per se

1. Introduction

Per se is a Latin prepositional phrase literally meaning “through itself” or “by itself,” which has become a technical marker across logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and law. Philosophers and jurists use it to single out what belongs to a thing, proposition, or act in its own right, as opposed to what depends on external circumstances, relations, or conventions.

Historically, the expression plays a mediating role between Greek and Latin thought. In medieval Latin philosophy it is the standard rendering of Aristotle’s phrase καθ᾿ αὑτό (kath’ hautó, “in itself”), and it becomes central to scholastic accounts of:

• Essential predication (what is said of a subject by virtue of what it is),
• Intrinsic vs. accidental being,
• Per se vs. per accidens causality,
• Self-evidence (per se notum),
• Divine self-subsistence (ens per se, per se subsistens).

Outside strictly philosophical contexts, per se also acquires more idiomatic meanings in modern European languages, especially English and French, roughly equivalent to “as such” or “in and of itself.” In these settings it often indicates that some feature, taken alone, does or does not suffice for a certain conclusion (e.g., “not illegal per se”).

Because of this long and layered history, the phrase functions both as:

• A technical term of art in classical, medieval, and some modern philosophical systems; and
• A general Latinism marking intrinsicness, independence, or definitional status in academic and legal discourse.

This entry traces the expression from its linguistic origins in Latin, through its adoption as the standard translation of Aristotle’s vocabulary of “in-itselfness,” to its systematic deployment by scholastics, its transformation in early modern philosophy, and its diverse applications in contemporary thought and law. Throughout, competing interpretations of what it means for something to be “through itself” or “in itself” are presented without endorsing any particular metaphysical or epistemological theory.

2. Etymology and Linguistic Origins of "Per Se"

2.1 Morphological Components

The phrase per se combines:

• per: a Latin preposition meaning “through,” “by means of,” “by,” or “in accordance with.”
• sē: the third-person reflexive pronoun in the ablative singular, meaning “himself,” “herself,” “itself.”

In its basic compositional sense, per sē thus means “by means of itself” or “through itself.” Latin grammarians and lexica typically class it as an adverbial phrase, modifying predicates with a manner or instrument nuance.

2.2 Early Semantic Range

Philologists note that, in non-technical Latin, per se is already somewhat idiomatic. It can suggest:

• Self-sufficiency (“enough by itself”),
• Isolation from context (“taken alone”),
• Independence from aid or addition (“without assistance”).

These nuances provide the raw material for later philosophical refinements, but they are not yet systematic metaphysical or logical categories.

2.3 Historical-Linguistic Path

The development of per se as a technical term is closely tied to the Latin reception of Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle. When late antique and medieval translators sought equivalents for Greek expressions like καθ᾿ αὑτό, they favored per se to capture the idea of something considered in virtue of itself. Alternative renderings (e.g., secundum se, “according to itself”) remained secondary.

A simplified timeline of usage:

2.4 Competing Philological Accounts

Some scholars argue that per se in philosophy is largely a calque of Greek καθ᾿ αὑτό, strengthened by the prestige of Aristotelian logic. Others emphasize the continuity with pre-existing Latin idiom, claiming that translators exploited a phrase whose connotations of self-sufficiency and independence were already well established. Evidence from early Latin philosophical writers (e.g., Cicero’s paraphrases of Greek sources) is used on both sides, and there is no consensus on whether Greek or native Latin usage is the primary driver of the later technical sense.

3. Grammatical Form and Semantic Field in Latin

3.1 Grammatical Structure

Grammatically, per se is:

• A prepositional phrase: per + ablative se.
• Functioning adverbially, modifying verbs, adjectives, or whole clauses.

Examples from classical usage illustrate this syntax:

"

hoc per se satis est – “this is enough in itself.”

Here per se modifies satis est (“is enough”), indicating adequacy without further support.

3.2 Core Semantic Values

Within Latin, the phrase participates in a broader semantic field of instrument and manner:

While per se and in se both gesture toward “itself”-ness, they differ syntactically (preposition + pronoun vs. preposition + pronoun with locative force) and often semantically. Medieval authors sometimes exploit these differences, treating per se as more explicitly instrumental or explanatory (“through itself”) and in se as more locative or ontological (“in itself”).

3.3 Relation to Other Technical Adverbs

In philosophical Latin, per se often appears in contrast or combination with other adverbial markers:

• per accidens (“by accident”) – for contingent or incidental attributions,
• simpliciter (“simply, without qualification”) – for absolute predication,
• quoad nos (“as regards us”) – for what holds relative to knowers.

These pairings allow authors to build fine-grained distinctions, such as “true per se simpliciter” versus “true per accidens quoad nos.”

