Arnold Gehlen
Arnold Gehlen was a German sociologist and philosophical anthropologist whose work became a central reference for 20th‑century theories of human nature, institutions, and modernity. Trained in philosophy and influenced by Hans Driesch and Max Scheler, Gehlen rejected purely idealist or existential conceptions of the human being. Instead, he proposed a naturalistic and institutional understanding: humans are biologically "deficient" and "world‑open" beings who survive only by stabilizing their volatile drives through culture, technology, and, above all, institutions. This framework offered a powerful, if controversial, foundation for conservative social and political theory in post‑war West Germany. Gehlen’s career was compromised by his engagement with National Socialism, a fact that has shaped critical reception of his work. Nevertheless, his analyses of action, habit, and institutions influenced later philosophers and social theorists, including Niklas Luhmann, Jürgen Habermas (often in critical opposition), and various strands of conservative and communitarian thought. His reflections on technology, bureaucracy, and mass culture anticipate later debates about functional differentiation, social control, and the fragility of normative orders in "late" modern societies.
At a Glance
- Field
- Thinker
- Born
- 1904-01-29 — Leipzig, Kingdom of Saxony, German Empire
- Died
- 1976-01-30 — Hamburg, Federal Republic of GermanyCause: Natural causes (age-related illness, specific cause not prominently documented)
- Active In
- Germany
- Interests
- Philosophical anthropologyTheory of institutionsTechnology and modernityAction theoryConservatism and orderSocial structuresBiological foundations of culture
Arnold Gehlen’s thought centers on a philosophical anthropology that views the human being as a biologically "deficient" yet "world‑open" creature who compensates for its instinctual underdetermination through action, habit, and, above all, the creation of institutions, which provide stable frameworks that relieve individuals from decision overload and secure the continuity of culture; the crisis of modernity, in his view, stems from the erosion and over‑reflexive critique of these institutions, leading to disorientation and moral "hypermorality" in late modern societies.
Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt
Composed: 1937–1940
Urmensch und Spätkultur
Composed: 1950–1961
Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter
Composed: 1957–1962
Moral und Hypermoral. Eine Streitschrift gegen die Ethik des Wertrelativismus
Composed: 1965–1969
Anthropologische Forschung. Zur Selbstbegegnung und Selbstentdeckung des Menschen
Composed: 1950–1961
Man is a deficient being, not equipped with specialized instincts, and precisely this biological poverty compels him to create a second nature in the form of culture and institutions.— Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (1940)
Gehlen’s programmatic statement of his philosophical anthropology, explaining why human under‑specialization leads to the construction of durable social orders.
Institutions relieve the human being by transforming unpredictable situations into typical cases and by prescribing roles that make action expectable.— Urmensch und Spätkultur (1961)
Defines institutions in functional terms as mechanisms of "relief" that stabilize behavior and reduce complexity in everyday life.
The more institutions are weakened, the more the individual is overtaxed by demands for decision and self‑orientation.— Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter (1957)
Part of Gehlen’s critique of late modernity, arguing that institutional erosion burdens individuals with unsustainable autonomy and choice.
Hypermorality arises when the moral claims valid within small groups are extended without limit to all relations, dissolving the boundaries of responsibility.— Moral und Hypermoral (1969)
Explains his concept of "hypermorality" as overextended moral universalism that undermines the functional differentiation of modern societies.
Action is the basic form in which man relates to the world; perception and knowledge are already integrated into horizons of possible action.— Anthropologische Forschung (1961)
Expresses his action‑theoretical perspective, emphasizing that human cognition is oriented toward practical engagement with the environment.
Formative Years and Neo‑Vitalist Influences (1920s–early 1930s)
During his university studies in Leipzig, Gehlen worked under Hans Driesch and engaged with neo‑Kantianism and phenomenology. He initially explored vitalist and realist metaphysics, but gradually turned toward a biologically informed philosophical anthropology that emphasized human action and embodiment rather than pure consciousness.
