Galen John Strawson

1. Introduction

Galen John Strawson (b. 1952) is a contemporary analytic philosopher whose work has become a central reference point in debates about consciousness, free will, and the nature of the self. Writing largely within the Anglo‑American analytic tradition, he combines close argumentative analysis with an insistence that philosophy must stay faithful to the phenomenology of lived experience.

In the philosophy of mind, Strawson is known for defending realist and non‑reductionist claims about consciousness while still describing himself as a physicalist. He argues that conscious experience is the most certain feature of reality and that any adequate physicalism must therefore treat experience as itself physical. This position underpins his influential formulation of “realistic monism,” which many commentators classify as a form of panpsychism.

In action theory and moral philosophy, Strawson is widely associated with his “Basic Argument” for the impossibility of ultimate moral responsibility. He maintains that no finite being can be causa sui—cause of itself—in the way that would be required to be ultimately responsible for its actions or character, a view that places him among the most prominent contemporary skeptics about free will in the strong, responsibility‑grounding sense.

Strawson has also played a major role in reorienting debates about selfhood. He challenges influential claims that human beings are essentially narrative selves, proposing instead that many psychologically healthy people are episodic, experiencing themselves in short‑term stretches of consciousness without organizing their lives as stories.

Across these areas, his work is frequently cited both by supporters, who see it as a rigorous defense of experience‑first metaphysics, and by critics, who question its implications for naturalism, responsibility, and personal identity.

2. Life and Historical Context

2.1 Biographical Sketch

Strawson was born on 9 April 1952 in Leeds, England, into a well‑known philosophical family; his father was the Oxford philosopher P. F. Strawson. Educated at the University of Oxford (Jesus College), he read Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE), then completed a DPhil in philosophy in 1979. His academic career has included positions at Oxford, the University of Reading, the University of Texas at Austin, and the University of British Columbia, among others, placing him within both British and North American analytic communities.

2.2 Institutional and Intellectual Setting

Strawson’s work emerged against the backdrop of late‑20th‑century analytic philosophy, marked by:

2.3 Historical Position

Commentators typically situate Strawson within the analytic metaphysical revival of the late 20th century, but note that his strong emphasis on phenomenology and experience‑description distinguishes him from more purely formal or language‑oriented strands. His career overlaps with major figures in consciousness studies (such as David Chalmers and Daniel Dennett), free will theory (e.g., Peter van Inwagen, Harry Frankfurt), and narrative ethics (e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre), whose positions often serve as foils for his own.

3. Intellectual Development

3.1 Early Metaphysical and Mind Interests (1970s–early 1980s)

In his formative Oxford years, Strawson engaged deeply with traditional analytic questions about truth, reference, and ontology, but his early writings already show a distinctive concern with experience rather than language as the basic datum of philosophy. Influenced but not constrained by P. F. Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics, he began to explore how the reality of consciousness constrains metaphysical theorizing.

3.2 Free Will and Responsibility Phase (mid‑1980s–1990s)

The publication of Freedom and Belief (1986) marks a clear phase focused on free will, determinism, and moral responsibility. Here Strawson formulates the Basic Argument and develops a systematic critique of both compatibilist and libertarian accounts. During this period he refines his skepticism about ultimate moral responsibility while allowing that responsibility in looser, everyday senses may still be intelligible, depending on how the terms are defined.

3.3 Consciousness and Mental Reality (1990s–2000s)

With Mental Reality (1994; 2nd ed. 2009) and related essays, his attention turns primarily to consciousness, intentionality, and physicalism. He elaborates a form of “realistic physicalism” that insists on the irreducibility of phenomenal consciousness and critiques views he regards as revisionary or eliminativist. This period consolidates his claim that our knowledge of our own experience is epistemically privileged.

3.4 Panpsychism and Metaphysics of Experience (2000s–2010s)

In “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism” (2006), Strawson pushes his experience‑based physicalism into an explicit panpsychist direction. He argues that if everything real is physical, and consciousness is real, then experience must be a fundamental feature of the physical. This period is characterized by intensive engagement with questions about the intrinsic nature of matter and the combination problem for panpsychism.

3.5 Self, Narrative, and Public‑Facing Work (2000s–present)

From the early 2000s onward, Strawson increasingly focuses on selfhood and narrative, culminating in Selves (2011) and his widely discussed essay “Against Narrativity” (2004). At the same time, he publishes more accessible essays, collected in Things That Bother Me (2017), bringing his positions on death, freedom, and consciousness to broader audiences while continuing to develop technical work on the subject of experience.

4. Major Works

4.1 Overview Table

4.2 Freedom and Belief

This monograph develops Strawson’s incompatibilist and skeptical stance on ultimate moral responsibility. It articulates the Basic Argument in full, examines compatibilist strategies, and considers psychological aspects of belief in freedom. The work has become a standard reference point for discussions of skepticism about responsibility.

