Intergenerational Justice

What, if anything, do present generations owe future and past generations as a matter of justice, and how should these obligations be fairly distributed, institutionalized, and balanced against the claims of currently existing people?

Intergenerational justice is the field of moral and political philosophy that investigates what duties of fairness, rights, and obligations exist between different generations, including past, present, and future people, and how these duties should shape institutions, policies, and individual behavior over time.

At a Glance

Quick Facts
Type
broad field
Discipline
Ethics, Political Philosophy, Applied Ethics, Environmental Ethics
Origin
The phrase “intergenerational justice” began to gain currency in the late 20th century, especially after John Rawls’s work on justice between generations in A Theory of Justice (1971) and the emergence of environmental and sustainability debates in the 1970s and 1980s; it crystallized as a distinct philosophical label in discussions of climate change, nuclear waste, and long‑term public debt.

1. Introduction

Intergenerational justice examines how moral and political principles apply across time, especially between past, present, and future people. It asks whether and how standards such as fairness, equality, rights, or mutual advantage extend beyond those currently alive, and what this implies for long‑term decisions about the environment, technology, public finance, and social institutions.

The topic gained prominence in the late twentieth century with the rise of global environmental concerns, nuclear risk, and debates about public debt. Philosophers began to argue that many existing theories of justice—liberal, utilitarian, contractarian, and others—implicitly presupposed a single temporal slice of society. Extending these theories to encompass multiple generations revealed new puzzles about identity, obligation, and political authority.

A central feature of intergenerational justice is that many of those potentially affected by our choices do not yet exist and cannot participate in present political processes or make claims in familiar legal ways. This temporal asymmetry raises questions about who can be a rights‑holder, how to represent future interests, and whether duties of justice require reciprocity.

Intergenerational issues also force ethical theories to confront very long time horizons. When decisions about climate policy, biodiversity loss, nuclear waste, or transformative technologies may shape conditions for centuries or millennia, familiar tools like discounting, cost–benefit analysis, and standard democratic procedures come under scrutiny.

The field is highly interdisciplinary, drawing on economics, climate science, demography, legal theory, political science, and religious and cultural traditions. Within philosophy it interacts with population ethics, theories of well‑being, human rights, and debates over risk and uncertainty.

This entry surveys how intergenerational justice is defined, the main questions it raises, its historical roots, leading theoretical approaches, and ongoing controversies about its implications for law, institutions, and public policy. It presents major positions and arguments without endorsing any particular view.

2. Definition and Scope

Intergenerational justice is most commonly defined as the study of what obligations of justice—as distinct from charity or mere prudence—hold between different generations of human beings. It considers how benefits, burdens, risks, and opportunities ought to be distributed over time, and whether later people can hold earlier ones to standards of fairness.

Distinguishing Justice from Other Norms

Many authors distinguish intergenerational justice from:

  • Intergenerational altruism or beneficence, which concerns doing good for future people without implying correlative rights.
  • Intergenerational prudence, which focuses on self‑interest extended through family lines or national continuity.
  • Historical responsibility, which often addresses past injustices but is closely related when legacies persist.

The scope of “justice” is itself contested. Some define it narrowly, tying it to enforceable institutional rules or reciprocity; others adopt a broader sense that includes any serious moral claims about how earlier generations ought to treat later ones.

Temporal and Spatial Scope

There is disagreement about how far into the future justice extends:

ViewTemporal ScopeTypical Rationale
Near‑future focus1–3 generationsGreater predictive certainty; tractable political obligations
Long‑termistCenturies or moreEqual moral weight to all persons, regardless of temporal location
IndefiniteNo fixed limitDuties governed by feasibility and risk, not a time cutoff

Some accounts also address backward‑looking duties to past generations (e.g., honoring sacrifices, preserving cultural heritage), though many concentrate on forward‑looking responsibilities.

Subject Matter

Intergenerational justice debates cover, but are not limited to:

  • Material resources (natural resources, capital, infrastructure)
  • Environmental conditions (climate stability, biodiversity, pollution)
  • Institutional structures (constitutions, legal systems, welfare states)
  • Cultural and knowledge goods (languages, traditions, scientific knowledge)
  • Demographic patterns (population size, age structure)

Different theories emphasize different subsets of these goods, from narrowly economic wealth to broader capabilities or ecological systems.

Levels of Analysis

The field operates at several levels:

  • Individual duties (e.g., reproductive choices, personal consumption)
  • Collective and institutional duties (state policy, international law)
  • Global versus national scope (duties to “our” descendants vs. all future people)

How these levels relate is a central issue for the wider debate.

3. The Core Question of Intergenerational Justice

At the heart of intergenerational justice lies a cluster of questions about what, if anything, present people owe those who come after them and how these obligations should be understood.

Formulating the Core Question

A widely cited formulation asks:

What, as a matter of justice, do present generations owe future generations, and how should the resulting obligations be allocated and enforced?

Philosophers unpack this into several sub‑questions:

  • Existence of obligations: Are duties to future people duties of justice or merely of charity, prudence, or virtue?
  • Content of obligations: Do they concern equal opportunities, minimum thresholds of well‑being, preservation of natural capital, or maximization of overall good?
  • Bearers and claimants: Can people who do not yet exist be rights‑holders or members of a cooperative scheme?
  • Distribution of burdens: How should costs of protecting the future be shared among states, classes, and individuals today?

