Keiji Nishitani

1. Introduction

Keiji Nishitani (1900–1990) is widely regarded as one of the most significant figures in modern Japanese philosophy and a central representative of the second generation of the Kyoto School. Working at the intersection of Zen Buddhism, Western existentialism, and philosophy of religion, he developed an influential account of how modern nihilism—the sense that life and values lack ultimate ground—can be transformed rather than simply rejected.

Nishitani’s thought is shaped by his dual formation: on one side, training in Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions and his apprenticeship under Nishida Kitarō in Kyoto; on the other, his intensive engagement with Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and modern Christian theology during his European sojourn. His work is often described as an attempt to rethink Western crises of meaning through the Buddhist concept of śūnyatā (emptiness) and the Kyoto School notion of absolute nothingness (zettai mu).

In contrast to accounts that treat religion as belief in supernatural entities or fixed doctrines, Nishitani presents it as a radical transformation of the standpoint (tachiba) from which we exist. Philosophers of religion, theologians, and comparative philosophers have drawn on his texts to explore secularization, “death of God” theologies, interfaith dialogue, and critiques of technological modernity. At the same time, critics have questioned aspects of his political involvement, his use of Buddhist concepts, and the accessibility of his style.

This entry surveys his life and historical context, the development of his thought within the Kyoto School, his major works and core concepts, his approach to religion and intercultural philosophy, and subsequent debates over his influence and legacy.

2. Life and Historical Context

2.1 Biographical Overview

Nishitani was born on 27 February 1900 in Ishikawa Prefecture and died in Kyoto on 24 November 1990. Educated at Kyoto Imperial University, he became a disciple of Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe Hajime, receiving a rigorous grounding in Western and Buddhist philosophy. From 1927 to 1929 he studied in Germany, especially in Freiburg under Martin Heidegger, before returning to Kyoto, where he eventually became professor of philosophy of religion in 1949.

Key moments in his life include:

2.2 Historical and Intellectual Setting

Nishitani’s life spans Japan’s transition from late Meiji modernization through militarism, World War II, and postwar democratization. Scholars note that this turbulent background shaped his perception of a pervasive spiritual crisis: first in Japan’s attempt to appropriate Western science and nationalism, then in the postwar collapse of traditional and imperial certainties.

Within philosophy, his formative decades coincided with the global reception of German idealism, phenomenology, and existentialism, and with theological movements grappling with secularization and the “death of God.” Commentators often interpret Nishitani’s preoccupation with nihilism and emptiness as a response both to these European currents and to Japan’s own cultural disorientation under rapid modernization and defeat.

3. Intellectual Development and Kyoto School Background

3.1 Stages of Intellectual Development

Commentators typically divide Nishitani’s intellectual development into several phases, which reflect the changing shape of his engagement with Western and Buddhist sources:

These phases are reconstructed from his publications, lecture records, and correspondence; some scholars caution that the boundaries between them remain somewhat porous.

3.2 Kyoto School Background

Nishitani’s work arises within the Kyoto School, an intellectual movement that combined Western philosophical tools with East Asian religious thought. Under Nishida Kitarō, the school developed the concept of basho (place/field) and absolute nothingness as a way to rethink metaphysics beyond the subject–object divide. Tanabe Hajime advanced a related “philosophy of metanoetics” stressing repentance and historical mediation.

Nishitani inherits this framework but redirects it toward the problem of nihilism. Whereas Nishida focuses on logic and epistemology, Nishitani emphasizes existential and religious questions: how modern individuals, confronted with groundlessness, may experience a transformation of standpoint. Scholars variously interpret him as:

• A faithful continuer of Nishida’s metaphysical project,
• A critic who “existentializes” and “religionizes” Nishida’s thought,
• Or a mediator bringing Kyoto School ideas into explicit dialogue with Western existentialism.

Debate continues over the extent to which his work remains within, or significantly revises, the Kyoto School paradigm.

