but also in its capacity to frame ongoing reflection on knowledge, justification, and the organization of inquiry.