Michael Joseph Oakeshott

1. Introduction

Michael Joseph Oakeshott (1901–1990) was an English political theorist and philosopher best known for his critique of rationalism in politics, his account of civil association, and his distinctive conception of tradition as a practical, historically evolved way of going on. Writing mainly in mid‑twentieth‑century Britain, he developed an approach to political philosophy that combined metaphysical reflection with close attention to historical practices and to the limits of abstract theory.

Oakeshott’s work spans several domains—political theory, the philosophy of history, legal theory, and the philosophy of education—but it is unified by a set of recurring themes: the plurality of “modes of experience”, the idea of politics as a practice rather than an applied science, and a corresponding insistence that political order is best understood as a framework of non‑instrumental rules rather than a collective project pursuing substantive ends.

In Anglophone debates, he is often grouped with conservative thinkers, largely because of his influential characterization of a conservative disposition and his skepticism toward large‑scale social engineering. However, interpreters disagree about how far his philosophy supports any particular ideology. Some read him as a conservative moralist, others as a liberal theorist of the rule of law, and still others as a post‑ideological critic of programmatic politics.

Oakeshott’s writings—especially Experience and Its Modes (1933), Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (1962), and On Human Conduct (1975)—are frequently cited in discussions of the rule of law, the neutrality of the modern state, and the role of tradition and tacit knowledge in public life. His work continues to shape contemporary debates over the nature and scope of political authority, the meaning of political education, and the limits of technocratic governance.

2. Life and Historical Context

Oakeshott was born in 1901 in Chelsfield, Kent, into a Nonconformist and Fabian‑sympathetic household, where political and religious questions were reportedly matters of regular discussion. Educated at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, he was elected to a fellowship there in 1925, joining a milieu shaped by late British Idealism and post‑Victorian liberal culture. This environment framed his early philosophical concerns with experience, history, and the nature of individuality.

His career unfolded across some of the central upheavals of the twentieth century. The interwar years, marked by economic crisis and the rise of totalitarian ideologies, formed the backdrop to his early work Experience and Its Modes (1933) and to his increasing engagement with historical thought. During the Second World War he served in British intelligence (MI6), an experience many commentators link to his later wariness of ideological politics and administrative grand designs, though he himself offered only indirect testimony about its impact.

In 1951 Oakeshott succeeded Harold Laski as professor of political science at the London School of Economics. The contrast between Laski’s socialist, programmatic orientation and Oakeshott’s more skeptical, practice‑oriented outlook has often been highlighted as emblematic of shifting post‑war British political thought. At LSE he taught through the consolidation of the welfare state, decolonization, and the Cold War, all of which provided contemporary reference points for his reflections on the modern European state, civil association, and the limits of planning.

Oakeshott retired in 1969 and spent his later years in relative seclusion, publishing On Human Conduct (1975) and essays on history and education. He died in 1990, by which time he was widely regarded as a distinctive, if often controversial, voice in twentieth‑century Anglo‑American political philosophy.

Timeline of Key Life Events

3. Intellectual Development

Oakeshott’s intellectual trajectory is often divided into several phases, each retaining continuity with earlier concerns but shifting emphasis and vocabulary.

Early Cambridge Idealism and Experience and Its Modes

In the 1920s and early 1930s, under the influence of British Idealists such as F.H. Bradley and J.M.E. McTaggart and various neo‑Kantian currents, Oakeshott developed a systematic metaphysical account of experience. Experience and Its Modes (1933) articulated distinct “modes” of understanding—historical, scientific, practical—each governed by its own criteria of coherence. This early work framed his lasting conviction that no single idiom of understanding, including the “practical,” can legitimately claim supremacy over others.

Historical and Skeptical Turn

From the later 1930s into the 1940s, his attention shifted toward history and politics. Editing Hobbes’s Leviathan (published 1946) prompted a sustained engagement with early modern state theory. Wartime service coincided with what interpreters describe as a deepening skepticism toward ideologies and rationalist system‑building. Essays from this period begin to treat politics primarily as a historically embedded practice, not an application of theory.

Critique of Rationalism and Conservative Reflection

Between the late 1940s and early 1960s, Oakeshott formulated his influential critique of rationalism in politics, arguing that technical reason and abstract principles cannot substitute for the “know‑how” embedded in traditions. Essays later collected in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (1962) developed accounts of tradition, political education, and the conservative disposition, re‑casting conservatism as a temperamental stance rather than a doctrinal platform.

Mature Political Theory: Civil Association

From the 1960s to the mid‑1970s, lectures and drafts culminated in On Human Conduct (1975), his most systematic political work. Here he elaborated the distinction between civil association and enterprise association, a sophisticated theory of law as adverbial conditions of conduct, and a typology of the modern European state. This phase is often seen as the theoretical consolidation of earlier insights about practice, tradition, and the limits of instrumental reason.