3.4 Semantic Flexibility and Polysemy

Even within Latin, per se remains notably polysemous. Depending on context, it can signal:

• Ontological independence,
• Logical or definitional connection,
• Epistemic immediacy,
• Mere isolation of a factor from its surroundings.

Later philosophical systems deliberately regiment some of these senses, but classical and late antique texts often rely on context rather than formal typologies to disambiguate them.

4. Pre-Philosophical and Classical Latin Usage

4.1 Idiomatic Adverbial Use

In Classical Latin literature, per se is common in rhetorical and narrative contexts without technical philosophical meaning. Authors like Cicero, Livy, and Quintilian use it to emphasize:

• Self-sufficiency: a feature or argument suffices on its own.
• Independence: an action or event occurs without external assistance.
• Isolated consideration: something evaluated apart from other factors.

Illustrative usages include:

"

virtus per se ipsa laudabilis est – “virtue is praiseworthy in and of itself.”

— Paraphrase of Ciceronian style

4.2 Stylistic and Rhetorical Function

Rhetorically, per se functions as an intensifier. Orators deploy it to:

• Strengthen praise or blame (“per se gravis iniuria” – “a grave wrong in itself”),
• Distinguish baseline significance from added circumstances (“per se leve, sed…” – “light in itself, but…”),
• Mark what does not depend on audience, fortune, or context.

This rhetorical value prefigures later normative uses (e.g., malum in se), though classical texts do not always draw a sharp theoretical line between “in itself” and “by convention.”

4.3 Early Philosophical Coloring in Latin Authors

Cicero, translating and adapting Greek philosophical works, occasionally edges per se toward more reflective meanings. In passages on the highest good or virtue, he uses per se or propter se (“for its own sake”) to echo Greek discussions of what is valuable καθ᾿ αὑτό:

"

virtus propter se expetenda est – “virtue is to be sought for its own sake.”

Some interpreters take such usages as early steps toward a more systematic notion of intrinsic value or essential predication in Latin. Others regard them as still predominantly rhetorical, arguing that precise logical and metaphysical roles for per se emerge only with later scholastic codification.

4.4 Non-Philosophical Domains

Outside philosophy and rhetoric, per se appears in:

• Legal contexts, where a fact may be sufficient per se to establish a case;
• Historiographical narratives, where events are described as remarkable per se, apart from their consequences.

These uses reinforce a general sense of stand-alone significance, but they do not yet constitute the structured terminological contrasts (e.g., per se vs. per accidens) that characterize medieval philosophy.

5. From Greek καθ᾿ αὑτό to Latin "Per Se"

5.1 Greek Source Expression

The Greek phrase καθ᾿ αὑτό (kath’ hautó) literally means “according to itself” or “in itself.” In Aristotle it becomes a key technical expression for:

• What belongs to a subject in virtue of what it is,
• As opposed to what belongs κατὰ συμβεβηκός (katà symbebekós), “by coincidence” or “accidentally.”

5.2 Translation Choices in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages

When Aristotle’s works were transmitted into Latin, translators such as Boethius (early) and the medieval “Aristoteles Latinus” tradition faced the task of rendering καθ᾿ αὑτό. The dominant practice became:

Alternative Latin phrases, such as secundum se or in se, appear in some texts and commentaries, but per se becomes the canonical equivalent in scholastic handbooks and glosses.

5.3 Motivations for the Choice

Scholars propose several reasons for preferring per se:

• It mirrors the prepositional structure of κατὰ + accusative.
• It allows the instrumental reading “through itself,” fitting demonstrations and causal explanations.
• Its pre-existing Latin idiomatic sense (“by itself”) already resonates with the idea of something considered independently.

Some philologists suggest that this choice nudges Latin readers toward viewing καθ᾿ αὑτό relations not only as intrinsic but also as explanatory (“through itself”), which in turn shapes scholastic understandings of scientific demonstration.

5.4 Effects on the Latin Aristotelian Vocabulary

Once per se and per accidens were established as paired translations, they became entrenched in:

• Logical treatises, especially on syllogistic and demonstration,
• Metaphysical discussions of substance vs. accident,
• Commentary traditions, where Greek terminology was regularly glossed with Latin equivalents.

This translation decision effectively inscribed per se into the core conceptual apparatus of Latin scholasticism, ensuring that subsequent debates about essence, property, and causality would be framed in these terms.

6. Aristotelian Background and Essential Predication

6.1 Per Se vs. Per Accidens in Aristotle

In Aristotle’s logic and metaphysics (in Greek), a crucial distinction is drawn between:

Essential predication occurs when a predicate belongs to a subject because of what the subject is, whereas accidental predication concerns features that can come and go without altering the subject’s essence.

