particulars
English “particular” comes from Old French particulier, from Medieval Latin particularis, from classical Latin particula (“small part, fragment, detail”), diminutive of pars (“part”). The plural “particulars” in philosophical English develops from scholastic Latin usuages (res particulares) to denote individual, concrete entities as opposed to universalia.
At a Glance
- Origin
- Latin via Medieval and Early Modern scholastic English
- Semantic Field
- Latin: pars, particula, specialis, singulare, individuum; English: individual, instance, case, detail; Scholastic and early modern: res singularis, res individua, res particularis; Contrasts with: universale, generalis, communis (universal, general, common).
The English ‘particulars’ simultaneously suggests (1) individual concrete things, (2) specific facts or details, and (3) logical items that instantiate a predicate. Different traditions map these to distinct terms—e.g., Greek καθ’ ἕκαστα or τὰ ἄτομα, Latin individua or singularia, German Einzeldinge. Translators must choose among ‘particulars,’ ‘individuals,’ ‘instances,’ or ‘tokens,’ each emphasizing a different aspect (ontological, logical, or epistemic). This makes it difficult to preserve the original metaphysical nuance, especially where the contrast is not simply with ‘universals’ but with ‘commons,’ ‘kinds,’ or ‘forms.’
In classical Latin, particularis and particula referred to something partial, specific, or a small part, often in legal and rhetorical contexts (e.g., ‘particular charges’ or ‘individual points’ in an argument). In ordinary English before technical metaphysics, ‘particulars’ typically meant concrete details, specific circumstances, or individual items of information, especially in law, commerce, and administration (e.g., ‘the particulars of the case’).
In late antique and medieval scholastic Latin, res particulares, singularia, and individua crystallized as technical terms for individual substances, especially in debates over universals and individuation. With the rise of early modern philosophy, ‘particulars’ became a standard English term in metaphysics and epistemology for individual substances and sense-data, contrasted with universals, essences, and abstract ideas. In 19th–20th century analytic philosophy, ‘particulars’ was further regimented as the counterpart to ‘universals’ in debates about properties, tropes, and the ontology of predication, and formalized as the domain of individual variables in predicate logic.
In contemporary analytic philosophy, ‘particulars’ generally denotes individual entities—whether concrete objects, events, or tropes—contrasted with universals or properties, while in everyday English it most often means specific details or items of information. The term also appears in legal and bureaucratic language (‘statement of particulars’), where it has largely lost its explicit metaphysical connotation but retains the sense of fine-grained specificity.
1. Introduction
In philosophy, particulars are usually understood as individual entities: this tree, that person, a specific event, or a single instance of a color or shape. They are commonly contrasted with universals, which are repeatable properties or kinds—such as greenness or humanity—that many different particulars can share. This contrast structures a wide range of debates in metaphysics, logic, and epistemology.
Across traditions, the term “particulars” marks the domain of what is single, concrete, and numerically one, as opposed to what is general, repeatable, or shared. Yet different philosophers identify different sorts of items as basic particulars: concrete substances, momentary sensory data, events, space-time points, or even individualized properties (often called tropes). Whether particulars are fundamentally substances, property-instances, or something else is a major point of disagreement.
The notion of particulars is also central to questions about knowledge and language. Many theories distinguish between knowledge of particular things (gained through perception or acquaintance) and knowledge of universals or general truths (gained by abstraction, reasoning, or intellectual intuition). In logic and semantics, particulars are often taken to be what names and singular terms stand for, and what individual variables in predicate logic range over.
Historically, the concept is shaped by long-running disputes:
- In Plato, sensible particulars are imperfect images of separate, intelligible Forms.
- In Aristotle, individual substances are the primary realities in which form and matter are united.
- Medieval scholastics refine these ideas in discussions of individuation and universals.
- Early modern empiricists make particular sensory impressions and ideas central to knowledge.
- Analytic philosophers regiment particulars as the “objects” in formal ontologies and logical systems.
Outside technical metaphysics, “particulars” maintains a related, though looser, sense in law, administration, and everyday speech, where it often means specific facts or details of a case. The sections that follow trace these developments and analyze the theoretical roles played by particulars across philosophical traditions and domains of discourse.
