meaning
English “meaning” derives from Middle English “mening/menynge,” from Old English mǣnan (“to mean, to intend, to signify”), related to Proto-Germanic mainijaną (“to have in mind, to intend”). It is cognate with German “meinen” (to think, mean) and Dutch “menen.” Philosophical reflection on “meaning” overlaps with Latin significatio (signification) and sensus (sense), and Greek σημασία (sēmasia, indication, signification) and λόγος (logos, word, account, rational structure).
At a Glance
- Origin
- Old English (Germanic); developed in modern analytic philosophy in English but with roots in Latin significationis and Greek σημασία
- Semantic Field
- Old English *mǣnan* (to mean, intend), German “meinen” (to opine, mean), Dutch “menen” (to mean), Latin *significatio* (signification), *sensus* (sense), *intentio* (aim, intention), Greek *σημασία* (signification), *σημαίνειν* (to signify), *λόγος* (word, reason), French “sens” (sense, meaning), “signification,” and related English terms “sense,” “significance,” “import,” “intention,” “reference,” “signification,” “purpose.”
“Meaning” fuses several distinct but historically intertwined notions: psychological intention (what a speaker means), linguistic content (the sense of an expression), reference (what it is about), and broader significance or purpose (the meaning of life, the meaning of an event). Many languages split these dimensions across different terms (e.g., French “sens” vs. “signification,” German “Bedeutung” vs. “Sinn,” Latin *sensus* vs. *significatio*), so any translation risks flattening nuances. Philosophically, technical distinctions (sense/reference, use/meaning, content/force) seldom map one-to-one across traditions, making it difficult to preserve the exact theoretical role of “meaning” when translating between, for instance, Anglo-American analytic, German idealist, and classical Greek vocabularies.
In early Germanic and Old English usage, to ‘mean’ (*mǣnan*) primarily indicated intending or having in mind, and secondarily signifying or expressing something; there was no sharp distinction between mental intending and linguistic signification. Medieval Latin distinguished *intentio* (mental aim) from *significatio* (what a word stands for), while everyday European vernaculars tended to use a single term for both ‘sense’ and ‘importance’ (e.g., French “sens”). Pre-philosophical religious and mythic discourse often treated meaning in terms of divine messages or symbolic significance of events and omens, rather than as a technical property of language.
With classical Greek philosophy, reflection on language introduced notions like *logos* (word, reason) and *onoma*/*rhema* distinctions, and later Stoic theories of the *lekton* as the sayable or meaning associated with an utterance. Scholastic logicians further refined talk of signification, supposition, and intentio. The modern crystallization of “meaning” as a central philosophical category occurs in nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy of language and logic: Frege’s distinction between sense and reference, Russell’s theory of descriptions, and Wittgenstein’s picture theory and later use-theory decisively shaped analytic debates. Parallel continental developments, especially in phenomenology and hermeneutics, located “meaning” in intentional experience, interpretive horizons, and historical lifeworlds, shifting attention from isolated sentences to texts, actions, and human existence itself.
Contemporary usage of “meaning” spans at least three major domains: (1) semantic meaning—what words, sentences, and symbols express, often analyzed via truth-conditions, inferential roles, or information; (2) speaker meaning—what a speaker intends to communicate in a concrete context, central to pragmatics and Gricean theories; and (3) existential or life meaning—the significance, purpose, or value structure of a person’s life or a historical event. In analytic philosophy, “meaning” is now carefully disambiguated into sense, reference, content, force, and use, while cognitive science and linguistics treat meaning in terms of mental representation, conceptual structures, and embodied or inferential models. In everyday discourse, however, these strands recombine, so talk of “the meaning of a word,” “the meaning of a law,” and “the meaning of life” often trades on different, only loosely related, underlying conceptions.
1. Introduction
Philosophers, linguists, theologians, psychologists, and ordinary speakers all use the word “meaning”, yet they often refer to quite different phenomena. In some contexts, “meaning” concerns the content of words and sentences; in others, it denotes a speaker’s intention, the reference of an expression, the interpretation of texts and actions, or the significance and purpose of a human life. This entry surveys how these strands have been historically distinguished and theoretically systematized.
Modern discussions typically separate at least three broad domains:
| Domain | Typical Questions | Disciplines |
|---|---|---|
| Linguistic/semantic meaning | What does this word/sentence mean? How do signs relate to things? | Philosophy of language, linguistics, logic, semiotics |
| Pragmatic/speaker meaning | What did the speaker mean here? How does context shape understanding? | Pragmatics, speech-act theory, sociolinguistics |
| Existential/life meaning | What is the meaning of life or of this event? | Ethics, existentialism, theology, psychology |
Historically, these domains were not sharply distinguished. Ancient and medieval authors often treated signification, truth, and understanding together. Only in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries did highly technical debates crystalize around such contrasts as sense vs. reference, semantics vs. pragmatics, and linguistic vs. existential meaning.
The entry follows this development: from the linguistic and philological roots of “meaning,” through classical and medieval theories of signification, the rise of analytic approaches (Frege, Wittgenstein, pragmatism, formal semantics), and continental traditions (phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism), to contemporary questions about translation, truth, interpretation, and the applications of meaning in law, ethics, and aesthetics.
Throughout, the focus remains on how different traditions have conceptualized what it is for something—a sign, an action, a life—to have meaning, and on the methods they propose for identifying, analyzing, or contesting such meaning.
