post rem

1. Introduction

Post rem is a technical expression of medieval Latin philosophy meaning “after the thing.” It designates the way in which certain entities—especially universals, concepts, and logical structures—exist subsequent to and dependent on individual things, typically as contents of the human mind. Within medieval scholasticism, it functions mainly as an ontological and epistemological label rather than a temporal one.

The phrase gains its full significance only within the broader scholastic triad ante rem – in re – post rem, which maps three distinct “locations” or modes of being for universals:

• Ante rem: before or independently of particulars (for example, in the divine intellect).
• In re: in the things themselves, as common natures instantiated in individuals.
• Post rem: after the things, as universal concepts and logical intentions in the mind.

The term is central to medieval discussions of the problem of universals, to scholastic logic of intentions (first and second intentions), and to later interpretations of realism, nominalism, and conceptualism. Different thinkers deploy post rem to articulate how human cognition moves from singular experiences to universal notions, and how these notions relate to extra‑mental reality.

In subsequent sections, this entry examines the linguistic roots of the expression, its pre‑philosophical uses, its crystallization in medieval metaphysics and logic, and its role in the major positions on universals from high scholasticism to neo‑scholastic and contemporary thought, always focusing on the specific function of post rem within those frameworks.

2. Etymology and Linguistic Origins

The expression post rem derives from two classical Latin elements:

• post: a preposition meaning “after, behind, later than,” indicating posteriority or dependence.
• rem: the accusative singular of rēs, a highly flexible noun meaning “thing, affair, matter, case, reality.”

Basic Latin Structure

In classical usage, post governing the accusative typically signals temporal or sometimes spatial succession. Thus post rem would straightforwardly mean “after the thing” or “after the matter,” with rem referring to some determinate affair or event already mentioned in the discourse.

The choice of the accusative here (rather than an ablative construction) follows standard Latin grammar for prepositions expressing motion toward or position after something in a sequence, contributing to the sense of “subsequent to X” rather than “located at X.”

From Ordinary Phrase to Technical Term

Philologists generally hold that the phrase itself is not originally philosophical. It belongs to a wider family of temporal and narrative markers—such as post hoc (“after this”), postea (“afterwards”), or post id tempus (“after that time”). Over time, scholastic authors adapted this ordinary spatial‑temporal preposition to describe relations of ontological and epistemic posteriority:

• “after” no longer only in time,
• but also “after” in the order of dependence or intelligibility.

When paired systematically with ante rem and in re in twelfth‑ and thirteenth‑century Latin, post rem gains a fixed terminological status. It comes to denote not just something that happens later, but a specific mode of existence—that of universals and intentions as found in the mind following its encounter with concrete things.

3. Semantic Field and Philological Context

The technical meaning of post rem in scholastic philosophy depends on the rich semantic field of rēs and the conceptual network of Latin prepositional phrases that surround it.

The Word rēs

In both classical and medieval Latin, rēs can mean:

• concrete thing or object,
• affair, transaction, or case (especially legal),
• matter or topic under discussion,
• more broadly, an entity or reality.

This breadth allows rēs to serve as a neutral placeholder for whatever is under philosophical scrutiny. When scholastics speak of universals in relation to the rēs, they can mean substances, qualities, or any item of extra‑mental reality.

Prepositional Network Around rēs

Scholastic authors exploit the flexibility of rēs by combining it with prepositions to articulate metaphysical relations:

Philologically, these phrases extend ordinary Latin locutions—originally spatial or temporal—into the domain of “order of being” (ordo essendi) and “order of knowing” (ordo cognoscendi). Medieval authors often rely on case distinctions (accusative vs. ablative) and prepositional contrast to encode subtle metaphysical distinctions that later translators must paraphrase.

Context Within Scholastic Latin

Within scholastic Latin, post rem is closely associated with:

• universale (universal),
• conceptus (concept),
• intentio (intention, mental content),
• secunda intentio (second intention).

Philologically, these co‑occurring terms indicate that post rem is almost always used where the focus is on the mind’s operations and on logical or conceptual structures that presuppose the existence of things already given.

4. Pre-Philosophical Usage of post rem

Before its adoption as a technical term in scholastic metaphysics and logic, the phrase post rem and related constructions appear in Latin sources with straightforward narrative or procedural meanings.