Nazi Era and Early Anthropological Synthesis (1933–1945)
Gehlen joined the Nazi Party and held academic posts in Königsberg, Vienna, and Leipzig. While operating within the intellectual climate of the regime, he developed the core ideas of "Der Mensch": the human as a biologically deficient yet world‑open being, and the necessity of institutions to stabilize behavior. These ideas, though philosophically original, are entangled in a politically compromised context.
Post‑War Rehabilitation and Institutional Theory (1945–1960)
After denazification, Gehlen resumed his academic career in Hamburg and later Aachen. He systematized his theory of institutions as "relief" mechanisms that protect individuals from overload, routinize expectations, and create durable orders. This phase includes his move toward a more sociological and less explicitly biological vocabulary, making his thought influential in post‑war social theory.
Critique of Late Modernity and Conservative Public Intellectual (1960–1976)
In works like "Urmensch und Spätkultur" and "Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter", Gehlen analyzed advanced industrial societies as "late cultures" marked by institutional erosion, technological acceleration, and mass media. He argued that the weakening of institutions produces disorientation and normlessness, articulating a conservative critique of cultural liberalization that resonated in West German public debates.
1. Introduction
Arnold Gehlen (1904–1976) was a German philosopher and sociologist best known for developing a biologically informed philosophical anthropology and a functionalist theory of institutions. Working in the mid‑20th century and active both before and after 1945, he sought to explain how human beings—conceived as biologically under‑specialized “deficient beings” (Mängelwesen)—stabilize their lives through culture, technology, and durable social structures.
Gehlen’s work occupies a distinctive position within Continental social thought. Unlike existentialist or purely hermeneutic approaches, he grounded his account of human agency in evolutionary biology and comparative zoology, while also drawing on sociology, psychology, and cultural history. His concept of “world‑openness” (Weltoffenheit) framed humans as capable of adapting to many environments, yet therefore in need of external supports such as institutions, routines, and roles that provide “relief” (Entlastung) from the burdens of constant decision‑making.
In post‑war West Germany, Gehlen became a key reference point for conservative social philosophy. His analyses of modern technology, bureaucracy, and what he called “late culture” (Spätkultur) articulated concerns about institutional erosion, mass democracy, and cultural liberalization. His polemical notion of “hypermorality” (Hypermoral) criticized expansive moral claims that, in his view, ignore institutional responsibilities.
Scholarly reception has been sharply divided. Supporters emphasize his systematic account of action and institutions and see his work as a bridge between philosophy and social science. Critics highlight his involvement with National Socialism, question the biological and conservative premises of his anthropology, and dispute his assessments of modernity. Subsequent thinkers, including Niklas Luhmann and Jürgen Habermas, have engaged his theories as important, if controversial, points of reference in debates on social order, functional differentiation, and the normative foundations of modern societies.
2. Life and Historical Context
2.1 Biographical Overview
Arnold Gehlen was born on 29 January 1904 in Leipzig and studied philosophy there, completing his habilitation in 1930. Early academic influences included Hans Driesch and currents of neo‑Kantianism and phenomenology. In the 1930s he held positions in Leipzig, Königsberg, and Vienna.
Gehlen joined the Nazi Party (NSDAP) in 1934 and pursued his career within the university system of the Third Reich. Scholars differ in assessing the depth of his political commitment: some emphasize opportunism and careerism, others see more substantive affinities with authoritarian and nationalist ideas. What is broadly agreed is that his later reputation was significantly shaped by these years.
After 1945, Gehlen underwent denazification and, following a temporary exclusion from university posts, was appointed to the Pädagogische Hochschule Altona in 1947, later integrated into the University of Hamburg. From the 1950s he held a prominent chair at the Technische Hochschule Aachen, becoming an influential voice in West German intellectual life until his death in Hamburg on 30 January 1976.
2.2 Historical and Intellectual Milieu
Gehlen’s thinking developed across three major German regimes—Imperial, Weimar, and National Socialist Germany—and then the Federal Republic. The upheavals of World War I, the instability of Weimar democracy, and the experience of totalitarianism formed the backdrop to his strong emphasis on order, institutions, and skepticism toward mass politics.