2. Etymology and Linguistic Origins
The English term “meaning” traces back to Old English and wider Germanic roots, in which a single lexical family covered both intending and signifying.
Germanic and Old English Roots
Old English *mǣnan meant “to mean, to intend, to signify,” linked to Proto-Germanic *mainijaną (“to have in mind, to intend”). Cognates include:
| Language | Form | Core Sense |
|---|---|---|
| Old English | mǣnan | to mean, intend, lament |
| German | meinen | to think, be of the opinion, mean |
| Dutch | menen | to mean, intend |
| Old Norse | mæna | to mean, signify (attested contextually) |
In Middle English, “mening/menynge” denoted both “intention” and “sense” of words, a duality that persisted into Modern English and still underlies expressions like “what do you mean?” (intention) vs. “the meaning of the word” (linguistic content).
Latin and Greek Backgrounds
Scholastic and humanist philosophy drew on Latin and Greek terms that partially overlap with “meaning”:
| Tradition | Key Terms | Typical Range |
|---|---|---|
| Latin | significatio, sensus, intentio | sign-meaning; sense; mental aim |
| Greek | sēmasia, sēmainein, logos | signification; to signify; word/reason |
While English translators often render these with “meaning,” each has its own historical role. For example, significatio is more narrowly about what a word stands for, whereas sensus covers sense, feeling, and understanding.
Modern European Developments
Modern European languages distribute the semantic field differently:
| Language | Main Terms | Rough Distinctions |
|---|---|---|
| German | Bedeutung, Sinn | reference/importance vs. sense |
| French | sens, signification | sense/direction vs. lexical signification |
| Italian | significato, senso | word-meaning vs. sense, import |
These distinctions informed twentieth‑century technical usage (e.g., Frege’s Sinn/Bedeutung), even as ordinary speech continues to oscillate between intention, content, and importance under single words akin to “meaning.”
3. Semantic Field and Related Terms
The semantic field of “meaning” spans several partially overlapping notions. Philosophical debates often turn on carefully distinguishing these.
Core Members of the Field
| Term | Typical Philosophical Use | Relation to “Meaning” |
|---|---|---|
| Sense | Mode of presentation, conceptual content, or inferential role of an expression | One dimension of meaning, especially in Fregean and analytic frameworks |
| Reference | The object(s) an expression stands for | Often treated as distinct from, but determined by, meaning or sense |
| Signification | What a sign signifies or denotes | Traditional and semiotic counterpart of “meaning” |
| Use | Pattern of deployment of expressions in practice | Proposed as the basis of meaning (esp. Wittgenstein) |
| Intention / Intentionality | Mental directedness toward objects or contents | Sometimes regarded as the psychological ground of meaning |
| Significance / Import | Broader importance or impact of an event, work, or life | Closer to existential or evaluative meaning |
Distinguishing Nearby Notions
Several contrasts structure the field:
- Linguistic vs. speaker meaning: The conventional content of expressions vs. what a particular speaker intends to convey on a given occasion.
- Narrow vs. broad meaning: For some theorists, “meaning” refers narrowly to truth-conditional or reference-determining content; for others, it includes pragmatic implications, emotional coloring, and cultural associations.
- Semantic vs. existential meaning: Many languages use the same word for “meaning of a term” and “meaning of life”; philosophers often treat these as distinct, though sometimes analogically related.
Technical Specializations
Subfields refine the general notion:
| Discipline | Preferred Terms | Focus |
|---|---|---|
| Formal semantics | proposition, truth-conditions, intension | Logical structure of sentence meaning |
| Semiotics | sign, object, interpretant, code | Systems of signs across media and culture |
| Hermeneutics | sense, horizon, understanding | Meaning as uncovered through interpretation |
| Psychology | mental representation, schema | Meaning as cognitive structure or association |
Because everyday language does not sharply separate these, careful philosophical work on “meaning” typically begins by specifying which aspect—sense, reference, use, intention, or significance—is under consideration.
4. Pre-Philosophical and Everyday Usage
Before technical theories, “meaning” functioned as an everyday term linking what people have in mind, what signs convey, and why things matter.
Intention and Communication
In ordinary English, to ask “What do you mean?” typically targets a speaker’s intention. This reflects the older sense of “mean” as “intend” or “have in mind.” Everyday usage therefore tends to intertwine:
- The psychological state of the speaker (what they meant to say)
- The content apparently expressed (what the words mean)
- The effect on the hearer (what the message means to them)
These can diverge; much ordinary dispute about “meaning” involves sorting out which is at issue.
Signs, Omens, and Symbolism
Pre‑philosophical cultures often treated natural or ritual phenomena as meaningful signs:
| Domain | Example | Kind of “Meaning” Attributed |
|---|---|---|
| Omens | Comets, eclipses | Portents of future events |
| Dreams | Symbolic images | Messages from gods or unconscious |
| Rituals | Sacrifices, festivals | Expression of communal or sacred truths |
Here “meaning” aligns with symbolic or divine communication, not just linguistic content. Events “mean” something in that they are interpreted as messages, warnings, or blessings.
Everyday Evaluative Talk
In contemporary everyday speech, “meaning” frequently denotes personal or social significance:
- “This job has no meaning for me.”
- “Her gesture really meant a lot.”
Such usage blends cognitive, emotional, and normative dimensions. It concerns importance and value, not merely descriptive content. While philosophers often separate this existential sense from linguistic meaning, lay discourse typically treats them as continuous: what something “means” can be both what it says and what it is worth.