Tensions and Trade‑offs

The core question often appears as a problem of intertemporal trade‑offs:

  • How much should the present sacrifice for the benefit of the future?
  • When, if ever, is it justifiable to impose significant risks or burdens on later people for substantial present gains?
  • How should competing claims of currently disadvantaged people and possible future beneficiaries be weighed?

Different theories answer by appealing to distinct principles, including equality, sufficiency, priority to the worse off, mutual advantage, or overall welfare maximization.

Conceptual Challenges

Several conceptual difficulties complicate the core question:

  • The non‑identity problem challenges whether many long‑term policies can be said to harm any particular future person.
  • Uncertainty over future preferences, technologies, and social contexts raises doubts about what counts as benefiting future people.
  • The asymmetry of power—present generations can profoundly shape the lives and even the existence of future people, but not vice versa—raises questions about legitimacy and representation.

The remainder of the entry explores how historical traditions and contemporary theories attempt to answer this core question.

4. Historical Origins and Early Intuitions

Long before “intergenerational justice” was a named topic, many cultures expressed concerns about obligations to ancestors and descendants. These early intuitions did not typically distinguish justice from reverence, prudence, or piety, but they prefigured later debates.

Early Motifs

Several recurring themes appear across societies:

MotifExample Intuition
Continuity of the polityLaws and institutions should endure to preserve civic order for future citizens.
Filial and ancestral relationsDescendants owe respect, care, and ritual duties to forebears, which may include preserving family land or reputation.
Stewardship of land and resourcesLand is to be held in trust rather than consumed outright, so that descendants can survive and flourish.
Reputation and legacyIndividuals and rulers act with an eye to how posterity will judge them.

These motifs often intertwine religious beliefs, social hierarchy, and practical concerns about survival.

In various legal traditions, intergenerational concerns appeared in rules about:

  • Entail and inheritance, designed to keep land within a family line.
  • Common property rights in forests, water, and grazing, often accompanied by usage norms aimed at sustainability.
  • Building codes and public works, such as Roman aqueducts or city walls, which assumed long‑term civic maintenance.

While these practices were not typically justified in terms of equal concern for future people, they reflected an implicit recognition that present actions shape posterity’s circumstances.

Proto‑Theoretical Reflections

Classical and religious authors occasionally articulated more general reflections:

  • Some Greek and Roman thinkers linked good lawmaking with concern for future stability.
  • Religious scriptures and commentaries in several traditions portray blessings and curses extending across generations, connecting present virtue or vice to future conditions.

These sources did not systematically theorize duties to future generations as distinct from duties to contemporaries, but they supplied normative resources—ideas of stewardship, covenant, prudence, and legacy—that later philosophers and jurists would reinterpret in terms of justice across time.

5. Ancient Approaches to Duties Across Time

Ancient philosophical traditions rarely framed duties to future generations as a separate topic, yet they developed influential ideas about temporal responsibility, continuity, and legacy.

Greek and Roman Thought

Plato and Aristotle linked political excellence with concern for the long‑term stability of the polis. In Laws, Plato discusses legislation intended to endure, with property rules and education structured to maintain civic order across generations. Aristotle’s emphasis on habituation and education in Politics and Nicomachean Ethics implies that virtuous citizens must preserve institutions enabling future citizens’ flourishing.

Roman jurists and statesmen, such as Cicero, stressed the continuity of the republic and the importance of transmitting just laws and civic virtues. Some Roman legal doctrines about inheritance and public works can be read as embedding expectations about duties to descendants, though couched in terms of family honor and civic duty rather than explicit intergenerational equity.

Stoicism

The Stoics advanced a cosmopolitan view in which all rational beings share in a common moral community. While they focused mainly on contemporary relations, their notion of living “according to nature” and maintaining harmony with the cosmos has been interpreted as supporting obligations not to degrade the natural world for those who follow. However, explicit reference to remote future people is limited.

Confucian and Early Chinese Traditions

Confucianism, especially in Confucius and Mencius, emphasizes filial piety (xiao) and reverence for ancestors. Duties run both backward (to parents and forebears) and forward (to descendants who will continue the family line). Maintaining rituals, family property, and moral cultivation are seen as responsibilities that span generations.

These duties, however, are largely role‑based and particularistic, arising from familial and hierarchical relations rather than from an abstract principle of equal concern for all future persons.

Other Ancient Traditions

In various ancient cultures, including Hindu and Near Eastern traditions, cosmologies involving cycles of time and rebirth framed human action in relation to long temporal horizons. Duties were often expressed in terms of maintaining cosmic order (ṛta, ma‘at, or similar concepts) and respecting sacred lands or practices over generations.

Across these diverse traditions, duties across time were typically grounded in:

  • Maintenance of cosmic or natural order
  • Preservation of political and familial structures
  • Concern for honor, reputation, and ritual continuity

They provided important background ideas—stewardship, continuity, and respect for ancestors and descendants—that later theories increasingly reinterpreted in terms of justice.

6. Medieval and Religious Conceptions of Stewardship

Medieval and religious traditions often conceptualized duties across generations through the lens of stewardship, covenant, and divine command rather than autonomous principles of justice.

Abrahamic Traditions

In Judaism and Christianity, the idea that the Earth belongs ultimately to God but is entrusted to humans as stewards is central. Biblical texts such as Genesis describe humans as charged to “till and keep” the Earth, and some prophetic writings link present obedience or injustice to blessings and curses affecting “to the third and fourth generation.”

