Timothy Martin Scanlon
Timothy Martin Scanlon (born 1940) is a leading figure in contemporary moral and political philosophy whose work has reshaped debates about reasons, morality, and justice. Best known for his contractualist theory in "What We Owe to Each Other," Scanlon argues that an action is wrong if it would be disallowed by principles no one could reasonably reject, understood from a standpoint of mutual respect among persons. This framework has become central to discussions of moral obligation, rights, and interpersonal justification. Educated at Princeton and Harvard, and later a long‑time professor at Harvard, Scanlon helped set the agenda in normative ethics, metaethics, and political philosophy from the late twentieth century onward. He developed an influential account of moral reasons that resists both pure subjectivism and robust moral realism, focusing instead on the role of judgment and justification between agents. Beyond abstract ethics, he has written on freedom of expression, toleration, contractualist accounts of political legitimacy, economic inequality, and moral desert, shaping legal theory and public philosophy. His careful distinctions among permissibility, meaning, and blame have refined how philosophers, legal theorists, and political thinkers analyze responsibility and moral criticism. Through his writing and teaching, Scanlon has influenced major philosophers and contributed to a broadly egalitarian, justificatory conception of moral and political life.
At a Glance
- Field
- Thinker
- Born
- 1940-06-29 — Indianapolis, Indiana, United States
- Died
- Floruit
- 1970–2015Period of greatest philosophical activity and publication
- Active In
- United States, United Kingdom
- Interests
- Moral reasonsContractualismValue theoryBlame and responsibilityFreedom of expressionPolitical legitimacyDistributive justice
Scanlon’s central thesis is that moral right and wrong are determined by principles that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement among persons who regard one another as equals, and that this contractualist standard structures our reasons, obligations, and political institutions without appealing to aggregate welfare or purely subjective preferences.
What We Owe to Each Other
Composed: 1980s–1998
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame
Composed: 1990s–2008
The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy
Composed: 1970s–2002
Why Does Inequality Matter?
Composed: 2010s–2017
Being Realistic About Reasons
Composed: 2000s–2014
The Diversity of Objections to Inequality
Composed: 2010s
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.— T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 153.
Scanlon’s canonical formulation of contractualism, defining wrongness in terms of principles that cannot be reasonably rejected by individuals seeking fair terms of cooperation.
What we owe to each other is determined by principles that specify the forms of treatment we are required to refrain from, or to accord, to other people, and these principles are those that no one could reasonably reject.— T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 189.
Clarifies the central contractualist idea that moral duties arise from mutually justifiable principles of treatment among persons understood as equals.
Blame, as I understand it, is a response to the meaning of a person’s actions or attitudes, as these bear on her relations to others, rather than simply a reaction to the fact that she has acted wrongly.— T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 122.
Distinguishes blame from mere judgment of wrongness, emphasizing its interpersonal, relationship‑shaping character in Scanlon’s theory of moral psychology.
To be realistic about reasons is to recognize that judgments about reasons purport to state truths, which are not made true by our attitudes toward them, but which we can come to know and explain by reflection and argument.— T. M. Scanlon, Being Realistic About Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 2.
Summarizes his metaethical position that there are objective normative truths about reasons, even though they are not natural or mind‑independent in the same way as ordinary empirical facts.
The most serious objections to inequality appeal not to envy but to the ways in which inequality can undermine the conditions under which we relate to one another as equals.— T. M. Scanlon, Why Does Inequality Matter? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 1.
Introduces his account of why certain economic and social inequalities are morally problematic, tying egalitarian concerns to the justificatory relations among citizens.
Formative Education and Early Analytic Training (1940–1968)
Scanlon’s undergraduate studies at Princeton and doctoral work at Harvard immersed him in mid‑century analytic philosophy, logic, and the emerging debates about reasons, value, and morality. Under the influence of figures such as Burton Dreben, he developed a lasting commitment to clarity, argument, and the analysis of reasons, initially focusing more on metaethical and conceptual questions than on a fully worked‑out normative theory.
