Epistemic Contextualism

Core Idea and Motivations

Epistemic contextualism is a position in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of language according to which the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions—sentences like “Anna knows that the bank will be open on Saturday”—are sensitive to the conversational context of the speaker (or attributor). On this view, the standards that must be met for “knows” to be truly applied are not fixed, but can rise or fall depending on what is at stake, what possibilities are being considered, and what is presupposed in the conversation.

A common example involves everyday versus high-stakes contexts. In a relaxed setting, we may truly say “Anna knows the bank is open on Saturday” on the basis of her recent visit. In a high-stakes setting—where a missed deposit would be disastrous—interlocutors might count skeptical possibilities (e.g., that the bank changed its hours) as relevant, and so it may no longer be true to say that Anna “knows” on the same evidence. Contextualists argue that this reflects a shift in the standards for knowledge, not a contradiction.

Philosophers such as Keith DeRose, David Lewis, and Stewart Cohen developed epistemic contextualism partly in response to perceived tensions between ordinary-language uses of “know” and the force of skeptical arguments. The approach preserves many everyday knowledge claims as true while also acknowledging the intuitive power of skepticism in more demanding philosophical contexts.

Contextualism and Skepticism

One of the central motivations for epistemic contextualism is its proposed resolution of skeptical paradoxes. Skeptical arguments often proceed by raising very remote error possibilities—such as being a brain in a vat or being systematically deceived by an evil demon—and insisting that if we cannot rule these out, then we do not know even ordinary claims like “I have hands” or “There is a tree outside.”

Contextualists respond by distinguishing between contexts in which such skeptical possibilities are not part of the conversational background and contexts—typically philosophical ones—in which they are explicitly raised. According to Lewis’s “Rule of Attention,” for instance, possibilities that are properly ignored in everyday contexts can become relevant once they are specifically mentioned or attended to. When they become relevant, the epistemic standards for “knows” increase, making it harder for ordinary knowledge ascriptions to come out true.

Thus contextualism allows the following to be simultaneously true:

• In ordinary contexts: “I know that I have hands” is true, because far-fetched skeptical possibilities are being ignored.
• In skeptical or highly demanding contexts: “I do not know that I have hands” can also be true, because the standards have been raised to require ruling out those skeptical possibilities.

On this view, there is no outright contradiction; instead, there is a shift in context-sensitive standards. For proponents, this preserves both the truth of ordinary knowledge claims and the insight of skeptical reasoning without requiring that we embrace full-blown skepticism.

Contrasting Views and Criticisms

Epistemic contextualism contrasts with several rival positions:

• Strict invariantism holds that the truth-conditions for “knows” are context-invariant: the same epistemic standards apply across all contexts. Skeptical invariantists accept high standards everywhere (often leading to widespread denial of knowledge), while anti-skeptical invariantists maintain lower, stable standards that preserve ordinary knowledge claims.

• Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) agrees that knowledge standards can vary, but locates that variation in the subject’s practical situation rather than in the attributor’s conversational context. On this view, whether “Anna knows” depends partly on what is at stake for Anna herself, not on who is describing her or what is being discussed.

• Relativism about knowledge ascriptions suggests that even once a context is fixed, there can be variation in truth relative to different evaluative perspectives, going beyond the attributor-context sensitivity emphasized by standard contextualism.

Critics raise several objections to epistemic contextualism. Some argue that it leads to intuitive instability: ordinary speakers do not typically experience their own knowledge as waxing and waning with subtle conversational shifts. Others contend that contextualism does not fully address the underlying skeptical concerns, but merely “relocates” them into special philosophical contexts without providing a genuine refutation.

There are also concerns about theoretical complexity. Opponents question whether appealing to context-sensitive semantics for “know” is more convoluted than alternative explanations—such as pragmatic accounts where the literal content of “knows” remains fixed, and only the conversational implicatures shift with context.

Significance and Ongoing Debates

Epistemic contextualism has had significant influence on debates at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of language. It is part of a broader trend exploring context sensitivity in natural language, paralleling work on terms like “tall,” “rich,” or “knows how.” The view has prompted detailed investigations into:

• The nature of epistemic standards and which factors (stakes, salience, conversational goals) can legitimately affect them.
• The relationship between semantic content and pragmatic implication in knowledge ascriptions.
• How best to model our everyday, seemingly stable epistemic practices in light of philosophical reflection.

Ongoing debates concern how precisely to formulate contextualism, whether empirical work on ordinary language supports it, and how it compares in explanatory power to invariantist and relativist theories. Regardless of its ultimate assessment, epistemic contextualism remains a central reference point in contemporary discussions of knowledge, language, and skepticism.