Polysemy and Practical Ambiguity
Because “meaning” naturally covers intention, signification, and significance, everyday contexts are often ambiguous. People switch between:
- Clarifying messages (“What does this sign mean?”)
- Probing motives (“What do you mean by that?”)
- Assessing importance (“Does it really mean anything?”)
Later theoretical distinctions (semantic vs. pragmatic, linguistic vs. existential) can be seen as attempts to bring analytic order to this rich but diffuse pre‑philosophical usage.
5. Classical and Medieval Theories of Signification
Classical and medieval thinkers developed systematic accounts of how words, thoughts, and things are related, typically under the heading of signification rather than “meaning” in the modern sense.
Classical Greek Approaches
In Greek philosophy, debates about names (onoma) and speech (logos) raised questions about correctness and signification.
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Plato in the Cratylus examined whether names are naturally or conventionally correct, implying competing views about how linguistic items get their significance.
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Aristotle in De Interpretatione proposed a tripartite structure:
“Spoken words are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds.”
— Aristotle, De Interpretatione 16a3–4
Here, vocal sounds signify mental affections, which in turn are likenesses of external things. Signification thus runs from sounds to thoughts to objects.
The Stoics introduced the notion of the lekton (“sayable”): an incorporeal entity expressed by an utterance and bearing truth or falsity. Many historians see this as an early analogue of a propositional meaning.
Latin and Scholastic Theories
Medieval logicians and theologians, drawing on Aristotle and Augustine, refined signification into a technical apparatus.
Key distinctions included:
| Term | Role in Signification |
|---|---|
| Signum (sign) | Anything that represents something else to a knower |
| Significatio | Relation by which a term brings an object or concept to mind |
| Suppositio | How a term stands for its referent in a given context (e.g. personal vs. simple supposition) |
| Intentio | Mental concept or aim, often seen as the immediate object of thought |
Thomas Aquinas, for instance, held that spoken words signify mental concepts (first intentions), which in turn are likenesses of things. William of Ockham developed a terminist logic in which terms in mental language have natural signification, while spoken and written terms have conventional signification.
Features of Medieval Accounts
- Hierarchical mediation: Signification often proceeds from external signs to internal concepts to external things.
- Truth and logic: Theories of signification were tightly linked to syllogistic logic and theories of proposition and truth.
- Ontological commitments: Disputes over universals (realism vs. nominalism) partly turned on what terms like “humanity” signify—real shared natures, concepts, or merely names.
These frameworks laid much of the conceptual groundwork for later distinctions between sense, reference, and proposition, even though the vocabulary of “meaning” was not yet central.
6. Frege and the Sense–Reference Distinction
Gottlob Frege is widely credited with introducing a rigorous distinction between two key dimensions of what is now called meaning: Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (reference).
The Puzzle Motivating the Distinction
Frege’s classic 1892 paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung addressed identity statements such as:
- “The morning star is the evening star.”
Both expressions refer (Bedeutung) to the same object (the planet Venus), yet the statement is informative, unlike “The morning star is the morning star.” Frege concluded that expressions must have, in addition to reference, a sense—a particular mode of presentation of the referent.
Sense (Sinn)
- Sense is the way in which a referent is given to thought.
- It is an objective, shareable content, not a private mental image.
- Different expressions can have the same reference but different senses (e.g., “the author of Waverley” vs. “the first major English-language logician”).
For Frege, the sense of a complete sentence is a thought (Gedanke)—a truth-apt content.
Reference (Bedeutung)
- Reference is the object, individual, or truth-value that an expression stands for.
- Proper names refer to objects; predicates to concepts; whole sentences to truth-values (the True or the False).
- Reference grounds the connection between language and truth: the meaning of a sentence is tied to what makes it true or false.
Key Distinctions and Legacy
| Level | Sense | Reference |
|---|---|---|
| Name | Mode of presentation of an object | The object itself |
| Predicate | Mode of presentation of a concept | The concept (as a function) |
| Sentence | Thought (proposition) | Truth-value (True/False) |
Frege also distinguished semantic value from psychological associations, arguing that meaning must be treated as a logical, not mental, entity to support objective reasoning.
Subsequent analytic philosophy of language—Russell’s theories, early analytic semantics, and formal logic—largely developed within or in reaction to this Fregean framework, making the sense–reference distinction a foundational tool for later debates about meaning, reference, and content.
7. Wittgenstein and the Use Theory of Meaning
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work presents two influential, contrasting pictures of meaning: the picture theory of his early period and the use theory of his later period. The latter has been especially important for reorienting discussions of meaning toward practice and social context.
From Picture Theory to Use
In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), Wittgenstein held that a proposition is a picture of a possible state of affairs:
“The proposition is a picture of reality.”
— Wittgenstein, Tractatus 4.01
Here, meaning is tied to a proposition’s logical form and its capacity to depict a configuration of objects. This view fits with truth-conditional approaches but leaves little room for the diversity of ordinary language.
In his later Philosophical Investigations (1953), Wittgenstein criticized his earlier theory and advanced the slogan:
“For a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’ … the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”
— Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §43
Language-Games and Forms of Life
The later view emphasizes:
- Language-games: Rule-governed practices in which words are used (e.g., ordering, greeting, storytelling, praying).
- Forms of life: The broader patterns of human activity and culture that give language-games their point.
