Harry Gordon Frankfurt

1. Introduction

Harry Gordon Frankfurt (1929–2023) was an American analytic philosopher whose work reshaped debates about free will, moral responsibility, and the structure of agency in the late twentieth century. Trained as a historian of early modern philosophy, he became best known for tightly argued essays that combined conceptual precision with vivid examples, many of which have become standard reference points across philosophy.

Within philosophy, Frankfurt is most closely associated with three clusters of ideas. First, his challenge to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP)—the claim that responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise—through so‑called Frankfurt cases. Second, his hierarchical theory of the will, which explains what it is to be a person and a responsible agent in terms of higher‑order desires and identification with one’s motives. Third, his later work on caring, love, and value, which portrays our deepest concerns as central to meaning in life and practical reasoning.

Frankfurt also became widely known outside academic philosophy through his analysis of “bullshit” and his accessible books on truth and economic inequality. These works connected technical issues in moral psychology and value theory to questions about public discourse and social justice, and they were read as timely interventions in contemporary political culture.

While there is no single “Frankfurtian system,” many interpreters suggest that his writings are unified by an interest in what it is to be wholeheartedly oneself—to act from motives one truly owns, to care about things in a way that gives life shape, and to maintain a serious regard for the truth. The following sections trace his life, intellectual development, main writings, and the influence and controversies surrounding his ideas.

2. Life and Historical Context

2.1 Biographical Overview

Harry Gordon Frankfurt was born on 29 May 1929 in Langhorne, Pennsylvania, and died on 16 July 2023 in Santa Monica, California. He studied at Johns Hopkins University, where he received his PhD in philosophy in 1954 with a dissertation on Descartes. Over the following decades he taught at several American universities, including Rockefeller University, Yale University, and Princeton University.

Frankfurt’s early career unfolded in a post‑war academic environment dominated by analytic philosophy, with its emphasis on logical clarity and argumentation. His background in the history of modern philosophy, especially Descartes, shaped a style that combined close reading of classic texts with contemporary conceptual analysis.

2.2 Academic Positions and Institutional Milieu

Frankfurt’s appointments at Yale and later Princeton placed him at institutions central to developments in ethics, philosophy of action, and philosophy of mind. Colleagues and students at these universities were active in debates about compatibilism, personal identity, and rational agency, providing the immediate context for his best‑known contributions.

2.3 Broader Historical Setting

Frankfurt’s central writings appeared amid renewed interest in free will and moral responsibility, partly stimulated by developments in metaphysics, logic, and the philosophy of language. His 1969 article on alternate possibilities entered a live discussion between compatibilists (who hold that freedom can coexist with determinism) and incompatibilists (who deny this).

Later, his essays on caring, love, and value intersected with a growing turn in Anglo‑American ethics toward moral psychology and questions of character, identity, and the emotions. His writings on bullshit and truth were widely read against the backdrop of perceived declines in public trust, media fragmentation, and concerns about political manipulation in the late twentieth and early twenty‑first centuries.

3. Intellectual Development

3.1 From History of Philosophy to Philosophy of Action

Frankfurt’s early work focused on Descartes and the history of modern philosophy. This period shaped his sensitivity to issues of self‑knowledge, mind–body relations, and the structure of the self. Commentators often note that Frankfurt carried a Cartesian concern with the inner life of the subject into his later systematic work.

During the 1960s, he shifted from historical scholarship to philosophy of action and ethics, contributing to emergent analytic debates about free will. His 1969 paper on alternate possibilities marks this turning point, using imaginative thought experiments rather than textual exegesis as his primary tool.

3.2 Elaboration of a Theory of the Will

In the 1970s, Frankfurt developed a more general account of personhood and freedom of the will, most notably in “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” Here he introduced the distinction between first‑order and higher‑order desires, and advanced the idea that being a person involves the capacity to form and endorse higher‑order volitions.

This phase is often described as his moral psychology period, in which he investigated weakness of will, identification with desires, and internal conflict. These analyses would later underpin his accounts of caring and love.

3.3 Turn to Caring, Love, and Value

From the late 1970s through the 1990s, Frankfurt’s attention moved toward value theory and the question of what makes life meaningful. Essays later collected in The Importance of What We Care About and The Reasons of Love elaborate an understanding of caring as a basic practical stance that generates reasons for action.

Interpreters sometimes divide his career into a “responsibility‑centered” early phase and a “value‑centered” later phase. Others emphasize continuity, arguing that his discussions of love and caring are applications of his earlier hierarchical model to broader issues of identity and meaning.