2. Etymology and Linguistic Origins
The English “particular” derives from Old French particulier, itself from Medieval Latin particularis, an adjective formed from classical Latin particula (“small part, fragment, detail”), diminutive of pars (“part”). The plural “particulars” emerges in scholastic and early modern English as a technical translation of Latin phrases such as res particulares (“particular things”).
Classical and Medieval Roots
In classical Latin, particularis typically meant “partial,” “specific,” or “limited,” often in legal or rhetorical contexts. It contrasted with generalis or universalis and could refer to individual points of an argument or specific charges in a legal case.
Medieval scholastic authors extended this everyday contrast into metaphysics:
| Latin term | Approximate sense in scholastic usage |
|---|---|
| res particularis | Individual thing, opposed to universal |
| individuum | Undivided, single entity; basic metaphysical unit |
| singulare | Singular or particular item, opposed to universale |
| universale | Common nature or kind, shareable by many particulars |
These Latin terms interacted with Greek predecessors such as καθ’ ἕκαστα (kath’ hekasta, “the things in each case”) and ἄτομα (atomon, “indivisible”), which already expressed the opposition between individual items and generalities.
Early Modern and Modern English Usage
By the early modern period, English writers in philosophy and law used “particular” to render both Latin particularis and singulare. The plural “particulars” acquired a double life:
- In legal and bureaucratic English, it meant itemized details (e.g., “the particulars of the claim”).
- In philosophical English, it denoted individual, concrete entities contrasted with universals.
In later German and French philosophy, this semantic space was divided among terms such as Einzelding, Einzelnes, individuum, and particulier, requiring careful choices by translators into English. This background underlies the layered meanings of “particulars” in contemporary philosophical and ordinary language.
3. Pre-Philosophical and Ordinary-Language Usage
Before its crystallization as a technical metaphysical notion, “particular” functioned in ordinary language to indicate what is specific, detailed, or limited as opposed to what is general or vague. This usage persists and shapes how non-specialists understand talk of “particulars.”
Everyday English
In everyday English, “particulars” most often means specific details or items of information:
- “Give me the particulars of the accident.”
- “The contract sets out the particulars of payment.”
Here the contrast is not with “universals” in a metaphysical sense, but with generalities or summaries. The focus is on fine-grained specification of who, what, where, and when.
This ordinary sense connects loosely with the philosophical one: both involve singling out definite items from a more general background, though in everyday use the “items” can be facts, circumstances, or clauses, not only objects.
Legal and Administrative Contexts
Pre-philosophically, legal and bureaucratic documents regularly used “particulars” for itemized statements:
| Domain | Typical phrase | Function |
|---|---|---|
| Law | “statement of particulars” | Detailed allegations in a case |
| Commerce | “bill of particulars” | Itemized list of goods or charges |
| Governance | “particulars of ownership” | Specific data about a property |
In these contexts, “particulars” are discrete entries in a list, often with evidential or contractual import. The emphasis falls on precision and accountability.
Pre-Philosophical Latin and Vernaculars
In Latin legal and rhetorical practice, particularia or singularia could similarly denote individual points in a case or specific circumstances. Vernacular counterparts in various European languages (e.g., French particuliers) were used to mark specific measures, clauses, or cases.
Philosophers later drew on this entrenched contrast between general rules and particular cases when they began to talk about “particulars” as individual entities. The ordinary-language background thereby prepared, but did not yet fully determine, the technical metaphysical sense of the term.
4. Plato and the Status of Sensible Particulars
In Plato’s metaphysics, sensible particulars are the many changing, perceptible things—this beautiful object, that just action—which stand in contrast to eternal, unchanging Forms (e.g., Beauty itself, Justice itself). Plato typically treats these particulars as ontologically and epistemically inferior to Forms.
Participation and Imitation
Sensible particulars are said to participate in (metechein) or imitate (mimēsis) the Forms:
“We are in the habit of positing a single form in each case, for the many things to which we apply the same name.”
— Plato, Republic 596a–b
On this view, a particular beautiful object is beautiful by virtue of participating in the Form of Beauty. The properties of particulars are thus derivative and imperfect expressions of the properties of Forms.