On this approach, to understand a word’s meaning is to grasp how it functions within these activities—what counts as correct use, what responses are appropriate, and how it connects with other practices.
Family Resemblance and Anti-Essentialism
Wittgenstein suggested that many concepts (such as “game”) lack strict definitions but are united by family resemblances. Meaning is thereby seen less as a matter of fixed abstract entities and more as a network of overlapping uses.
Consequences for Theories of Meaning
The use theory has been interpreted as:
| Emphasis | Implication for Meaning |
|---|---|
| Anti-mentalism | Meaning is not primarily a private mental item but a public practice |
| Anti-essentialism | No single essence of meaning; different language-games support different criteria |
| Pragmatic orientation | Understanding meaning requires attending to what people do with words |
This shift influenced later developments in ordinary language philosophy, pragmatics, and social theories of language, many of which adopt, adapt, or contest Wittgenstein’s identification of meaning with use.
8. Pragmatist and Semiotic Approaches
Pragmatist and semiotic traditions analyze meaning in terms of practical effects, actions, and sign processes, often broadening the field beyond language to include images, gestures, and cultural codes.
Classical Pragmatism
In American pragmatism, meaning is closely tied to practice and consequences.
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Charles Sanders Peirce formulated the pragmatic maxim:
“Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”
— Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878)
Meaning is what makes a practical difference to reasoning and action.
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William James applied this to beliefs more broadly, treating the meaning of ideas as the experiential and practical consequences they involve for human life.
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John Dewey linked meaning to habit, inquiry, and problem-solving within social contexts.
Peircean Semiotics
Peirce also developed a triadic theory of signs:
| Element | Role |
|---|---|
| Sign (representamen) | The form which stands for something |
| Object | What the sign stands for |
| Interpretant | The understanding or response the sign produces |
Meaning emerges through semiosis, the ongoing process in which signs generate interpretants, which may themselves function as further signs. This model extends beyond human language to include scientific diagrams, legal symbols, and natural signs.
Saussurean and Structuralist Semiotics
Independently, Ferdinand de Saussure framed the sign as a signifier–signified pair:
- Signifier: sound-image or written mark
- Signified: concept
For Saussure, the relation is arbitrary and embedded in a system of differences; meaning arises from contrast within a language, not from intrinsic ties to things.
Structuralist and post-structuralist semioticians (e.g., Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco) expanded this framework to cultural phenomena, treating fashion, advertisements, and myths as systems of signs.
Shared Themes
Despite differences, pragmatist and semiotic approaches commonly:
- Emphasize relations and effects rather than standalone entities
- Treat meaning as dynamic and processual
- Extend “meaning” beyond sentences to practices, codes, and sign systems in culture and communication
They thus provide a broad, relational perspective on meaning, complementary to more narrowly logical or mentalistic accounts.
9. Analytic Debates: Meaning, Reference, and Content
Within analytic philosophy, the Fregean framework gave rise to intensive debates over how to characterize meaning, how it relates to reference, and what counts as content.
Descriptivism and Direct Reference
A central issue concerns how names and other referring expressions get their reference.
- Descriptivist theories (following Frege and Russell) hold that a name’s meaning is given by a description or cluster of descriptions associated with it; reference is fixed via the satisfaction of that description.
- Direct reference theories (e.g., Saul Kripke, David Kaplan) argue that proper names and some indexicals refer without descriptive mediation. Kripke introduced the idea of rigid designators, which refer to the same object in all possible worlds where it exists.
| View | Role of Meaning | Relation to Reference |
|---|---|---|
| Descriptivism | Meaning as descriptive content | Reference determined via description |
| Direct Reference | Minimal or thin sense | Meaning partly constituted by referent itself |
Internalism vs. Externalism about Content
Debates over content ask whether meaning is determined by factors inside the head or by environmental and social conditions.
- Internalists emphasize cognitive or conceptual structures accessible to the individual.
- Externalists (e.g., Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge) argue that meanings depend on causal or social relations to the environment. Putnam’s “Twin Earth” thought experiment suggests that two individuals with identical mental states can mean different things by “water” if they inhabit different chemical environments.
Truth-Conditional and Inferential Theories
Analytic philosophers also dispute how to model sentence meaning:
- Truth-conditional theories (Donald Davidson, Montague grammar) treat meaning as given by truth-conditions, often formalized via possible worlds semantics.
- Inferential role semantics (e.g., Wilfrid Sellars, Robert Brandom) analyze meaning in terms of a term’s place in a network of inferences rather than directly in terms of truth-conditions.
Skepticism and Indeterminacy
Some analytic philosophers question whether “meaning” as traditionally conceived is coherent:
- W.V.O. Quine argued for the indeterminacy of translation and inscrutability of reference, suggesting that there may be no fact of the matter about which of many empirically adequate translation schemes is correct.
- Donald Davidson criticized reified meanings while still retaining a role for truth-conditional theories.
These debates shape contemporary conceptions of semantic content, the division between semantics and pragmatics, and the extent to which meaning is determinate, public, and formalizable.
10. Phenomenological and Hermeneutic Conceptions
Phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions shift attention from abstract semantic entities to lived experience, understanding, and interpretation.
Husserl: Intentional Sense (Sinn)
Edmund Husserl treated consciousness as inherently intentional—always of or about something. He distinguished:
- Noesis: the act of consciousness (judging, imagining, etc.)