6.2 Kinds of Essential Predication

Aristotle distinguishes several ways a predicate may belong “in itself”:

1. Definition to definiendum: The parts of a definition are said per se of what is defined (e.g., “having three angles” of “triangle”).
2. Genus to species: The genus is predicated per se of the species (e.g., “animal” of “human”).
3. Proper attributes: Properties that follow necessarily from a thing’s essence (e.g., “having interior angles equal to two right angles” for triangles).

Latin Aristotelian tradition often codifies these under various “modes” of per se predication.

6.3 Role in Demonstrative Science

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle ties scientific knowledge to syllogisms whose premises express per se connections. A demonstration is properly scientific only when:

• The middle term captures what belongs essentially to the subject,
• The conclusion follows of necessity from the essence.

"

“We think we know a thing without qualification when we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is.”

— Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.2 (tr. paraphrased)

Latin interpreters map this “knowledge through the cause” onto per se relations, distinguishing it from knowledge of coincidental truths.

6.4 Ontological Resonances

Although Aristotle’s vocabulary is primarily logical and explanatory, many commentators (ancient, medieval, and modern) see ontological implications. The contrast between what is predicated καθ᾿ αὑτό / per se and κατὰ συμβεβηκός / per accidens appears to presuppose:

• A differentiation between essence and accident,
• A hierarchy of more and less fundamental features of things.

Some scholars emphasize the logical-explanatory role, while others foreground metaphysical commitments. The Latin choice of per se intensifies this double aspect by suggesting both “in itself” and “through itself.”

7. Scholastic Systematization: Per Se vs. Per Accidens

7.1 Formalization of the Distinction

Medieval scholastics, drawing on Latin Aristotle and his commentators, codified per se and per accidens into a tightly structured opposition applied to:

• Predication: essential vs. accidental properties,
• Causality: intrinsic vs. incidental causes,
• Being: ens per se vs. ens per accidens.

A typical scholastic table of contrasts:

7.2 Modes of Per Se Predication

Scholastic authors often distinguish multiple “modes” (modi) of per se. One common fourfold scheme (derived from Aristotle and Porphyry) is:

1. Per se primo modo – the definition is predicated of the defined.
2. Per se secundo modo – the subject is part of the definition of the predicate.
3. Per se tertio modo – properties flowing immediately from the essence.
4. Per se quarto modo – more remotely derived proper attributes.

Not all authors accept the same enumeration, and some reduce or expand the modes. Debates focus on how strictly each mode must be tied to essence vs. broader explanatory roles.

7.3 Per Se and Scientific Demonstration

Following Aristotelian lines, scholastics maintain that scientific demonstrations must employ per se premises. Theories of science therefore revolve around identifying which connections count as per se in the relevant mode. Some thinkers stress logical form (how terms are related in definitions), while others emphasize metaphysical grounding (what in reality underwrites the necessity).

7.4 Per Accidens as a Limiting Category

Per accidens is used to classify:

• Predications where the predicate is tied to a subject only through some separable feature,
• Causal chains where an agent causes something not as such but “while being something else” (e.g., “the builder as white”).

Some scholastics treat per accidens as ontologically “less real” or “less unified,” while others restrict the contrast to explanatory relevance, reserving strong ontological claims for separate argument.

7.5 Divergent Interpretive Traditions

Later medieval schools (e.g., Thomist, Scotist, nominalist) differ on:

• How strictly per se must be anchored in real essences,
• Whether per accidens beings enjoy genuine unity,
• The extent to which logical and metaphysical uses of the pair are separable.

These divergences set the stage for more specialized developments in Aquinas, Scotus, and others.

8. Aquinas on Per Se Being, Causality, and Demonstration

8.1 Ens Per Se vs. Ens Per Accidens

For Thomas Aquinas, per se becomes a central tool for distinguishing types of being:

• Ens per se: that which has unity and existence in its own right, paradigmatically substances.
• Ens per accidens: aggregates such as “the white musician,” whose unity is only incidental.

In De ente et essentia, Aquinas uses this distinction to analyze the relation between essence and existence, and to differentiate stable natures from accidental composites.

8.2 Per Se Causality

Aquinas extends the per se / per accidens contrast to causal series. A per se ordered series is one in which:

• Later members depend here and now on earlier members (e.g., the movement of a stick on the hand that moves it),
• The series cannot regress infinitely if a current effect is to be explained.