Epistemic Status: Opinion vs Knowledge
In dialogues such as the Republic (476a–480a), Plato contrasts:
| Realm | Items | Cognitive state |
|---|---|---|
| Intelligible | Forms (e.g., Beauty Itself) | Knowledge (epistēmē) |
| Sensible | Particulars (e.g., this beautiful thing) | Opinion (doxa) |
Sensible particulars are changeable and perceptible, making them unsuitable, in Plato’s view, as objects of strict knowledge, which requires stability. Proponents of this interpretation emphasize the two-worlds picture: Forms as true beings, particulars as their mutable images.
Alternative readings stress that Plato sometimes allows a more integrated view, where the sensible world remains deeply connected to the intelligible through structured participation rather than being mere illusion.
Particulars in Ethical and Aesthetic Contexts
In ethical and aesthetic discussions, Plato often moves from particular examples—a specific courageous act, a particular beautiful object—to their underlying Forms. Particulars play a ** heuristic role**: they can occasion philosophical reflection but do not themselves ground ultimate explanation.
Some scholars argue that this gives particulars a derivative but indispensable place: while metaphysical explanation bottoms out in Forms, philosophical inquiry typically begins from sensible particulars encountered in ordinary experience.
5. Aristotle’s Theory of Particular Substances
Aristotle fundamentally reconfigures the status of particulars by treating individual substances (tòde ti, “this something”) as primary realities. While he retains the distinction between universals and particulars, he embeds universals within particulars rather than separating them into a distinct realm.
Primary Substance and Subjecthood
In the Categories (2a11–19), Aristotle distinguishes:
| Category | Example | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Primary substance | “This man,” “this horse” | Ultimate subject of predication |
| Secondary substance | “Man,” “horse” (as kinds) | Predicable of individuals |
Primary substances are particulars: concrete, individual entities that are not predicated of anything else, but of which everything else is predicated. They serve as ontological anchors for properties and relations.
Form–Matter Composition
In the Metaphysics (especially book Z), Aristotle explains particulars as composites of form (eidos, morphē) and matter (hulē). The form gives a particular its essence (e.g., being human), while matter individuates instances of that form.
Medieval Aristotelians later interpret individuating matter as materia signata quantitate (matter marked by quantity), but Aristotle himself emphasizes that what exists are this-form-in-this-matter configurations, i.e., concrete particulars.
Knowledge and Particulars
Aristotle acknowledges a tension between:
- Particulars as what primarily exist and act.
- Universals as what sciences know (Posterior Analytics I.31).
He holds that we come to know universals through experience of particulars, by abstraction from repeated encounters with individual cases. Particulars are thus epistemically basic for induction but not themselves the direct objects of scientific demonstration, which concerns universal laws.
Comparison with Plato
Where Plato assigns full reality to transcendent Forms, Aristotle embeds the form within the particular substance. The universal “man” exists in individual men as a shareable essence. Many interpreters see this as a form of immanent realism: universals are real but not separate from particulars.
This framework makes particular substances central both ontologically (as bearers of properties) and explanatorily (as sources of change and activity) in Aristotelian metaphysics.
6. Medieval Scholastic Debates on Singularia
Medieval scholasticism inherits Aristotelian and Augustinian themes and develops intricate debates concerning singularia (particulars), individuation, and the status of universals.
Singularia as Primary Reality
For many scholastics, singularia (res particulares, individua) are the only entities existing extra animam (outside the mind). Universals are often said to exist either only in the intellect (conceptualism) or both in things and in the mind (moderate realism).
Thomas Aquinas, for example, maintains:
“The intellect knows the universal, but what exists in reality is only the particular.”
— Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.85, a.2 (paraphrased)
He treats individual substances as particular composites of form and matter, individuated by designated matter (materia signata quantitate).
The Problem of Individuation
A central concern is: what makes this individual distinct from another of the same species? Proposed answers include:
| Thinker / School | Principle of individuation |
|---|---|
| Aquinas | Designated matter (matter with determinate quantity and position) |
| Scotus | Haecceitas (“thisness”), a formal individuality |
| Ockham (nominalist) | No separate principle beyond the individual itself |
John Duns Scotus argues that beyond common nature and matter, there is an irreducible haecceity—a non-qualitative “thisness” that makes a particular the very individual it is. Critics contend that this posits obscure entities; proponents view it as necessary to secure genuine numerical distinction.