- Noema: the sense (Sinn) or intended object as experienced
For Husserl, meaning is bound up with the noematic sense through which an object is given in intuition and thought. This sense is ideal and shareable, grounding the possibility of objective knowledge.
Heidegger: Meaning and Being-in-the-World
Martin Heidegger reinterpreted meaning as a structural feature of Dasein’s (human existence’s) being-in-the-world.
“Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself.”
— Heidegger, Being and Time §31
Key points:
- Meaning (Sinn) is not primarily a property of sentences but of worldly involvement.
- Tools, for example, are understood through their “in-order-to” relations (a hammer is for hammering), embedded in a network of equipmental totality.
- Understanding is existential: Dasein always already operates within a horizon of significance that makes entities intelligible.
Hermeneutics: Interpretation and Understanding
Hermeneutic thinkers extend the concern with meaning to texts, history, and culture.
- Hans-Georg Gadamer in Truth and Method presents understanding as a “fusion of horizons” between interpreter and text, where meaning emerges through a dialogical process shaped by tradition.
- Paul Ricoeur explores how meaning is sedimented in texts and symbols, requiring interpretation to be re-appropriated.
| Thinker | Focus | Conception of Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Husserl | Intentional consciousness | Noematic sense of lived experience |
| Heidegger | Being-in-the-world | Structural significance of practices and relations |
| Gadamer | Historical understanding | Event of interpretation within tradition |
| Ricoeur | Texts and symbols | Multi-layered, interpretable significance |
Common Themes
Across phenomenology and hermeneutics, meaning is:
- Contextual: bound to lifeworlds, history, and traditions
- Dynamic: realized in acts of understanding and interpretation
- Non-reductive: not exhausted by reference or truth-conditions
These conceptions complement, and sometimes challenge, more formal or mentalistic accounts by emphasizing how meaning is experienced and disclosed.
11. Meaning in Pragmatics and Speech-Act Theory
Pragmatics and speech-act theory highlight the context-sensitive, action-oriented dimensions of meaning that go beyond conventional sentence content.
Gricean Speaker Meaning and Implicature
H.P. Grice distinguished what words mean (sentence meaning) from what a speaker means in a particular context.
He characterized speaker meaning broadly as:
A speaker meant something by an utterance if they intended to induce a response in an audience by means of the audience’s recognition of that very intention.
— Paraphrased from Grice, “Meaning” (1957)
Grice also introduced conversational implicature:
- Utterances often convey meanings beyond their literal content, guided by assumptions about cooperation (e.g., being informative, truthful, relevant).
- For example, “Some of the guests arrived” can implicate “not all,” without that being part of the literal meaning.
Semantics–Pragmatics Distinction
Pragmatics studies aspects of meaning that depend on context, speaker intentions, and social norms, including:
| Phenomenon | Description |
|---|---|
| Deixis | Context-dependent terms like “I,” “here,” “now” |
| Presupposition | Background assumptions taken for granted |
| Implicature | Indirectly communicated content |
| Speech-act force | Whether an utterance is a request, promise, assertion, etc. |
Debates continue over how sharply semantics (conventional, context-insensitive content) can be separated from pragmatics, with some theorists proposing contextualist or dynamic models that integrate them more closely.
Speech-Act Theory
J.L. Austin and John Searle analyzed utterances as actions:
- Locutionary act: producing meaningful expressions
- Illocutionary act: the act performed in saying something (asserting, promising, ordering)
- Perlocutionary act: the effects produced by saying something (persuading, frightening)
For speech-act theorists, meaning involves not only what is said, but what is done by saying it. Conditions such as uptake, authority, and conventional procedures help determine whether an illocutionary act is successfully performed.
This action-oriented perspective has influenced analyses of legal language, institutional facts, and social norms, where meaning is intertwined with norm-governed practices.
12. Cognitive and Embodied Theories of Meaning
Cognitive and embodied approaches reinterpret meaning as a feature of mental and bodily systems, often informed by psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive linguistics.
Representational and Conceptual Theories
In mainstream cognitive science, meaning is frequently identified with mental representation:
- Words and sentences are linked to concepts, schemas, or frames stored in memory.
- Understanding meaning involves activating these structures and integrating them with perceptual input.
Prototype theory (Eleanor Rosch) and frame semantics (Charles Fillmore) suggest that word meanings are organized around typical examples and structured knowledge frames rather than strict necessary and sufficient conditions.
Embodied and Enactive Views
Embodied cognition theorists argue that meaning is grounded in sensorimotor experience:
“Our concepts are not abstract and amodal; they are grounded in the body’s interactions with the world.”
— Lakoff & Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh (1999), paraphrased
Key themes include:
- Image schemas: recurrent bodily patterns (e.g., container, path) underlying abstract meanings.
- Metaphor: systematic mappings from concrete domains (space, movement) to abstract domains (time, emotion), shaping conceptual structure.
- Enactivism: meaning arises from the active engagement of organisms with their environment, not from internal representations alone.
Cognitive Semantics and Usage-Based Models
Cognitive linguistics treats meaning as central to grammar:
- Grammar is seen as an extension of symbolic pairings between form and conceptual content.
