Sandra G. Harding

1. Introduction

Sandra G. Harding (b. 1939) is a contemporary feminist philosopher of science whose work has been central to rethinking how objectivity, rationality, and scientific method are understood. Working at the intersection of philosophy, feminist theory, and science and technology studies (STS), she argues that scientific knowledge is always socially situated and that the social positions of knowers affect what they can reliably know.

Harding is best known for developing feminist standpoint theory and the related notion of strong objectivity. These concepts propose that starting inquiry from the lives of those marginalized by gender, race, class, or colonial power relations can yield more critical and comprehensive accounts of nature and society than perspectives grounded solely in dominant groups. Rather than treating social values and interests as threats to rational inquiry, she examines how they structure research agendas, methods, and interpretations.

Her writings, including The Science Question in Feminism (1986), Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (1991/1996), Sciences From Below (2008), and Objectivity and Diversity (2015), have become key reference points in debates about the value-ladenness of science, epistemic injustice, and the global politics of knowledge. Within philosophy, her proposals have been discussed as alternatives to both traditional empiricist views of neutral observation and to radically relativist approaches that dissolve standards of justification.

Harding’s work has also been influential far beyond philosophy, shaping empirical research practices in sociology, development studies, education, and postcolonial science studies. Across these domains, she provides frameworks for analyzing how gendered and colonial power relations enter into scientific practice while maintaining a commitment to the possibility of more reliable and accountable forms of knowledge.

2. Life and Historical Context

Sandra G. Harding was born on March 29, 1939, in Los Angeles, California. Her formative years coincided with the post–World War II expansion of U.S. scientific institutions and Cold War investment in research, contexts that later informed her analyses of the social and political dimensions of scientific inquiry. She completed her Ph.D. in Philosophy at New York University in 1973, receiving training in analytic philosophy and philosophy of science at a time when these fields often framed science as value-neutral and methodologically self-justifying.

Harding’s early academic career unfolded alongside the rise of second-wave feminism, the civil rights movement, and debates over the Vietnam War. These movements raised questions about authority, expertise, and institutional power that would become central to her later work on the social location of knowers. Feminist scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s increasingly criticized androcentric assumptions in the humanities and social sciences; Harding participated in and systematized these critiques within philosophical discussions of epistemology and methodology.

Her mature work emerged as part of broader shifts in the study of science. The development of science and technology studies (STS), the influence of Thomas Kuhn’s account of paradigm shifts, and increasing attention to the sociology of scientific knowledge all challenged earlier images of science as purely objective. Harding’s writings engage with, and extend, these currents by foregrounding gender and later colonial histories as key structuring forces in scientific practice.

From the 1990s onward, globalization and post–Cold War reconfigurations of geopolitical power provided the backdrop for her turn to postcolonial science studies, where she explored how Western scientific traditions have been intertwined with imperial projects and how knowledge from the Global South can reorient scientific rationality.

3. Intellectual Development

Harding’s intellectual development is often described in phases that track both her disciplinary formation and her engagement with emerging social movements and theoretical debates.

3.1 Analytic Formation and Early Feminist Engagement

During the 1960s and early 1970s, Harding’s doctoral training at New York University immersed her in analytic philosophy, logic, and mainstream philosophy of science. Within this milieu, science was typically characterized by formal criteria of rationality and impartial method. Exposure to feminist and civil rights activism, however, prompted her to question prevailing claims about value-free inquiry and to explore how gender and race might shape what counted as evidence or a good explanation.

3.2 Construction of Feminist Standpoint Theory

In the early 1980s through the early 1990s, Harding became a key architect of feminist standpoint theory. Drawing on Marxist and Hegelian notions of standpoint, and on empirical work in feminist social science, she argued that beginning inquiry from women’s lives can reveal structures of gender power that conventional approaches overlook. This period produced The Science Question in Feminism and Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?, in which she articulated the concepts of situated knowledge and strong objectivity.

3.3 Methodological and Interdisciplinary Expansion

From the 1990s into the 2000s, Harding focused on methodological elaboration and interdisciplinary application. She edited collections such as The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader that brought together philosophical arguments with empirical case studies of scientific practice. Her work during this period addressed how standpoint-informed research might be implemented in the natural and social sciences, as well as in education, development studies, and policy analysis.

3.4 Postcolonial and Global Reorientation

In the 2000s and beyond, Harding extended standpoint theory to global and postcolonial contexts. In texts like Sciences From Below she analyzed how Western scientific modernity has been entangled with colonial and imperial projects, and she explored how starting from the experiences and knowledge practices of the Global South might generate alternative scientific rationalities. This phase deepened the connection between feminist epistemology and postcolonial thought, emphasizing the geopolitical distribution of epistemic authority.

4. Major Works

Harding’s major works develop her ideas across several decades, each intervening in specific debates in feminist theory, philosophy of science, and STS.

4.1 The Science Question in Feminism

In this book Harding surveys feminist responses to science—ranging from rejection to reform—and proposes standpoint theory as a way to reconceive objectivity without abandoning scientific inquiry. She examines case studies from biology and social science to show how gender assumptions can shape research questions and interpretations.