Ordinary Temporal Marker

In classical literature and documentary Latin, phrases of the form post rem (or close variants) function mainly to indicate that one event follows another:

• In historical writing, one might find expressions equivalent to “after the affair (post rem gestām)...” introducing subsequent developments.
• In legal and administrative texts, post rem can mean “after the case” or “after the business (has been settled),” referring to the conclusion of a trial or transaction.

In such contexts, rem usually denotes a specific affair previously mentioned, not a generic metaphysical “thing.”

Pragmatic and Forensic Uses

In forensic or bureaucratic Latin, post rem and related expressions sometimes signal:

• the sequence of procedural steps (“after the matter has been pleaded”),
• the closure of a negotiation or contract (“after the business is done”).

Here, the focus is on temporal order and practical completion, not on any abstract relation between universals and particulars.

Absence of Ontological Content

There is little evidence that pre‑scholastic authors treated post rem as an ontological or epistemological label. When philosophical questions about universals arise in late antiquity (e.g., in Boethius), they tend to be framed without this particular prepositional formula.

Most historians therefore view the scholastic usage of post rem as a semantic specialization of a pre‑existing everyday phrase. The underlying Latin remained the same, but in the school context the expression was reinterpreted to describe a relation of conceptual dependence: what comes “after the thing” not merely in time, but in thought and in the order of explanation.

5. The Scholastic Triad: ante rem, in re, post rem

In medieval discussions of universals, the triad ante rem – in re – post rem becomes a standard classificatory scheme for mapping possible “locations” or modes of being of universals.

Basic Structure of the Triad

The triad structures debate about whether universals exist:

• only in the divine intellect (ante rem),
• in the very constitution of material things (in re),
• or solely in the human mind and language (post rem).

Roles of Each Member

• Ante rem is typically associated with exemplarism and Platonizing or Augustinian views: universals as divine ideas.
• In re expresses the moderate realist claim that there are real common natures in things themselves, although not as separate entities.
• Post rem denotes the epistemic and logical level: universals considered precisely as universals, formed by the intellect through abstraction and reflection.

Function in Systematizing Positions

Scholastic manuals often use the triad to classify major positions on universals:

• Forms of extreme realism emphasize ante rem.
• Moderate realism stresses in re with a correlated post rem component.
• Nominalism and conceptualism restrict universals to post rem.

Thus post rem is never an isolated label; it is one pole of a three‑part scheme that organizes how universals may be related to things and to minds.

6. Philosophical Crystallization in Medieval Metaphysics

The technical use of post rem crystallizes in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when Latin scholastics synthesize Aristotelian, Porphyrian, and Boethian materials with Christian theological concerns.

From Porphyry and Boethius to the Triad

Porphyry’s Isagoge and Boethius’s commentaries raise the problem of universals—whether genera and species exist and, if so, how. Medieval commentators, seeking concise formulas, gradually adopt prepositional phrases with rēs to denote different ontological options.

By the time of high scholasticism:

• ante rem labels universals in the divine intellect or in an ideal realm,
• in re names universality as rooted in common natures of substances,
• post rem marks universals as intellectual constructs, formed after contact with singulars.

Integration into Metaphysical Systems

Various metaphysical systems integrate post rem differently:

• Thomist and other moderate realists treat post‑rem universals as grounded in real common natures in things, yet existing as universals only in the intellect.
• More Platonizing or exemplarist views see post‑rem universals as secondary reflections of primary divine ideas (ante rem).
• Nominalists retain only a mental or linguistic universality post rem, denying any distinct universal “in the thing.”

In each case, post rem marks the ontological and epistemic status of universals as mental or logical rather than extra‑mental substances.

Relation to Orders of Being and Knowing

Scholastics often distinguish:

• ordo essendi (order of being),
• ordo cognoscendi (order of knowing).

Post rem belongs primarily to the order of knowing: it describes how universals appear in human cognition. However, debates arise over how this cognitive level depends on the order of being—whether mental universals faithfully reflect real structures (in re) or merely track similarities among individuals without any real common nature.

This crystallization sets the stage for later disputes about realism, nominalism, and conceptualism, in which the precise meaning of post rem is continuously contested and refined.