- Usage-based models view linguistic meaning as emerging from patterns of actual use, reinforced by cognitive processes like analogy and categorization.
| Approach | Core Idea of Meaning |
|---|---|
| Classical representational | Internal symbols and rules |
| Prototype/frames | Radial categories, structured knowledge |
| Embodied | Sensorimotor and affective grounding |
| Enactive | Meaning as enacted in organism–environment coupling |
Relations to Philosophical Debates
These theories intersect with philosophical questions about:
- Naturalizing meaning (linking it to neural and cognitive mechanisms)
- The role of body and environment in fixing content
- The balance between rule-based and usage-based accounts of meaning
While often empirically oriented, cognitive and embodied theories contribute alternative models of how meanings are represented, learned, and used.
13. Existential and Spiritual Uses: Meaning of Life
Beyond language and cognition, “meaning” plays a central role in discussions of life’s significance, purpose, and value. This domain, though conceptually distinct from linguistic meaning, has often been informed by philosophical reflections on interpretation and understanding.
Existentialist Perspectives
Existentialist thinkers address meaning against the background of freedom, finitude, and absurdity.
- Albert Camus characterized the human condition as confronting an “absurd” gap between the search for meaning and a seemingly indifferent universe. For Camus, recognizing absurdity does not resolve the question of meaning but reframes it around rebellion and lucidity.
- Jean-Paul Sartre argued that humans are “condemned to be free,” with no pre-given essence or purpose. Meaning is seen as something that must be created through choices and projects, though critics debate whether Sartre also presupposes shared values or structures.
Phenomenological-Existential Approaches
Building on phenomenology, some authors emphasize the structures of meaningfulness in lived experience.
- Heidegger analyzed the “meaning of Being” and suggested that individual lives gain significance through authentic engagement with one’s own mortality and possibilities.
- Later existential phenomenology explores how narrative, care, and relations to others shape the meaningfulness of a life.
Logotherapy and Psychological Accounts
In psychology, Viktor Frankl developed logotherapy, positing a “will to meaning” as a primary human motivation.
“Man’s search for meaning is the primary motivation in his life.”
— Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (1946)
Frankl argued that meaning is often discovered through work, love, and suffering, rather than arbitrarily invented. Empirical research in positive psychology and psychiatry investigates meaning in life as a factor in well-being, resilience, and mental health.
Religious and Spiritual Conceptions
Religious traditions frequently ground life’s meaning in relations to the divine, cosmic order, or transcendent goals:
| Tradition | Source of Meaning |
|---|---|
| Monotheistic (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) | God’s will, covenant, salvation, worship |
| Hindu and Buddhist traditions | Dharma, liberation (moksha, nirvana), karmic order |
| Various spiritualities | Harmony with nature, cosmic consciousness, enlightenment |
These views commonly interpret individual lives within larger metaphysical narratives.
Intersections and Divergences
Philosophical discussions differentiate between:
- Subjective versus objective accounts of life’s meaning (dependence on individual attitudes vs. independent standards)
- Created versus discovered meaning
- Meaning as tied to happiness, virtue, or achievement vs. meaning as potentially compatible with suffering and tragedy
While distinct from semantic questions about words, these existential and spiritual uses continue to influence broader intuitions about what it is for anything—a life, an event, a work—to “have meaning.”
14. Cross-Linguistic and Translation Challenges
Because “meaning” amalgamates several dimensions—intention, signification, significance—translating it and its theoretical uses across languages poses persistent difficulties.
Divergent Lexical Partitions
Different languages distribute the semantic field of “meaning” across multiple terms.
| Language | Key Terms | Typical Distinctions |
|---|---|---|
| English | meaning, sense, significance | broad, partially overlapping |
| German | Bedeutung, Sinn | reference/importance vs. sense |
| French | sens, signification | sense/direction vs. lexical signification |
| Latin | sensus, significatio, intentio | sense/feeling; sign-meaning; mental aim |
| Japanese | 意味 (imi), 意義 (igi) | meaning/content vs. significance/value |
These partitions do not map neatly onto each other. For example, Frege’s technical Bedeutung is often translated as “reference,” though ordinary German Bedeutung also means “meaning” or “importance.” This can obscure how his terminology interacts with everyday usage.
Technical Terms and Conceptual Mismatches
Philosophical texts pose special translation challenges:
- Frege’s Sinn/Bedeutung vs. English “sense/meaning” or “sense/reference.”
- Wittgenstein’s Gebrauch (use) and Sprachspiel (language-game), where literal translations may miss nuances of practice and play.
- Greek logos, which can mean “word,” “reason,” “account,” or “rational structure,” lacks a single English equivalent.
Misalignments may lead to reinterpretation of theories when imported into new linguistic contexts, as seen in cross-fertilization between analytic and continental traditions.
Indeterminacy and Relativism
Theoretical debates also address whether meanings are fully translatable:
- Quine’s indeterminacy of translation argues that multiple incompatible translation schemes can fit the same behavioral data, suggesting that there is no unique, fact-of-the-matter mapping of meanings between languages.
- Some hermeneutic and post-structural thinkers emphasize untranslatability and semantic excess, holding that certain meanings are inextricably tied to linguistic and cultural contexts.
Practical Translation Strategies
Translators and scholars employ various strategies:
| Strategy | Example | Trade-offs |
|---|---|---|
| Calque or literal translation | “language-game” for Sprachspiel | Preserves form, may obscure connotations |
| Technical neologisms | “lekton,” “noema” left untranslated | Clarity within specialized discourse, barrier to lay readers |
| Contextual glossing | “Sinn (sense or meaningful structure)” | Greater explicitness, heavier text |
These challenges underscore that discussing “meaning” across languages often requires not only linguistic skill but also theoretical choices about which aspects—reference, sense, use, significance—are primary.