Medieval Christian theologians, including Thomas Aquinas, interpreted property as held under a higher moral law. While Aquinas did not develop a detailed intergenerational theory, his account of the common destination of goods has been read as implying that present owners must not use resources in ways that undermine future people’s ability to meet basic needs.

In Islamic thought, the concept of humans as khalīfa (vicegerents) on Earth underscores a trusteeship role. Some jurists argued that natural resources and communal assets should be used without waste (isrāf) and preserved for future members of the umma.

Medieval charters and canon law sometimes expressed obligations to posterity, especially with respect to church lands, endowments, and common resources. The idea of the “king’s two bodies” and the corporate nature of political authority suggested that rulers held office in a chain of succession, tasked with preserving the realm for future subjects.

Thinkers like Edmund Burke later drew on this tradition, portraying society as a partnership “between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born,” emphasizing inherited duties and gradual change.

Non‑Western Religious and Philosophical Traditions

In Hindu and Buddhist contexts, doctrines of karma and rebirth embedded actions in long causal chains extending beyond a single lifetime. Duties often focused on maintaining ritual practices, caste or monastic obligations, and natural cycles (such as sacred groves or rivers), with implications for future generations’ spiritual and material conditions.

In indigenous and animist traditions across the world, land and non‑human beings were frequently treated as sacred trusts. The often‑cited (though historically debated) “seventh generation” principle in some North American Indigenous thought symbolizes a duty to consider the impacts of actions on distant descendants.

From Stewardship to Justice

While many of these traditions foreground stewardship, piety, and communal continuity, rather than individual rights or distributive fairness, later theorists of intergenerational justice have drawn on them as normative resources. They offer:

  • A model of trusteeship: current generations as custodians rather than absolute owners.
  • A sense of temporal humility: acknowledging dependence on past sacrifices and responsibility to future inheritors.
  • A framework for linking moral, ecological, and spiritual considerations over long periods.

Subsequent secular theories reinterpret these motifs to argue for obligations of justice across time.

7. Modern Social Contract Theory and Posterity

Early modern social contract theories began to formulate more explicitly political accounts of obligations that extend to future citizens, though often in fragmentary or contested ways.

Natural Law and Property

Hugo Grotius and other natural law theorists treated the Earth’s resources as originally held in common, with private property justified by convention and utility. This raised questions about whether appropriation must leave “enough and as good” for others, including future people.

John Locke’s famous proviso in Second Treatise of Government—that appropriation is just only if it leaves enough and as good for others—has been interpreted by some as implying duties to posterity. Others argue that Locke understood “others” mainly as contemporaries, with future scarcity addressed indirectly through productivity gains.

Social contract theorists debated the legitimacy of one generation binding another:

  • Thomas Jefferson suggested that “the earth belongs... to the living,” implying that no generation has the right to encumber future ones with perpetual debts or unalterable constitutions.
  • Edmund Burke, in contrast, depicted society as a multi‑generational partnership, where present people inherit obligations and institutions they must preserve and transmit.

These contrasting views foreshadow contemporary disagreements over constitutional entrenchment, public debt, and the extent to which present political decisions may legitimately constrain future citizens.

Kantian Themes

Immanuel Kant did not elaborate a full intergenerational theory, but several aspects of his thought bear on posterity:

  • His principle that humanity must always be treated as an end in itself has been extended by some interpreters to future persons, who would count as potential rational agents.
  • Kant’s interest in the historical progress of reason and a “universal civil society” suggests an orientation toward humanity’s long‑term future, though framed more as a teleological narrative than as explicit distributive duties to future individuals.

From Contract to Posterity

Modern contractarian ideas introduced several enduring questions:

QuestionIllustrative Source
Can one generation legitimately bind another through laws or debts?Jefferson, Burke
Do principles of justice chosen under fair conditions (a hypothetical contract) apply to all generations?Later Rawlsian formulations
Must principles of legitimacy consider the interests of those not yet born?Various liberal and republican theorists

While early modern social contract theory did not systematically answer these questions, it created the conceptual space—consent, legitimacy, rights, and property—for later explicit treatments of intergenerational justice, most notably in Rawls’s work.

8. Rawls and the Just Savings Principle

John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) brought intergenerational justice into mainstream analytic political philosophy through the just savings principle, a proposed rule governing how much each generation must save for its successors.

The Original Position Across Generations

Rawls imagines representatives of generations in an original position, choosing principles of justice behind a veil of ignorance that hides their temporal location. They do not know to which generation they belong and must select rules that are fair across time. This device is meant to neutralize present‑bias and model impartiality between earlier and later cohorts.

The Just Savings Principle

Rawls proposes that parties would agree to a just savings principle:

Each generation is to save sufficient resources and institutional capital to enable those that follow to enjoy just institutions and a decent level of well‑being.

He sometimes describes this as the duty to accumulate and then maintain an appropriate stock of “real capital”—including not only physical capital but also knowledge, culture, and just institutions—until a just basic structure is securely established.

Key features include:

  • Stage sensitivity: Early generations may need to save more to build institutions; later ones may maintain rather than accumulate.
  • Non‑maximizing: The principle does not require maximizing future wealth, but meeting a threshold adequate for just institutions.
  • Reciprocity: Rawls portrays the relation between generations as a fair system of cooperation over time.