7. Post Rem in Theories of Universals

Within medieval theories of universals, post rem specifies one possible mode of existence for universals: as mental or logical entities that arise after the intellect engages with singular things.

Universals as Predicable‑of‑Many

Most scholastics define a universal (universale) as “that which is predicable of many.” The question is: in what sense does such a thing exist?

• If universals exist post rem, they are primarily concepts or intentions in the mind.
• Their capacity to be predicated of many individuals is grounded in the mind’s act of conceiving them so, rather than in a separate universal substance.

Competing Post‑Rem Accounts

There are several main ways to interpret post‑rem universals:

Proponents of moderate realism hold that universals are really in things (in re) but become universal only in the intellect (post rem). Conceptualists downplay or deny real common natures while retaining a strong role for mental universals. Nominalists sometimes speak of universals only as names or mental signs that stand for many.

Dependence on Extra‑Mental Reality

Almost all medieval accounts tie post rem universals to some form of dependence on things:

• Through similarity or resemblance among individuals,
• Through real common natures or forms,
• Through causal influence of singulars on the mind.

Yet they differ on whether the universal has any ontological status beyond its mental existence. In each case, the phrase post rem emphasizes that universals, understood as universals, emerge only after the mind has been affected by, or has abstracted from, particular things.

8. Major Thinkers’ Definitions and Uses

Different medieval and later scholastic thinkers employ post rem within distinct metaphysical and logical frameworks. The following overview highlights some representative patterns.

Thomas Aquinas and Thomist Tradition

In Thomist moderate realism, universals exist in three ways:

• in re: as common natures in individuals,
• post rem: as universal concepts in the intellect,
• and, in a theological register, ante rem: as divine ideas.

Aquinas describes the universal as having “existence in singulars, but intelligibility apart from them.” Post rem marks the intellectual mode in which the common nature, abstracted from individuating conditions, is conceived as one and predicable of many.

"

“The nature of a species is found in individuals, but the notion of universality is received from the intellect.”

— Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 85, a. 2

Later Thomists codify this in the ante/in/post rem triad when teaching metaphysics and logic.

John Duns Scotus and Moderate Realism

Scotus introduces the notion of a formal distinction within things. For him, a “common nature” has a sort of neutrality in re; it is neither universal nor singular in itself. Post rem, in the intellect, this nature receives a universal mode.

Scotus’s followers use post rem especially to classify second intentions—concepts like genus and species, which arise when the mind reflects on its own first concepts.

William of Ockham and Nominalism

Ockham rejects real universals in re. For him, only individuals exist extra‑mentally. Universals exist post rem as:

• conceptus mentis, mental signs naturally signifying many individuals,
• or as spoken/written terms standing for many.

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“A universal is nothing but a mental sign which can be truly predicated of many.”

— William of Ockham, Summa Logicae I, 14

Here post rem marks the only genuine mode of universal existence.

Neo-Scholastics (Maritain, Gilson)

Neo‑scholastic authors reaffirm a Thomistic reading of post rem as the phase in which the intellect, by abstraction, forms universal concepts from sense experience. They stress that these concepts, while existing only in the mind, are objectively grounded in real natures in things.

9. Post Rem in Scholastic Logic and Intentions

In scholastic logic, post rem is closely linked to the theory of intentions (intentiones), particularly the distinction between first and second intentions.

First and Second Intentions

• First intentions (primae intentiones) are direct concepts of things: e.g., man, animal, white. They refer immediately to extra‑mental realities (or at least purport to).
• Second intentions (secundae intentiones) are concepts about concepts: e.g., genus, species, predicate, subject. They arise when the intellect reflects on its own first intentions and on the relations among them.

While first intentions are sometimes said to be “founded on” things in re, second intentions are paradigmatic post rem entities, existing purely as logical constructs.

Logical Status of Post‑Rem Entities

Scholastic logicians characterize post‑rem intentions as:

• dependent on prior acts of understanding (first intentions),
• dealing with predicables (genus, species, difference, property, accident),
• and with logical relations such as inclusion, subordination, and predication.

On many accounts, the proper subject of logic is not things themselves but second intentions—precisely those post‑rem structures by which the mind organizes and reasons about its first concepts.