Post‑war West Germany’s rapid economic growth, technological modernization, and democratization provided the context for his analysis of “late culture” and societal change. He participated in conservative Catholic and bourgeois circles (for example, around the newspaper Christ und Welt), commenting on student protests, cultural liberalization, and the expansion of welfare‑state institutions. His work thus reflects, and in turn shaped, broader debates about authority, modernization, and the legacy of fascism in mid‑20th‑century Europe.
| Year | Contextual Event | Relevance for Gehlen |
|---|---|---|
| 1918 | End of WWI, collapse of Empire | Frames his generation’s concern with order |
| 1933 | Nazi seizure of power | Conditions his early academic career |
| 1945 | End of WWII, denazification | Forces intellectual and institutional reset |
| 1960s | Student movement, cultural shift | Background to his critique of late modernity |
3. Intellectual Development
3.1 Formative Phase: Vitalism and Philosophical Anthropology
In the 1920s and early 1930s, Gehlen’s work was shaped by Hans Driesch’s neo‑vitalism, neo‑Kantian debates about science, and phenomenological discussions of embodiment. He initially explored metaphysical questions about life and organism, but gradually turned toward philosophical anthropology, seeking a comprehensive account of the human being that integrated biology and culture. During this phase, he was also influenced by Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner, whose anthropologies emphasized human distinctiveness, though he later distanced himself from their more phenomenological approaches.
3.2 Nazi‑Era Synthesis
The 1930s and early 1940s saw the consolidation of Gehlen’s core ideas, culminating in Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (1940). Here he formulated his influential thesis of the human as a “deficient being” and elaborated the necessity of institutions for stabilizing behavior. Scholars debate how far this synthesis was shaped by the ideological climate of National Socialism. Some argue that his focus on order and authority resonated with authoritarian politics; others stress the relative autonomy and broader scientific sources of his anthropology.
3.3 Post‑War Reorientation and Sociological Turn
After 1945, Gehlen reframed many of his ideas in more sociological and less explicitly biological language. Works such as Anthropologische Forschung (1961) and Urmensch und Spätkultur (1961) expanded his analysis of action, habit, and institutions, engaging more systematically with empirical social science and cultural history. Commentators often describe this as a move from a primarily philosophical to an anthropological‑sociological orientation, while noting substantial continuity in fundamental premises.
3.4 Late Phase: Critique of Modernity and Moral Theory
From the late 1950s to the 1970s, Gehlen focused on diagnosing advanced industrial societies. In Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter and Moral und Hypermoral (1969), he developed notions of late culture, institutional erosion, and hypermorality. His stance here is widely viewed as conservative, expressing skepticism toward expanding rights discourses, pacifism, and student radicalism. Some interpreters see this as a coherent extension of his institutional theory; others regard it as a more polemical, politically inflected departure from his earlier, more analytic work.
4. Major Works
4.1 Overview of Key Texts
| Original Title | English Title | Focus |
|---|---|---|
| Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (1940) | Man: His Nature and Place in the World | Systematic philosophical anthropology |
| Anthropologische Forschung (1961) | Studies in Anthropological Sociology and Social Psychology | Empirical and theoretical studies on human action |
| Urmensch und Spätkultur (1961) | Primitive Man and Late Culture | Institutions, cultural evolution, modernity |
| Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter (1957–62) | Man in the Age of Technology | Technology, bureaucracy, psychological effects |
| Moral und Hypermoral (1969) | Moral and Hypermorality | Ethics, value theory, critique of moral universalism |
4.2 Der Mensch (1940)
This work lays out Gehlen’s foundational thesis that humans are biologically deficient yet world‑open beings whose survival depends on constructing a “second nature” through tools, language, and institutions. It combines zoological comparisons, developmental psychology, and philosophical argument to explain how action, rather than contemplation, is the primary mode of human world‑relation.
“Man is a deficient being, not equipped with specialized instincts, and precisely this biological poverty compels him to create a second nature in the form of culture and institutions.”
— Arnold Gehlen, Der Mensch
4.3 Urmensch und Spätkultur and Institutional Theory
In Urmensch und Spätkultur, Gehlen traces a long arc from “primitive man” to “late culture”, developing a systematic theory of institutions as mechanisms of relief (Entlastung) that transform unpredictable situations into typical cases and stabilize expectations. The book connects anthropological premises with analyses of modern bureaucracy, law, and mass organizations.