In contrast, a per accidens series concerns successions where earlier members do not have to exist for later ones to act (e.g., a lineage of fathers and sons). Aquinas’s “Five Ways” for the existence of God appeal to per se causal series that, he argues, require a first cause per se.

8.3 Per Se Demonstration and Per Se Notum

In logic and epistemology, Aquinas develops the notion of per se notum (self-evident):

• A proposition is per se notum simpliciter if, for any intellect that grasps the terms, the predicate is seen to belong to the subject by its very meaning.
• It may be per se notum quoad se but not quoad nos (“in itself” but not “to us”) if human knowers lack sufficient understanding of the terms.

"

“Some propositions are self-evident in themselves, but not to us, because we do not understand the essence of the subject.”

— Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.2, a.1 (paraphrased)

This framework relies on per se predication: self-evident truths are those where the predicate belongs per se to the subject, either as definitional or as a proper attribute.

8.4 God as Ipsum Esse Per Se Subsistens

Aquinas also describes God as ipsum esse per se subsistens (“the very act of being, subsisting through itself”). Here per se signals:

• Independence: God’s existence is not received from another.
• Identity of essence and existence: God is not a being that has existence, but Being itself.

Interpretations vary on how to understand this metaphysical claim; some emphasize absolute ontological self-sufficiency, others stress its role within Aquinas’s broader doctrine of participation. In all readings, per se marks a maximal form of intrinsic, non-derived being, contrasted with creatures as entia per participationem.

9. Scotus and Later Medieval Refinements

9.1 Scotus on Per Se and Formal Distinctions

John Duns Scotus accepts the basic per se / per accidens framework but introduces a more nuanced account of formal aspects (formalitates) within a single thing. For Scotus:

• A single res can contain formally distinct aspects (e.g., nature, existence, personal properties).
• A predicate may belong per se to one formal aspect but not to another.

This allows him to say that certain attributes are essential in one respect while not collapsing all of them into a simple essence.

9.2 Ens Primum Per Se in Causal Order

In arguments for God’s existence, Scotus develops the notion of an ens primum per se in the order of efficient causes:

• A cause is per se first when its priority is essential, not merely chronological or accidental.
• Such a cause is necessary, uncaused, and independent in its causal efficacy.

Scotus’s proof aims to show that there must be a first essentially prior cause in any causal series ordered per se, differing in structure from Thomistic arguments but sharing the basic per se / per accidens contrast.

9.3 Later Scholastic Debates

Subsequent medieval thinkers—Franciscan, Dominican, and nominalist—develop, modify, or challenge Scotist refinements:

• Some Thomists resist Scotus’s multiplicity of formalities, arguing it complicates the notion of an essence to which properties belong per se.
• Nominalists (e.g., Ockham) tend to reduce or reinterpret metaphysical per se relations, framing them primarily in terms of conceptual or linguistic structures rather than robust real essences.

These debates concern, among other things, whether:

• Per se connections reflect real distinctions in things,
• Or whether they can be entirely captured by logical and semantic analysis.

9.4 Broadening and Fragmentation of the Concept

By the late Middle Ages, the vocabulary of per se has been applied to:

• Predication,
• Causal series,
• Orders of priority (in perfection, dignity, necessity),
• Attributes of God and creatures.

Different schools systematize these in divergent ways. Some attempt comprehensive taxonomies of per se modes across all domains; others treat the phrase more flexibly, adjusting its meaning to context. This diversity sets the stage for later early modern reconfigurations and partial abandonments of the medieval framework.

10. Per Se, In Se, and A Se: Intrinsic Being and Self-Causation

10.1 Distinguishing the Expressions

Medieval Latin employs several related expressions:

While overlapping, these are not usually treated as synonyms.

10.2 Per Se and In Se: Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic

In se often designates what is intrinsic to a thing’s constitution, as opposed to what is ad aliud (“toward another”) or quoad nos (“relative to us”). For example:

• A substance exists in se, whereas an accident exists in alio (“in another”).
• A property may be considered in se (abstracting from effects) or quoad nos (as it appears to us).

Per se, by contrast, tends to highlight explanatory or essential relations: a predicate belongs to a subject per se when grounded in its essence; a cause acts per se when its action flows from what it is.

Some authors explicitly link the two: what belongs per se to a thing is often thought to be something it has in se. Others maintain that the two adverbs track different aspects—one logical-explanatory, the other ontological-locative.

10.3 A Se and Self-Causation

The phrase a se (“from itself”) is especially prominent in philosophical theology. It is used to characterize:

• A being whose existence is not received from another cause,
• Often identified with God as causa sui (“cause of itself”) or ens a se.

"

“That which is through another (per aliud) must be reduced to that which is through itself (per se), which is called a se.”