Post Rem and Logical Universality

The universality of logical notions—such as genus applying to many species—is generally located post rem. These notions do not correspond to distinct entities in reality but to patterns in our conceptual framework. Consequently, post rem marks the level at which logic operates: after the mind has already grasped things and now examines the formal properties of its own conceptual discourse.

10. Contrasts with Ante Rem and In Re Realism

The meaning of post rem becomes clearer when contrasted with the neighboring notions ante rem and in re, which are associated with different strands of realism.

Comparative Overview

Ante Rem vs. Post Rem

Proponents of ante rem universals, influenced by Platonic or Augustinian traditions, hold that true universals exist as exemplary forms in the divine mind or in an intelligible realm. Human post‑rem concepts then mirror or participate in these pre‑existing exemplars.

By contrast, post rem universals:

• arise only after the mind encounters particular things,
• and are often treated as derivative or secondary with respect to ante‑rem exemplars.

Some authors emphasize this dependence; others downplay ante‑rem universals, giving priority to in‑re and post‑rem modes.

In Re vs. Post Rem

Moderate realists distinguish between:

• common natures in re (e.g., human nature present in Socrates and Plato),
• and universals post rem (the concept humanity as predicable of many).

They argue that:

• the reality of the universal’s content comes from its basis in re,
• while its universality as such (being one in many) arises in the intellect post rem.

Critics of this view, especially nominalists, contend that positing any common nature in re is unnecessary. For them, only post rem universals exist, as mental or linguistic entities, and any appeal to in‑re universals is either redundant or incoherent.

Thus, post rem serves both as a bridge and a dividing line between positions that stress extra‑mental universals and those that restrict universality to mental or linguistic domains.

11. Nominalism, Conceptualism, and Post Rem Universals

Within nominalist and conceptualist traditions, post rem often denotes the only mode in which universals exist.

Nominalist Accounts

Nominalists such as William of Ockham deny real universals in re and reject independent ante‑rem forms. For them:

• Only individual substances and qualities exist extra‑mentally.
• Universals are conceptus mentis—mental signs that naturally signify many individuals.
• Spoken and written terms are conventional signs that stand for individuals by institution.

Under this view, universals are strictly post rem: they arise after and in dependence upon individual things but do not correspond to any universal entity outside the mind.

Conceptualist Variants

Some conceptualist positions likewise locate universals solely post rem, but often emphasize:

• the causal grounding of concepts in extra‑mental things,
• or the structural role of concepts in organizing experience.

They may be more willing than strict nominalists to speak of objective similarities among things, while still denying any robust universal in re.

Debates over Cognitive and Linguistic Status

Questions arise about the nature of post‑rem universals in these theories:

• Are they acts of thinking, habits, or mental qualities?
• How do they achieve general reference to many individuals?
• Are logical relations such as genus and species merely features of language or of thought?

Nominalists commonly answer by developing detailed theories of mental language and signification, explaining universality in terms of how a single concept or term can stand for multiple individuals. In every case, post rem marks the level at which universality is fully accounted for without positing extra‑mental universals.

12. Post Rem and the Process of Abstraction

The notion of abstraction (abstractio) is central to explaining how post rem universals arise from encounters with singular things.

Abstraction in Moderate Realism

For moderate realists (notably Thomists):

1. The senses apprehend individuals (this man, this tree).
2. The intellect, operating on sensory images, abstracts the form or nature (e.g., humanity, treeness) by:
   • disregarding individuating conditions (this time, place, matter),
   • retaining what is common.
3. The resulting concept exists post rem in the intellect as a universal, predicable of many.

On this view, abstraction does not create the universal ex nihilo; it draws out a form that is already present in things in a particularized way.

Alternative Accounts of Abstraction

Other traditions interpret abstraction differently:

• Some exemplarist authors stress that abstraction helps the mind “rise” from singulars to ante‑rem divine ideas. The post‑rem concept thus serves as a mediated reflection of a higher exemplar.
• Nominalists often reinterpret abstraction as a process of mental attention or selection, whereby the intellect focuses on certain similarities among individuals without positing a shared form in re. The resulting universal remains strictly post rem.