4.4 Works on Technology and Morality
Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter explores how technological systems and bureaucratic routines reshape perception, motivation, and identity, while Moral und Hypermoral criticizes value relativism and what Gehlen calls “hypermorality”—the extension of small‑group moral sentiments to all social relations. These texts are central to his late critique of modernity and have been focal points for both interest and controversy in his reception.
5. Core Ideas in Philosophical Anthropology
5.1 The Human as “Deficient Being” (Mängelwesen)
Gehlen’s anthropology begins from the biological thesis that humans lack strong, fixed instincts and morphological specialization. Compared with animals, human infants are neotenous, dependent, and behaviorally underdetermined. This deficiency is not merely negative: it creates flexibility and the possibility of diverse forms of life. Proponents of this reading see in Gehlen a naturalistic explanation of human plasticity and cultural creativity.
5.2 World‑Openness (Weltoffenheit) and Environmental Flexibility
Because they are not tied to a single ecological niche, humans are “world‑open”—capable of adapting to varied environments and constructing new ones. For Gehlen, this openness generates both opportunity and instability: without fixed patterns of behavior, humans must actively structure their surroundings. Critics argue that this contrast with animal life can be overstated, pointing to complex animal learning; supporters respond that Gehlen highlights differences of degree with far‑reaching consequences.
5.3 Action, Habit, and Second Nature
Gehlen places action (Handeln) at the center of human existence. Perception and cognition are interpreted as oriented toward possible actions:
“Action is the basic form in which man relates to the world; perception and knowledge are already integrated into horizons of possible action.”
— Arnold Gehlen, Anthropologische Forschung
Through repeated actions, humans build habits that reduce situational complexity and form a “second nature”. Habits, techniques, and routines channel drives into stable patterns, enabling individuals to cope with their biological under‑specialization.
5.4 From Individual to Social Structures
While initially focused on the organism and its environment, Gehlen’s anthropology tends toward social theory: the same mechanisms that produce habits at the individual level scale up to customs, roles, and institutions. Many commentators therefore regard his philosophical anthropology as the anthropological foundation of his later theory of social order. Others contend that his biological premises unduly constrain his understanding of culture and underplay conflict, power, and historical contingency.
6. Theory of Institutions and Social Order
6.1 Definition and Functions of Institutions
For Gehlen, institutions are durable complexes of norms, roles, and practices—such as the family, law, the state, religion, and professional organizations—that structure expectations and behavior. Their central function is Entlastung (“relief” or “offloading”): by standardizing situations, they reduce the need for constant individual decision‑making.
“Institutions relieve the human being by transforming unpredictable situations into typical cases and by prescribing roles that make action expectable.”
— Arnold Gehlen, Urmensch und Spätkultur
6.2 Institutions as Drive‑Control and Stabilization
Because humans are, in his view, drive‑rich and instinct‑poor, institutions channel drives into socially acceptable and functionally useful forms (for example, sexuality into family structures, aggression into legal and military orders). This drive‑control contributes to social integration and predictability. Supporters argue that this offers a powerful explanation of how complex societies maintain order; critics contend that it risks naturalizing existing institutions by presenting them as anthropological necessities.
6.3 Roles, Authority, and Legitimacy
Institutions operate through roles that confer responsibilities, powers, and expectations on individuals (judge, teacher, parent, citizen). Gehlen emphasizes the importance of authority—not merely coercive, but taken‑for‑granted legitimacy that allows roles to function without continuous justification. Sociologists have compared this to later role theory and functionalism, noting similarities with Talcott Parsons and, via critical transformation, with Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory.
6.4 Change, Crisis, and Institutional Erosion
Institutions are not static. Gehlen acknowledges that they evolve but warns that over‑reflexive criticism, rapid social change, and technological acceleration can weaken institutional authority. When norms lose their taken‑for‑granted status, individuals face decision overload and social order becomes fragile. Some interpreters see this as a conservative defense of traditional institutions; others read it as a more general theory of the conditions for stable social coordination, potentially compatible with institutional reform and democratization.