Princeton Years and Early Work on Reasons and Expression (1966–1984)
While teaching at Princeton, Scanlon began publishing influential papers on freedom of expression, toleration, and practical reasoning. He defended a justification‑centered account of free speech and explored how reasons bear on action without invoking strong metaphysical assumptions. During this period, he also started to sketch the contractualist outlook that later became the core of his moral theory, emphasizing justifiability to others rather than maximizing aggregate value.
Harvard Contractualist System-Building (1984–early 2000s)
After moving to Harvard, Scanlon developed his contractualism into a systematic moral view, culminating in the 1998 book "What We Owe to Each Other." He refined key ideas about what it is to reasonably reject principles, the role of personal and impersonal values, and the nature of moral motivation. This phase secured his central place in Anglophone ethics and sparked intensive debate over contractualism, consequentialism, and deontology.
Expansion into Moral Psychology and Political Morality (2000s–2010s)
In the 2000s, Scanlon turned more explicitly to questions of blame, meaning, and moral responsibility, as seen in "Moral Dimensions." He argued that permissibility, meaning, and blame are distinct moral dimensions governed by different considerations. He also addressed political topics—legitimacy, equality, and desert—articulating an egalitarian, contractualist approach to distributive justice and criticizing meritocratic justifications for vast economic inequalities.
Refinement, Public Engagement, and Late Work on Value (2010s–)
In later work, Scanlon further clarified his views on reasons and value, including defenses of the idea that there are irreducibly normative truths and explorations of how personal relationships and institutional structures shape what we owe to one another. His reflections on inequality, political legitimacy, and moral desert increasingly engaged with public policy discourse while maintaining a characteristically careful, analytical style, consolidating his influence on both philosophers and broader debates about justice.
1. Introduction
Timothy Martin Scanlon (b. 1940) is a central figure in contemporary Anglophone moral and political philosophy, best known for articulating a distinctive version of contractualism and for influential work on normative reasons, moral responsibility, and egalitarian political morality. His views are widely discussed as a leading alternative to both consequentialist and intuitionist deontological theories.
In What We Owe to Each Other (1998), Scanlon develops the idea that an act is wrong if it would be disallowed by principles that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement among persons regarded as equals. This approach places the justification of actions to others at the center of moral theory, emphasizing mutual recognition and the rejection of purely aggregative welfare calculations.
Beyond contractualism, Scanlon has argued that there are irreducibly normative reasons—considerations that count in favor of actions or attitudes and that are not reducible to natural or psychological facts. In Being Realistic About Reasons (2014), he defends a form of “realism about reasons” intended to steer between robust metaphysical realism and reductionist naturalism.
His later work extends these ideas to questions of permissibility, meaning, and blame in moral judgment, and to issues in political philosophy such as freedom of expression, toleration, political legitimacy, inequality, and desert. Scanlon’s writings are characterized by careful distinction‑drawing, attention to intuitive moral practice, and a justificatory ideal of relating to others as free and equal agents.
The following sections examine his life, the development of his thought, his major works, and the main themes of his moral and political philosophy, as well as their broader impact and historical significance.
2. Life and Historical Context
Scanlon was born on 29 June 1940 in Indianapolis, Indiana. He studied at Princeton University (B.A., 1962), where he was exposed to mid‑century analytic philosophy, followed by graduate work at Harvard University, completing his Ph.D. in 1968 under Burton Dreben. His early academic formation coincided with the dominance of logical empiricism and the emergence of post‑Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, as well as renewed interest in ethics after a period of relative neglect.
From 1966 to 1984, Scanlon taught at Princeton, then moved to Harvard University’s Department of Philosophy in 1984, where he remained a leading figure until his retirement. His career unfolded alongside major shifts in moral and political philosophy: the rise of Rawlsian liberalism, debates between utilitarian and rights‑based theories, the development of contemporary metaethics, and growing interest in equality and distributive justice.