15. Meaning, Truth, and Interpretation
The relationship between meaning, truth, and interpretation lies at the heart of many philosophical projects, from formal semantics to hermeneutics.
Truth-Conditional Semantics
In analytic philosophy, one influential approach ties meaning closely to truth-conditions.
- According to this view, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know under what conditions it would be true.
- Donald Davidson proposed giving a Tarski-style truth theory for a language as a way of specifying sentence meanings.
| Concept | Role |
|---|---|
| Truth-conditions | Specify when a sentence is true |
| Meaning | Captured (or approximated) by those conditions |
| Reference | Contributes to determining truth-conditions |
Critics question whether all aspects of meaning—such as connotation, presupposition, or speech-act force—can be reduced to truth-conditions.
Deflationary and Redundancy Views
Some philosophers hold deflationary views of truth, suggesting that truth adds no substantial property beyond what is expressed by the sentence itself. This can weaken the idea that meaning is deeply grounded in an independently robust notion of truth.
Hermeneutic Approaches to Truth and Meaning
Hermeneutic thinkers connect meaning and truth through interpretive understanding rather than formal semantics.
- For Gadamer, truth in the humanities arises through the event of understanding a text or artwork; meaning is not fixed but is realized in historically situated acts of interpretation.
- Ricoeur distinguishes between the “sense” of a text (its structural meaning) and its “reference” (its world-projection), both accessed through interpretation.
Here, meaning is inseparable from interpretive practice; truth appears as disclosure or unconcealment rather than correspondence alone.
Interpretation and Underdetermination
Both analytic and continental traditions recognize that texts, utterances, and actions can be interpreted in multiple ways:
- In analytic pragmatics, context and speaker intentions help narrow down which proposition is expressed.
- In hermeneutics, tradition, prejudice (in a non-pejorative sense), and dialogical engagement shape which meanings are appropriated.
Debates arise over:
- Whether there is a single correct interpretation vs. multiple equally legitimate ones
- How far authorial intention, textual structure, and reader response should count in fixing meaning
These issues illustrate how meaning is often negotiated at the intersection of formal properties, truth-related standards, and interpretive practices.
16. Critiques of the Notion of Meaning
Various philosophical movements have challenged the coherence, usefulness, or centrality of “meaning” as a theoretical notion.
Quine and the Attack on Intensional Entities
W.V.O. Quine cast doubt on the idea of meanings as abstract entities:
- He criticized the distinction between analytic (true by meaning alone) and synthetic truths, arguing that no clear boundary could be drawn.
- His thesis of the indeterminacy of translation suggests that there may be no fact of the matter about which meanings are assigned by a language, undermining reified “meanings.”
Quine proposed focusing instead on behavioral evidence, stimulus meanings, and holistic theories of language use.
Behaviorist and Verificationist Skepticism
Logical positivists and some behaviorists treated talk of meaning as acceptable only when tied to verification conditions or observable behavior.
- The verification principle sought to eliminate metaphysical or theological statements as “meaningless” if they lacked empirical testability.
- Critics argue that this criterion itself seemed not empirically verifiable, raising questions about its status.
Ordinary Language and Use-Centered Critiques
Influenced by later Wittgenstein, some philosophers caution against hypostatizing “meaning”:
- They view philosophical problems about meaning as arising from misleading pictures—for example, treating meanings as inner objects corresponding to words.
- On this view, the task is to examine actual language practices, not to construct theories of hidden semantic entities.
Post-Structuralist and Deconstructionist Challenges
In post-structuralism and deconstruction, “meaning” is often portrayed as unstable or deferred:
- Jacques Derrida argued that meaning depends on systems of difference and is subject to “différance”—the interplay of differing and deferring—so that it never fully stabilizes.
- Structuralist and post-structuralist analyses suggest that signs gain value only within relational systems, where any element’s meaning can shift as the system changes.
Internal Critiques within Semantics and Pragmatics
Some contemporary theorists question:
- Whether there is a clear boundary between semantic and pragmatic meaning, given pervasive context-sensitivity.
- Whether “meaning” should remain a central explanatory term, or be replaced by more fine-grained notions such as information, cognitive role, or normative status.
These critiques do not eliminate talk of meaning in practice but highlight tensions in treating it as a single, unproblematic, or fundamental theoretical category.
17. Applications in Law, Ethics, and Aesthetics
The concept of meaning plays a pivotal role in applied domains where interpretation, normativity, and value are central.
Law: Interpreting Legal Texts and Acts
Legal theory grapples with what statutes, constitutions, and contracts mean.
Key debates include:
| Approach | Focus of Meaning |
|---|---|
| Textualism | Ordinary meaning of the legal text at the time of enactment |
| Intentionalism | Lawmakers’ or framers’ intended meaning |
| Purposivism | Underlying purpose or aim of the statute |
| Living constitutionalism | Evolving meaning shaped by contemporary values and practices |
Questions arise over whether legal meaning is closer to semantic content, speaker meaning, or institutional purpose, and how much weight should be given to precedent and interpretive practice.
Ethics: Meaning, Value, and Moral Language
In ethics, “meaning” can refer to both:
- The meaning of moral terms (e.g., “good,” “right”), central to metaethics.
- The meaningfulness of lives, actions, or projects, linked to value theory.
