John Joseph Mearsheimer
John Joseph Mearsheimer (b. 1947) is an American political scientist and one of the most influential contemporary theorists of international relations. Best known as the leading proponent of "offensive realism," he argues that anarchy in the international system compels great powers to seek regional hegemony and maximize relative power. Educated at West Point and Cornell and long based at the University of Chicago, Mearsheimer combines formal academic rigor with a pronounced willingness to intervene in public debates about war, empire, and U.S. foreign policy. Philosophically, Mearsheimer is significant for forcing moral and political theorists to confront the tension between ethical universalism and structural constraints in world politics. His account of tragic outcomes—generated not by wicked leaders but by systemic incentives—has shaped discussions in political philosophy, just war theory, and debates on moral responsibility under conditions of anarchy. His critique of liberal hegemony in The Great Delusion offers a quasi-anthropological claim about human nature, nationalism, and the limits of cosmopolitan identity. Although not a philosopher by training, his work challenges liberal and cosmopolitan theories to respond to realist claims about power, fear, and the structural roots of war.
At a Glance
- Field
- Thinker
- Born
- 1947-12-14 — Brooklyn, New York, United States
- Died
- Floruit
- 1983–presentPeriod of major academic activity and influence in international relations theory
- Active In
- United States, Europe
- Interests
- International relations theoryRealismSecurity and warGreat power politicsNationalismNuclear deterrenceEthics in foreign policyLiberalism in international politics
John J. Mearsheimer’s thought centers on offensive realism: in an anarchic international system where no overarching authority guarantees security, great powers, driven by survival and uncertainty about others’ intentions, are compelled to maximize their relative power and seek regional hegemony, producing tragic conflicts that reflect structural imperatives rather than moral failing alone and thereby placing strict limits on the practical reach of liberal and cosmopolitan moral norms in world politics.
Conventional Deterrence
Composed: Late 1970s–1983
Liddell Hart and the Weight of History
Composed: Early 1980s–1988
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
Composed: Mid-1990s–2001
The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy
Composed: Early 2000s–2007
Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics
Composed: Late 2000s–2011
The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities
Composed: 2010–2018
Great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal.— John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), p. 2.
Programmatic statement of offensive realism, summarizing the structural logic he believes drives great-power behavior and constrains moral aspirations in international politics.
The tragic element of international politics is that reasonable, well-intentioned leaders are often unable to avoid war.— John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), approximate paraphrase of themes in Chapter 1.
Captures his core claim that systemic pressures, not simply individual wickedness, generate war, reshaping debates on moral responsibility and the ethics of statecraft.
Liberal states are driven by their own ideology to try to remake the world in their own image, but in the process they often cause enormous harm.— John J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), approximate summary of argument in the introduction.
Expresses his criticism of liberal hegemony and the unintended consequences of moralizing foreign policy, central to philosophical debates on moral risk and intervention.
Nationalism is the most powerful political ideology on the planet.— John J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), esp. Chapter 3.
Highlights his view that nationalism structurally limits cosmopolitan projects, a key premise in his challenge to liberal and cosmopolitan political philosophy.
Leaders lie to foreign audiences much more often than they lie to their own people.— John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), conclusion.
Illustrates his differentiated, analytic approach to political lying and its ethical evaluation across domestic and international contexts.
Military and Early Academic Formation (1960s–late 1970s)
Mearsheimer’s education at West Point and service as an army officer during the Cold War grounded his thinking in the practical realities of force, deterrence, and organizational behavior. Graduate studies at Cornell, influenced by realist scholars like Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, led him to reject both idealist and behaviorist approaches, favoring theory-driven analysis rooted in historical cases.
Strategic Studies and Conventional Deterrence (1980s)
In the 1980s he focused on nuclear strategy and conventional deterrence in Europe, arguing that military balances and offense-defense dynamics strongly shape the likelihood of war. This period culminated in works like Conventional Deterrence, where he developed a structural, mechanism-based view of how states anticipate and miscalculate the costs of war, prefiguring his later offensive realism.