Late Reflections on History, Education, and Morality

In retirement, Oakeshott returned to questions of history, education, and morality, in essays later collected in On History and The Voice of Liberal Learning. He increasingly portrayed human practices—scholarship, politics, morality—as voices in an ongoing conversation, emphasizing learning as initiation into vernacular practices rather than acquisition of instrumental skills or moral blueprints.

4. Major Works

Oakeshott’s reputation rests on a relatively small number of books and essay collections, many of which assemble pieces written over long periods. Each occupies a distinct place in his intellectual development.

Principal Works and Their Focus

Thematic Roles

• Metaphysics and Epistemology of Experience:
  Experience and Its Modes provides the conceptual underpinning for Oakeshott’s later analysis of politics, by insisting on the autonomy and internal coherence of different modes of understanding.

• Historical and Textual Engagement:
  The Leviathan edition and introduction have been influential in Hobbes scholarship, presenting Hobbes less as a proto‑totalitarian and more as a theorist of a juridical civil association.

• Critique of Rationalism and Tradition:
  The essays in Rationalism in Politics articulate his opposition to treating politics as an applied science and his account of tradition as practice.

• Systematic Political Theory:
  On Human Conduct is widely regarded as his major theoretical contribution to political philosophy, offering an intricate conceptual framework for understanding the modern state and the rule of law.

• History and Education:
  On History and The Voice of Liberal Learning elaborate his views on historical inquiry and liberal education as participation in non‑instrumental practices of understanding.

Together, these works form a loosely unified corpus rather than a single system, with later writings often re‑articulating themes first developed in Experience and Its Modes and the political essays.

5. Core Ideas: Experience, Tradition, and Rationalism

Oakeshott’s core ideas revolve around an account of experience as plural, an understanding of tradition as practical knowledge, and a critique of rationalism in politics.

Modes of Experience

In Experience and Its Modes, Oakeshott argues that human understanding occurs in distinct modes, each governed by its own standards of coherence:

He maintains that no mode can claim absolute authority over the others; attempts to reduce practical life to science, or history to moral lessons, are therefore philosophically misguided.

Tradition as Practice

Against pictures of tradition as a static set of rules, Oakeshott portrays it as an inherited “manner of going on”—a form of tacit, practical knowledge. In political life, this consists of habits, conventions, and vernacular understandings acquired by participation rather than by learning explicit doctrines:

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“A tradition is not an inheritance of formulas; it is an inheritance of manner, an understood way of going on, a knowledge that is not a doctrine but a practice.”

This conception underpins his view that competent participation in practices such as politics or law depends on apprenticeship in their traditions, not primarily on theoretical instruction.

Rationalism in Politics

Oakeshott’s essay “Rationalism in Politics” criticizes the tendency to treat politics as an applied science conducted by reference to abstract principles or “blueprints.” Rationalists, as he describes them, distrust tradition and elevate technical, codified knowledge above practical know‑how. Proponents of rationalist politics are said to favor written plans, manifestos, or constitutions as sufficient guides to political action.

Oakeshott does not reject reasoning in politics; rather, he insists that political reasoning is embedded in historically evolved practices. Critics of his account argue that he underestimates the emancipatory role of principles and written rules, while supporters contend that he captures the dangers of technocratic overconfidence and ideological simplification.

6. Civil and Enterprise Association

In On Human Conduct, Oakeshott introduces a central distinction between civil association and enterprise association as ideal types of political order. This distinction is conceptual and normative rather than purely descriptive; actual states may combine elements of both.

Civil Association

A civil association is a political order in which the relationship between ruler and ruled is constituted by general, non‑instrumental rules—laws understood as “adverbial” conditions of conduct. These laws specify how persons may act (e.g., “no one shall steal”) without prescribing what substantive goals they must pursue. The state, in this view, is not an instrument for realizing a collective project but a framework within which individuals and groups pursue their own diverse purposes.

Oakeshott characterizes such laws as impersonal, general, and non‑purposive. The office of government is to maintain and interpret this juridical order rather than to direct society toward specific outcomes such as equality, productivity, or national glory.

Enterprise Association

An enterprise association, by contrast, is organized around a common substantive purpose—for example, economic growth, religious salvation, national greatness, or social equality. In this mode, the state resembles a joint enterprise or corporation; laws and institutions are evaluated primarily as instruments for achieving the designated aims.

According to Oakeshott, enterprise association tends to transform citizens into contributors or participants in a project, subject to managerial direction. Political disagreement is likely to appear as conflict over goals or strategies of the enterprise.

