Kendall Lewis Walton

1. Introduction

Kendall Lewis Walton (1939–2024) was an American philosopher whose work reshaped analytic aesthetics, the philosophy of art, and the theory of fiction. He is best known for developing a comprehensive account of games of make-believe, according to which representational artworks function as props that prescribe imaginings and generate fictional truths. This framework underpins his treatments of depiction, emotional engagement with fiction, and the ontology of artworks.

Walton’s thought is situated within late 20th‑century analytic philosophy, drawing on its emphasis on argument, clarity, and attention to ordinary practices. Yet he departs from purely linguistic or propositional approaches by foregrounding imagination, perception-like experiences, and socially embedded rules. His work is widely seen as a turning point in aesthetics, influencing debates on pictorial representation, photographic realism, moral criticism of art, and the metaphysics of fictional entities.

The entry that follows is organized around both the development of Walton’s ideas and their thematic focal points. After outlining his life and intellectual context, it examines his major writings—especially Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990) and Marvelous Images (2008)—and his central theses about representation, fiction, and emotion. Subsequent sections survey his contributions to pictorial theory, aesthetic value, and artistic categories; his methodological style; his impact across neighboring disciplines; and the main lines of criticism and subsequent development of his views. Throughout, attention is given to competing interpretations and to the wider philosophical conversations in which Walton’s work participates.

2. Life and Historical Context

Walton was born in Glendale, California, on 7 January 1939 and completed his A.B. at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1962, followed by a Ph.D. at Cornell University in 1967. In 1969 he joined the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, where he spent the bulk of his career and became a central figure in its influential philosophy department. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2011. Walton died in 2024 in the United States, reportedly from age-related complications.

2.1 Career Milestones

2.2 Intellectual and Cultural Setting

Walton’s career unfolded against the backdrop of late 20th‑century analytic philosophy, in which logical empiricism had receded but a commitment to clarity and argument remained central. His work intersects with:

Walton’s focus on everyday practices (children’s games, maps, diagrams) echoes broader methodological shifts toward ordinary language and social practices, while his attention to film and photography reflects changing artistic and technological landscapes.

3. Intellectual Development

Walton’s intellectual trajectory can be divided into several overlapping phases, each marked by distinctive questions yet unified by a growing emphasis on rules, practices, and imagination.

3.1 Early Analytic Formation

During his studies at Berkeley and Cornell in the 1950s–60s, Walton absorbed mainstream analytic methods: precise argumentation, attention to logical form, and a sensitivity to linguistic distinctions. While detailed archival evidence is limited, commentators commonly situate him among philosophers influenced by post‑Wittgensteinian attention to use and by debates about reference and ontology. This background prepared him to engage with questions about the status of fictional entities and representational content.

3.2 Emergence of Aesthetic Concerns (1970s)

In the 1970s Walton turned decisively to aesthetics. “Categories of Art” (1970) already exhibits his interest in rule‑governed practices: he argues that correct perception of a work’s artistic category (e.g., as a painting of a certain style) conditions which aesthetic properties it can have. Throughout this decade, he developed the idea that representational artifacts participate in structured activities, beginning to treat children’s games and maps as illuminating models.

3.3 Systematization: Make-Believe and Fiction (late 1970s–1990)

“Fearing Fictions” (1978) introduced his influential response to the paradox of fiction and made explicit the notion of games of make-believe. Over the following decade Walton integrated strands from philosophy of mind (imagination, perception), metaphysics (fictional entities), and aesthetics (representation, depiction) into a unified theory. This culminated in Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990), which presents a general framework for understanding representational arts as props in games of make-believe.

3.4 Expansion to Value and Ethics (1990s–2000s)

From the 1990s onward, Walton extended his framework to questions of aesthetic and moral value, exploring how works guide not only what is fictionally true, but also how audiences are invited to feel and evaluate. Essays later collected in Marvelous Images address moral criticism of art, the nature of aesthetic value, and the interplay between imaginative engagement and ethical outlooks.