Interpretations and Debates

Commentators disagree on how demanding and determinate the just savings principle is:

  • Some see it as underspecified, offering little guidance on environmental limits or climate risk.
  • Others argue it can be extended to include ecological capital, interpreting the preservation of a stable climate and biodiversity as preconditions for just institutions.

Critics also question whether the original position can coherently represent future persons who do not yet exist, and whether Rawls underestimates issues of historical responsibility for past injustices and emissions.

Despite these debates, the just savings principle remains a central reference point, shaping subsequent theorizing about fair savings rates, sustainable development, and the integration of intergenerational duties into liberal‑egalitarian frameworks.

9. Consequentialism, Utilitarianism, and the Long Term

Consequentialist and especially utilitarian approaches have played a major role in debates about intergenerational justice, largely because they naturally extend moral concern across time.

Temporal Impartiality

Classical utilitarianism typically holds that each unit of well‑being counts equally, regardless of who experiences it or when. Many utilitarians therefore argue that:

  • Future people’s welfare should be given the same moral weight as that of present people, apart from adjustments for uncertainty.
  • Ethical evaluation of policies should aggregate expected welfare over the entire future, leading to potentially strong obligations to prevent long‑term harms and promote distant benefits.

This stance underlies much work in long‑termism and in utilitarian analyses of climate policy, existential risk reduction, and technological trajectories.

Discounting and Welfare Aggregation

Economists frequently use temporal discounting in cost–benefit analysis, reducing the present value of future welfare. Utilitarian philosophers are divided:

  • Some accept positive discounting on pragmatic or uncertainty‑based grounds.
  • Others, following arguments by Ramsey and later Parfit, reject pure time preference as ethically arbitrary, claiming that only risk and opportunity costs can justify discounting.

Utilitarian frameworks also face questions about how to aggregate welfare when population sizes and identities vary, a central topic in population ethics.

Population Ethics and Paradoxes

Utilitarian reasoning across long time horizons generates well‑known puzzles:

  • The Repugnant Conclusion: under total utilitarianism, a very large population with lives barely worth living may be judged better than a smaller population with very high well‑being.
  • The Non‑Identity Problem: many actions that seem to disadvantage future generations also determine which individuals will exist, complicating claims of harm.

These paradoxes have led to a proliferation of alternative aggregative principles (e.g., average utilitarianism, critical‑level utilities, person‑affecting constraints) as theorists attempt to reconcile utilitarian intuitions with intergenerational fairness.

Strengths and Critiques

Utilitarian and broader consequentialist approaches are often praised for:

  • Providing decision‑theoretic tools for complex intertemporal risk assessments.
  • Treating all affected individuals, including distant future people, in a formally impartial way.

Critics contend that such views may:

  • Demand extreme present sacrifices for speculative long‑term gains.
  • Permit severe harms to some individuals if offset by larger aggregate benefits.
  • Rely on highly uncertain projections of future welfare and probabilities.

Consequentialist thinking nonetheless remains central to policy‑oriented work on intergenerational issues, particularly in climate economics and risk analysis.

10. Rights-Based, Sufficientarian, and Capability Approaches

Non‑consequentialist theories have developed alternative frameworks for intergenerational justice, emphasizing rights, sufficiency thresholds, and human capabilities.

Rights-Based Approaches

Rights-based theorists argue that future people, or at least those who will exist, can be bearers of moral or human rights—for example, to life, health, subsistence, or a safe environment. On this view:

  • Present generations have duties not to violate these rights (e.g., by causing catastrophic climate change).
  • Rights also ground claims to institutions capable of protecting future persons’ basic interests.

Some international instruments, such as environmental provisions in constitutions and human rights treaties, have been interpreted as recognizing such rights of future generations.

Debates focus on:

  • Whether individuals who do not yet exist can meaningfully be said to have rights.
  • How to identify the specific rights‑holders when different policy choices lead to different people existing (the non‑identity problem).
  • How to balance potential conflicts between rights of present and future persons.

Sufficientarian Approaches

Sufficientarianism holds that justice requires ensuring that each person or generation attains at least a sufficient level of resources or well‑being, rather than strict equality. Applied intergenerationally, this view emphasizes:

  • Guaranteeing that each generation can meet basic needs and secure decent living conditions.
  • Framing obligations in terms of overcoming or preventing future deprivation below a threshold, rather than maximizing total welfare.

Supporters claim this aligns with policy frameworks like the Sustainable Development Goals, which set minimum standards for health, education, and environmental quality.

Critics question how thresholds are chosen and worry that, once sufficiency is reached, large inequalities between generations may be permitted.

Capability Approaches

Inspired by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, the capability approach shifts focus from resources or utilities to what people are able to be and do. Intergenerational capability accounts hold that:

  • Each generation should be enabled to enjoy a core set of basic capabilities, such as health, bodily integrity, education, and political participation.
  • Environmental and social preconditions (e.g., stable climate, biodiversity, social institutions) are integral to maintaining these capabilities over time.

This framework aims to capture multidimensional aspects of human flourishing and is often seen as particularly congenial to sustainability discourse.

Debates concern:

  • Which capabilities to prioritize across generations.
  • How to operationalize capability thresholds in policy.
  • How capability claims interact with population size and demographic change.