These broader currents shaped both the problems Scanlon addressed and the reception of his work. His contractualism developed partly in dialogue with John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and with consequentialist traditions associated with R. M. Hare, Derek Parfit, and others. The reorientation of political philosophy toward questions of legitimacy, rights, and democratic justification provided a context for his essays on freedom of expression and toleration.
Historically, Scanlon’s mature work belongs to a generation of philosophers who sought to reconnect analytic rigor with substantive moral and political questions. His emphasis on justification to others reflects a wider late‑20th‑century shift toward relational and procedural accounts of morality and legitimacy.
| Period | Contextual Features |
|---|---|
| 1940s–1960s | Ascendancy of analytic philosophy; limited focus on normative ethics |
| 1970s–1980s | Post‑Rawls revival of political theory; consequentialism vs. deontology debates |
| 1990s–2000s | Expansion of metaethics, moral psychology, egalitarian theory |
| 2010s– | Increased attention to inequality, desert, and public philosophy |
3. Intellectual Development
Scanlon’s intellectual trajectory can be described as moving from formal and metaethical concerns toward a systematic moral theory and, later, toward applications in political philosophy and moral psychology, while retaining a consistent focus on reasons and justification.
Early Analytic and Metaethical Focus
In his student and early professional years, Scanlon was influenced by the analytic tradition’s concern with clarity, argument, and language. Under Burton Dreben at Harvard, he engaged with issues about meaning, logic, and the structure of reasons, initially without advancing a comprehensive substantive moral theory. This period fostered a lasting suspicion of heavy metaphysical commitments and an emphasis on how we actually reason about what to do.
Emergence of Contractualist Themes
During his Princeton years (1966–1984), Scanlon published work on freedom of expression and toleration that already relied on justificatory ideas central to his later contractualism: citizens must be able to see political and legal restrictions as justifiable to them. At the same time, he began to explore practical reasoning and the nature of reasons, sketching an account in which interpersonal justification, not aggregate welfare, is fundamental.
Systematization at Harvard
After moving to Harvard in 1984, Scanlon developed his contractualism into a fully articulated theory, culminating in What We Owe to Each Other. Here he integrated his earlier concerns about reasons with a normative framework centered on reasonable rejection. This period also saw him refine distinctions among personal and impersonal values, and between different kinds of moral considerations.
Expansion into Moral Psychology and Political Morality
From the 2000s onward, Scanlon extended his work to questions of blame, meaning, and responsibility (especially in Moral Dimensions), and deepened his analysis of political legitimacy, inequality, and desert. His later writings on reasons and value, culminating in Being Realistic About Reasons, sought to clarify the metaphysical and epistemological underpinnings of his long‑standing views on normativity.
4. Major Works
Scanlon’s major books and collections form a coherent, though evolving, body of work centered on reasons, contractualism, and political morality.
| Work | Focus | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| What We Owe to Each Other (1998) | Contractualist moral theory | Canonical statement of his account of wrongness as what would be disallowed by principles no one could reasonably reject. |
| Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (2008) | Structure of moral assessment | Distinguishes three dimensions of moral judgment and offers an influential theory of blame. |
| The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (2003) | Freedom of expression, toleration, legitimacy | Collects essays from the 1970s–2000s on liberal political philosophy and contractualist political morality. |
| Being Realistic About Reasons (2014) | Metaethics, reasons, normativity | Develops his defense of irreducibly normative truths about reasons, and a non‑metaphysically extravagant realism. |
| Why Does Inequality Matter? (2018) | Egalitarianism, inequality | Systematic account of distinct objections to inequality and their contractualist underpinnings. |
Contractualist System‑Building
What We Owe to Each Other is widely regarded as Scanlon’s magnum opus in normative ethics. It articulates his definition of wrongness, develops the notion of reasonable rejection, and addresses topics such as aggregation, risk, and moral motivation.