4.3 Mental Reality

Here Strawson argues for a realist account of experience and intentionality, criticizing theories that treat consciousness as reducible to functional or representational states. He defends the view that phenomenology provides indispensable data for metaphysics and naturalism, and that any satisfactory theory must take phenomenal consciousness as basic.

4.4 “Realistic Monism” and Later Mind‑Metaphysics

The 2006 article “Realistic Monism” extends his earlier physicalism into a panpsychist framework, claiming that a genuine physicalism cannot treat consciousness as emergent from wholly non‑experiential matter. Subsequent essays elaborate this position, address the combination problem, and respond to critics who see panpsychism as either scientifically unmotivated or metaphysically extravagant.

4.5 Selves and Related Work on Selfhood

In Selves, Strawson defends a revisionary metaphysics in which selves are understood as relatively short‑lived subjects of experience rather than robustly persisting entities. This book, together with “Against Narrativity” and later essays, anchors his contribution to debates about personal identity and narrative self‑understanding.

4.6 Accessible Essays

Things That Bother Me collects essays originally published in venues such as the London Review of Books and The New York Times. These texts present his views on death, freedom, and the self in a less technical register, and have been cited in interdisciplinary discussions in psychology, literary studies, and public philosophy.

5. Core Ideas in Philosophy of Mind

5.1 Realism about Phenomenal Consciousness

A central claim of Strawson’s philosophy of mind is that phenomenal consciousness—the “what‑it‑is‑like” aspect of experience—is indubitable and metaphysically basic. He maintains that our direct awareness of conscious experience provides the most certain knowledge we have, more secure than any theoretical picture of the physical.

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“Experience is the only thing we know for certain exists; if you are a physicalist, you must therefore hold that experience is itself physical.”

— Strawson, “Realistic Monism”

Proponents of this line see it as a corrective to eliminativist or revisionary theories that, in Strawson’s view, underplay or reinterpret the manifest character of consciousness. Critics argue that his epistemic emphasis on phenomenology risks privileging subjective appearances over explanatory theory.

5.2 Realistic Physicalism and the Nature of the Physical

Strawson describes himself as a real physicalist: everything real is physical, but “physical” must be understood broadly enough to include experiential properties. He holds that we know very little about the intrinsic nature of matter and that it is therefore open—and, for him, plausible—to treat experience as one aspect of the physical world, rather than as an anomaly.

Supporters regard this as an attractive way to reconcile realism about consciousness with a broadly naturalistic world‑view. Detractors contend that it either stretches the notion of the physical beyond recognition or blurs useful distinctions between physical and mental.

5.3 Panpsychist Implications

From these premises, Strawson argues that physicalism, properly understood, entails a form of panpsychism: if all concrete reality is physical and some of it is experiential, then basic physical entities must possess experiential or proto‑experiential features. This view has been influential in the recent panpsychist revival.

Alternative accounts—such as emergentism, dualism, or standard non‑panpsychist physicalisms—dispute both the necessity and the coherence of this inference. They typically claim either that experience can emerge from non‑experiential bases under appropriate conditions or that mental and physical properties are fundamentally distinct.

5.4 Intentionality and Mental Content

In Mental Reality, Strawson also defends a close linkage between intentionality (aboutness) and conscious experience. He questions theories that attempt to fully naturalize intentionality in non‑experiential, purely functional terms. Some philosophers endorse his insistence on the centrality of conscious content, while others argue that unconscious and subpersonal representational states show that intentionality can be largely accounted for without appeal to phenomenology.

6. Free Will, Responsibility, and the Basic Argument

6.1 Structure of the Basic Argument

Strawson’s Basic Argument aims to show that ultimate moral responsibility is impossible. A simplified reconstruction, widely discussed in the literature, runs roughly as follows:

Strawson allows that there may be other, weaker notions of responsibility compatible with determinism or indeterminism, but he holds that ultimate desert‑entailing responsibility is unattainable.

6.2 Relation to Compatibilism and Incompatibilism

Strawson describes himself as a “basic incompatibilist”: he thinks that the kind of freedom needed for ultimate responsibility is incompatible with determinism. However, he also argues that indeterminism cannot help, because randomness does not generate self‑creation. Thus he concludes that no metaphysical configuration can provide ultimate responsibility.

Compatibilists challenge the Basic Argument’s second and third steps, claiming that responsibility does not require being causa sui but only the right kind of control (e.g., reasons‑responsiveness, ownership of actions). Libertarians who posit agent‑causation reject the impossibility of self‑creation, holding that agents can be the ultimate sources of their actions in ways Strawson denies.