Together, rights-based, sufficientarian, and capability approaches offer alternatives to purely aggregative theories, emphasizing thresholds, inviolability, and the quality of life structures future generations can reasonably expect.

11. The Non-Identity Problem and Person-Affecting Views

The non‑identity problem, most extensively discussed by Derek Parfit, poses a challenge to standard ways of thinking about harm and justice in intergenerational contexts.

The Non-Identity Problem

Many policies—such as decisions about climate mitigation, nuclear waste disposal, or reproductive technologies—affect who will be born in the future. If a policy leads to the existence of certain individuals who would not otherwise have existed, and their lives are still worth living, then:

  • It seems difficult to say that these individuals have been harmed, since without the policy they would not exist at all.
  • Yet intuitively, some such policies appear morally objectionable or unjust because they create predictably worse conditions for future people.

Parfit illustrated this with cases where a choice between a “depleted” and “non‑depleted” resource policy results in different people being born centuries later. Those living under depletion cannot claim they were made worse off than they otherwise would have been, since under the alternative they would not exist.

Person-Affecting Views

Person‑affecting principles hold that:

An outcome is worse (or unjust) only if it is worse for some particular person.

Proponents argue this captures the intuitive connection between wronging someone and making that person worse off. Applied intergenerationally, it often leads to skepticism about labeling many long‑term policy choices as injustices to specific future individuals.

Some person‑affecting theorists respond by:

  • Restricting the domain to cases where identities are fixed (e.g., near‑future effects).
  • Distinguishing between making people exist and affecting already‑existing or inevitable people.

Implications for Intergenerational Justice

The non‑identity problem has several implications:

IssueTension Created
Rights of future personsDifficulties assigning rights if potential rights‑holders depend on policy choices.
Historical responsibilityChallenges to claiming that past generations wronged future individuals whose existence depended on past decisions.
Evaluating policiesPolicies may seem impersonally worse (a degraded world) without being worse for any particular person.

Responses include:

  • Impersonal views: Evaluate states of affairs without requiring that anyone be made worse off (e.g., compare overall quality of future worlds).
  • Hybrid accounts: Combine person‑affecting constraints with impersonal principles in cases involving identity changes.
  • Group or generational comparisons: Treat “generations” or societies as units of evaluation rather than individuals.

Critics of person‑affecting skepticism argue that it would permit seemingly grave wrongs—such as deliberately creating a significantly degraded but barely livable future—provided lives remain worth living, which many find unacceptable. The debate remains central to the conceptual foundations of intergenerational justice.

12. Temporal Discounting, Risk, and Policy Evaluation

Intergenerational policy decisions frequently involve weighing present costs against uncertain future benefits or harms. Philosophers and economists debate how temporal discounting and risk should be treated in evaluations that aspire to be just across generations.

Temporal Discounting

Temporal discounting assigns lower present value to future goods and harms. In economic analysis, a discount rate is applied to future utilities or monetary values. Two main justifications are distinguished:

  • Pure time preference: A direct preference for benefits to occur sooner rather than later.
  • Opportunity cost and growth: Future benefits are discounted because resources invested now would otherwise yield returns, and because future generations may be richer.

From an ethical standpoint:

  • Many theorists, following Ramsey and others, argue that pure time preference is morally arbitrary, implying that the mere fact that a benefit occurs later does not lessen its moral importance.
  • Others defend some positive discounting on grounds of uncertainty about the future, risk of non‑existence, or the need to reflect trade‑offs with present severe deprivation.

The choice of discount rate can dramatically change assessments of long‑term projects such as climate mitigation or nuclear waste management.

Risk, Uncertainty, and Catastrophic Outcomes

Intergenerational policies are characterized by:

  • Deep uncertainty about future technologies, preferences, and environmental feedbacks.
  • Low‑probability, high‑impact risks, including catastrophic or existential outcomes affecting many generations.

Normative approaches to risk include:

ApproachCore IdeaIntergenerational Relevance
Expected utilityMaximize expected value of outcomesStandard in cost–benefit analysis, but sensitive to risk attitudes and probabilities.
Precautionary principlesAvoid serious or irreversible harm despite uncertaintyWidely invoked in environmental and health contexts.
Prioritarian risk viewsGive extra weight to risks facing the worse offApplied to future generations if they are expected to be vulnerable.

Some philosophers argue that catastrophic risks to humanity’s long‑term survival or potential warrant special priority, even when probabilities are low. Others caution against over‑weighting speculative long‑term scenarios at the expense of pressing current needs.

Policy Evaluation Frameworks

Debates over discounting and risk inform various evaluative frameworks:

  • Cost–benefit analysis with different discounting schemes (zero, declining, or positive rates).
  • Multi‑criteria decision methods that incorporate non‑monetary values, rights constraints, or thresholds.
  • Robust decision‑making and adaptive management, which emphasize strategies that perform reasonably well across a wide range of uncertain futures.

Intergenerational justice theorists scrutinize these tools for how they represent the interests of future people, how they handle uncertainty and irreversibility, and whether they implicitly privilege current generations through parameter choices.

13. Climate Change, Environment, and Intergenerational Equity

Climate change and environmental degradation have become paradigmatic issues for intergenerational justice, given their long‑term, cumulative, and potentially irreversible impacts.