4.2 Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?

Here she generalizes feminist insights into a broader epistemological framework. The text argues that all knowledge is situated and that starting from women’s lives can reveal structural relations of power. The notion of strong objectivity is developed as a methodological demand for reflexive scrutiny of researchers’ own social locations.

4.3 Later Works

Sciences From Below and Objectivity and Diversity integrate postcolonial theory and social epistemology, respectively, emphasizing how colonial histories and institutional arrangements influence whose knowledge is recognized as legitimate and how diversity among knowers may improve the reliability and scope of scientific research.

5. Core Ideas: Standpoint Theory and Strong Objectivity

Harding’s most influential conceptual contributions center on feminist standpoint theory and strong objectivity. These ideas reconfigure how objectivity and the social location of knowers are understood.

5.1 Feminist Standpoint Theory

Harding’s version of standpoint theory claims that:

Proponents maintain that people located in oppressed positions must understand both their own world and the rules of dominant groups, thereby potentially gaining “double vision” on social relations. Harding develops this claim as a methodological and epistemological thesis rather than merely a political slogan.

5.2 Strong Objectivity

Strong objectivity is Harding’s term for a reconceptualized ideal of objectivity that goes beyond traditional notions of neutrality and value-freedom.

Harding argues that subjecting research to critique from the perspectives of those most affected—often marginalized groups—can make knowledge claims more robust and less distorted. She presents this not as a rejection of objectivity but as a “stronger” form because it incorporates reflexive scrutiny of the conditions under which knowledge is produced.

Proponents of Harding’s approach suggest that standpoint theory and strong objectivity together offer an alternative to both naive empiricism and radical epistemic relativism, whereas critics debate the scope and coherence of the claimed epistemic advantages.

6. Methodology and Situated Knowledge

Harding’s methodological proposals build on the claim that all knowledge is situated—produced from particular historical and social locations that shape what is observed, questioned, and taken as evidence.

6.1 Situated Knowledge

For Harding, situated knowledge has several components:

She argues that acknowledging situatedness does not entail that “anything goes,” but rather motivates more rigorous examination of how knowledge is produced.

6.2 Standpoint-Inflected Methodology

Harding’s methodological guidance for the sciences emphasizes:

• Starting research from marginalized lives: For example, beginning environmental studies from the experiences of communities disproportionately affected by pollution.
• Systematic reflexivity: Researchers are encouraged to analyze how their own social positions, and those of their institutions, may shape the framing of problems and interpretations.
• Community diversity and dialogue: She maintains that a plurality of socially diverse researchers, engaged in critical interaction, can better identify and correct distortions.

In Objectivity and Diversity, Harding describes this as “another logic of scientific research,” where methodological rigor includes explicit analysis of power relations in knowledge production.

6.3 Relation to Empirical Practice

Harding’s methodological views have been applied in empirical fields such as public health, education, and development studies. Proponents report that standpoint-informed designs can reveal previously overlooked variables or causal mechanisms (for instance, unpaid care work in economic analyses). Critics question how such starting points are to be operationalized without overgeneralizing about “marginalized” groups, but Harding presents her framework as a set of open-ended guidelines rather than a fixed recipe.

7. Impact on Philosophy of Science and Epistemology

Harding’s work has had substantial influence on debates about objectivity, the role of values in science, and the social dimensions of knowledge.

7.1 Objectivity and Values in Science

In philosophy of science, Harding’s notion of strong objectivity has been taken up as a significant alternative to both traditional value-free ideals and views that see science as wholly determined by social interests. Philosophers and STS scholars have used her framework to argue that:

• Social and ethical values are inescapable in research, but
• Their presence can enhance objectivity when critically scrutinized from diverse standpoints.

Her ideas have intersected with discussions of theory-ladenness, underdetermination, and the role of “inductive risk” in scientific decision-making.

7.2 Social Epistemology and Epistemic Injustice

Within epistemology, Harding is frequently cited in social epistemology, where scholars analyze how communities, institutions, and power relations shape knowledge. Her emphasis on social location and marginalized standpoints informed the development of concepts such as epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression, even when later authors modified or critiqued her formulations.

7.3 Engagement with Mainstream Debates

Harding’s work has been discussed in relation to Kuhnian paradigm theory, feminist empiricism, and postmodern critiques of science. Some philosophers treat her standpoint theory as a way to retain normative evaluation of scientific claims while recognizing their social embeddedness. Others juxtapose her approach with more individualistic reliabilist or evidentialist accounts, debating whether social location can confer epistemic privilege in the sense she proposes.

Overall, her arguments have become standard reference points in courses and anthologies on philosophy of science, feminist epistemology, and STS, indicating broad if contested uptake.

8. Influence on Feminist and Postcolonial Thought

Harding’s ideas have been especially influential within feminist theory and postcolonial studies, where questions of power, representation, and knowledge are central.