Post Rem as the Endpoint of Abstraction

In all these views, post rem designates the endpoint of abstraction:

• a universal concept,
• formed after cognitive engagement with singulars,
• structurally capable of being attributed to many.

The disputes concern what this process presupposes in reality and how much ontological commitment it entails beyond the mental act itself.

13. Related Concepts and Doctrinal Neighbors

The technical use of post rem in medieval philosophy is tightly connected to a cluster of related notions and doctrines.

Universale and Rēs

• Universale (universal) is the primary item said to exist post rem.
• Rēs (thing) provides the reference point: universals are after the thing they are about.

The relation between universale and rēs is interpreted differently by various schools—either as reflection of a real common nature, or as a mental grouping of similar individuals.

Intentio and Secundae Intentiones

• Intentio refers to a mental “aim” or content; intentiones secundae are second‑order contents about concepts.
• These second intentions (e.g., genus, species, predicate) are standardly treated as post rem, since they arise only after the mind has formed first concepts of things.

Conceptus Mentis and Mental Language

• Conceptus mentis (mental concept) is the post‑rem entity in nominalist and conceptualist theories.
• The doctrine of a lingua mentalis (mental language) elaborates how such concepts function as signs within thought, providing a detailed account of post‑rem universals without extra‑mental counterparts.

Exemplarism and Divine Ideas

• Exemplarism posits divine ideas or exemplars ante rem.
• Post‑rem universals in human minds are then often portrayed as images or participations in these exemplars, mediated by experience of created things.

Realism and Nominalism

The broader debate between realismus moderatus and nominalismus frames the meaning of post rem:

• Moderate realism treats post‑rem universals as conceptually distinct but ontologically grounded in real natures in re.
• Nominalism and certain forms of conceptualism interpret post‑rem universals as the whole story about universals, with no further ontological layer.

These surrounding concepts and doctrines shape how post rem is understood and how much metaphysical weight it is given.

14. Translation Challenges and Interpretive Issues

Rendering post rem and its scholastic nuances into modern languages raises several interpretive difficulties.

Temporal vs. Ontological “After”

Literal translations—“after the thing,” “posterior to the thing”—may suggest mere temporal succession, whereas scholastic authors typically intend an ontological or epistemic posteriority:

• The universal concept is “after” the thing in the order of knowing,
• and often dependent on the thing in the order of being.

Translators must often clarify whether “after” is to be taken temporally, causally, or structurally.

Isolating Post Rem from the Triad

Another difficulty is that post rem is rarely intended in isolation. Its meaning is triadic, contrasting with ante rem and in re. Modern translations that render it simply as “in the mind” or “conceptual” can obscure:

• how it relates to potential ante‑rem divine ideas,
• or to in‑re common natures.

Scholars sometimes retain the Latin or use paraphrases like “as existing in the mind, after and because of things,” to signal its place in the triad.

Case and Preposition Nuances

Latin case usage (accusative with post) and prepositional contrasts encode subtle distinctions that modern languages lack. For example:

• ante rem vs. post rem suggests a structural ordering around the same rēs.
• The preposition in in in re may mislead modern readers into spatial interpretations, while scholastics use it analogically.

Translators have to choose between literal fidelity and explanatory paraphrase.

Interpretive Disagreements

Historians and philosophers differ on how strongly to emphasize:

• the mentalistic aspect of post‑rem universals,
• versus their objective grounding in reality (in realist readings).

Consequently, phrases such as “merely conceptual” or “purely mental” may overstate one side of the historical debate. Many scholarly works therefore preserve post rem untranslated, explaining its nuances in commentary rather than forcing a single English equivalent.

15. Post Rem in Neo-Scholastic and Contemporary Thought

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, neo‑scholastic revival movements reappropriated post rem as part of a renewed Thomistic and scholastic framework.

Neo-Scholastic Thomism

Neo‑Thomists such as Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson emphasize:

• that universals exist post rem as intelligible contents of the human mind,
• that they are formed through abstraction from sense experience,
• and that they are objectively grounded in real natures in re.

They deploy the ante/in/post rem triad pedagogically to distinguish:

• divine ideas (ante rem),
• natures in things (in re),
• and human concepts (post rem).