Universals and the Reality of Particulars
Debates over realism and nominalism about universals directly affect the status of particulars:
- Moderate realists (Aquinas and many Thomists) hold that universals exist in re (in things) as common natures, but only singulars exist outside the mind.
- Extreme realists (some early scholastics) incline toward seeing universals as having robust, quasi-Platonic existence, though usually not fully separate from particulars.
- Nominalists (e.g., William of Ockham) deny real universals; only individual substances and qualities exist. General terms are mental or linguistic signs that can be applied to many particulars.
These positions shape the medieval ontology of particulars, determining whether particulars are metaphysically fundamental or derivative from more basic formal structures.
7. Early Modern Empiricism and Particular Ideas
Early modern empiricists place particular sensory experiences and ideas at the center of their epistemology, often redefining what counts as a particular.
Locke: Particular Ideas and General Terms
John Locke holds that the immediate objects of the mind are ideas, which are themselves particular:
“All our general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain name.”
— Locke, Essay, III.iii.11
For Locke:
- Particular ideas arise from direct sensory experience (e.g., the idea of this white paper).
- General ideas result from abstraction: the mind omits distinguishing features and uses a general term to signify many similar particulars.
Locke’s particulars include both external objects (individual substances and modes) and the particular ideas that represent them in the mind. Generality lies in linguistic and mental practices, not in extra-mental universals.
Berkeley: Particular Perceptions and Anti-Abstraction
George Berkeley questions abstract ideas, insisting that all ideas we actually perceive are particular:
“An idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.”
— Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, §12
He treats particular sensory ideas (e.g., this specific shade of color) as basic. Generality is again a matter of representational function, not an intrinsic universal character.
Hume: Particular Impressions and Ideas
David Hume distinguishes impressions (vivid perceptions) from ideas (their faint copies). Both are fundamentally particular mental items:
| Humean item | Characteristics |
|---|---|
| Impression | Immediate, lively, particular |
| Idea | Faint copy of an impression, particular |
Hume denies that we have impressions corresponding to abstract entities; instead, our apparently general ideas are collections or series of resembling particulars, organized through custom and habit.
Empiricist Conception of Particulars
Across these figures, “particulars” refer centrally to:
- Individual percepts or ideas in the mind.
- Individual objects or events that cause such ideas (for Locke).
- The denial or minimization of extra-mental universals as separate items.
This empiricist turn shifts discussion from metaphysical particulars in themselves to epistemic particulars as the building blocks of knowledge and meaning.
8. Particulars in Analytic Metaphysics and Logic
In analytic philosophy, “particulars” are often treated as ontological primitives occupying the category of individuals, especially within formal ontologies and model-theoretic semantics.
Particulars as Domain Elements
In first-order predicate logic, variables (x, y, z) range over a domain of quantification. This domain is standardly interpreted as a set of particulars, while predicates represent properties or relations:
| Logical item | Philosophical correlate |
|---|---|
| Individual variable (x) | Particular (object, event, etc.) |
| Predicate (F, G) | Universal property or relation |
| Constant (a, b) | Named particular |
This regimentation underlies discussions in works such as Quine’s “On What There Is,” where quantification over individuals indicates ontological commitment to particulars of certain kinds.
Russell and the Ontology of Particulars
Bertrand Russell often distinguishes between particulars and universals as basic categories. Particulars may include:
- Concrete objects (tables, chairs)
- Sense-data (for certain periods of his thought)
- Points of space-time (in later scientific realism)
He sometimes treats immediate data of sensation as particulars known by acquaintance, forming the basis for knowledge of more complex structures.
Competing Theories of Particulars
Analytic metaphysicians disagree about what sorts of entities count as basic particulars:
| Theory | Basic particulars |
|---|---|
| Substance ontology | Concrete objects (substances) |
| Event ontology | Events or processes |
| Bundle theory | Bundles of tropes (property-instances) |
| Trope theory | Particularized property-instances |
Trope theorists, for instance, regard tropes—this particular redness here—as the most fundamental particulars, from which objects are constructed as bundles or complexes. Others defend substratum theories, where a bare particular underlies properties.