6.3 Psychological and Practical Dimensions

In Freedom and Belief, Strawson also explores the psychological difficulty of accepting his skeptical conclusion. He suggests that humans may be “hard‑wired” to experience themselves as free and responsible, regardless of philosophical argument. Some commentators see this as aligning him with “natural compatibilist” positions, while others interpret it as an attempt to explain why belief in ultimate responsibility persists even if, on his view, it is irrational.

Debates continue over the practical implications of Strawson’s skepticism: some argue it undermines retributive punishment and certain moral emotions, whereas others contend that forward‑looking practices and interpersonal attitudes can survive without ultimate desert.

7. The Self, Narrative, and Personal Identity

7.1 Episodic and Diachronic Self‑Experience

Strawson distinguishes between diachronic individuals, who naturally experience themselves as persisting over long stretches of time and readily frame their lives as continuous, and episodic individuals, who experience themselves primarily in relatively short‑term episodes, with weaker subjective connectedness to distant past or future selves.

He emphasizes that both forms can be psychologically normal. This distinction has been taken up in empirical and philosophical work as a tool for understanding variation in self‑experience.

7.2 Critique of Narrativism

In “Against Narrativity” (2004), Strawson targets two theses:

He argues that many people, including himself, do not live narratively and that this non‑narrative style is not a defect. Proponents of narrative identity (e.g., some moral philosophers and psychologists) hold that narrative self‑interpretation underpins agency, responsibility, and moral development. Strawson contends that such claims overgeneralize from certain temperaments or cultural contexts and risk pathologizing non‑narrative lives.

7.3 Metaphysics of Selves

In Selves and The Subject of Experience, Strawson defends a revisionary metaphysics of the self. He maintains that:

• Selves are real, not mere fictions or linguistic constructs.
• A self is essentially a subject of experience, not a substantial soul or a mere bundle of events.
• Many selves are short‑lived, tied to relatively limited temporal stretches of unified consciousness rather than to an entire biological lifespan.

This view contrasts with robust ego theories that posit a strongly persisting subject and with some reductionist views that identify persons strictly with bodies or psychological bundles. Supporters see Strawson’s account as capturing the phenomenology of conscious unity while accommodating psychological and neuroscientific insights. Critics question whether short‑lived selves can ground responsibility, prudential concern, or social practices organized around the idea of a long‑term person.

7.4 Influence on Personal Identity Debates

Strawson’s work interacts with and challenges classic accounts by Locke, Hume, and Parfit. Whereas Parfit emphasizes impersonal relations of psychological continuity, Strawson retains a robust notion of a subject, but denies that it must extend across an entire human life. The resulting position has prompted ongoing debate about how to reconcile first‑person phenomenology, metaphysical individuation, and practical concerns about survival and identity.

8. Methodology and Style of Argument

8.1 Phenomenology‑First Approach

Strawson’s methodology gives a central role to phenomenological description. He frequently begins from careful, often introspective accounts of what it is like to be conscious, to decide, or to experience oneself over time. Proponents see this as ensuring that theories remain answerable to the data of experience; critics worry about the reliability and universality of introspective reports.

8.2 Analytic Rigor and Conceptual Clarification

Operating firmly within analytic philosophy, Strawson uses detailed conceptual analysis and explicit argument‑structures. In Freedom and Belief, for example, he reconstructs the Basic Argument in stepwise fashion and differentiates multiple senses of “freedom” and “responsibility.” His style often involves identifying what he considers hidden assumptions in widely accepted positions and making them explicit.

8.3 Engagement with Science and Naturalism

Strawson presents himself as a naturalist, but insists that genuine naturalism must accommodate the reality of consciousness rather than explain it away. He draws on physics and cognitive science mainly to argue that we lack a full grasp of the intrinsic nature of the physical world, leaving conceptual space for experiential properties. Some philosophers regard this as a productive engagement with contemporary science; others view his appeals to scientific underdetermination as insufficiently constrained.

8.4 Polemical and Personal Voice

Many of Strawson’s essays, especially those in Things That Bother Me, are written in a polemical and occasionally autobiographical style. He often uses first‑person reports (for instance, of his own episodic self‑experience) as data points. Supporters argue that this personal voice clarifies otherwise abstract debates and foregrounds neglected forms of experience. Critics sometimes question the generalizability of such reports and the sharpness of his dismissals of opposing views.

8.5 Relation to Other Methodological Traditions

Strawson’s work stands at an intersection between analytic metaphysics and phenomenology without fully aligning with continental methods. He rarely employs historical or hermeneutic techniques, but he does engage closely with individual figures (such as Hume, Kant, and William James). Commentators note that his approach has helped open channels between analytic discussions of consciousness and broader philosophical traditions that take lived experience as primary.