3.4 Engagement with Public Issues

In the 1980s and 2000s, Frankfurt addressed topics of broad public interest, especially in On Bullshit, On Truth, and On Inequality. These works drew on his longstanding interests in sincerity, agency, and value while presenting them in a more accessible form. They represent a late phase in which he reflected explicitly on the social and political implications of indifference to truth and of economic inequality.

4. Major Works

4.1 Key Philosophical Essays and Collections

Frankfurt’s reputation rests primarily on a series of influential essays, many later collected in book form.

These texts are widely cited as central contributions to philosophy of action and moral psychology.

4.2 Works on Truth, Bullshit, and Public Culture

Frankfurt’s essay On Bullshit first appeared in 1986 and was expanded into a short book in 2005. It offers a conceptual analysis of bullshit as discourse marked by indifference to truth, distinguishing it from lying and error. The book achieved unexpected popular success.

His subsequent volume On Truth (2006) presents a normative defense of the importance of caring about truth, arguing that practical agency and social cooperation depend on it. Commentators often read this as a companion piece that makes explicit some of the evaluative commitments underlying On Bullshit.

4.3 Political and Social Philosophy

In On Inequality (2015), Frankfurt addresses economic inequality and questions of distributive justice. He argues, in a deliberately provocative way, that poverty and sufficiency matter more morally than relative differences in wealth. The work situates him within debates in contemporary political philosophy, though it is shorter and more polemical than standard academic treatments.

4.4 Thematic Coherence

Across these works, scholars identify recurring concerns with:

• the structure of the will and conditions for responsibility,
• the role of caring and love in grounding reasons and value,
• and the significance of truthfulness for agency and social life.

Debate continues over how tightly unified these writings are; some commentators see a single underlying project, while others treat the works as addressing relatively distinct problem‑fields.

5. Core Ideas: Will, Personhood, and Responsibility

5.1 The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and Frankfurt Cases

In “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Frankfurt formulates the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP):

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“A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.”

— Harry G. Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”

He then introduces Frankfurt cases: scenarios in which an agent seems morally responsible even though some counterfactual intervener would have ensured the same action if the agent had wavered. Proponents interpret these cases as showing that being able to do otherwise is not necessary for responsibility. Critics argue either that the agent retains some relevant alternative possibility, or that such cases covertly presuppose responsibility rather than demonstrate it.

5.2 Hierarchical Model of the Will

In “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Frankfurt distinguishes between:

• First‑order desires: desires to perform particular actions.
• Second‑order desires: desires about which first‑order desires one wants to have.
• Second‑order volitions: second‑order desires that a certain first‑order desire be effective in moving one to act.

According to Frankfurt, a person is a being capable of forming second‑order volitions; freedom of the will consists in having the will one wants to have. A person lacks freedom of the will when the effective first‑order desire conflicts with their higher‑order volition, as in some cases of addiction.

5.3 Identification, Wholeheartedness, and Responsibility

Frankfurt further develops the notion of identification: an agent identifies with certain desires when they endorse them reflectively as truly their own. Wholeheartedness describes a state in which such identification is free from internal conflict.

On many interpretations, Frankfurt holds that moral responsibility depends not on alternative possibilities but on whether actions issue from motives with which the agent identifies. Persistent inner conflict or divided will can, on this view, undermine full responsibility. Alternative readings stress that Frankfurt does not abandon all relevance of alternatives, but shifts primary emphasis to the agent’s actual motivational structure.

6. Caring, Love, and the Sources of Value

6.1 Caring as a Fundamental Practical Attitude

In essays collected in The Importance of What We Care About, Frankfurt develops a theory of caring as a deep, relatively stable attitude toward persons, projects, or ideals. Caring is portrayed as more than preference or desire: it involves a disposition to be emotionally and practically engaged, and to see certain outcomes as mattering to one’s life.

Proponents of this reading emphasize that, for Frankfurt, caring is identity‑shaping: what we care about helps constitute who we are and organizes our practical reasoning. Some interpreters view this as a move toward a subject‑centered theory of value, where reasons for action are grounded in the agent’s cares.

6.2 The Nature and Reasons of Love

In The Reasons of Love, Frankfurt applies this framework to love, arguing that love is typically non‑voluntary: we do not simply decide whom or what to love. Instead, we find ourselves caring in ways that generate distinctive reasons:

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“Love is not a matter of choice. We do not decide to love; we find ourselves loving, and our reasons follow from what we care about.”

— Harry G. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (paraphrased)

He distinguishes self‑love, love of others, and love of ideals, contending that such loves establish what he calls our “volitional necessities”—things we cannot help but treat as reasons.