Abstract vs Concrete Particulars
Some analytic philosophers extend the notion of particulars to abstract entities (e.g., sets, numbers) if they are non-repeatable units rather than universals. Others reserve “particular” for concrete, spatiotemporal items and treat abstracta as a separate category.
These ontological options shape contemporary debates about identity, persistence, composition, and the structure of reality, all framed in terms of how particulars and their properties are to be understood.
9. Ontological Categories: Particulars, Universals, Tropes
Philosophical ontologies frequently organize reality into a small number of basic categories, among which particulars, universals, and tropes are central contenders.
Particulars and Universals
In many traditional frameworks:
- Particulars are individual entities: this cat, that electron, a specific event.
- Universals are repeatable features or kinds: cat-hood, electric charge, being an explosion.
The classic question concerns instantiation: how do particulars “have” universals? Realists about universals posit a genuine relation of exemplification: a particular instantiates a universal property. Nominalists seek to avoid positing universals, explaining similarity among particulars via resemblance, conceptual grouping, or linguistic convention.
Tropes as Particularized Properties
Tropes are proposed as particular property-instances: for example, the redness of this specific apple is a trope, distinct from the redness of another apple.
| Category | Repeatable? | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Universal | Yes | Redness (as a kind) |
| Particular | No | This apple |
| Trope | No (non-repeatable) | This apple’s specific redness |
Trope theorists commonly argue that:
- We can do without universals by construing objects as bundles of tropes.
- Metaphysical explanation can proceed with only particulars (tropes and their bundles), preserving nominalist intuitions while accounting for similarity via resemblance among tropes.
Critics of trope theory raise issues about explaining exact resemblance and lawlike generalizations without invoking repeatable universals.
Category Systems
Different metaphysical systems distribute these categories variably:
| View | Categories admitted |
|---|---|
| Traditional realism | Particulars + universals |
| Nominalism (object-based) | Particulars only |
| Trope nominalism | Tropes + trope-aggregates (objects) |
| Platonism | Particulars + abstract universals |
Debates about which categories are fundamental or derivative concern questions such as: Are objects more basic than properties, or vice versa? Are there relations in addition to monadic properties? Are events a separate kind of particular?
These competing categorial schemes frame contemporary and historical discussions of the nature and structure of particulars and their place in a broader ontology.
10. Epistemology: Knowing Particulars vs Knowing Universals
Philosophers often distinguish between knowledge of particulars (this person, this event) and knowledge of universals (general principles, kinds, or laws). The relation between these two forms of knowledge is a central epistemological issue.
Modes of Access
Different traditions propose distinct routes to each:
| Target of knowledge | Typical route (according to various theories) |
|---|---|
| Particulars | Sense perception, memory, acquaintance |
| Universals | Abstraction, intellectual intuition, inference |
Many empiricists hold that knowledge begins with particular experiences (sensory impressions or ideas), from which the mind forms more general concepts via abstraction or habit. Rationalist traditions sometimes emphasize intellectual grasp of universal truths, possibly independent of particular sensory input, though usually triggered by it.
Acquaintance vs Description
In 20th-century analytic epistemology, a further distinction arises between:
- Knowledge by acquaintance: direct awareness of a particular (e.g., a color patch, a pain).
- Knowledge by description: knowing that there exists some entity fitting a description (e.g., “the author of Waverley”).
Bertrand Russell, for instance, characterizes particulars (especially sense-data) as objects of acquaintance, forming the basis for knowledge of external objects, which may be known only by description. Critics question whether there are such immediate, infallible modes of access to particulars.
General vs Singular Knowledge Claims
Epistemologists also examine the structure of:
- Singular propositions: “Socrates is wise,” which concern a specific particular.
- General propositions: “All humans are mortal,” which concern a universal pattern.
Some theories treat general knowledge as derivative from repeated singular knowledge (induction), while others regard general truths (e.g., laws of nature, mathematical truths) as primary, with singular knowledge as their application to particular cases.
Priority Debates
There is disagreement about which type of knowledge is epistemically prior:
- Many empiricists: knowledge of particulars is primary; knowledge of universals arises from it.
- Some rationalists and formalists: knowledge of universals (logical or mathematical structures) underpins and organizes knowledge of particulars.