Metaethical theories differ in their accounts of moral meaning:
| Theory | View of Moral Meaning |
|---|---|
| Cognitivism | Moral statements express truth-apt propositions |
| Non-cognitivism | They express attitudes, prescriptions, or emotions rather than factual content |
| Error theory | Moral claims aim at truth but are systematically false |
Discussions of meaning in life intersect with ethical evaluations of what counts as a worthwhile or morally significant existence.
Aesthetics: Meaning in Art and Interpretation
In aesthetics, questions about meaning concern artworks, performances, and aesthetic experiences.
- Authorial intention: To what extent does an artist’s intended meaning fix the meaning of a work?
- Autonomy of the artwork: Some theories hold that works can have meanings independent of the artist’s intentions, discovered through critical interpretation.
- Audience and cultural context: Others emphasize the role of receivers and traditions in constituting meaning.
Competing interpretive approaches include:
| Approach | Source of Meaning |
|---|---|
| Intentionalism | Artist’s communicative intentions |
| Formalism | Internal structure and form of the work |
| Reader/receiver-response | Audience’s experience and interpretation |
| Contextualism | Historical, social, and political contexts |
Across law, ethics, and aesthetics, meaning is closely tied to norms, practices, and interpretive communities, demonstrating how semantic and hermeneutic issues intersect with practical reasoning.
18. Legacy and Historical Significance
The notion of meaning has functioned as a crossroads concept across philosophy, linguistics, theology, psychology, and cultural theory. Its historical trajectory reflects shifting priorities about language, mind, and human life.
Consolidation of a Central Philosophical Theme
From early reflections on names and signs in antiquity and the intricate medieval logics of signification, to Frege’s technical sense–reference distinction and Wittgenstein’s focus on use, meaning became a central organizing concept in twentieth-century philosophy.
- In analytic philosophy, meaning serves as the hinge for debates about reference, truth, modality, and mental content.
- In continental traditions, meaning is interwoven with themes of intentionality, interpretation, and existential significance.
Interdisciplinary Influence
Theoretical work on meaning has shaped:
| Field | Influence of Meaning-Theorizing |
|---|---|
| Linguistics | Development of formal semantics and pragmatics |
| Cognitive science | Models of conceptual representation and language processing |
| Semiotics and media studies | Analyses of cultural sign systems |
| Law and political theory | Doctrines of textual and constitutional interpretation |
| Literary and cultural studies | Hermeneutic and deconstructive approaches to texts |
These borrowings have often involved adapting philosophical notions of meaning to empirical or practical concerns.
Ongoing Reconfigurations
Later critiques—Quine’s indeterminacy, Wittgensteinian anti-essentialism, post-structuralist accounts of signification—have challenged static or reified pictures of meaning, leading to more pluralistic and dynamic conceptions.
Current research frequently:
- Integrates formal and pragmatic aspects of meaning.
- Explores embodied and enactive accounts that link meaning to bodily and environmental interaction.
- Reconsiders the relation between linguistic meaning and existential or narrative meaning in human lives.
The historical significance of “meaning” thus lies not in a single settled theory, but in its role as a rapidly evolving focal point through which diverse disciplines have sought to understand how signs, minds, actions, and lives can be said to be about something and to matter.
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@online{philopedia_meaning,
title = {meaning},
author = {Philopedia},
year = {2025},
url = {https://philopedia.com/terms/meaning/},
urldate = {December 10, 2025}
}Study Guide
Sense (Sinn)
The way an expression presents its referent—an objective, shareable mode of presentation or conceptual content that determines, but is distinct from, the referent itself.
Reference (Bedeutung in Frege’s technical use)
The object, individual, class, or truth-value that a linguistic expression stands for; one central but not exhaustive dimension of meaning.
Use (Wittgensteinian)
The pattern of practical employment of a word within language-games and forms of life; for later Wittgenstein, meaning is identified with this use rather than with a mental or abstract entity.
Pragmatic Meaning
The aspect of meaning that depends on speaker intentions, conversational context, norms of cooperation, and speech-act force, including implicature and presupposition.
Intentionality
The directedness of mental states toward objects, properties, or states of affairs; the ‘aboutness’ of thought and experience.
Truth-Conditional Meaning
The view that the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions under which it would be true, often captured via formal semantics or possible-worlds models.
Hermeneutics
The theory and practice of interpretation, initially of texts and scripture and later of actions and history, treating meaning as something disclosed in a historically situated process of understanding.
Indeterminacy of Translation
Quine’s thesis that multiple, equally adequate translation manuals can match the same behavioral evidence, undermining the idea of unique, determinate meanings across languages.
How does Frege’s distinction between Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (reference) solve the puzzle of informative identity statements, and what limitations does this solution have in light of later theories of direct reference?
In what ways does Wittgenstein’s later slogan ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’ challenge both mentalistic and purely referential theories of meaning?
Compare Grice’s notion of speaker meaning with the truth-conditional approach to sentence meaning. How do implicatures show that what is meant often exceeds what is said?
How do phenomenological and hermeneutic accounts shift the focus of meaning from sentences to lived experience, practices, and texts? Are these perspectives compatible with formal semantic approaches, or do they conflict?
What is Quine’s argument for the indeterminacy of translation, and how does it undermine the idea that there are unique, determinate meanings for sentences across languages?
In what ways do cognitive and embodied theories of meaning support or challenge traditional representational views that treat meaning as abstract, amodal symbols?
How do legal theories such as textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism implicitly rely on different philosophical notions of meaning?