Formulation of Offensive Realism (1990s–early 2000s)
As U.S. unipolarity emerged after the Cold War, Mearsheimer elaborated offensive realism, systematically presented in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. He articulated an austere set of assumptions about anarchy, uncertainty, and survival, deducing a logic that pushes states to maximize power and seek regional hegemony while deeply mistrusting others’ intentions.
Normative Engagement and Critique of Liberal Hegemony (mid-2000s–2010s)
From the Iraq War onward, Mearsheimer increasingly engaged normative and philosophical questions. His work on the Israel lobby examined democracy, interest-group power, and foreign policy ethics. In The Great Delusion he advanced a broad critique of liberal internationalism, arguing that nationalism and balance-of-power politics place hard limits on moral universalism in practice.
Public Intellectual and Systemic Critic of U.S. Foreign Policy (2010s–present)
In the 2010s and 2020s, Mearsheimer became a prominent public critic of NATO expansion, the U.S. role in Ukraine, and liberal interventionism more broadly. His claims about structural responsibility, unintended consequences, and tragic outcomes have influenced debates among philosophers and theorists about blame, moral risk, and institutional design in international politics.
1. Introduction
John Joseph Mearsheimer (b. 1947) is an American political scientist widely regarded as the leading contemporary theorist of offensive realism in international relations. His work centers on the claim that in an anarchic international system, great powers are structurally driven to maximize their relative power and, where possible, to seek regional hegemony. From this starting point, he develops a tragic view of politics, arguing that wars and coercive behavior often emerge not from malign intentions but from systemic pressures and pervasive uncertainty.
Educated at West Point and Cornell and based for decades at the University of Chicago, Mearsheimer has combined abstract theorizing with detailed historical analysis of great-power rivalry, deterrence, and military strategy. He is known both for formal theoretical statements—most notably in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001)—and for provocative interventions in policy debates over NATO expansion, the Iraq War, U.S.–China relations, and the Israel–Palestine conflict.
Within the broader landscape of international thought, Mearsheimer’s realism has been positioned against liberal internationalism, constructivism, and various cosmopolitan ethical theories. Proponents view his work as a rigorous statement of structural constraints on state behavior; critics regard it as overly materialist, pessimistic about cooperation, and insufficiently attentive to norms and domestic politics. His later writings, especially The Great Delusion (2018), explicitly engage questions of nationalism, human nature, and the limits of liberal hegemony, making his scholarship a recurrent reference point in debates about the morality and feasibility of ambitious liberal projects in world politics.
2. Life and Historical Context
Mearsheimer was born on 14 December 1947 in Brooklyn, New York, and grew up in New York City and the Hudson River Valley in a milieu often described as working- and middle-class. Commentators frequently connect this background, together with his later military experience, to his skepticism toward idealistic or crusading foreign policies and his emphasis on material constraints.
Education and Military Service
He attended the United States Military Academy at West Point, graduating in 1970, and then served as an officer in the U.S. Army, including a posting in West Germany during the Cold War. Exposure to NATO–Warsaw Pact confrontation and the practicalities of deterrence has been cited by both Mearsheimer and biographers as formative for his enduring focus on security, force, and great-power competition.
After leaving active duty, he pursued graduate study at Cornell University, receiving a PhD in Government in 1975. At Cornell he encountered and engaged critically with existing realist thought, especially the work of Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, as well as behavioral and liberal approaches then prominent in U.S. political science.
Academic Career and Cold War/Post–Cold War Setting
Following positions at the University of Southern California and elsewhere, he joined the University of Chicago faculty in 1983, eventually becoming the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science. His career spans the late Cold War, the unipolar moment after the Soviet collapse, and the subsequent shift toward a more contested international order.