4. Major Works and Central Themes

4.1 Overview of Major Works

Nishitani’s principal writings form a relatively compact but thematically interconnected corpus:

4.2 Central Themes Across the Corpus

Across these works, several recurring themes structure Nishitani’s thought:

• Nihilism as existential field: Rather than a doctrine to refute, nihilism is depicted as a lived standpoint to be fully undergone.
• Emptiness and absolute nothingness: Drawing on Mahāyāna Buddhism and Kyoto School metaphysics, he interprets śūnyatā as a non-objectifiable field (basho) where all beings are interdependent.
• Transformation of standpoint: Philosophy and religion are described as shifts in how we exist—moving from the ego-centered standpoint, through nihilism, to the standpoint of emptiness.
• Reinterpretation of religion: In What Is Religion? and Religion and Nothingness, religion is treated as response to the question of why there is existence at all, rather than as assent to dogmas.
• Engagement with Western thinkers: His essays and books include detailed dialogues with Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Eckhart, and others, used both as conversation partners and as diagnostic tools for modernity’s crisis.
• Critique of modern science and technology: Particularly in Science and Zen and later writings, he analyzes how objectifying rationality intensifies nihilism while also insisting that science need not be rejected but seen from another standpoint.

Scholars often read the oeuvre as a progressively refined attempt to weave these themes into a single, religion-centered philosophical vision.

5. Core Ideas: Nihilism, Emptiness, and Absolute Nothingness

5.1 Nihilism as Standpoint

For Nishitani, nihilism (nihirizumu) names a pervasive modern experience in which values, purposes, and even beings appear groundless. He argues that this is not merely an intellectual doctrine but a standpoint that transforms how the world appears. Influenced by Nietzsche and Heidegger, he interprets the “death of God” and the collapse of metaphysical certainties as exposing a “nihility” at the ground of existence.

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“Nihilism is not merely a phenomenon that should be overcome; it is a field that we ourselves must stand upon, a field we must go out onto and through which we must pass.”
— Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness

Many commentators emphasize that, on this view, attempts to bypass nihilism—by returning to dogmatic belief or simplistic humanism—remain superficial.

5.2 Emptiness (Śūnyatā) and the “Field” of Existence

Drawing on Mahāyāna Buddhism, Nishitani reinterprets śūnyatā (emptiness) as a field (basho) in which all things are mutually dependent and lack fixed self-nature. Emptiness is not sheer negation but the dynamic openness that allows beings to be as they are. When the self is “emptied of itself,” beings are experienced in their suchness.

Proponents of this reading argue that Nishitani clarifies Buddhist emptiness for modern audiences by distinguishing it from nihilistic nothingness. Critics contend that his heavy reliance on Western existential vocabulary risks reshaping śūnyatā into a primarily philosophical, rather than soteriological, concept.

5.3 Absolute Nothingness (Zettai Mu)

Building on Nishida’s metaphysics, Nishitani speaks of absolute nothingness as the deepest dimension where even the distinction between being and non-being collapses. This is the “place” from which all beings arise and to which selfhood is radically opened in religious awakening.

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“To become aware of the nihility that lies at the ground of our existence is at the same time to open ourselves to a dimension that cannot be objectified, a dimension I call absolute nothingness.”
— Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness

Some scholars see this as a philosophical translation of Buddhist ultimate reality; others caution that identifying Buddhist insight with a general metaphysical “absolute” may blur doctrinal differences between Buddhism and other traditions.

6. Philosophy of Religion and the Question of Meaning

6.1 Redefining “Religion”

In What Is Religion? and Religion and Nothingness, Nishitani proposes that religion arises where the question of existence becomes unavoidable:

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“What is called religion arises at the point where the radical question of the meaning of existence becomes unavoidable for us in our very being.”
— Keiji Nishitani, What Is Religion?