Long-Term Environmental Harms

Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss, ocean acidification, and land‑use change are expected to affect conditions for centuries or longer. Present emissions and ecological damage:

  • Shape future climate patterns, sea levels, and extreme weather.
  • Affect the availability of fresh water, arable land, and ecosystem services.
  • Influence the risk of crossing planetary boundaries and triggering abrupt changes.

These processes make future generations vulnerable to harms they did not cause and could not prevent.

Intergenerational Equity in Environmental Law and Policy

Principles of intergenerational equity have been incorporated into various legal and policy documents:

  • The 1987 Brundtland Report defined sustainable development as meeting present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own.
  • Some national constitutions and environmental statutes explicitly recognize duties to future generations to preserve the environment.
  • International climate agreements, such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, reference equity and, in some interpretations, intergenerational concerns.

Legal scholars debate how robust these commitments are and whether they create enforceable obligations toward future people.

Distributive and Responsibility Questions

Environmental intergenerational justice raises several distributive issues:

IssueExample Question
Emissions allocationHow should remaining carbon budgets be shared between present and future users?
Adaptation vs. mitigationHow to balance reducing future harm against helping current populations adapt?
Historical responsibilityDo high‑emitting past and present societies owe compensation or special mitigation efforts to future people?

Different ethical frameworks—utilitarian, rights‑based, sufficientarian, capability‑oriented—offer distinct answers regarding fair emission pathways, acceptable levels of risk, and standards for a “livable” climate.

Environmental Integrity and Non-Human Values

Some theorists argue that intergenerational justice must incorporate not only human interests but also intrinsic values of non‑human nature. On this view:

  • Duties to preserve species, ecosystems, and wilderness areas are owed partly to future humans (who may value them) and partly to non‑human entities themselves.
  • Environmental degradation may thus be unjust even if future human welfare could in principle be maintained by technological substitutes.

Others maintain a more anthropocentric stance, focusing on environmental conditions as essential components of future generations’ well‑being, health, and capabilities.

Climate change and environmental limits thus serve as concrete arenas in which abstract principles of intergenerational justice are tested, contested, and translated into legal and policy instruments.

To make intergenerational obligations practically effective, many scholars and policymakers have proposed or implemented institutional and legal mechanisms intended to represent or protect the interests of future people.

Some states have embedded intergenerational principles directly into their legal frameworks:

  • Constitutional clauses guaranteeing the right to a healthy environment or referencing duties to future generations.
  • Environmental statutes requiring long‑term impact assessments or sustainability criteria for major projects.

Courts in several jurisdictions have interpreted such provisions as grounds for climate litigation and other actions, sometimes recognizing a form of standing on behalf of future persons or generations.

Ombudspersons and Commissions for Future Generations

Institutional innovations include:

MechanismExamplesTypical Functions
Future Generations Commissioner / OmbudspersonHungary (past), WalesReview legislation, issue recommendations, advocate long‑term interests.
Sustainability councils or advisory bodiesVarious EU statesProvide expert advice on long‑term environmental and fiscal issues.
Independent fiscal councilsMany OECD countriesAssess sustainability of public finances, sometimes with explicit intergenerational framing.

These bodies vary widely in their mandate, independence, and powers—ranging from purely advisory roles to more robust veto or review functions.

Long-Term Policy Tools

Beyond specific offices, legal and policy tools include:

  • Impact assessments requiring evaluation of long‑term environmental, fiscal, or social consequences.
  • Rules‑based frameworks, such as debt brakes or emission caps, intended to constrain present decision‑makers on behalf of future citizens.
  • Trusts and endowments, such as sovereign wealth funds, designed to convert non‑renewable resource revenues into diversified assets for future use.

These mechanisms seek to operationalize concepts like stewardship and just savings within existing legal and political structures.

Debates About Design and Effectiveness

Scholars and practitioners debate:

  • How strongly future‑oriented institutions should be empowered (advisory vs. binding authority).
  • Risks of democratic deficit if unelected bodies gain substantial power over elected legislatures.
  • Whether such institutions genuinely shift policy or primarily serve symbolic functions.

Alternative proposals include deliberative assemblies, youth quotas, or citizens’ juries focused on long‑term issues. Evaluations of existing experiments are mixed, with some evidence of agenda‑setting influence but also concerns about limited enforcement capacity.

Institutional design thus becomes a key site where normative ideas about intergenerational justice confront the practical realities of law and governance.

15. Democracy, Representation, and the Unborn

Democratic systems are typically structured around the participation and interests of current citizens, raising difficult questions about how—or whether—the unborn can be represented.

Representation Gaps

Future people:

  • Cannot vote, lobby, or bring legal claims during the period when many decisions affecting them are made.
  • Have interests that may diverge significantly from those of current voters, particularly regarding long‑term environmental risks and public debt.

This creates what some theorists call a representation gap or democratic myopia, potentially biasing decisions toward short‑term benefits.

Theoretical Approaches to Representation

Several models have been proposed:

ApproachCore IdeaIssues Raised
TrusteeshipCurrent representatives act as trustees for future citizens, guided by constitutional duties or public reasonRelies on current officials’ virtue and incentives
Proxy institutionsSpecialized bodies (e.g., future generations commissioners) speak for the unbornQuestions about legitimacy and accountability
Extended demosThe “people” is conceived as temporally extended, including past and future citizens in some normative senseHard to operationalize in concrete decision rules

Some democratic theorists argue that legitimacy requires considering the potential perspectives of future citizens in public reasoning, even if they cannot participate directly.