The timing of his major works corresponds closely to these systemic changes: studies of nuclear and conventional deterrence during superpower rivalry in the 1980s, formulation of offensive realism as U.S. unipolarity emerged in the 1990s, and critiques of liberal hegemony amid U.S. interventions and NATO expansion in the 2000s and 2010s. Observers often interpret his trajectory as an attempt to provide a consistent realist framework across these shifting historical contexts.
| Period | Historical Context | Mearsheimer’s Focus |
|---|---|---|
| 1960s–70s | High Cold War | Military service; early views on deterrence |
| 1980s | Late Cold War | Nuclear strategy; conventional deterrence in Europe |
| 1990s–2000s | U.S. unipolarity | Formulation of offensive realism |
| 2000s–2010s | War on Terror, NATO expansion | Critique of liberal hegemony |
3. Intellectual Development
Mearsheimer’s intellectual development is often presented in distinct but connected phases, each shaped by changing empirical problems and scholarly debates.
From Strategic Studies to Structural Theory
In the 1970s and 1980s, his work focused on strategic studies and conventional deterrence. He analysed how offense–defense balances, force structures, and operational doctrines influence the likelihood and course of war. Conventional Deterrence (1983) articulated mechanisms through which states miscalculate costs and prospects of conventional conflict, foreshadowing his later emphasis on structural incentives and unintended consequences.
Formulation of Offensive Realism
During the late Cold War and early post–Cold War period, Mearsheimer moved toward more abstract theorizing. Building on but revising neorealism (especially Waltz), he advanced offensive realism, systematically presented in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. This phase is marked by:
- A deliberately sparse set of assumptions (anarchy, survival, offensive capabilities, uncertainty, rationality)
- A deductive derivation of expectations about great-power behavior (power maximization, regional hegemony, fear and balancing)
He framed his approach as an explicit alternative to both defensive realism and liberal or institutionalist theories.
Normative and Ideational Turn
From the 2000s onward, particularly after the Iraq War, Mearsheimer increasingly engaged with normative questions and ideational factors such as nationalism and liberal ideology. In collaboration with Stephen M. Walt, he examined domestic interest groups and their foreign-policy influence in The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (2007). Why Leaders Lie (2011) explored the ethics and patterns of political deception. The Great Delusion (2018) advanced a broad critique of liberal hegemony, incorporating explicit claims about human nature, the resilience of nationalism, and the limits of cosmopolitan projects.
Commentators disagree about whether this later work represents a significant shift or simply an extension of his realist framework into normative and ideational domains; Mearsheimer himself tends to portray it as the latter.
4. Major Works
Mearsheimer’s major books trace his movement from detailed strategic analysis toward broad theorizing about power and ideology in international politics.
| Work | Focus | Representative Themes |
|---|---|---|
| Conventional Deterrence (1983) | Military strategy and war initiation | Offense–defense balance; miscalculation; limited vs. attrition strategies |
| Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (1988) | Intellectual history of military theory | Critique of strategic ideas; relationship between theory, reputation, and policy |
| The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001) | Systematic theory of offensive realism | Anarchy, power maximization, regional hegemony, tragedy of great-power rivalry |
| The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (2007, with Stephen M. Walt) | Domestic interest groups and foreign policy | Role of lobbies, democratic accountability, U.S.–Israel relationship |
| Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (2011) | Political deception | Typology of lies, audiences, strategic incentives, ethical evaluation |
| The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018) | Critique of liberal hegemony | Nationalism vs. liberalism, human nature, limits of cosmopolitanism |
Themes Across the Corpus
Across these works, several recurrent concerns appear:
- Security and war: How states assess threats, deterrence, and the costs of conflict.
- Structure vs. agency: The extent to which leaders can escape systemic pressures.
- Ideas and ideology: Nationalism and liberalism as drivers of state behavior.
- Ethics and responsibility: The morality of intervention, lying, and interest-group influence.
Primary-source passages often encapsulate these themes:
“Great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal.”
— John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), p. 2
“Nationalism is the most powerful political ideology on the planet.”
— John J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion (2018)
5. Core Ideas and Theoretical Framework
Mearsheimer’s theoretical framework is built around offensive realism, a structural theory of international politics.
Assumptions and Logic of Offensive Realism
He advances five core assumptions:
- The international system is anarchic (no central authority).