3.5 Late Refinements (2010s–2020s)

In his later work Walton focused on clarifying and defending core theses about fictional truth, the status of artworks as props, and the nature of photographic transparency. He engaged with critics in aesthetics, metaphysics, and cognitive science, fine‑tuning distinctions (e.g., between different kinds of imagining) rather than proposing radically new doctrines.

4. Major Works and Key Publications

Walton’s contributions are concentrated in a small number of major works and widely cited articles that articulate and refine his views on representation, fiction, and value.

4.1 Books

4.2 Influential Articles

These writings are interrelated. “Categories of Art” anticipates the rule-governed practices central to Mimesis as Make-Believe; “Fearing Fictions” supplies the emotional dimension of make-believe; and “Transparent Pictures” develops a distinctive theory of pictorial representation that is incorporated into his broader framework.

4.3 Thematic Range

Although best known for aesthetics, Walton’s work intersects with:

• Metaphysics and ontology: through analyses of fictional entities and the status of artworks;
• Philosophy of mind: via accounts of imagination, perception-like experiences, and emotion;
• Ethics and moral psychology: in discussions of art’s capacity to shape moral emotions and evaluative outlooks.

These cross-cutting concerns are dispersed across essays but anchored in the core books and articles listed above.

5. Core Ideas: Make-Believe and Representation

Walton’s central claim is that many representational activities—including engagement with artworks—are best understood as participation in games of make-believe. In such games, props (objects, texts, images) function under rules that specify what participants are to imagine and thereby determine what is fictionally true.

5.1 Games of Make-Believe

Children’s pretend games serve as paradigms: a tree may count as a “monster” within a game; its shape and position help fix what is fictionally true (e.g., that a monster is lurking nearby). Walton argues that similar structures underlie engagement with novels, paintings, and films. The work itself, along with contextual conventions, prescribes imaginings for properly engaged audiences.

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“Works of fiction serve as props in games of make-believe; they generate fictional truths by indicating what we are to imagine.”
— Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe

5.2 Props and Fictional Truth

A prop is any item that, in a given game, has the function of generating or constraining imaginings. Fictional truth is defined relative to such a game: a proposition is fictionally true if, according to the rules governing the relevant props, participants are to imagine it. This account contrasts with views that treat fictional truth as a matter of an author’s stipulation or of possible worlds, emphasizing instead socially shared practices and norms.

5.3 Representation as Participation in Practices

On Walton’s view, to call an artwork “representational” is to situate it within a practice of make-believe. Paintings, novels, and films represent by serving as props in games that prescribe imaginings of objects, events, and perspectives. Proponents see this as unifying different media under a common mechanism (rule-governed imagining), while critics question whether all representation is reducible to make-believe, especially in non‑fictional or purely informational contexts (e.g., maps, diagrams). Walton responds by treating many such artifacts as participating in specialized or “partial” games of make-believe, though this extension remains debated.

6. Fiction, Emotion, and the Paradox of Fiction

Walton’s essay “Fearing Fictions” provides a widely discussed response to the paradox of fiction, which arises from an apparent inconsistency:

Taken together, these seem to imply that our emotional responses to fiction are either irrational or not fully genuine.

6.1 Walton’s Make-Believe Solution

Walton accepts that we do not literally fear fictional monsters (since we do not believe they exist) but holds that we participate in a game of make-believe in which it is fictional that we are in danger. Our responses are genuine emotions that occur within the context of this game. When a viewer “fears” a movie monster, it is fictionally true that they are afraid of being attacked, even though, in reality, they know they are safe.

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“Our emotions directed toward fictional characters are genuine emotions, even though they are embedded in a game of make-believe.”
— Walton, “Fearing Fictions”

Thus, premise (2) is restricted: some genuine emotions are directed not at believed realities but at states of affairs we are to imagine, given a practice’s rules.