— Paraphrase of scholastic formulations

Some scholastics carefully differentiate per se from a se:

• Per se may describe beings whose operations or properties are essential, even if their existence is received (e.g., created substances).
• A se is reserved for a being whose very esse is uncaused and self-grounding.

Others treat them more loosely as overlapping in contexts where God’s absolute independence is at issue.

10.4 Systematic and Critical Perspectives

Systematic treatments often arrange these expressions in hierarchies:

• Creatures: in se and per se in many respects, but not a se.
• God: in se, per se, and a se in an eminent or unique way.

Critics, especially in later periods, question whether the notion of a se is coherent (e.g., whether self-causation is intelligible) and whether the shifts between in se, per se, and a se conceal ambiguities. Nonetheless, the triad remains a standard set of tools for analyzing intrinsic being and self-sufficiency in the Latin metaphysical tradition.

11. Per Se Notum and Theories of Self-Evidence

11.1 Definition of Per Se Notum

In scholastic epistemology, per se notum (“known through itself,” usually rendered “self-evident”) is a technical label for propositions whose truth is evident upon understanding the terms. The key idea is that:

• The predicate is seen to belong per se to the subject, either by definition or as an immediate consequence of it.

This concept is applied to mathematics, logic, metaphysics, and theology.

11.2 Types of Self-Evidence

Scholastics commonly distinguish:

Aquinas, for instance, holds that “God exists” is per se notum quoad se (given God’s essence), but not quoad nos, since humans do not grasp divine essence directly.

11.3 Logical Structure of Per Se Notum Propositions

Typical examples include:

• Analytic or definitional truths: “Every whole is greater than its part.”
• Immediate metaphysical principles: “Nothing can be and not be at the same time in the same respect.”

For such propositions, the connection between subject and predicate is thought to be per se in one of the Aristotelian modes. Hence, anyone who fully understands the subject concept already implicitly grasps the predicate.

11.4 Disputes and Alternatives

Not all medieval or early modern thinkers agree on:

• Which propositions are genuinely per se notum,
• Whether self-evidence depends on conceptual analysis, intellectual intuition, or innate knowledge.

Some nominalists narrow the class of per se notum truths, stressing their logical or linguistic basis. Others, especially in metaphysical realism, allow more substantive ontological principles (e.g., principles of causality) to count as self-evident.

Early modern philosophers, including Descartes, adapt this vocabulary to their own theories of clear and distinct perception, sometimes equating such perceptions with self-evident or known per se truths, though interpretations vary on how close this is to scholastic per se notum.

12. Early Modern Transformations and Cartesian Usage

12.1 Continuity and Change from Scholasticism

Early modern philosophers inherit the Latin vocabulary of per se, but they operate within changing metaphysical and epistemological frameworks. Scholastic distinctions remain influential in:

• Academic textbooks,
• University disputations,
• Latin commentaries on new philosophical works.

At the same time, emerging systems question or reinterpret the underlying assumptions about essences, substantial forms, and causality.

12.2 Descartes on Substance and Existence

In his Latin Principia Philosophiae, René Descartes defines substance as:

"

“That which exists in such a way as to require nothing else in order to exist.”

— Descartes, Principia Philosophiae I, §51 (paraphrased)

This is often glossed as existing in se and, in scholastic commentary, as existing per se. Descartes sharply distinguishes:

• Created substances (minds and bodies), which depend on God for existence,
• God as the only being whose essence involves existence and is thus truly a se or causa sui.

The scholastic vocabulary of per se, in se, and a se thus persists, though embedded in a dualistic metaphysics and a new theory of substance.

12.3 Per Se and Clear and Distinct Perception

Descartes also emphasizes truths known through themselves—those perceived clearly and distinctly—such as the cogito and basic mathematical propositions. Some Latin scholastic commentators describe these as known per se or per se notum, connecting them with earlier accounts of self-evidence.

Interpretations diverge on how far this resemblance goes:

• Some see Descartes as recasting scholastic per se notum within a more introspective epistemology, focusing on the mind’s acts of clear and distinct perception.
• Others stress differences, arguing that Descartes grounds self-evidence primarily in subjective cognitive states rather than in objective essential connections.

12.4 Wider Early Modern Developments

Other early modern thinkers, such as Leibniz, Spinoza, and various scholastic continuators, also use per se:

• Spinoza’s notion of causa sui and substance that is in itself and conceived through itself (in se est et per se concipitur) is a notable case, though built on a distinct metaphysical scheme.
• Leibniz speaks of truths of reason whose denial is impossible, sometimes aligning them with propositions whose predicates are contained “in” their subjects—a notion reminiscent of per se predication.