7. Technology, Late Culture, and Hypermorality
7.1 Technology and the Technical Age
In Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter, Gehlen analyzes how technology and large‑scale organizations reshape human life. Technological systems, he argues, extend human capacities but also create abstract, mediated environments in which direct experience is replaced by technical operations and bureaucratic procedures. This increases the demand for specialized roles and functional rationality, while potentially weakening traditional value orientations.
7.2 The Concept of “Late Culture” (Spätkultur)
Gehlen uses Spätkultur to describe highly developed, technologically advanced societies characterized by:
- extensive differentiation of institutions,
- mass media and consumer culture,
- heightened individualism and reflexivity.
In late cultures, institutional authority is increasingly questioned, while cultural production proliferates. For Gehlen, this combination produces overstimulation and normative ambiguity. Supporters of his analysis see prescient insights into contemporary consumer and media societies; critics argue that the concept underplays emancipatory gains of modernization and tends to idealize earlier, more hierarchical orders.
7.3 Hypermorality (Hypermoral)
In Moral und Hypermoral, Gehlen distinguishes between “moral” obligations tied to concrete institutions (family, profession, state) and “hypermorality”, where sentiments appropriate to intimate circles (care, unconditional solidarity) are universalized to all social relations:
“Hypermorality arises when the moral claims valid within small groups are extended without limit to all relations, dissolving the boundaries of responsibility.”
— Arnold Gehlen, Moral und Hypermoral
He associates hypermorality with pacifism, certain human‑rights discourses, and value ethics that, in his view, neglect the functional limits of institutions. Proponents consider this a warning against moral overextension that can undermine institutional roles (for example, in law or politics). Critics, especially from critical theory and liberal perspectives, contend that Gehlen mischaracterizes universalistic ethics, downplays structural injustice, and uses “hypermorality” polemically against democratic and humanitarian movements.
8. Methodology and Interdisciplinary Approach
8.1 Philosophical Anthropology as a “Bridge Discipline”
Gehlen conceives philosophical anthropology as a bridge between philosophy and the empirical sciences. He draws on zoology, evolutionary biology, psychology, ethnology, and sociology to construct a general theory of the human. Rather than starting from transcendental conditions of knowledge or existential experience, he begins with the organism in its environment and derives cognitive, cultural, and institutional structures from this base.
8.2 Naturalism and Anti‑Psychologism
Methodologically, Gehlen adopts a naturalistic orientation: human capacities are understood as products of biological evolution and adaptive behavior. At the same time, he opposes reducing social phenomena to individual psychology. Institutions, for example, are treated as objective structures with their own logic, not mere aggregates of subjective attitudes. This stance has been compared to Durkheimian sociology, though Gehlen grounds his approach more explicitly in biology and action theory.
8.3 Use of Comparative and Functional Analysis
Gehlen employs comparative methods (animal–human comparisons, “primitive”–“late” culture contrasts) and functional explanations. He frequently asks what function a given practice or institution performs in terms of relief, drive‑control, and stabilization. Supporters argue that this yields a powerful, integrative framework; critics claim it risks functionalist tautology (explaining persistence by presumed function) and can obscure conflict, power relations, and contingency.
| Methodological Element | Description |
|---|---|
| Biological comparison | Derives human distinctiveness from zoological contrasts |
| Functionalism | Explains institutions via their stabilizing functions |
| Interdisciplinary data | Uses findings from psychology, ethnology, sociology |
8.4 Relation to Other Traditions
Gehlen positions himself against purely existential and value‑philosophical approaches (such as some readings of Scheler) and against Marxist reductions of culture to economic relations. His methodology has been interpreted as an alternative to both phenomenology and historical materialism, influencing later systems theory and parts of conservative social science. Detractors argue that his starting point in biological anthropology predetermines conservative conclusions and underestimates the transformative potential of praxis and communication.
9. Reception, Criticism, and Political Controversies
9.1 Early and Post‑War Reception
In the 1940s, Der Mensch attracted attention within German philosophical anthropology, alongside works by Scheler and Plessner. After 1945, Gehlen’s reintegration into academia and republication of his works led to renewed discussion. In the 1950s and 1960s he became a widely cited figure in West German sociology and social philosophy, especially in debates on institutions, modernization, and technology.