- Hybrid views: treat both as interdependent, with perception delivering particulars that are understood only against a backdrop of general concepts or categories.
These differing accounts influence theories of concept formation, justification, and scientific reasoning, all of which hinge on how we come to know particular things and universal truths.
11. Logical and Semantic Roles of Particulars
In logic and semantics, particulars function as the referents of singular terms and as the values of individual variables, providing the entities about which propositions are made and quantified.
Singular Terms and Reference
Natural languages contain names, demonstratives, and definite descriptions that typically refer to particulars:
- Names: “Socrates,” “Paris”
- Demonstratives: “this,” “that”
- Definite descriptions (on some analyses): “the tallest building”
Semantic theories aim to explain how such expressions succeed in picking out particular entities. Competing accounts include:
| Theory | Mechanism of reference to particulars |
|---|---|
| Descriptivism | Via associated descriptions or properties |
| Causal-historical theories | Via causal chains linking use to an initial “baptism” |
| Direct reference theories | Terms refer without descriptive mediation |
In all these, particulars are what make singular statements true or false.
Quantification and Domains
In formal logic, quantifiers (∀, ∃) range over a domain of discourse, usually conceived as a set of particulars. For example:
- ∃x F(x): “There exists at least one particular that is F.”
- ∀x G(x): “All particulars in the domain are G.”
This formal apparatus presupposes an ontology of individuals (particulars), even when the logic is neutral about what they are (objects, events, numbers, etc.).
Predication and Subject–Predicate Structure
Many logical systems adopt a subject–predicate form in which:
- The subject term refers to a particular (or quantifies over particulars).
- The predicate corresponds to a property or relation.
“Socrates is wise”
Subject: “Socrates” (particular)
Predicate: “is wise” (property/universal)
Alternative logics (e.g., relational or free logics) modify these assumptions but still generally treat particulars as the items standing in relations or bearing properties.
Singular vs General Propositions
Logic distinguishes between:
| Type of statement | Example | Role of particulars |
|---|---|---|
| Singular | “Aristotle taught Alexander” | As specific referents of singular terms |
| General | “All philosophers are mortal” | As members of the domain quantified over |
The semantics of general statements depends on their truth across all relevant particulars, while existential statements assert the existence of at least one particular with certain properties.
These logical and semantic roles do not by themselves determine a metaphysical theory of particulars, but they strongly influence how philosophers formulate and test such theories.
12. Translation Challenges Across Languages and Traditions
Translating “particulars” across philosophical languages presents persistent difficulties, because different traditions carve the ontological and logical space differently.
Greek, Latin, and Vernacular Equivalents
Key source terms include:
| Language | Term | Usual scope |
|---|---|---|
| Greek | καθ’ ἕκαστα (kath’ hekasta) | Individual cases, concrete particulars |
| Greek | ἄτομα (atomon) | Indivisible units, sometimes particulars |
| Latin | singularia, individua | Individual things |
| Latin | res particulares | Particular things (scholastic usage) |
| German | Einzeldinge, Einzelnes | Individual things or instances |
When rendering these into English as “particulars,” translators must decide whether the original context focuses on concrete substances, instances of predication, logical cases, or individuation.
Ontological vs Logical Senses
“Particular” in English can refer to:
- Ontological particulars: spatiotemporal individuals.
- Logical particulars: instances or cases in an argument or rule.
- Epistemic particulars: specific facts or details.
Some languages deploy different terms for these dimensions. For example, German may distinguish between Einzeldinge (individual things) and Einzelfälle (individual cases). Rendering both simply as “particulars” can blur important nuances.
Type–Token and Abstract–Concrete Distinctions
In analytic contexts, “particulars” are sometimes aligned with tokens (individual instances) as opposed to types (abstract patterns). Other languages may lack direct equivalents for “token,” prompting choices among words for “example,” “instance,” or “singular thing.”
Similarly, philosophical debates over abstract particulars (e.g., individualized properties) require careful handling in languages where “particular” strongly implies concreteness. Translators may resort to paraphrases or newly coined terms.
Tradition-Specific Terminology
Different schools embed “particular” in distinct terminological networks:
- Aristotelian and scholastic texts contrast singulare with universale.
- Early modern empiricists talk of “particular ideas” and “particular perceptions.”