6.2 Competing Views

Walton’s approach contrasts with:

Proponents of Walton’s solution highlight its integration with his broader make-believe framework. Critics contend that ordinary emotional engagement with fiction is less game‑like or self-consciously imaginative than his account suggests, and some argue that the phenomenology of intense responses (e.g., lasting grief over characters) strains a purely fictional-truth-based explanation.

7. Pictorial Representation and Photographic Realism

Walton extends his make-believe framework to visual representation, especially in “Transparent Pictures” and chapters of Mimesis as Make-Believe. He aims to explain how pictures depict and why photographs appear particularly realistic.

7.1 Depiction as Prop-Use

For Walton, pictures are props in games of make-believe that prescribe perceptual-like imaginings. Looking at a painting of a landscape, one is to imagine seeing the depicted scene. Depiction is thus not primarily a matter of encoding propositions but of guiding how spectators are to imagine looking at things. This contrasts with purely resemblance-based accounts, which tie depiction to similarity, and with purely conventionalist accounts, which stress arbitrary symbol systems; Walton offers a hybrid that emphasizes conventional rules governing imaginative uptake.

7.2 Transparent Pictures

Walton’s most controversial claim is that many photographs are transparent: when we look at them, we literally see (in some sense) the objects they depict through the photograph.

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“Photographs are transparent; we see, literally see, through them the objects that produced them.”
— Walton, “Transparent Pictures”

The key idea is causal: the photographic process creates an image by the object’s light physically affecting the photosensitive medium, enabling a kind of visually mediated contact with the original scene. Proponents argue this captures the intuitive difference between photographs and hand‑made pictures, particularly in evidential and documentary uses.

7.3 Critical Responses and Alternatives

Critics dispute the literal “seeing through” claim, suggesting that:

• The phenomenology of viewing photographs and paintings is not categorically different.
• Technological mediation and post-processing undermine any special transparency.
• The account may not generalize across digital, composite, or heavily edited images.

Alternative views propose that photographic realism is better explained by cultural conventions, high detail, or typical viewing contexts. Others offer “twofold” theories of seeing-in (e.g., Richard Wollheim), emphasizing that in both painting and photography viewers are simultaneously aware of a surface and a depicted scene. Debates continue over whether Walton’s transparency thesis is best read metaphysically (about perception) or as a normative claim about how photographs ought to function as props in certain practices.

8. Aesthetic Value, Morality, and Artistic Categories

Walton extends his make-believe framework to questions about aesthetic value, moral criticism, and artistic categories, especially in “Categories of Art” and essays collected in Marvelous Images.

8.1 Artistic Categories and Aesthetic Properties

In “Categories of Art” Walton argues that the artistic category under which a work is correctly perceived (e.g., Baroque painting, horror film, satire) affects which aesthetic properties it can intelligibly be said to have. A painting that looks crudely executed relative to Renaissance standards may be subtle when seen as an example of a different style. Correct categorization depends on features like standardness, contrast, and historical practice.

This account has been used to explain why some aesthetic judgments seem category-relative and how genre conventions structure audience expectations.

8.2 Aesthetic Value and “Marvelous” Images

In essays such as “How Marvelous! Toward a Theory of Aesthetic Value,” Walton explores how artworks provide marvelous experiences: striking, surprising, or revelatory imaginative engagements. Aesthetic value is linked to the richness and appropriateness of the imaginings a work prescribes, including the patterns of attention and emotional response it fosters. Proponents emphasize that this ties value to the distinctive kinds of engagement artworks invite, rather than to purely formal or moral criteria.

8.3 Morality and Imaginative Engagement

Walton also addresses how works engage moral attitudes. Fiction can invite us to imagine endorsing, rejecting, or inhabiting morally loaded perspectives. Some argue that this supports forms of moral education: by guiding imagination, artworks may shape or refine moral emotions (empathy, guilt, indignation). Others worry about problematic works that invite morally troubling imaginings (e.g., racist or misogynistic attitudes).