Comparison of the Two Types

Interpretations differ over whether Oakeshott merely describes tendencies in modern states or recommends civil association as a political ideal. Some commentators see his account as a defense of a liberal, non‑perfectionist state; others argue that his sharp dichotomy neglects the complexity of welfare states and democratic projects that combine rule‑of‑law frameworks with substantive collective aims.

7. Methodology and Style of Political Theory

Oakeshott’s approach to political theory is notable both for its methodological self‑consciousness and for its distinctive literary style.

Philosophical Method: Conversation, Not Foundations

He consistently rejects the idea that political theory discovers ultimate, Archimedean foundations from which political prescriptions can be deduced. Instead, he presents philosophy as a reflective activity internal to existing practices—a “conversation” among voices rather than a tribunal that passes final judgment. Political theorizing, on this view, clarifies the concepts implicit in practices such as law, government, and citizenship, rather than dictating how they must be re‑designed.

This methodological stance is linked to his account of modes of experience: political understanding is a specialized idiom within the practical mode, not reducible to science or moral theology. Theory remains parasitic upon historically formed practices and languages.

Style and Rhetoric

Oakeshott writes in an intentionally elaborate, sometimes allusive prose, marked by metaphors (for example, politics as sailing a “boundless and bottomless sea”) and literary references. Supporters see this style as appropriate to his anti‑dogmatic, conversational method; critics occasionally regard it as obscure or evasive.

He favors essays and lectures over systematic treatises; even On Human Conduct, his most formal work, is highly stylized and densely conceptual rather than axiomatically constructed. Methodologically, he often proceeds by:

• Extracting and refining ideal types (e.g., civil vs. enterprise association);
• Offering internal analyses of practices (such as law or education) rather than empirical case studies;
• Employing historical narrative selectively to illuminate conceptual distinctions.

Relation to Other Methodological Traditions

Commentators have compared Oakeshott’s method to:

• Hermeneutic and interpretive approaches that emphasize understanding practices from within;
• Certain strands of analytic philosophy, in his close attention to conceptual analysis;
• Elements of continental philosophy, in his interest in historicity and in the autonomy of different forms of experience.

He is often distinguished from both positivist political science, which seeks empirical laws, and from normative theory that aspires to universal principles, though interpreters disagree about how sharp this separation is.

8. Impact on Political Philosophy and Conservative Thought

Oakeshott’s influence on political philosophy is both direct—through readers who develop or contest his arguments—and indirect, by shaping broader debates about tradition, rationalism, and the rule of law.

Influence on Political and Legal Philosophy

His critique of rationalism in politics has been cited in discussions of technocracy, policy expertise, and the limits of social engineering. The distinction between civil and enterprise association has informed debates on:

• The neutral state in liberal theory, particularly questions about whether the state should promote substantive conceptions of the good;
• The rule of law, especially the idea of law as general, non‑instrumental rules rather than policy tools;
• The nature of modern European statehood, including in Hobbes scholarship and constitutional theory.

Some legal theorists and classical liberals have drawn on Oakeshott to defend a restrained, juridical conception of the state, while others have used his ideas as a foil for articulating more activist or egalitarian roles for government.

Role in Conservative Thought

Oakeshott’s essay “On Being Conservative” has become a touchstone for modern conservatism. He defines a conservative disposition as a preference for the familiar, the tried, and the limited, emphasizing temperament over ideology. This has resonated with:

• British and American traditionalist conservatives, who see in him a philosophical articulation of their skepticism toward rapid reform;
• Some post‑liberal or communitarian thinkers, who appreciate his focus on practices and traditions.

At the same time, there is disagreement about how far he belongs within conservatism. Some commentators stress that he did not endorse many standard conservative policy positions and remained wary of party politics. Others argue that his theory of civil association aligns him more closely with forms of liberalism than with conservative projects seeking strong national or moral purposes.

Overall, Oakeshott’s work serves both as a resource for certain conservative and liberal currents and as a critical challenge to ideological politics of many kinds.

9. Oakeshott on History and Education

Oakeshott devoted substantial attention to the philosophy of history and the idea of liberal education, especially in essays collected in On History and Other Essays and The Voice of Liberal Learning.

Philosophy of History

In his account, historical understanding is a distinct mode of experience, concerned with the past “for its own sake” rather than as a source of lessons or predictions. The historian constructs a coherent account of past events using evidence, but without subordinating the narrative to practical or moral purposes.

Oakeshott emphasizes:

• The autonomy of historical inquiry from science and from practical politics;
• The role of imaginative reconstruction in making past events intelligible;
• The idea that history is an engagement with “the world of the past in the present”, not a neutral record.

He is critical of using history primarily as a didactic tool for citizens or statesmen, arguing that such instrumentalization distorts its character as a contemplative, self‑justifying activity. Critics question whether history can in practice be separated from moral and political interests to the extent he suggests.