- Great powers possess some offensive military capability.
- States can never be certain about others’ intentions.
- Survival is the primary goal of states.
- States are rational actors.
From these assumptions, he argues that great powers are compelled to:
- Maximize their relative power, not merely ensure adequate security.
- Seek regional hegemony (dominance in one’s own region) while preventing peer hegemons elsewhere.
- Engage in balancing, buck-passing, and occasionally war as instruments of power accumulation.
Tragic View of Politics
The framework yields a tragic conception of international politics: even well-intentioned leaders may be driven to adopt policies that heighten rivalry and risk war. Structural conditions, rather than personal malice, play the central causal role.
“The tragic element of international politics is that reasonable, well-intentioned leaders are often unable to avoid war.”
— Paraphrasing themes in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
Nationalism, Liberalism, and Liberal Hegemony
In The Great Delusion, Mearsheimer integrates offensive realism with a theory of nationalism and liberal ideology:
- Nationalism: Portrayed as a deeply rooted form of group attachment that underpins the state’s legitimacy and makes people prioritize national interests.
- Liberalism: Associated with universal rights and the desire to remake the world in a liberal image.
- Liberal hegemony: A grand strategy in which a liberal great power uses military, economic, and institutional tools to promote democracy and human rights abroad.
He contends that nationalism and balance-of-power logics fundamentally constrain liberal hegemony, often generating unintended harmful consequences when liberal states pursue ambitious transformative projects.
Distinctions from Other Realisms
Mearsheimer explicitly distinguishes offensive realism from:
| Approach | Key Difference (as he presents it) |
|---|---|
| Defensive realism | Sees states as primarily security maximizers; more optimistic about status quo powers |
| Classical realism | Emphasizes human nature and prudence more than structural imperatives |
| Liberal institutionalism | Places greater weight on institutions, norms, and absolute gains |
6. Methodology and Use of History
Mearsheimer employs a theory-driven, historically grounded methodology that combines deductive reasoning with qualitative case studies.
Theoretical Parsimony and Hypothesis Derivation
He begins with a small set of structural assumptions, from which he derives clear, testable expectations about state behavior. His work often contrasts “logically coherent” theories, which he favors, with more eclectic approaches. Proponents describe this as parsimonious and conducive to cumulative knowledge; critics see it as overly simplifying complex realities.
Historical Case Studies
Mearsheimer uses extensive historical cases to illustrate and assess his theoretical claims. Examples include:
| Domain | Illustrative Cases He Discusses |
|---|---|
| Great-power rivalry | 19th-century Europe, World War I and II, Cold War Europe |
| Deterrence and strategy | Arab–Israeli wars, NATO–Warsaw Pact balance |
| Liberal hegemony | U.S. interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans; NATO expansion |
He typically reconstructs leaders’ choices, military balances, and diplomatic interactions to show how systemic incentives shape outcomes, emphasizing recurring patterns over unique contingencies.
Counterfactual Reasoning
Mearsheimer makes frequent use of counterfactuals (“If NATO had not expanded…”) to argue that different policies might have produced different outcomes within the same structural constraints. Supporters see this as a useful device for clarifying causal claims; critics argue that such counterfactuals are difficult to verify.
Engagement with Evidence and Alternatives
He draws on military archives, secondary historical literature, and policy documents, but usually to test broad theoretical propositions rather than to reconstruct events for their own sake. Mearsheimer often contrasts his structural explanations with liberal or domestic-political accounts, arguing that his framework better fits observed patterns. Opponents contend that his case selection and interpretation may favor realist explanations and underplay the role of ideas, norms, or domestic institutions.
Overall, his methodology is generally classified as qualitative, theory-driven, and comparative-historical, situated within the broader tradition of realist scholarship in international relations.
7. Philosophical Relevance and Ethical Implications
Though trained as a political scientist, Mearsheimer’s work has significant implications for political philosophy and international ethics.