Walton’s own view, as reconstructed by commentators, does not reduce aesthetic value to moral value. Instead, he examines how moral features can be aesthetically relevant when they affect the success or failure of a work’s prescribed games of make-believe (for instance, when invited sympathies conflict with widely held moral convictions, potentially undermining engagement). Debates continue over how far his framework can accommodate robust moralism or autonomism in aesthetics.

9. Methodology and Style of Argument

Walton’s methodology combines analytic rigor with an unusual reliance on everyday examples and imaginative case studies.

9.1 Use of Ordinary Practices

Walton frequently begins with familiar activities—children’s games, reading novels, using maps, viewing photographs—and uses them as models for more complex artistic and representational practices. This reflects a methodological commitment to understanding art by situating it within broader human activities rather than treating it as sui generis. Many commentators see this as continuous with ordinary language philosophy and practice-based approaches.

9.2 Thought Experiments and Intuitive Cases

His arguments often proceed through carefully constructed examples that invite readers to reflect on their own responses. For instance, “Fearing Fictions” relies on cinematic horror cases; “Transparent Pictures” uses everyday snapshots; “Categories of Art” invites reflection on works perceived under different stylistic categories. Walton typically:

1. Describes a concrete scenario in detail.
2. Elicits shared intuitive judgments about it.
3. Proposes theoretical principles that explain those judgments.
4. Tests those principles across a range of related cases.

9.3 Rule- and Practice-Oriented Explanations

Walton’s style emphasizes rules and social practices rather than solitary mental states. Games of make-believe, artistic categories, and conventions of pictorial usage are all treated as normative structures that guide imagination and evaluation. This aligns his work with broader trends toward social and normative explanations in late 20th‑century philosophy.

9.4 Expository Style

Commentators often note Walton’s clear prose and relatively low level of formal apparatus. He rarely uses heavy symbolism or technical jargon, instead favoring accessible language and stepwise arguments. Primary texts frequently contain summarizing passages and explicit signposting. At the same time, his analyses can be dense, with fine-grained distinctions (e.g., between kinds of imagining, levels of fictional truth) that require careful reading.

Some critics suggest that the reliance on intuitions about examples may obscure cultural variation or alternative practices, while supporters regard his case-based, practice-sensitive style as a strength that grounds theorizing in recognizable phenomena.

10. Impact on Philosophy and Related Disciplines

Walton’s work has had considerable influence across multiple philosophical subfields and beyond.

10.1 Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art

In aesthetics, his make-believe framework has become a standard reference point for theories of representation, depiction, and fiction. Many subsequent accounts of narrative engagement, genre, and artistic categories build on, refine, or challenge Walton’s proposals. His views are widely discussed in textbooks and anthologies, and Mimesis as Make-Believe is often treated as a canonical text in analytic aesthetics.

10.2 Metaphysics of Fiction and Ontology of Artworks

Metaphysicians interested in fictional entities and artworks have drawn on Walton’s idea that we can talk meaningfully about fictional characters without positing robust, non‑existent objects. His emphasis on practices and fictional truth has informed debates on:

• The status of fictional names and reference;
• The nature of ontologically “lightweight” objects;
• The role of social practices in constituting artworks.

Some theorists use Walton’s approach as a deflationary alternative to Meinongian or robust fictional realist views.

10.3 Philosophy of Mind and Emotion

Walton’s treatment of imagination and emotion has influenced research on mental imagery, pretense, and emotional response. His solution to the paradox of fiction is part of a broader shift toward recognizing the cognitive and affective significance of imagination, alongside work by other philosophers and cognitive scientists.

10.4 Influence Beyond Philosophy

In film theory, Walton’s ideas on make-believe and transparency inform discussions of cinematic realism and viewer engagement. In literary theory, his account of fiction as prescribing imaginings has been used to analyze narrative voice, unreliable narration, and reader response. Art historians and theorists have drawn on his categories-of-art framework to discuss style, genre, and historical reception.

The degree of uptake varies across disciplines, with analytic aesthetics showing the most systematic engagement, while other fields selectively adapt particular concepts (e.g., games of make-believe) to their own theoretical agendas.

