Descriptive Relativism

Definition and Scope

Descriptive relativism is the thesis that there is substantial factual variation in moral values, cultural norms, or standards of rationality across individuals, groups, or societies. It is a purely empirical or sociological claim: it aims to describe how people actually think and behave, not to evaluate whether those beliefs or practices are right, justified, or valid.

In ethics, descriptive relativism typically states that different cultures endorse divergent moral codes—for example, differing views on marriage, punishment, or obligations to strangers. In epistemology and philosophy of science, it can take the form of claims that standards of evidence, reasoning, or explanation differ across communities or historical periods. The central idea is that diversity in norms and values is a widespread, observable phenomenon.

Importantly, descriptive relativism does not itself assert that no single view is objectively correct, or that all views are equally good. It provides data about disagreement and diversity, which may then be interpreted in various ways by moral realists, relativists, or other theorists.

Historical and Disciplinary Context

Descriptive relativist claims have appeared in many disciplines:

• In anthropology, early 20th‑century figures such as Franz Boas and his students emphasized cultural particularity and warned against ethnocentrism, the tendency to judge other cultures by one’s own standards. Ethnographic reports of diverse kinship systems, rituals, and moral codes are often cited as evidence for descriptive relativism.
• In sociology and cultural studies, researchers have documented variation in social norms regarding gender, sexuality, authority, and deviance, reinforcing the idea that what is considered “normal” or “acceptable” is historically and culturally situated.
• In the history and sociology of science, authors such as Thomas Kuhn and some later “strong programme” sociologists described shifts in scientific paradigms and the role of social factors in shaping standards of evidence and explanation. These accounts have sometimes been interpreted as forms of descriptive relativism about scientific rationality.
• In comparative ethics and religious studies, accounts of contrasting moral ideals and theological doctrines further illustrate the descriptive relativist claim that deeply held values and conceptions of the good vary widely.

Across these fields, descriptive relativism is usually grounded in empirical research: ethnography, surveys, historical analysis, and cross-cultural comparison. Its strength as a claim depends on the breadth, depth, and interpretation of this evidence.

Relation to Other Forms of Relativism

Descriptive relativism is often distinguished from normative and metaethical forms of relativism:

• Normative relativism holds that we ought to tolerate or refrain from criticizing the practices of other cultures, often appealing to the fact of diversity as a moral reason for tolerance.
• Metaethical relativism (or moral relativism in the strict sense) claims that moral truth or justification is relative to a framework, culture, or individual standpoint—there is no single, framework‑independent standard by which all moral claims can be assessed.

Descriptive relativism by itself does not entail either normative or metaethical relativism. From the fact that cultures disagree, it does not logically follow that no one is correct, that all are equally correct, or that one must be tolerant of all practices. Additional philosophical premises are needed to move from a descriptive claim about disagreement to a normative or metaethical conclusion.

Conversely, some philosophers argue that descriptive relativism is compatible with robust forms of moral objectivism. On this view, widespread disagreement can be explained by different factual beliefs, social conditions, or limited information, while the underlying moral truths remain objective and universal. Others maintain that the depth and persistence of disagreement described by descriptive relativists supports some form of relativism or skepticism, especially when disagreements persist even under conditions of shared information and reasoning.

Descriptive relativism is also related to, but distinct from, error theories and constructivist views. Whereas an error theorist might claim that many moral beliefs are simply false, and a constructivist might say they are constructed from shared procedures or practices, the descriptive relativist remains at the level of cataloguing and explaining variation, leaving questions of truth and justification open.

Philosophical Significance and Criticisms

The philosophical significance of descriptive relativism lies in its role as a starting point for debates about morality, rationality, and culture. It raises questions such as:

• How deep are cross‑cultural disagreements—do they concern surface practices or fundamental values?
• Can apparently conflicting moral codes be reconciled through translation, contextualization, or uncovering shared principles?
• What counts as an adequate explanation for moral and cultural diversity: differences in environment, history, power, or human nature?

Proponents emphasize several implications:

• Descriptive relativism can challenge assumptions of universality embedded in moral or rational theories by highlighting neglected forms of life and alternative value systems.
• It can support methodological caution, encouraging philosophers and social scientists to take local meanings and practices seriously rather than imposing external categories.
• It may motivate constructive engagement across cultures, since understanding the diversity of values is often a precondition for dialogue, critique, or cooperation.

Critics raise several concerns:

• Some argue that evidence for descriptive relativism is sometimes overstated or misinterpreted. What appears as deep moral disagreement may in part reflect differing factual beliefs (for example, about consequences or empirical circumstances) or divergent applications of shared values rather than incompatible basic principles.
• Others contend that focusing on differences can obscure cross‑cultural commonalities, such as prohibitions on arbitrary killing or norms of reciprocity, which might support more universalist accounts of morality.
• In the philosophy of science, critics caution that describing variability in standards of inquiry can slide, if not carefully distinguished, into epistemic relativism, which they view as undermining the possibility of rational critique and progress. Supporters of descriptive approaches respond that one can acknowledge historical and cultural variation in scientific practice without denying the possibility of better and worse reasons.

Overall, descriptive relativism functions as a background empirical thesis in many philosophical discussions. It does not decide substantive questions about moral or epistemic truth, but it constrains and informs such theorizing by insisting that any adequate account of morality, rationality, or culture must reckon with the observed diversity of human values and norms.