9. Impact on Contemporary Philosophy and Related Fields

9.1 Philosophy of Mind and Metaphysics

Strawson’s defense of realist physicalism and his argument that physicalism entails panpsychism have been central to the contemporary resurgence of panpsychist views. His work is frequently cited by philosophers such as David Chalmers and Philip Goff, either as inspiration or as a target of critique. Debates about the intrinsic nature of the physical, the combination problem, and the status of phenomenal consciousness often explicitly engage with his positions.

In metaphysics, his views on subjects, selves, and the relation between experience and reality contribute to ongoing discussions about fundamentality, grounding, and the metaphysics of persons.

9.2 Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Within free will theory, Strawson is regarded as one of the most prominent contemporary responsibility skeptics. His Basic Argument is regularly taught and discussed alongside positions by Peter van Inwagen, Harry Frankfurt, and others. It has spurred a rich literature on:

• The coherence of causa sui requirements.
• The distinction between ultimate and non‑ultimate responsibility.
• The practical implications of skepticism for punishment and moral blame.

Compatibilists, libertarians, and skeptics alike often frame their views in relation to his argument.

9.3 Selfhood, Narrative, and Interdisciplinary Debates

Strawson’s critique of narrative identity has influenced moral psychology, psychiatry, literary theory, and narrative studies. Some psychologists and clinicians use his episodic/diachronic distinction to interpret differences in self‑report and to question assumptions about the therapeutic value of narrative. Narrative theorists, in turn, have sought to refine or defend their positions, distinguishing between strong constitutive claims and weaker, context‑dependent roles for narrative.

9.4 Public Philosophy and Cultural Reception

Through essays in non‑specialist venues and interviews on topics such as death, freedom, and consciousness, Strawson has contributed to public debates about the self and responsibility. His accessible pieces have been used in university courses across disciplines and in public discussion of criminal justice and mental health. Reactions are mixed: some readers find his skepticism about responsibility and his panpsychist leanings liberating or thought‑provoking; others see them as counterintuitive or culturally unsettling.

9.5 Influence on Emerging Research

Younger philosophers working on panpsychism, intrinsic natures, the metaphysics of subjects, and non‑narrative selfhood frequently cite Strawson as a major influence. At the same time, empirical researchers in psychology and cognitive science sometimes invoke his distinctions to design studies on self‑experience and temporal perspective, illustrating a modest but notable cross‑disciplinary reach.

10. Legacy and Historical Significance

10.1 Position within Analytic Philosophy

Commentators generally situate Strawson as a distinctive figure in late‑20th‑ and early‑21st‑century analytic metaphysics and philosophy of mind. His work is often compared with that of his father, P. F. Strawson, but is seen as more explicitly metaphysical and phenomenologically oriented. Historically, he is part of a broader shift from language‑centered analysis toward substantive questions about consciousness, agency, and selfhood.

10.2 Contribution to the Consciousness Debate

Strawson’s insistence on the reality and centrality of phenomenal consciousness has played a notable role in legitimizing robustly realist approaches within mainstream analytic philosophy. His claim that physicalism may entail panpsychism has been especially influential, helping to move panpsychism from a marginal to a widely discussed position. Historians of philosophy of mind increasingly treat his work as a key node in the trajectory from behaviorism and functionalism to contemporary consciousness studies.

10.3 Free Will Skepticism and Moral Theory

The Basic Argument is frequently regarded as one of the clearest formulations of global responsibility skepticism. Its historical significance lies in showing how, even after sophisticated compatibilist developments, a simple regress argument can challenge the idea of ultimate moral responsibility. Discussions of the normative implications of skepticism—especially regarding punishment, blame, and interpersonal attitudes—regularly trace part of their lineage to Strawson’s work.

10.4 Rethinking the Self and Narrative

Strawson’s challenge to narrativism is often cited as a turning point in debates about selfhood. Historically, it has contributed to a more pluralistic understanding of self‑experience, in which narrative is one important mode among others rather than a universal structure. His metaphysics of short‑lived selves ensures that future discussions of personal identity must address not only continuity and memory but also the nature and duration of the experiencing subject.

10.5 Long‑Term Assessment and Open Questions

Assessments of Strawson’s ultimate place in the philosophical canon remain open, given his ongoing activity. Some scholars predict that his most enduring contributions will be:

• The articulation of experience‑first physicalism and its panpsychist implications.
• The Basic Argument’s enduring role in free will theory.
• The normalization of non‑narrative self‑conceptions in moral psychology and literary studies.

Others are more cautious, suggesting that empirical advances in neuroscience or psychology may challenge aspects of his phenomenology‑first methodology or his claims about consciousness. Nonetheless, his work is widely regarded as a significant and provocative contribution to the history of recent philosophy, ensuring continued discussion of his ideas in future scholarship.