- German Idealists use contrasts like Besonderes vs Allgemeines, which do not map neatly onto “particular” vs “universal.”
Translators thus face choices that can influence interpretation, such as whether to render Besonderes as “particular,” “specific,” or “particularized,” each carrying somewhat different connotations in English.
13. Contrasting and Related Concepts
The notion of particulars stands within a network of related contrasts and auxiliary concepts that structure metaphysical and logical discussions.
Particulars vs Universals
The most central contrast is with universals, understood as repeatable properties, kinds, or relations. While particulars are numerically single, universals are multiply instantiable.
| Concept | Characterization |
|---|---|
| Particular | Individual entity, non-repeatable |
| Universal | Repeatable property, kind, or relation |
Debates over whether universals exist, and if so how, directly affect how particulars are conceived (as instantiating, resembling, or being grouped under them).
Tokens and Types
The type–token distinction provides a quasi-technical analogue:
- Type: general pattern or kind (e.g., the word “tree” as a type).
- Token: individual instance of that type (e.g., this printed occurrence of “tree”).
Tokens are often treated as particulars in discussions of language, art, and information, though the mapping is not always exact (since tokens can be artifacts with complex structure).
Substances, Events, and States
Other related notions refine what counts as a particular:
| Concept | Typical usage | Relation to particulars |
|---|---|---|
| Substance | Underlying entity that bears properties | Often paradigm concrete particular |
| Event | Occurrence in time, possibly with location | Sometimes treated as a kind of particular |
| State | Condition or way a thing is | May be seen as non-repeatable particular |
Some ontologies privilege substances as basic particulars; others treat events or processes as fundamental, with substances derivative.
Concrete vs Abstract
The contrast between concrete objects (located in space-time) and abstract objects (e.g., numbers, propositions) raises the question whether all particulars must be concrete. Some views:
- Restrict “particulars” to concrete individuals.
- Allow abstract particulars, especially in trope theories (e.g., a particular property-instance not located in space-time in the usual way).
Instantiation, Resemblance, and Exemplification
To articulate how particulars relate to generality, philosophers employ:
- Instantiation/exemplification: standard on realist views about universals.
- Resemblance: central on resemblance-nominalist and trope-theoretic accounts.
- Classification or sorting: emphasized by conceptualists and some empiricists.
These concepts mediate between the individual particular and patterns of similarity, lawfulness, or conceptual organization.
14. Applications in Law, Science, and Everyday Discourse
Outside technical metaphysics, the notion of “particulars” figures prominently in legal practice, scientific methodology, and ordinary conversation, often preserving a family resemblance to its philosophical usage.
Law and Legal Procedure
In legal contexts, “particulars” typically denote specific allegations, facts, or items that must be specified to clarify a claim:
| Legal usage | Function |
|---|---|
| “Statement of particulars” | Detailed specification of allegations |
| “Further and better particulars” | Additional clarification requested by the court |
Legal systems often require that general claims (e.g., negligence, breach of contract) be supported by concretely specified particulars: dates, actions, omissions, and individual parties. Here, particulars serve evidential and procedural roles: they ensure fair notice, enable fact-finding, and constrain the scope of litigation.
Science and Empirical Data
In scientific inquiry, a contrast is often drawn between:
- Particular observations or data points (individual measurements, case studies).
- General laws, theories, or models.
Scientists collect particular observations (e.g., readings from a specific experiment at a particular time and place) and then infer or test general regularities. Methodological debates concern issues such as:
- How many particulars are required to justify a generalization (induction).
- The role of particular case studies in disciplines like medicine or geology.
- The evidential weight of anomalous particulars that conflict with general laws.
While not usually employing the philosophical jargon explicitly, scientific practice operationalizes the distinction between individual instances and general patterns in ways that parallel metaphysical discussions.
Everyday Communication
In ordinary discourse, speakers often move between:
- General statements: “Dogs are friendly.”
- Specific particulars: “My neighbor’s dog bit me yesterday.”
Requests for “the particulars” of a story or transaction typically seek concrete details—who, what, when, where—emphasizing the same concern for individuation and specificity that characterizes philosophical notions of particulars.
These practical uses of “particulars” illustrate how abstract metaphysical distinctions intersect with everyday needs to identify, distinguish, and describe individual items and events.