Essays in Political Philosophy
The Difficulty of Tolerance gathers important articles on topics including the basis of freedom of expression, religious toleration, and political legitimacy. These essays show how contractualist ideas apply to institutional and constitutional questions.
Metaethics and Reasons
In Being Realistic About Reasons, Scanlon defends the view that judgments about reasons aim at truths that are not reducible to natural properties, while resisting metaphysically heavyweight realism. This work situates his moral theory within broader debates about normativity.
Inequality and Desert
Why Does Inequality Matter? and related writings such as “The Diversity of Objections to Inequality” examine different grounds on which inequalities may be morally objectionable, including status, control, and democratic fairness, rather than focusing solely on welfare outcomes.
5. Core Ideas: Contractualism and Reasons
Scanlon’s contractualism and his account of reasons are closely interrelated: the former describes how moral right and wrong are determined; the latter explains the kind of normative considerations that figure in such determinations.
Contractualism and Reasonable Rejection
Scanlon’s central claim is that:
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.
— T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other
On this view, moral principles are assessed from the standpoint of individuals seeking terms of cooperation that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably refuse. Objections must be grounded in individuals’ generic reasons (e.g., to avoid pain, to maintain important projects), and they must be weighed against the reasons others have to support a given principle. The standard is not whether a principle maximizes aggregate value, but whether each person has sufficient reason to accept it.
Contractualism is often contrasted with consequentialism:
| Feature | Contractualism | Consequentialism |
|---|---|---|
| Basic unit of assessment | Principles justifiable to each person | Overall consequences (e.g., welfare) |
| Focus | Reasonable rejection by individuals | Aggregation of benefits and harms |
| Moral status of persons | Separate sources of justification | Often permits trade‑offs among persons |
Supporters see contractualism as capturing the individualist, justificatory structure of moral wrong, while critics question its handling of aggregation and risk.
Reasons and Normativity
In parallel, Scanlon argues that there are normative reasons—considerations that count in favor of attitudes or actions—and that our judgments about them aim at truth. In Being Realistic About Reasons, he maintains that such truths are not constituted by our attitudes, yet they do not presuppose a realm of queer, non‑natural entities. Instead, they are understood through reflection, comparison of cases, and argument.
Proponents read this as a moderate realism that fits everyday reasoning about what we have reason to do. Critics debate whether his view ultimately collapses into expressivism, constructivism, or robust realism, and whether it can explain how we gain epistemic access to normative truths without empirical observation.
6. Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame
Scanlon’s Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame develops a tripartite framework for understanding moral assessment. He argues that disputes in moral philosophy and legal theory often arise from conflating three distinct questions: whether an act is permissible, what it means (or expresses), and whether the agent is blameworthy.
Permissibility
Moral permissibility, for Scanlon, concerns whether an act accords with the correct moral principles—principles that, in contractualist fashion, no one could reasonably reject. This dimension focuses on what one is allowed or required to do, abstracting from the agent’s inner states or the interpersonal meaning of her action.
Meaning of Actions
The meaning of an action is its significance for interpersonal relationships: what it expresses about the agent’s regard or attitudes toward others. An action may be permissible yet have a hurtful or disrespectful meaning, or impermissible while not expressing ill will. This distinction is used to analyze cases involving intentions, side‑effects, and symbolic acts.
Blame
Scanlon’s account of blame is relational and interpretive:
Blame, as I understand it, is a response to the meaning of a person’s actions or attitudes, as these bear on her relations to others, rather than simply a reaction to the fact that she has acted wrongly.
— T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions
Blame involves revising one’s relationship with someone in light of what her actions reveal, rather than merely registering that she violated a moral rule. This view contrasts with conceptions that tie blame directly to wrongdoing or to the fittingness of certain reactive emotions.