Voting Rules and Constitutional Constraints

Proposals to strengthen future representation include:

  • Supermajority requirements or delayed implementation for decisions with large long‑term impacts.
  • Constitutional entrenchment of environmental protections or fiscal rules to bind future governments.

Critics worry that such measures may unduly restrict future citizens’ self‑government, echoing Jefferson’s concern that the dead should not rule the living. Supporters contend that some constraints are necessary to prevent present majorities from imposing unfair burdens on the future.

Youth and Proxy Representation

Some suggest that young people, whose interests span further into the future, can partially proxy for future generations. Proposals include:

  • Lowering the voting age.
  • Reserving seats for youth representatives.
  • Integrating long‑term issues into civic education and public deliberation.

Others argue that youth themselves may still prioritize short‑term interests or be unequally empowered, so dedicated institutions or legal guardians for future generations might still be needed.

Overall, debates about democracy and the unborn revolve around balancing present self‑rule, intergenerational fairness, and the feasibility and legitimacy of representing those who cannot yet speak.

16. Critiques, Limitations, and Ongoing Debates

Intergenerational justice as a field faces numerous critiques and unresolved questions, both conceptual and practical.

Skepticism About Duties to the Distant Future

Some theorists question whether robust duties to remote future people are plausible or action‑guiding:

  • Epistemic skepticism: Our limited knowledge of future circumstances and preferences may undermine claims about what will benefit them.
  • Motivational concerns: Extremely demanding obligations to vast numbers of potential future persons might be psychologically and politically unsustainable.
  • Mutual advantage constraints: Contractarian views sometimes argue that justice requires reciprocity, which distant future generations cannot offer.

Supporters of strong intergenerational duties respond by appealing to precaution, impartiality, or analogies with duties to present non‑reciprocating dependents (e.g., infants).

Conflicts with Present Justice

There is ongoing debate about how to balance intragenerational and intergenerational claims:

  • Should current severe poverty be alleviated even if it increases long‑term environmental risks?
  • May currently disadvantaged groups legitimately prioritize their own advancement over distant future harms?

Different theories—utilitarian, prioritarian, sufficientarian, rights‑based—offer divergent guidance, and many policy discussions involve trade‑offs without clear consensus principles.

Conceptual Puzzles

Persistent conceptual issues include:

  • The non‑identity problem and its implications for harm, rights, and responsibility.
  • The status of potential persons: whether moral standing attaches only to actual future individuals or also to merely possible ones.
  • Metrics of intergenerational comparison: whether to compare resources, welfare, capabilities, or some composite index.

These puzzles lead some to view intergenerational justice as necessarily imperfect or indeterminate, requiring pragmatic compromise and pluralistic reasoning.

Power, Ideology, and Critical Perspectives

Critical theorists and political economists argue that intergenerational language can be used to:

  • Legitimize austerity or regressive policies (e.g., justifying cuts to social programs in the name of “our grandchildren”).
  • Divert attention from present inequalities or structural injustices.
  • Obscure power relations between states, corporations, and communities.

Others contend that focusing on “humanity’s” future can mask disparities in who bears the costs and who enjoys the benefits of long‑term projects.

These critiques prompt calls for integrating intergenerational with intersectional and global justice perspectives, and for scrutinizing who invokes future generations and to what ends.

Overall, intergenerational justice remains a contested and evolving field, with ongoing debates about its foundations, limits, and practical implications.

17. Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Future Directions

Intergenerational justice has become increasingly interdisciplinary, drawing on empirical research and methods from multiple fields while also influencing them.

Scientific and Economic Inputs

Climate science, ecology, and Earth system modeling inform assessments of:

  • Long‑term environmental trajectories.
  • Thresholds and tipping points relevant to sustainability and risk.

Economics contributes tools for:

  • Intertemporal choice, including discounting and investment theory.
  • Modeling optimal carbon prices, resource depletion paths, and savings rates.

These models both shape and are constrained by ethical debates about how to value future welfare and environmental integrity.

Law, Politics, and Governance

Legal scholarship examines:

  • Constitutional and human rights frameworks for future generations.
  • Doctrines of standing, justiciability, and liability in intergenerational cases.

Political science and public policy research explore:

  • Institutional innovations for long‑term governance.
  • The effects of electoral cycles, lobbying, and media on policy time horizons.

These analyses inform proposals for future‑oriented institutions, participatory mechanisms, and reforms to budgeting and regulatory processes.

Cultural, Religious, and Anthropological Perspectives

Religious studies and anthropology highlight:

  • Diverse cultural understandings of time, ancestry, and posterity.
  • Alternative models of stewardship, kinship, and communal property.

Such work suggests that intergenerational norms need not be framed solely in liberal or individualistic terms and may benefit from plural conceptions of obligation and community.

Future Research Directions

Scholars identify several promising directions:

AreaIllustrative Questions
Existential and transformative risksHow should justice account for low‑probability events that could drastically curtail or reshape humanity’s future?
Technological changeWhat intergenerational duties arise regarding AI, biotechnology, geoengineering, and digital infrastructure?
Demographic shiftsHow do aging populations, migration, and changing family structures affect intergenerational solidarity and policy?
Measurement and metricsHow can capabilities, ecological integrity, and cultural goods be operationalized for intergenerational evaluation?