15. Legacy and Historical Significance
The concept of particulars has played a persistent and evolving role across the history of philosophy, shaping debates about reality, knowledge, and language.
Structuring Metaphysical Debates
From Plato and Aristotle through medieval scholasticism to contemporary analytic metaphysics, the opposition between particulars and universals has provided a framework for:
- Theories of individuation: what makes one entity numerically distinct from another.
- Accounts of properties and relations: whether they are universals, tropes, or conceptual constructs.
- Conceptions of substance and objecthood: what counts as a basic entity.
Shifts in the understanding of particulars—e.g., from Aristotelian substances to empiricist sensory particulars or to trope-based ontologies—mark major turning points in metaphysical theory.
Shaping Epistemology and Logic
In epistemology, the role of particular experiences or items of knowledge has been central to discussions of:
- The origin of concepts (abstraction from particulars vs innate ideas).
- The structure of justification (singular evidence vs general principles).
- The nature of perceptual and testimonial knowledge.
In logic and semantics, the treatment of individuals as the objects of reference and quantification has underpinned formal tools that remain standard in contemporary philosophy and linguistics.
Cross-Disciplinary Influence
Beyond philosophy, the particular–general distinction has influenced:
- Legal theory, through requirements for detailed particulars in pleadings.
- Scientific methodology, in the interplay between data (particulars) and theory (generalities).
- Social and political thought, where attention to particular cases can challenge or refine broad generalizations.
Continuing Relevance
Ongoing debates about:
- The nature of objects and events in physics.
- The status of abstract entities in mathematics and semantics.
- The relationship between individual experiences and social categories.
all implicitly rely on conceptions of what particulars are and how they relate to wider structures.
Thus, while the terminology has shifted and diversified, the idea of a particular—a single, determinate item or instance—remains a foundational tool for organizing inquiry across philosophical and non-philosophical domains.
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@online{philopedia_particulars,
title = {particulars},
author = {Philopedia},
year = {2025},
url = {https://philopedia.com/terms/particulars/},
urldate = {December 10, 2025}
}Study Guide
Particular
An individual, numerically single entity or instance—such as this tree, that event, or a specific property-instance—usually contrasted with universals, which are repeatable or shareable.
Universal
A repeatable property, kind, or relation—such as redness or humanity—that can be instantiated by many different particulars.
καθ’ ἕκαστα (kath’ hekasta)
Aristotle’s expression for “the things in each case,” used to denote concrete individual cases or particulars as opposed to universals.
Substance
In many metaphysical systems, an underlying individual entity—such as this man or this horse—that bears properties and persists through change.
Tropes
Non-repeatable, particularized property-instances, such as this specific shade of red on this apple, proposed as basic particulars instead of or alongside universals.
Token vs Type
The distinction between individual instances (tokens, akin to particulars) and abstract patterns or kinds (types, akin to universals).
Instantiation (Exemplification)
The relation by which a particular bears, exemplifies, or “has” a universal property, as when this apple instantiates redness.
Nominalism vs Realism about Universals
Nominalism holds that only particulars are fundamentally real and universals are merely names or concepts; realism holds that universals exist in some robust sense, with particulars as their instances.
How does Plato’s treatment of sensible particulars as imperfect images of Forms differ from Aristotle’s view of individual substances as primary realities, and what are the implications for how each thinker conceives knowledge?
In medieval debates about individuation, why did some thinkers (like Scotus) posit a ‘haecceity’ or ‘thisness’ in addition to common nature and matter, and what problem was this meant to solve?
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume all emphasize particular ideas or impressions. In what ways do their accounts of how we form general concepts from these particulars converge and diverge?
What advantages and disadvantages does trope theory have over traditional realism about universals in explaining similarity between particulars?
How does the ordinary-language use of ‘particulars’ to mean ‘specific details of a case’ relate to the philosophical use of ‘particulars’ as individual entities? Is this merely a coincidence of language, or does it reveal something about how we think?
In predicate logic, variables range over a domain of individuals. To what extent does adopting such a logical framework commit us to a specific metaphysical view of particulars?
Do you think knowledge of particulars or knowledge of universals is more fundamental for scientific inquiry, and why?