Comparative Structure
| Dimension | Central Question | Main Considerations |
|---|---|---|
| Permissibility | Was the action allowed? | Correct principles, reasons, obligations |
| Meaning | What did it express? | Attitudes, regard, social context |
| Blame | How should relations change? | Understanding, expectations, fairness in response |
Supporters maintain that this framework clarifies moral disputes about intention, risk, and strict liability. Critics question whether the three dimensions can be cleanly separated in practice, and whether Scanlon’s account of blame adequately captures the role of emotions and desert.
7. Political Philosophy: Legitimacy, Toleration, and Equality
Scanlon’s political philosophy extends his contractualist ideas to institutional and constitutional questions, focusing on political legitimacy, toleration, and egalitarian concerns about inequality.
Political Legitimacy
For Scanlon, a political system is legitimate when its basic institutions and coercive laws are justifiable to each citizen regarded as a free and equal person. This reflects a contractualist ideal: principles of political order must be such that no one could reasonably reject them, given their interests as citizens. Legitimacy thus depends not only on outcomes but also on the public justifiability of the political framework.
Freedom of Expression and Toleration
In early and later essays on freedom of expression, Scanlon defends a justification centered on individuals’ ability to assess the reasons for and against laws and policies. Restrictions on expression are problematic, he argues, when they undermine citizens’ capacity to evaluate and challenge the principles that govern them. This view differs from purely “marketplace of ideas” or autonomy‑only theories by tying free speech to the conditions for legitimate political justification.
On toleration, Scanlon analyzes the difficulty of sustaining institutions that respect religious and moral pluralism while maintaining shared civic principles. His work explores when the state may restrict practices or expressions that others find offensive, and how to reconcile mutual justification with deep disagreement.
Equality and Inequality
In Why Does Inequality Matter? and related writings, Scanlon identifies a diversity of objections to inequality. He argues that inequalities can be objectionable because they:
- Give some excessive control over others’ lives,
- Undermine fair equality of opportunity,
- Damage social and political equality of status,
- Erode the conditions of democratic legitimacy.
These objections are presented as grounded in what can be justified to citizens as equals, rather than solely in aggregate welfare losses. Critics debate the weight he assigns to different objections and whether his approach sufficiently addresses global inequality and structural injustice.
| Theme | Contractualist Tie |
|---|---|
| Legitimacy | Laws must be justifiable to each citizen |
| Free speech | Needed for citizens to assess justifications |
| Toleration | Managing disagreement under mutual justification |
| Inequality | Assessed by its impact on relations among equals |
8. Methodology and Style of Argument
Scanlon’s philosophical methodology is characteristically careful, case‑based, and justificatory. Commentators often highlight several features of his style.
Reflective, Case‑Driven Analysis
Scanlon frequently proceeds by examining concrete cases and intuitive judgments, refining principles to make sense of our considered responses. He employs a form of reflective equilibrium, seeking coherence between general principles (e.g., reasonable rejection) and specific judgments about risk, aggregation, or expression.
Distinction‑Drawing and Conceptual Clarity
A hallmark of his work is the drawing of fine distinctions—for instance, among permissibility, meaning, and blame; or between personal and impersonal values; or between various objections to inequality. Supporters view this as clarifying moral debates that would otherwise conflate different issues. Some critics contend that the resulting frameworks can become complex and may underplay systemic or empirical factors.
Justificatory Perspective
Methodologically, Scanlon consistently adopts the standpoint of justification: he asks what principles individuals could not reasonably reject, what reasons they have, and how institutional arrangements can be defended to citizens as equals. This perspective shapes both his substantive positions and his argumentative style, which often advances by considering what a reasonable person, with particular interests or complaints, could say against a candidate principle.
Relational Yet Non‑Constructivist Normativity
Though his contractualism is relational and interpersonal, Scanlon insists that it presupposes independent normative reasons. His method does not treat morality as constructed by agreement; rather, it treats the contractualist test as a way of organizing and assessing reasons persons have. This places his methodology between robust constructivist approaches and purely intuitionist or realist ones.
| Methodological Feature | Characterization |
|---|---|
| Use of cases | Detailed examples to test and adjust principles |
| Role of intuitions | Starting points for reflection, not final authorities |
| Normative commitments | Irreducibly normative reasons, moderate realism |
| Tone and style | Argumentative, precise, cautious about sweeping claims |
9. Impact on Ethics, Law, and Public Debate
Scanlon’s work has had significant influence across normative ethics, legal and political theory, and more public discussions of equality and desert.