Realism and the Limits of Moral Theory
His offensive realism articulates a quasi-ontological view of international politics: anarchy, uncertainty, and the pursuit of survival structure the realm of state action. Philosophers interested in political realism draw on his arguments to challenge ideal theory and cosmopolitan ethics, suggesting that ambitious moral projects may underestimate systemic constraints.
His account contributes to debates on “dirty hands” and moral responsibility: if structural pressures drive even well-intentioned leaders toward coercive or harmful policies, assigning individual blame becomes more complex.
Just War Theory and Deterrence
Mearsheimer’s analyses of deterrence, preventive war, and nuclear strategy intersect with just war theory. Supportive readers argue that his focus on consequences, miscalculation, and structural risk enriches prudential aspects of just war reasoning (jus ad bellum). Critics worry that an emphasis on survival and power may license morally troubling practices or underplay the intrinsic wrongness of aggression.
Nationalism, Liberalism, and Cosmopolitanism
In The Great Delusion, Mearsheimer advances claims about human nature and group attachment, arguing that nationalism is more deeply rooted than cosmopolitan identity. This has become a reference point for philosophers debating:
- Whether national partiality is morally justified or merely inevitable.
- The feasibility of cosmopolitan political orders.
- How far liberal states may legitimately go in promoting their values abroad.
He contends that liberal hegemony often produces moral backfire effects—wars and instability triggered by normatively motivated interventions—pressing ethicists to consider moral risk and unintended consequences.
Lying and Political Ethics
Why Leaders Lie offers a typology of lies (inter-state, fear-mongering, strategic cover-ups) and evaluates when leaders deceive foreign or domestic audiences. Ethicists of politics use this framework to probe the conditions—if any—under which political deception may be permissible, and to differentiate between domestic democratic obligations and external strategic considerations.
Across these debates, Mearsheimer functions less as a moral theorist than as a provider of empirical and structural constraints that normative theories must either accommodate or challenge.
8. Critiques and Debates
Mearsheimer’s work has generated extensive debate across theoretical, empirical, and normative dimensions.
Challenges from Within International Relations Theory
- Defensive realists and neorealists argue that he overstates states’ drive for power maximization. They maintain that security, not hegemony, is the primary goal, and that status quo powers can be satisfied under certain conditions.
- Liberal institutionalists contend that he underestimates the pacifying effects of international institutions, economic interdependence, and democracy. They point to cooperative outcomes and durable institutions as evidence that anarchy does not compel relentless competition.
- Constructivists criticize his focus on material capabilities and structural anarchy, arguing that norms, identities, and social practices significantly shape state interests and behavior.
Empirical Disputes
Empirical critics question whether offensive realism accurately explains key historical episodes:
| Area of Debate | Critics’ Contentions |
|---|---|
| Post–Cold War Europe | NATO expansion and EU integration are cited as evidence of cooperative security rather than power balancing. |
| U.S. unipolar behavior | Some scholars argue that U.S. restraint in certain crises contradicts expectations of consistent power maximization. |
| China’s rise | Debates revolve around whether China’s trajectory aligns with Mearsheimer’s prediction of inevitable intense rivalry with the United States. |
Supporters respond that many of these developments can be reinterpreted as consistent with competitive balancing and power politics when viewed over the long term.
Normative and Political Controversies
Mearsheimer’s policy prescriptions and public commentary have been contentious:
- His criticism of liberal hegemony and opposition to interventions in Iraq and elsewhere have been welcomed by some realists and anti-interventionists but seen by others as overly permissive toward authoritarian regimes.
- The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy sparked intense debate about the role of organized lobbies, with defenders portraying it as a legitimate examination of interest-group politics and critics viewing it as methodologically flawed or normatively problematic.
- His interpretation of the Ukraine crisis and NATO expansion has been praised by those who see it as highlighting Western policy failures, while others argue it downplays Russian agency and internal dynamics.
Philosophical Critiques
Philosophers and theorists challenge:
- His assumptions about human nature and the inevitability of nationalism.
- The claim that structural imperatives sharply limit the scope for moral choice.