8.1 Feminist Theory and Feminist Epistemology

In feminist theory, Harding’s version of standpoint epistemology provided a systematic philosophical framework for arguments that had emerged in activism and empirical research. It influenced:

• Feminist epistemology: Scholars used her concepts to analyze how gendered divisions of labor, care work, and bodily experience shape knowledge.
• Feminist critiques of disciplines: Her work informed re-analyses of economics, biology, psychology, and history from women’s and other marginalized standpoints.
• Debates within feminism: The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader documents how her views became a focal point in discussions about essentialism, intersectionality, and the diversity of women’s experiences.

8.2 Postcolonial Science Studies

Harding’s later work, particularly Sciences From Below, contributed to postcolonial science studies by linking feminist standpoint theory with critiques of imperialism. She examined how:

Her approach has been taken up by scholars investigating indigenous knowledge systems, development policies, and global health, who explore how local standpoints can contest or complement international scientific frameworks.

8.3 Intersectional and Transnational Feminisms

Harding’s attention to race, class, and colonial relations within feminist standpoint theory intersects with intersectional and transnational feminisms. While intersectionality developed partly independently, many theorists draw on Harding’s emphasis on multiple, structurally located standpoints to articulate how overlapping systems of oppression affect knowledge production. At the same time, critics within these fields debate how effectively her original formulations accommodate the heterogeneity of global feminist experiences.

9. Critiques and Debates

Harding’s theories have generated extensive discussion and criticism across philosophy, feminist theory, and STS. Debates focus on both the coherence of standpoint claims and their implications for objectivity.

9.1 Essentialism and the Diversity of “Women’s Lives”

One major line of critique questions whether standpoint theory risks essentializing “women” or other marginalized groups. Critics argue that:

• Women’s experiences are internally diverse along lines of race, class, sexuality, and nationality.
• Claiming a unified “women’s standpoint” may obscure internal power differences.

Harding has responded by emphasizing that standpoints are not automatic or biologically grounded but are achieved through collective political and analytical work, and that multiple, intersecting standpoints are possible. Nonetheless, debates continue over how to specify whose experiences are taken as the starting point.

9.2 Epistemic Privilege and Relativism

Another set of objections targets the idea that marginalized groups enjoy epistemic advantage. Some critics maintain that oppression does not guarantee better knowledge, pointing to cases where marginalized individuals may internalize dominant ideologies. Others worry that if all knowledge is said to be “situated,” then no standpoint can claim greater validity, leading to relativism.

Proponents of Harding’s view reply that standpoint theory offers conditional, not absolute, privilege: marginalized positions may be better placed to identify certain power structures, but claims remain subject to empirical and argumentative testing. Harding’s notion of strong objectivity is presented as a way to avoid relativism by expanding, rather than abandoning, standards of critique.

9.3 Relation to Mainstream Epistemology and Science

Some philosophers contend that Harding overstates the uniqueness of feminist and postcolonial critiques, arguing that traditional philosophy of science already recognizes theory-ladenness and the role of background assumptions. Others question whether community-level diversity is sufficient for objectivity, emphasizing instead individual virtues or formal methods.

Within STS, a different debate concerns whether Harding’s continued use of “objectivity” concedes too much to traditional scientific ideals. Postmodern and constructivist critics sometimes view strong objectivity as insufficiently radical, while more traditional philosophers may see it as excessively politicizing science.

These ongoing discussions have made Harding’s work a central reference point in controversies about the relationship between knowledge, power, and social identity.

10. Legacy and Historical Significance

Harding’s legacy lies in how she reshaped discussions of science, objectivity, and knowledge across multiple disciplines. Historically, her work contributed to a shift from viewing science as an isolated, neutral enterprise toward understanding it as embedded in gendered, racialized, and colonial social structures.

10.1 Position within Twentieth- and Twenty-First-Century Thought

Placed alongside figures such as Thomas Kuhn, Donna Haraway, and Helen Longino, Harding is often identified as a key contributor to late twentieth-century reconfigurations of the philosophy of science. Her articulation of feminist standpoint theory helped establish feminist epistemology as a recognized subfield and influenced the broader emergence of social epistemology.

10.2 Institutional and Disciplinary Impact

Harding’s roles in universities and professional associations, and recognition such as the John Desmond Bernal Prize (2014), reflect institutional acknowledgment of her influence. Her books are widely assigned in curricula in philosophy, gender studies, STS, and development studies, contributing to the training of several generations of scholars.

10.3 Continuing Relevance

Contemporary debates about epistemic injustice, research ethics, and diversity in science continue to draw on Harding’s concepts, whether in agreement or critique. Discussions about how to incorporate indigenous and local knowledges into environmental policy, global health, and development programs often invoke ideas akin to situated knowledge and standpoint-informed methodology.

While assessments of her proposals vary, Harding’s work has become a durable reference point for thinking about who counts as a knower, how social power shapes inquiry, and how objectivity might be reconceived under conditions of persistent inequality. Her historical significance thus resides both in the specific theories she advanced and in the broader transformation of epistemological questions that her work helped to catalyze.