In parallel, critics of scholastic metaphysics sometimes retain the phrase per se as a convenient Latinism meaning “as such” or “in itself,” but without endorsing the full scholastic apparatus of essences and formal distinctions.

13. Modern Philosophical and Legal Uses of "Per Se"

13.1 Everyday and Academic Philosophical English

In contemporary English, per se is widely used as a general Latinism meaning:

• “as such,”
• “in and of itself,”
• “considered in isolation.”

Philosophers employ it to bracket conditions: e.g., “The act is not wrong per se, but only given certain consequences.” This usage is often looser than medieval technical senses and may not presuppose a robust theory of essence or intrinsicness.

13.2 Modern Metaphysics and Logic

In analytic metaphysics and logic, per se sometimes retains a more technical flavor, approximating “essentially” or “intrinsically”. It appears in discussions of:

• Essential vs. accidental properties,
• De re vs. de dicto modalities (properties of a thing itself vs. under a description),
• Intrinsicality (features a thing has regardless of its environment).

Some authors use per se cautiously, aware of its historical baggage, while others treat it simply as a stylistic synonym for “in itself.” There is no fully standardized contemporary formal definition, and the expression’s meaning is often inferred contextually.

13.3 Legal Uses: Per Se Rules and Malum In Se

In modern legal systems, particularly in Anglo-American law, per se acquires specialized meanings:

In antitrust law, for instance, certain practices (e.g., price-fixing cartels) may be illegal per se, meaning that courts do not require detailed economic analysis to show anticompetitive effects.

13.4 Normative Theory and Moral Philosophy

Legal distinctions influence moral philosophy, where malum in se is contrasted with malum prohibitum:

• Some theorists argue that some actions (e.g., murder, torture) are morally wrong per se, independently of social or legal norms.
• Others challenge the clarity or usefulness of the notion, questioning whether any moral wrongs are entirely norm-independent.

Here per se functions to mark presumed intrinsic moral status, echoing older uses without necessarily adopting scholastic metaphysics.

13.5 Divergent Assessments of the Term’s Utility

Contemporary scholars disagree about the ongoing value of per se:

• Supporters view it as a concise marker for intrinsic, essential, or stand-alone status in both philosophy and law.
• Critics argue that its historical polysemy and Latin form can obscure rather than clarify issues, recommending more precise vernacular terms (“intrinsic,” “essential,” “categorically wrong,” etc.).

As a result, the term persists but often with local, field-specific meanings rather than a single unified philosophical definition.

14. Conceptual Analysis: Essence, Property, and Intrinsicality

14.1 Per Se and Essence

At the heart of the philosophical use of per se lies the notion of essence—what a thing is. Traditional accounts treat a predicate as belonging per se to a subject when:

• It is part of the subject’s definition (e.g., “rational” of “human”), or
• It flows necessarily from that definition as a proper attribute.

On this view, per se marks a special subclass of predications tightly tied to essence.

14.2 Proper Attributes (Propria)

Scholastic logic distinguishes:

For example, “being able to laugh” is often cited as a proprium of humans: not part of the definition but necessarily following from human nature. It thus belongs per se in a derivative sense.

14.3 Intrinsicality vs. Relationality

Modern discussions of intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties partly parallel, and partly diverge from, the older per se vs. per accidens distinction. Intrinsic properties are those that:

• A thing has in itself, independently of its environment or relations.

The relationship to per se can be summarized (with qualifications) as:

Philosophers debate whether per se should be treated as primarily about essence or about intrinsicality, and some argue that the two concepts should be kept strictly distinct.

14.4 De Re Modality and Per Se

In modal logic and metaphysics, de re necessity is sometimes glossed as truth per se of a thing:

• A property is necessary de re if the object has it in virtue of what it is, across all possible worlds in which it exists.

This is close to traditional per se essential predication. However, some contemporary accounts define essence in terms of modal profiles, while others define modality in terms of essence, leading to circularity concerns and different strategies for analysis.

14.5 Critiques and Alternatives

Several lines of critique arise:

• Nominalist and empiricist traditions question whether there are essences robust enough to ground per se relations in the strong scholastic sense.
• Some analytic philosophers replace per se talk with formal notions like analyticity, definition, or property essential to x.
• Others seek to reconstruct a thin or deflationary notion of essence (e.g., as role in explanation or as a pattern of counterfactual dependence), reinterpreting per se accordingly.

Thus, while the vocabulary of per se maps neatly onto long-standing concerns about essence, property, and intrinsicality, contemporary theorists disagree on how, or whether, it should be integrated into current metaphysical frameworks.