9.2 Influence on Later Theory
Gehlen’s ideas influenced Niklas Luhmann, who reworked the notion of institutional relief within systems theory, and informed debates about role theory and functionalism. Jürgen Habermas and other members of the Frankfurt School engaged critically with his work, often treating it as a paradigmatic conservative anthropology that prioritizes order over emancipation.
9.3 Critiques of Anthropological and Social Theory
Critics have raised several recurring objections:
- Biological reductionism: Some argue that Gehlen overstates the role of biological deficiency, neglecting historical and cultural variability.
- Functionalist conservatism: Others contend that by explaining institutions in terms of stabilizing functions, he tends to legitimize existing orders and underplay domination and conflict.
- View of modernity: His diagnosis of “late culture” and “hypermorality” is seen by many as pessimistic and insufficiently attentive to democratic gains, gender equality, and human rights.
Defenders respond that his framework is compatible with institutional reform and that functional explanations need not entail normative endorsement.
9.4 Political Involvement and Controversy
Gehlen’s membership in the Nazi Party and his academic career under the Third Reich have been central to debates about his legacy. Some scholars document instances where he aligned himself with regime discourses; others stress that his core anthropological theses neither presuppose nor entail specifically Nazi ideology. In the post‑war period, his role as a conservative public intellectual—critical of student movements, pacifism, and liberalization—reinforced perceptions of him as a right‑leaning thinker.
Interpretations diverge: some see a continuity between his pre‑ and post‑war authoritarian leanings, others emphasize modifications and context shifts. The question of how far his political engagements shape the use and evaluation of his theoretical contributions remains a live issue in contemporary scholarship.
10. Legacy and Historical Significance
10.1 Place within Philosophical Anthropology and Social Theory
Gehlen is widely regarded as one of the principal figures of 20th‑century philosophical anthropology, alongside Scheler and Plessner. His formulation of humans as deficient yet world‑open beings and his emphasis on action, habit, and institutions helped reorient anthropology toward an integrative, biologically informed, and sociologically sensitive discipline. In social theory, his institutional functionalism contributed to later debates on social order, role structures, and systems theory.
10.2 Impact on Debates about Modernity, Technology, and Morality
His analyses of technology, bureaucracy, and late culture anticipated later concerns about complexity, alienation, and the overload of individuals in advanced societies. The concept of Entlastung has been taken up, modified, or echoed in discussions of cognitive offloading, routine, and organizational design. His critique of hypermorality remains a reference point in conservative and communitarian critiques of universalistic ethics, even as many philosophers contest his conclusions.
10.3 Continuing Controversies and Selective Appropriations
Gehlen’s legacy is marked by selective appropriation. Some theorists adopt his concepts of institution, relief, and world‑openness while distancing themselves from his conservative diagnoses of modernity or from his Nazi‑era entanglements. Others treat his work chiefly as an instructive foil against which to articulate alternative, more emancipatory anthropologies and social theories.
| Domain | Typical Use of Gehlen’s Ideas |
|---|---|
| Systems theory | Functional relief, complexity reduction |
| Conservative political thought | Defense of institutions, critique of hypermorality |
| Critical theory & ethics | Negative foil in debates on normativity and modernity |
10.4 Assessment in Contemporary Scholarship
Current research tends to situate Gehlen historically, emphasizing both his systematic originality and the political ambivalence of his work. Some scholars argue that, stripped of some polemical elements, his concepts offer valuable tools for analyzing institutional fragility and technological societies. Others stress that his framework is inseparable from a contentious political orientation and a problematic biological grounding.
Overall, Gehlen is viewed as a major but controversial figure whose ideas continue to inform, challenge, and provoke discussions in anthropology, sociology, political theory, and the philosophy of technology.
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title = {Arnold Gehlen},
author = {Philopedia},
year = {2025},
url = {https://philopedia.com/thinkers/arnold-gehlen/},
urldate = {December 11, 2025}
}Note: This entry was last updated on 2025-12-10. For the most current version, always check the online entry.