11. Criticisms, Debates, and Further Developments

Walton’s work has prompted extensive discussion. Criticisms target both specific theses (e.g., photographic transparency) and broader aspects of the make-believe framework.

11.1 Paradox of Fiction and Emotion

Some philosophers accept Walton’s rejection of quasi-emotions but contest the game-of-make-believe component, arguing that ordinary engagement with fiction need not involve explicit or implicit participation in a game. “Thought theorists” maintain that ordinary thoughts about fictional scenarios suffice to generate genuine emotions, without invoking fictional truths. Debates centre on phenomenology (how responses feel) and explanatory adequacy.

11.2 Scope of Make-Believe

Critics question whether all representational practices fit comfortably into the make-believe model. Maps, diagrams, and scientific models, while sometimes involving imagination, also serve straightforwardly informational or practical roles. Some argue that Walton’s account either over‑intellectualizes these uses or must stretch the notion of a game to cover them. Others suggest a pluralist picture on which make-believe explains some, but not all, representational phenomena.

11.3 Photographic Transparency

The transparency thesis has generated sustained debate. Opponents argue that:

• We do not literally see absent or past objects when looking at photographs;
• Manipulated, composite, or digital images undermine causal-contact arguments;
• The differences between photographs and paintings can be explained in epistemic or conventional terms.

Defenders have refined Walton’s ideas, sometimes weakening the claim (e.g., to a special kind of indirect perception) or extending it to other mechanically produced images.

11.4 Artistic Categories and Relativism

Walton’s “Categories of Art” has been both influential and contested. Some worry that if aesthetic properties depend heavily on category, judgments become overly relative to historical or cultural practices. Others respond by emphasizing Walton’s criteria for correct categorization and by integrating his account with more robust normative theories of aesthetic value.

11.5 Extensions and Modifications

Subsequent philosophers have developed Walton-inspired theories:

• Make-believe and metaphysics: Fictionalists adapt his prop-and-practice ideas to areas like mathematics or modality.
• Game-theoretic elaborations: Some interpret games of make-believe using formal tools from game theory or cognitive science.
• Empirical work on imagination: Cognitive scientists investigate how imaginative engagement with fiction aligns (or not) with Walton’s descriptive claims.

These developments illustrate both the generative power of Walton’s framework and ongoing debates about its limits.

12. Legacy and Historical Significance

Walton is widely regarded as one of the most important aesthetic theorists in late 20th‑ and early 21st‑century analytic philosophy. His legacy rests on the introduction and systematic elaboration of games of make-believe as a unifying device for understanding representation, fiction, and aesthetic engagement.

12.1 Position within Aesthetic Theory

Walton’s work is often juxtaposed with earlier traditions:

Within this landscape, Walton’s contributions are seen as consolidating a practice-and-rule-based orientation that continues in contemporary aesthetics.

12.2 Cross-Subfield Significance

Walton’s ideas have become touchstones in metaphysics (fictional entities), philosophy of mind (imagination, emotion), and ethics (moral dimensions of art). His work exemplifies how aesthetics can interact productively with other branches of philosophy, countering tendencies to marginalize the philosophy of art.

12.3 Reception and Ongoing Use

His writings remain central in curricula, anthologies, and scholarly debates. Subsequent theories of narrative engagement, pictorial perception, and aesthetic value routinely engage with Walton either as a point of departure or as a foil. Even critics often adopt his terminology (props, fictional truth, games of make-believe), indicating the penetration of his conceptual framework.

12.4 Historical Assessment

Scholars frequently describe Walton’s Mimesis as Make-Believe as a landmark comparable, within analytic aesthetics, to classic works in other subfields (e.g., Kripke in philosophy of language). While assessments differ about the ultimate correctness or scope of his theories, there is widespread agreement that he provided an exceptionally clear, fertile, and integrative framework that reshaped how philosophers think about art, fiction, and imagination. His influence is likely to persist as discussions evolve around new media, digital images, and changing cultural practices of representation.