15. Translation Challenges and Competing Equivalents

15.1 Polysemy Across Contexts

Translating per se from Latin into modern languages poses difficulties because the phrase simultaneously carries:

• Ontological connotations (“through itself,” “in its own right”),
• Logical connotations (“essentially,” “by definition”),
• Epistemic connotations (“self-evidently”),
• Idiomatic modern senses (“as such,” “in and of itself”).

No single target expression reliably covers all these uses.

15.2 Common English Renderings

Translators typically choose among:

Each choice has trade-offs. For example:

• “In itself” risks confusion with in se, which in some contexts is distinct.
• “Essentially” imports modern connotations of essence that may not exactly match medieval usage.
• “As such” may be too weak or colloquial for technical passages.

15.3 Strategies in Scholarly Translation

Scholars adopt different strategies:

1. Context-sensitive variation: rendering per se differently depending on whether the context is logical, metaphysical, or epistemic.
2. Retention of Latin: leaving per se untranslated in critical passages, sometimes with glosses.
3. Systematic mapping: assigning fixed English equivalents (e.g., always “essentially” or always “in itself”).

Proponents of variation argue it captures contextual nuance; critics note it may obscure the systematic role of per se as a unifying technical term. Retaining Latin preserves precision but can hinder accessibility.

15.4 Cross-Linguistic Issues

Other modern languages face analogous problems:

• French uses en soi, par soi, en tant que tel;
• German uses an sich, für sich, aus sich selbst;
• Italian uses in sé, di per sé.

These expressions themselves have philosophical histories (e.g., an sich in Kant and Hegel), which can introduce unintended resonances when used to translate Latin per se.

15.5 Philosophical Stakes

Translation choices are not merely stylistic. They can:

• Shape interpretations of arguments about essence, causality, and self-evidence,
• Suggest or downplay connections between historically distinct traditions (e.g., scholasticism and German idealism),
• Influence whether per se is seen as primarily logical, metaphysical, or epistemic.

As a result, translators and commentators often explicitly justify their renderings, and scholarly debates persist about the best way to balance fidelity, clarity, and comparative intelligibility.

16. Related Concepts and Contrasting Terms

16.1 Per Accidens

Per accidens (“by accident”) is the standard foil to per se. It designates:

• Predications not grounded in a thing’s essence,
• Causal relations arising from contingent circumstances,
• Beings or aggregates lacking intrinsic unity.

The pair per se / per accidens is central to medieval logic and metaphysics, structuring discussions of necessity, explanation, and ontology.

16.2 In Se and Ad Aliud

In se (“in itself”) contrasts with ad aliud (“toward another”) or quoad nos (“with respect to us”). These distinctions help analyze:

• Intrinsic vs. relational properties,
• A thing considered in its own constitution vs. in relation to knowers or other things.

While often overlapping with per se, in se emphasizes locative or constitutive aspects rather than explanatory ones.

16.3 A Se and Per Aliud

A se (“from itself”) and per aliud (“through another”) articulate dependence relations:

These terms interact with per se when distinguishing:

• Beings that exist through themselves vs. those existing through another,
• Knowledge self-evident per se vs. knowledge mediated per aliud.

16.4 Simpliciter and Secundum Quid

Simpliciter (“simply, without qualification”) and secundum quid (“in a certain respect”) qualify predications:

• A statement may be true per se simpliciter (absolutely, in virtue of essence),
• But false or only contingently true secundum quid.

These adverbs help articulate different “respects” in which a predicate may belong to a subject, avoiding contradictions when the same statement appears both true and false under different aspects.

16.5 Malum In Se and Malum Prohibitum

In ethical and legal contexts, malum in se (evil in itself) contrasts with malum prohibitum (evil because prohibited). This pair uses in se rather than per se, but the underlying idea of intrinsic vs. conventional wrongness parallels per se / per accidens patterns.

16.6 Other Latin and Greek Parallels

Additional related notions include:

• Proprium: a proper attribute belonging per se but not definitional.
• Secundum se: “according to itself,” sometimes a variant for per se in translating καθ᾿ αὑτό.
• Greek αὐτομάτως (automatically, of itself) and δι᾿ αὑτοῦ (through itself), which occasionally intersect with Latin per se in conceptual role.

Together, these terms create a network of concepts used to articulate fine-grained distinctions between intrinsic vs. extrinsic, essential vs. accidental, and self-grounded vs. dependent features of reality and discourse.