- The adequacy of a framework centered on survival and power to capture justice, rights, and global distributive concerns.
These debates situate Mearsheimer as a central, and often polarizing, figure in contemporary discussions about realism, morality, and the interpretation of international events.
9. Impact on International Relations and Political Theory
Mearsheimer’s influence extends across academic international relations (IR), policy debates, and normative political theory.
Within International Relations
In IR, offensive realism is widely treated as a core variant of realist theory, alongside defensive and classical realism. His work has:
- Provided a benchmark structural theory against which other approaches—liberal institutionalism, constructivism, English School—position themselves.
- Shaped research on great-power politics, balancing behavior, and regional security orders.
- Stimulated empirical studies testing propositions about power transitions, hegemony, and the rise of China.
Graduate syllabi in security studies and IR theory frequently include The Tragedy of Great Power Politics as a canonical text, either to endorse or critically engage.
Influence on Political and International Theory
In political theory and international political theory, Mearsheimer’s contributions are often used as a primary example of realism about international politics:
- Realist theorists invoke his arguments to underline the constraints imposed by anarchy and power politics on cosmopolitan projects and ideal theory.
- Normative debates on intervention, democracy promotion, and humanitarian war engage with his critique of liberal hegemony, whether to accept, refine, or reject his conclusions.
- Discussions of nationalism and global justice use his claims about the resilience of national identities as a challenge to cosmopolitan or post-national visions.
Public and Policy Discourse
Mearsheimer is also a prominent public intellectual. His analyses of NATO, the Iraq War, and U.S.–China relations have circulated widely beyond academia, influencing:
- Policy commentators who use his framework to argue for restraint and balance-of-power strategies.
- Critics who cite his work as emblematic of a pessimistic or “cold” view of world politics.
While the degree to which he directly shapes state policy is debated, his ideas form part of the intellectual landscape within which policymakers, think tanks, and journalists discuss grand strategy and the future of U.S. global engagement.
10. Legacy and Historical Significance
Assessments of Mearsheimer’s legacy focus on his role in defining a distinctive strand of realism and his influence on debates about power, morality, and order in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.
Position in the Realist Tradition
Many scholars place Mearsheimer in a lineage that includes Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Morgenthau, and Waltz, viewing offensive realism as a major late 20th-century development in realist thought. His work is often cited as:
- A clear, rigorous statement of structural realism with a strong emphasis on power maximization.
- A synthesis that combines strategic studies, history, and theory into a coherent framework.
Some commentators describe him as one of the most influential realist thinkers of his generation; others regard his contributions as more polarizing, noting substantial dissent from rival schools.
Historical Context and Controversy
Mearsheimer’s historical significance is also tied to his interventions at key moments:
| Era | Issues on which he became a reference point |
|---|---|
| Late Cold War | Debates over nuclear and conventional deterrence in Europe |
| Post–Cold War unipolarity | Expectations about U.S. dominance and future major-power conflict |
| War on Terror and beyond | Critiques of liberal interventionism and democracy promotion |
| 21st-century great-power rivalry | Analyses of China’s rise, NATO expansion, and the Ukraine crisis |
Supporters see his warnings about the limits of liberal hegemony and the dangers of major-power rivalry as prescient; critics argue that some of his forecasts have not materialized or have been too deterministic.
Long-Term Significance for Theory and Ethics
In retrospect, Mearsheimer is widely expected to remain a central reference for:
- The study of great-power politics and grand strategy.
- Debates over realism vs. liberalism and the ethics of foreign policy.
- Discussions of nationalism, global order, and the feasibility of cosmopolitan projects.
Whether his specific predictions prove accurate or not, commentators from diverse perspectives acknowledge that his work has compelled both scholars and practitioners to grapple with the tensions between power, security, and moral aspiration in international life, thereby shaping the intellectual contours of contemporary debates about war and peace.
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title = {John Joseph Mearsheimer},
author = {Philopedia},
year = {2025},
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urldate = {December 11, 2025}
}Note: This entry was last updated on 2025-12-10. For the most current version, always check the online entry.