There is growing interest in integrating empirical behavioral research on time preferences and risk perception with normative theories, and in developing deliberative and participatory methods for incorporating long‑term perspectives into collective decision‑making.

Interdisciplinary collaboration is widely regarded as essential for addressing the complex, uncertainty‑laden, and value‑laden questions that intergenerational justice poses.

18. Legacy and Historical Significance

The emergence of intergenerational justice as a distinct topic has had notable effects on both philosophical theory and public discourse.

Impact on Ethical and Political Theory

Within philosophy, intergenerational questions have:

  • Pressured traditional theories of justice, rights, and democracy to confront temporal extension and uncertainty.
  • Stimulated major developments in population ethics, leading to new paradoxes and refinements.
  • Encouraged the integration of environmental concerns into mainstream political philosophy, bridging previously separate subfields.

Debates over the just savings principle, non‑identity, and discounting have become standard reference points in contemporary ethics.

Influence on Policy and Law

Normative arguments about duties to future generations have:

  • Informed the language of sustainable development, climate justice, and intergenerational equity in international agreements.
  • Contributed to the adoption of constitutional provisions, environmental rights, and institutional innovations focused on long‑term interests.
  • Provided conceptual frameworks for climate litigation and public campaigns invoking the rights of future people.

While the causal impact of philosophical work is difficult to trace precisely, there is substantial cross‑fertilization between academic debates and policy rhetoric.

Shifts in Public Imagination

Intergenerational justice has also shaped broader cultural understandings:

  • Political speeches, social movements, and youth activism frequently invoke obligations to “our children and grandchildren” or “future generations.”
  • Environmental and technological debates now commonly frame decisions in terms of their long‑term legacy, not only immediate costs and benefits.

At the same time, critics highlight the risk that appeals to future generations can be used rhetorically without substantive policy change, or to justify contested present‑day sacrifices.

Continuing Relevance

As climate change, biodiversity loss, emerging technologies, and demographic transitions intensify, the questions posed by intergenerational justice remain central to ethical reflection and institutional design. The field’s historical trajectory—from implicit stewardship and legacy concerns to explicit, theoretically articulated duties across time—continues to shape how societies conceptualize their place between past and future, and how they evaluate the legitimacy of decisions whose full effects will unfold long after current decision‑makers are gone.

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APA Style (7th Edition)

Philopedia. (2025). Intergenerational Justice. Philopedia. https://philopedia.com/topics/intergenerational-justice/

MLA Style (9th Edition)

"Intergenerational Justice." Philopedia, 2025, https://philopedia.com/topics/intergenerational-justice/.

Chicago Style (17th Edition)

Philopedia. "Intergenerational Justice." Philopedia. Accessed December 10, 2025. https://philopedia.com/topics/intergenerational-justice/.

BibTeX
@online{philopedia_intergenerational_justice,
  title = {Intergenerational Justice},
  author = {Philopedia},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://philopedia.com/topics/intergenerational-justice/},
  urldate = {December 10, 2025}
}

Study Guide

Key Concepts

Intergenerational justice

The field that studies what obligations of justice—rights, fairness, and duties—hold between past, present, and future generations, and how these should shape institutions and policies over time.

Just savings principle

Rawls’s idea that each generation must save enough resources and institutional capital to secure and preserve just basic structures and decent conditions for future generations.

Non-identity problem

A puzzle showing that many long‑term policies change which individuals will exist, so that future people seemingly cannot claim to have been harmed by policies that were necessary for their very existence, as long as their lives are worth living.

Temporal discounting

The practice of giving less moral or economic weight to goods, harms, or welfare the further they lie in the future, often operationalized through a discount rate in policy analysis.

Sustainability and intergenerational equity

Normative ideas requiring that present practices not compromise future generations’ ability to meet their needs or maintain key ecological and social systems, and that burdens and benefits be fairly shared across time.

Capability approach (intergenerational)

A framework that evaluates justice by what people are able to be and do, emphasizing the maintenance of core human capabilities (health, education, political participation, etc.) for each generation given environmental and institutional preconditions.

Mutual advantage and contractarianism

Views that ground duties of justice in reciprocal benefit within cooperative schemes, often claiming that those who cannot reciprocate (like distant future people) fall outside strict justice.

Institutional design for future generations

The creation of legal and political mechanisms—such as constitutional provisions, commissioners for future generations, fiscal rules, and long‑term impact assessments—intended to represent or protect long‑term interests in present decision‑making.

Discussion Questions
Q1

In what sense, if any, do we owe duties of justice (rather than charity or prudence) to people who do not yet exist? How should we argue for or against such duties?

Q2

How does Rawls’s just savings principle attempt to extend the original position across generations, and what are the main objections to this extension?

Q3

Does the non-identity problem show that many seemingly harmful long‑term policies are not unjust to anyone? If not, what alternative evaluative methods might we use?

Q4

Should ethical evaluation of climate policies use a positive pure rate of time preference in discounting? Why or why not?

Q5

Compare how utilitarian, rights-based, and capability approaches would evaluate a policy that modestly harms the current poor but significantly reduces catastrophic climate risk for future people.

Q6

Are special institutions (such as commissioners for future generations or constitutional environmental rights) compatible with democratic self‑government, or do they illegitimately constrain future voters?

Q7

How might critical perspectives on power and ideology change the way we talk about ‘intergenerational fairness’ in debates over public debt or climate policy?