17. Per Se in Contemporary Analytic Debates

17.1 Essential vs. Accidental Properties

Contemporary analytic metaphysics frequently discusses essential and accidental properties, often in modal terms (what an object has in all possible worlds where it exists vs. what it has only in some). While the Latin phrase per se is not always used explicitly, its historical role informs:

• Analyses of essence as the properties an object has in virtue of what it is,
• Debates about whether essential properties are metaphysically robust or merely conceptual.

Some authors occasionally use per se for stylistic emphasis (“belongs to x per se, not merely contingently”), though the formal work is typically done by modal operators and definitions of essence.

17.2 Intrinsicality and Independence

In discussions of intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties, philosophers explore criteria for when a property depends only on the object itself. The older vocabulary of per se and in se is sometimes invoked historically, but contemporary debates tend to rely on:

• Supervenience relations,
• Combinatorial or duplication accounts (properties preserved under perfect duplicates).

A few theorists explicitly connect these to per se traditions, arguing that intrinsicality is a secularized descendant of per se predication; others prefer to treat the historical connection as mainly terminological.

17.3 Grounding and Explanation

The modern notion of metaphysical grounding—one fact holding in virtue of another—bears resemblances to scholastic per se explanations. Some philosophers:

• Draw comparisons between grounding claims (“A in virtue of B”) and per se explanatory connections,
• Explore whether grounding can capture the idea of something being true or existing through itself.

Others caution against assimilating grounding too closely to historical notions, emphasizing differences in formalization, scope, and neutrality about essences.

17.4 Self-Evidence and A Priori Knowledge

In epistemology, debates about self-evidence, a priori justification, and conceptual truths echo earlier discussions of per se notum. Analytic philosophers may:

• Define self-evident propositions as those whose understanding suffices for justified belief,
• Differentiate analytic from synthetic a priori truths.

A minority explicitly use per se language (e.g., “true per se”), usually in historical or neo-scholastic contexts. Mainstream analytic epistemology tends instead to prefer vocabulary of justification, entitlement, and rational insight, while acknowledging historical antecedents.

17.5 Neo-Scholastic and Analytic-Scholastic Engagements

There is a growing body of work that attempts to integrate or compare scholastic and analytic frameworks:

• Neo-scholastic authors reintroduce per se distinctions into debates on causality, essence, and natural law.
• Analytic philosophers interested in historical metaphysics sometimes employ per se in reconstructions of Aristotelian or Thomistic arguments.

Views diverge on whether per se can be fully translated into current formal tools (modal logic, grounding theory, property theory) or whether it preserves distinctive insights tied to its original conceptual milieu.

18. Legacy and Historical Significance

18.1 Conceptual Bridge Between Traditions

The phrase per se serves as a conceptual bridge linking:

• Greek philosophy (especially Aristotelian καθ᾿ αὑτό),
• Latin scholasticism,
• Early modern rationalism and scholastic continuations,
• Contemporary philosophical and legal discourse.

Its enduring presence illustrates how a compact linguistic expression can carry complex theoretical roles across languages and eras.

18.2 Influence on Theories of Essence and Science

Historically, per se has been central to:

• The development of essence–accident distinctions,
• Accounts of scientific demonstration in Aristotelian and scholastic traditions,
• Metaphysical analyses of substance, causality, and priority.

Even when modern thinkers abandon overt per se terminology, many of these structures reappear in discussions of essential properties, laws of nature, and explanatory grounding.

18.3 Role in Theological and Metaphysical Doctrines

In Christian, Jewish, and Islamic scholasticisms, per se vocabulary undergirds doctrines of:

• Divine simplicity and self-subsistence (ipsum esse per se subsistens),
• Creation and the dependence of creatures on a being that exists a se,
• Hierarchies of beings classified as more or less per se in their mode of existence.

These uses shape classical theism’s articulation of God’s uniqueness and the contingency of the created order.

18.4 Legal and Normative Legacies

In law and ethics, the survival of expressions like per se rule, libel per se, and malum in se reflects the adaptation of the intrinsic/accidental and in-itself/for-another distinctions to normative evaluation. These categories continue to influence judicial reasoning and moral theory, even as their precise philosophical underpinnings are contested.

18.5 Historiographical and Methodological Significance

For historians of philosophy, the study of per se:

• Illuminates how translation choices (e.g., for καθ᾿ αὑτό) shape entire intellectual traditions,
• Reveals the interdependence of grammar, semantics, and metaphysics,
• Provides a lens for comparing scholastic, early modern, and analytic conceptions of essence, explanation, and self-evidence.

Debates about how to interpret and translate per se continue to inform broader methodological questions: how best to relate historical ontologies to contemporary frameworks, and how linguistic form both reflects and constrains philosophical thought.