He thus shifts emphasis from institutional affiliation or doctrinal belief to an existential interrogation: Why do I exist? Why is there suffering, death, and apparent meaninglessness? Proponents hold that this allows a cross-traditional philosophy of religion that treats different religious paths as responses to a shared existential problem.

6.2 Standpoints and Religious Awakening

Nishitani’s philosophy of religion is structured by successive standpoints:

On his account, authentic religion entails moving from the ego-ground to the field of emptiness, not by negating the world but by seeing self and world as interdependent. This has attracted interest among phenomenologists of religion and theologians exploring non-theistic or “post-metaphysical” conceptions of the divine.

6.3 Relation to Theism and Non-Theism

Nishitani’s approach neither straightforwardly affirms nor simply denies the existence of a theistic God. Instead, he often reads notions of God, sin, and salvation through the lens of emptiness. Some Christian theologians interpret his work as a resource for negative theology or “death of God” theologies, which emphasize the transcendence of God beyond objectification. Others argue that his framework ultimately subordinates theistic language to a Buddhist ontology of emptiness, raising questions about how genuinely reciprocal the dialogue is.

Philosophers of religion debate whether his model supports a pluralist view of religions converging on a common experiential core, or whether it privileges Mahāyāna perspectives while reinterpreting other traditions in their terms.

7. Methodology: Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy

7.1 Dialogical Method

Nishitani’s work is a prominent example of comparative philosophy that seeks rigorous dialogue between Eastern and Western traditions. His method typically involves:

1. Intensive, text-based interpretation of Western thinkers (e.g., Nietzsche, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Eckhart).
2. Parallel engagement with Buddhist sources (e.g., early Buddhism, Mahāyāna texts, Zen masters such as Dōgen).
3. A movement toward a “third standpoint”—often that of emptiness—within which similarities and differences can be reinterpreted.

Supporters view this as avoiding superficial parallels by remaining close to primary texts and by allowing each side to challenge the other.

7.2 Use of Key Frameworks: Basho and Standpoint

Nishitani frequently employs Kyoto School concepts such as basho (field/place) and standpoint (tachiba) as mediating tools:

This allows him to juxtapose, for example, Heidegger’s “Being” and Buddhist emptiness as different articulations of the ultimate “field” in which beings arise.

7.3 Debates on Methodological Neutrality

Scholars are divided on the neutrality of his approach:

• One camp argues that Nishitani exemplifies a genuinely intercultural philosophy, where neither East nor West is privileged and where categories are reworked through mutual critique.
• Another camp contends that his method is asymmetrical, subtly privileging Mahāyāna Buddhism and Kyoto School notions of absolute nothingness as the ultimate horizon into which Western ideas are “translated.”
• A further line of criticism suggests that the complexity of his comparative vocabulary makes it difficult for non-specialists to assess whether the Western and Buddhist positions are represented accurately or selectively.

These debates have made his work a touchstone in discussions about standards and aims in comparative and intercultural philosophy.

8. Engagement with Science, Technology, and Modernity

8.1 Science and Objectification

In Science and Zen and related essays, Nishitani analyzes modern science as a mode of grasping the world through objectification and calculation. He emphasizes that this has yielded powerful knowledge and technology but also a worldview in which both nature and human beings appear as manipulable objects. Some interpreters see his position as a continuation of Heidegger’s critique of technology, adapted to a Buddhist framework.

Nishitani does not advocate rejecting science; rather, he proposes that science be seen from a different standpoint—that of emptiness—so that its findings are integrated into, rather than dominating, our understanding of reality.

8.2 Technology, Nihilism, and the Modern Subject

Modern technology is described by Nishitani as intensifying nihilism by reducing beings to resources and eroding traditional sources of meaning. Postwar consumer society, in his analysis, often masks a profound spiritual emptiness with material abundance. This diagnosis situates him within global twentieth-century critiques of modernity.

Proponents hold that his concept of nihilism helps explain contemporary experiences of alienation and loss of purpose under advanced technological capitalism. Critics argue that he risks romanticizing premodern lifeworlds or underestimating the emancipatory potentials of technology and secularization.