Education and Liberal Learning

In the field of education, Oakeshott contrasts “liberal learning” with vocational or utilitarian models of schooling. For him, education is an induction into “the conversation of mankind”—the multiple voices of science, history, poetry, and philosophy. Universities, on this view, are not primarily training centers for economic roles or vehicles for social engineering, but places where individuals learn to participate in these diverse modes of understanding.

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In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting‑point nor appointed destination.

Although this passage addresses politics, commentators often link its imagery to his view of education as open‑ended exploration rather than preparation for a fixed destination.

Supporters of his educational thought highlight its defense of non‑instrumental intellectual inquiry. Critics argue that his emphasis on contemplation and tradition underplays questions of social inequality, democratization of access, and the political roles of educational institutions.

10. Criticisms and Debates

Oakeshott’s work has generated extensive debate across political theory, philosophy of history, and educational thought. Criticisms often focus on the practical implications, coherence, or political orientation of his ideas.

Conservatism and Politics

Some critics argue that Oakeshott’s apparent political quietism—his portrayal of politics as a modest, non‑missionary activity—neglects urgent demands for social justice and structural reform. They contend that his valorization of the familiar may legitimize unjust institutions. Proponents respond that Oakeshott does not prohibit change but advocates cautious, piecemeal reform rooted in existing practices.

There is also debate over whether his theory of civil association surreptitiously favors liberal‑capitalist arrangements. Supporters claim it provides a neutral framework compatible with diverse economic and social orders; detractors suggest that the framework’s abstraction obscures substantive commitments.

Rationalism, Tradition, and Progress

Critics from more rationalist or egalitarian perspectives argue that Oakeshott underestimates the emancipatory role of principles, rights, and codified law in challenging oppressive traditions. They maintain that appeals to tradition may entrench power structures and inhibit necessary transformation. Defenders counter that he recognizes traditions as self‑modifying practices open to internal criticism and that he targets not reasoning as such but overconfident reliance on blueprints.

Civil vs. Enterprise Association

Some theorists question the sharpness and plausibility of Oakeshott’s distinction between civil and enterprise association. They note that modern states routinely combine rule‑of‑law frameworks with collective projects (such as welfare provision or environmental protection), and argue that Oakeshott’s typology oversimplifies these hybrid realities. Others regard his ideal types as illuminating conceptual tools for analyzing tensions within contemporary politics.

History and Education

In the philosophy of history, critics doubt that historians can or should pursue the past entirely “for its own sake,” emphasizing the roles of memory, identity, and moral evaluation in historical practice. Similarly, educational theorists sympathetic to democratizing and instrumental aims contend that Oakeshott’s vision of liberal learning is elitist or insufficiently attentive to social needs.

Despite these criticisms, even detractors often acknowledge the subtlety of his analyses and employ his categories—such as rationalism in politics or the conservative disposition—as reference points in ongoing debates.

11. Legacy and Historical Significance

Oakeshott’s legacy lies less in a school of followers than in a set of conceptual tools and sensibilities that have permeated late twentieth‑ and early twenty‑first‑century political thought.

Place in Twentieth‑Century Political Philosophy

He is widely regarded as one of the most important English‑language political thinkers of the post‑war period, especially for his reconceptualization of politics as practice, his articulation of civil association, and his analysis of rationalism in politics. While not as institutionally dominant as some contemporaries, his work continues to be read across ideological lines, from conservative theorists to liberal legal scholars and critics of technocracy.

His edition of Hobbes’s Leviathan helped reshape twentieth‑century Hobbes scholarship, contributing to a view of Hobbes as a theorist of juridical order and modern statehood rather than primarily of absolutist power.

Influence on Later Currents

Elements of Oakeshott’s thought resonate with:

• Communitarian and post‑liberal critiques of abstract individualism, in his emphasis on practices and traditions;
• Rule‑of‑law and constitutional theories that stress the non‑instrumental character of legal order;
• Interpretive and hermeneutic approaches in political theory, with his focus on understanding practices from within.

At the same time, his skepticism toward ideological politics and his literary style have limited his integration into more programmatic theoretical movements.

Reception and Continuing Relevance

Since his death, new editions and posthumous publications—such as Morality and Politics in Modern Europe—have sustained scholarly interest. Debates continue over:

• Whether his notion of civil association offers a viable ideal for contemporary pluralistic democracies;
• How his conception of tradition might respond to concerns about power, exclusion, and rapid social change;
• The extent to which his skepticism toward rationalism can be reconciled with demands for democratic accountability and social justice.

Oakeshott’s historical significance is often located in his role as a counterpoint to both technocratic managerialism and ideological activism, offering an alternative image of politics as a limited, conversational activity within a framework of law and tradition. His work remains a regular point of reference in discussions about the purposes of the state, the status of expertise, and the meaning of conservative and liberal thought in modern Europe.