6.3 Debates about the Source of Value

Frankfurt’s view has been interpreted in different ways:

Critics worry that if caring alone grounds value, there may be no basis to judge some cares better than others. Defenders respond that Frankfurt allows for internal standards of coherence, stability, and wholeheartedness, and that he sometimes gestures toward constraints rooted in our nature as caring beings. The precise status of these constraints remains a topic of interpretation.

7. Truth, Bullshit, and Public Discourse

7.1 The Concept of Bullshit

In On Bullshit, Frankfurt analyzes bullshit as a distinctive type of speech act. Unlike the liar, who is guided by the truth in order to conceal it, the bullshitter is characterized by indifference to how things really are:

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“It is impossible for someone to lie unless he thinks he knows the truth. Producing bullshit requires no such conviction.”

— Harry G. Frankfurt, On Bullshit, p. 55

On Frankfurt’s account, bullshit often arises in contexts where speakers are expected to have opinions on many topics but lack the time or information to form them responsibly.

7.2 The Value of Truth

In On Truth, Frankfurt defends the importance of caring about truth for both individual agency and social cooperation. He argues that successful action, genuine self‑respect, and mutual trust all depend on an adequate grasp of reality. The book is sometimes read as extending the largely descriptive analysis of On Bullshit into a more explicitly normative defense of truthfulness.

7.3 Implications for Public Discourse

Commentators have applied Frankfurt’s concepts to media, politics, and everyday communication, especially in discussions of “post‑truth” culture. Some see his analysis as diagnosing a shift from deliberate lying to more pervasive carelessness about accuracy. Others question whether the distinction between lying and bullshit is as sharp as Frankfurt suggests, or whether the focus on individual attitudes neglects structural features of modern information environments.

Despite differing evaluations, Frankfurt’s terminology has become part of broader public discussion about propaganda, spin, and the degradation of public discourse.

8. Methodology and Use of Thought Experiments

8.1 Style of Argumentation

Frankfurt’s work is methodologically characteristic of analytic philosophy, marked by careful distinctions, succinct prose, and a focus on conceptual clarification. Rather than offering large systematic treatises, he tends to develop ideas in relatively short essays built around targeted counterexamples to widely held principles.

8.2 Frankfurt Cases as Methodological Tools

His most famous methodological contribution is the use of Frankfurt cases. These are designed to test the necessity of PAP by constructing scenarios where:

1. An agent acts seemingly of their own accord.
2. A counterfactual intervener would ensure the same action if the agent were about to choose otherwise.
3. The intervener in fact remains idle because the agent acts as they do independently.

Proponents hold that such cases show PAP to be false or at least dubious, forcing revisions to traditional accounts of responsibility. Critics argue that the cases rely on contentious assumptions about counterfactuals, causation, or the nature of control, and that they may smuggle in the very judgments they are meant to justify.

8.3 Broader Use of Examples

Beyond Frankfurt cases, his writings on addiction, ambivalence, love, and bullshit all employ stylized examples—often ordinary, sometimes hypothetical—to elicit particular intuitions. Some commentators regard this as a strength, making his arguments accessible and psychologically realistic. Others question whether such examples can bear the theoretical weight placed on them, or whether they underrepresent the diversity of real‑world cases.

8.4 Relation to Historical Scholarship

Although best known for thought experiments, Frankfurt’s methodological approach retains traces of his historical training: he frequently engages closely with canonical concepts (such as will, person, love, and truth), seeking to refine and sometimes revise them rather than abandoning them altogether. This combination of historical sensitivity and analytic experimentation is seen by many as distinctive of his work.

9. Reception, Criticisms, and Debates

9.1 Debates over Alternate Possibilities

Frankfurt’s challenge to PAP generated extensive literature. Reactions include:

These debates have shaped contemporary compatibilist and incompatibilist theories of free will.

9.2 Critiques of the Hierarchical Will and Identification

Frankfurt’s hierarchical model has been both influential and contested. Critics argue that:

• Higher‑order endorsement may itself be manipulated or alienated, raising doubts about its adequacy as a criterion of autonomy.
• The model may underplay social and relational dimensions of agency, focusing too heavily on internal mental structure.

Alternative accounts, such as procedural theories of autonomy, relational autonomy, and narrative conceptions of the self, often define themselves partly in contrast to Frankfurt’s approach while still borrowing his terminology of higher‑order reflection and identification.