8.3 Zen, Emptiness, and a Non-Oppositional Response

Nishitani proposes that insight into emptiness offers a way to relate to science and technology without either absolutizing or demonizing them. From the “field of emptiness,” technological tools can be employed while recognizing their limits and avoiding the reification of the scientific worldview as the sole arbiter of truth.

Some environmental philosophers and ethicists have drawn on this aspect of his work to articulate non-dualistic approaches to nature and technology. Others question whether his framework yields concrete social or political proposals, or remains primarily at the level of individual spiritual transformation.

9. Reception, Criticisms, and Debates

9.1 Reception in Japan and Internationally

In Japan, Nishitani has been recognized as a major postwar philosopher of religion and a key second-generation Kyoto School figure. His seminars at Kyoto University influenced many scholars in philosophy, religious studies, and theology. Internationally, his impact has been strongest in:

The English translation of Religion and Nothingness in 1982 significantly broadened his global readership.

9.2 Wartime Involvement and Political Critiques

A persistent line of criticism concerns Nishitani’s role during World War II. Like several Kyoto School figures, he participated in wartime intellectual circles; some writings from this period have been read as offering philosophical justification, or at least insufficient resistance, to Japanese nationalism and imperial ideology. Critics argue that his later focus on spiritual crisis may deflect from concrete political responsibility.

Defenders contend that his wartime stance was more ambivalent, highlighting passages that stress repentance and critique of state idolatry, and pointing to his postwar reflections on war responsibility. The extent and meaning of his political complicity remain debated in Japanese and Western scholarship.

9.3 Philosophical and Theological Critiques

Other criticisms focus on his philosophical system:

• From Buddhist studies: Some scholars argue that equating Buddhist śūnyatā with “absolute nothingness” and using it as a universal metaphysical key risks distorting specific doctrinal traditions and soteriological aims.
• From Christian theology: While many appreciate his contribution to negative theology and interfaith dialogue, others claim that his framework tends to relativize or reinterpret Christian beliefs in a Buddhist direction, raising concerns about asymmetrical dialogue.
• From analytic and continental philosophers: His dense style and hybrid vocabulary have been characterized as obscure, and some question whether concepts like “field of absolute nothingness” can be rendered in clear argumentative terms.

At the same time, supporters maintain that these very tensions have made Nishitani’s work a productive site for ongoing debate about method, metaphysics, and interreligious understanding.

10. Legacy and Historical Significance

10.1 Place in 20th-Century Philosophy

Nishitani is frequently situated at the crossroads of 20th-century philosophy of religion, existentialism, and Buddhist thought. Within the Kyoto School, he is often seen as one of the main figures who translated Nishida’s metaphysical insights into a sustained exploration of nihilism and religious existence. In global intellectual history, he is cited as a pioneer of intercultural philosophy, taking both Buddhist and Western traditions as serious partners in systematic inquiry.

10.2 Influence on Subsequent Thought

His influence can be traced in several areas:

Later thinkers in Japan, Europe, and North America have drawn on his analyses of nihilism and emptiness to address issues ranging from environmental crisis to interreligious ethics.

10.3 Ongoing Assessment

Historians and philosophers continue to reassess Nishitani’s significance:

• Some present him as a key figure in a “global turn” in philosophy, contributing to a more plural, non-Eurocentric canon.
• Others emphasize the unresolved tensions in his work—between metaphysics and soteriology, politics and spirituality, East and West—as emblematic of broader challenges in cross-cultural philosophy.
• Critical discussions of his wartime involvement and doctrinal reinterpretations form part of wider debates on the responsibilities of intellectuals and the possibilities and limits of comparative thought.

Overall, his writings remain a major reference point for anyone investigating the intersections of nihilism, religion, and intercultural philosophical dialogue in the 20th and 21st centuries.