Normative Ethics and Metaethics
His contractualism is widely taught and debated as a leading non‑consequentialist theory. It has generated extensive literature on topics such as aggregation, risk, the moral relevance of intentions, and the nature of moral wrongness. In metaethics, his defense of realism about reasons has become a key reference point in discussions about normative objectivity, influencing supporters and critics who seek alternatives to both robust realism and expressivism.
Moral Psychology and Responsibility
Moral Dimensions has shaped contemporary debates about blame, intention, and the structure of moral judgment. Philosophers and legal theorists have drawn on his tripartite framework to analyze criminal liability, the significance of motives in law, and the appropriateness of moral criticism.
Legal and Constitutional Theory
Scanlon’s essays on freedom of expression and toleration are widely cited in legal scholarship. His argument that free speech is central to citizens’ ability to evaluate and contest political principles has influenced some liberal justifications of constitutional protections. Legal theorists have also used his contractualist ideas to discuss due process, legitimacy of coercion, and the justification of rights.
Public and Policy Debates on Inequality
In Why Does Inequality Matter? and public lectures, Scanlon has engaged debates about economic inequality and meritocracy. His analysis of distinct objections to inequality has been used in discussions of tax policy, social insurance, and education. While policy conclusions are often left open, his framework has provided a vocabulary for distinguishing concerns about poverty, status, opportunity, and democratic control.
| Domain | Forms of Influence |
|---|---|
| Ethics/metaethics | Contractualist debates; realism about reasons |
| Moral psychology | Accounts of blame, meaning, intention |
| Law | Free speech theory; legitimacy of coercion |
| Public debate | Egalitarian critiques of inequality and desert |
Reception has been both admiring and critical, with many authors accepting his questions and distinctions while proposing alternative answers or revisions.
10. Legacy and Historical Significance
Scanlon is widely regarded as one of the most important moral and political philosophers of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. His work has contributed to a reorientation of normative ethics toward justification to individuals rather than aggregation of welfare, and to an understanding of morality as fundamentally about what we can reasonably justify to one another.
Historically, his contractualism stands alongside John Rawls’s justice as fairness and Derek Parfit’s work on reasons and morality as a major post‑war contribution to non‑consequentialist ethics within the analytic tradition. It has provided a focal point for debates about the nature of moral wrongness, the weight of individual claims, and the permissibility of sacrificing some for the greater good.
In metaethics, Scanlon’s realism about reasons has helped to normalize the view that there are objective normative truths accessible through reflection and argument, influencing subsequent generations of philosophers working on normativity, rationality, and value theory. His approach is often treated as a paradigm of moderate, non‑metaphysically extravagant realism.
In political philosophy, his writings on freedom of expression, toleration, and inequality have fed into liberal egalitarian thought, particularly views emphasizing status, justification, and democratic control over institutions. His critique of meritocratic desert and focus on how inequalities affect relations among citizens have shaped contemporary egalitarian discourse.
Scanlon’s teaching and mentorship at Princeton and Harvard have also been historically significant, shaping many influential philosophers in ethics and political theory. Overall, his legacy is commonly characterized by a distinctive combination of analytic rigor, attention to everyday moral practice, and a sustained commitment to understanding morality and politics as enterprises of mutual justification among equals.
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title = {Timothy Martin Scanlon},
author = {Philopedia},
year = {2025},
url = {https://philopedia.com/thinkers/timothy-martin-scanlon/},
urldate = {December 11, 2025}
}Note: This entry was last updated on 2025-12-10. For the most current version, always check the online entry.