Post‑rem universals become a key element in their defense of a realist epistemology against empiricist or idealist critiques, while still stressing the mind’s active role in forming universal notions.

Twentieth-Century Systematizations

Scholastic manuals of logic and metaphysics, widely used in seminaries and Catholic universities, routinely classify universals and second intentions as post rem, reinforcing this technical vocabulary in teaching.

These works often integrate post rem into discussions of:

• the scientific status of metaphysics (universal concepts as bases for scientific knowledge),
• the nature of logical form,
• and the relation between language, thought, and reality.

Contemporary Historical and Analytic Uses

In contemporary philosophy and intellectual history:

• Historians of medieval philosophy employ post rem mainly as a descriptive label, explaining how medieval authors located universals in the mind.
• Some analytic metaphysicians and philosophers of language draw analogies between post‑rem universals and modern notions of concepts, properties, or predicates, though many prefer to use native English terminology.

The Latin phrase is thus retained chiefly in scholarly discussions of medieval texts and in comparative work on theories of universals, cognition, and logical form.

16. Comparative Perspectives: Medieval and Modern Debates

Comparing medieval uses of post rem with modern debates on universals and concepts reveals both continuities and divergences.

Medieval Post Rem and Modern Concepts

Many contemporary philosophers speak of:

• concepts in the mind,
• intensions (as opposed to extensions),
• or mental representations.

These may resemble medieval post‑rem universals in being:

• mental items,
• predicable of many,
• and structured by logical relations.

However, modern theories often emerge within different frameworks (e.g., cognitive science, analytic philosophy of language) and do not presuppose the ante/in/post rem triad or the same metaphysical background.

Parallels with Nominalism and Conceptualism

Modern nominalist or conceptualist positions sometimes parallel medieval views that locate universals only post rem:

• Some contemporary nominalists treat universals as linguistic or conceptual constructs with no extra‑mental correlates.
• Others adopt trope theory or class nominalism, which can be compared to medieval efforts to explain similarity without in‑re universals.

These parallels are often noted in scholarly literature, though the technical details and motivations may differ substantially.

Realist Comparisons

Modern realist theories of universals—whether Platonic (universals as abstract entities) or Aristotelian (universals in things)—can be lined up with the ante rem and in re poles of the medieval triad. In this context, post rem corresponds roughly to the epistemic and conceptual side of universals, akin to contemporary discussions of how we grasp or think about universals.

Methodological Differences

Modern debates often proceed with:

• formal logic,
• set theory,
• or semantic theories of reference and meaning.

Medieval debates use:

• intentionality theory,
• metaphysics of form and matter,
• and the scholastic logic of terms and propositions.

Comparative work therefore requires careful translation between conceptual frameworks. Still, the medieval notion of post rem remains a useful reference point for situating historical and contemporary positions on the status of universals in the mind.

17. Legacy and Historical Significance

The concept of post rem has left a lasting imprint on the history of metaphysics, logic, and epistemology.

Structuring the Problem of Universals

By providing a concise label for universals as mental or logical entities, post rem helped medieval thinkers:

• distinguish clearly between ontological and epistemic questions,
• and articulate nuanced combinations of realism and nominalism.

The ante/in/post rem triad, with its post‑rem component, became a standard framework for teaching and debating the problem of universals for centuries.

Influence on Logic and Philosophy of Mind

The close association of post rem with second intentions and mental language contributed to:

• the development of sophisticated term logic,
• early theories of intentionality,
• and accounts of how the mind can conceive and reason about generalities.

These discussions anticipate later concerns in the philosophy of mind and language about the nature of concepts and their relation to reality.

Transmission Through Neo-Scholasticism

Neo‑scholastic revivals in the modern era kept the terminology of post rem alive, especially in Catholic education. This ensured that:

• the medieval distinctions remained accessible to twentieth‑century philosophers,
• and could be brought into dialogue with analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science.

Ongoing Scholarly Relevance

Today, post rem is primarily a historical and interpretive tool. It enables scholars to:

• classify medieval positions on universals,
• compare them systematically with modern theories,
• and trace continuities and ruptures in the long‑term discussion of how universal thought relates to particular reality.

In this way, the notion of post rem continues to frame scholarly understanding of medieval intellectual life and its contribution to enduring philosophical questions.