9.3 Evaluations of Caring and Love

Some philosophers welcome Frankfurt’s emphasis on caring and love as bringing emotions and attachments into the center of ethics. Others worry that his account risks subjectivism, potentially legitimizing harmful or unjust cares. Discussions focus on whether Frankfurt can explain how we might rationally criticize or revise our cares, and how his view compares with more explicitly objective value theories.

9.4 Responses to “On Bullshit” and “On Inequality”

On Bullshit has been praised for clarifying an intuitive distinction and for its resonance with contemporary public concerns. Some commentators, however, question whether the book’s definition of bullshit captures all phenomena commonly labeled by that term, or whether its empirical claims about modern culture are adequately supported.

On Inequality provoked disagreement within political philosophy. Critics of Frankfurt’s focus on sufficiency argue that relative inequality can itself be morally objectionable, even when basic needs are met, because of its impact on status, power, and democratic equality. Supporters see the book as a useful reminder that reducing poverty may be more urgent than equalizing incomes per se.

10. Impact Beyond Philosophy

10.1 Law, Ethics, and Public Policy

Frankfurt’s ideas about moral responsibility, particularly his focus on the actual sources of action rather than alternate possibilities, have influenced debates in criminal law and legal theory. Legal scholars have drawn on his notions of identification and higher‑order desires when analyzing culpability, addiction, and diminished responsibility, though they often adapt his concepts to fit institutional and evidential constraints.

In bioethics and medical ethics, his account of autonomy and the will has informed discussions of informed consent, addiction, and psychiatric disorders, especially where questions arise about whether a patient’s choices reflect their “true” will.

10.2 Psychology, Psychiatry, and the Human Sciences

Researchers in clinical psychology and psychiatry have sometimes employed Frankfurtian terminology—such as higher‑order desires and ambivalence—to describe phenomena like substance dependence, obsessive behavior, and internal conflict. While these uses are not always philosophically rigorous, they testify to the cross‑disciplinary appeal of his framework for understanding agency and self‑control.

In personality psychology and narrative studies of identity, Frankfurt’s ideas about caring and wholeheartedness have been taken up in models of commitment, life projects, and psychological well‑being.

10.3 Public Discourse, Media, and Cultural Commentary

On Bullshit in particular has had a wide impact on public discussions of media, politics, and communication. Journalists, commentators, and educators have used Frankfurt’s categories to analyze political spin, advertising, and the spread of misinformation. Some view his analysis as especially relevant to debates over “post‑truth” politics and social media, though others argue that structural and technological factors require additional explanatory tools.

10.4 Education and Popular Culture

Frankfurt’s shorter books and essays have been incorporated into university curricula across disciplines, including writing courses, communication studies, and introductory ethics. References to “Frankfurt cases” and “bullshit” appear in popular essays, satire, and cultural criticism, indicating a degree of penetration into wider cultural consciousness.

11. Legacy and Historical Significance

11.1 Place in Twentieth‑ and Twenty‑First‑Century Philosophy

Frankfurt is widely regarded as a central figure in late twentieth‑century analytic ethics and philosophy of action. Many surveys of free will and moral responsibility treat his 1969 paper as a turning point, after which the necessity of alternate possibilities could no longer be taken for granted. His work on hierarchical desires and personhood is often listed alongside that of other major theorists of autonomy and agency.

11.2 Conceptual Contributions

Several technical notions introduced or popularized by Frankfurt—Frankfurt cases, higher‑order desires, second‑order volitions, identification, and wholeheartedness—have become standard terms of art. These concepts structure ongoing debates about addiction, weakness of will, personal identity, and authenticity.

His analyses of caring and love helped shift attention within moral philosophy from rule‑following and outcome‑maximization toward questions about attachment, commitment, and identity. In this respect, some commentators view him as part of a broader movement emphasizing moral psychology and the emotions.

11.3 Broader Cultural Significance

Frankfurt’s reflections on bullshit and truth have given philosophers a conspicuous presence in public discussions about language, sincerity, and political culture. The uptake of his ideas outside academia has contributed to perceptions of philosophy’s relevance to contemporary social concerns.

11.4 Continuing Influence and Open Questions

Ongoing work in free will theory, autonomy, and value regularly engages with Frankfurt’s arguments, either building on them or developing alternatives. Current discussions explore, among other topics:

• whether responsibility can be fully “actual‑sequence,” as Frankfurt suggests, or must also involve modal conditions;
• how hierarchical and identification‑based models of agency should incorporate social, historical, and relational factors;
• and how to articulate the relation between what we care about and more traditional notions of objective value.

In these ways, Frankfurt’s contributions continue to frame central questions for contemporary philosophy, while also inviting reinterpretation and critique as new perspectives emerge.