Meta Ethical Relativism

Definition and Scope

Meta-ethical relativism is a position in meta-ethics, the branch of philosophy that investigates the nature, status, and meaning of moral claims. Unlike normative ethics, which asks what is right or wrong, meta-ethical relativism asks what it means for something to be right or wrong and whether such claims can be true or false in any objective sense.

According to meta-ethical relativism, the truth, justification, or validity of moral judgments is relative to some standpoint—typically a culture, society, historical period, or conceptual scheme. There are no moral truths that hold universally and independently of all such standpoints; instead, moral claims are true or justified only relative to these frameworks.

Meta-ethical relativism is often contrasted with moral objectivism (or moral realism), which maintains that some moral claims are true independently of any particular culture or perspective. It is also distinct from descriptive cultural relativism, which is the empirical claim that different societies in fact have different moral codes; meta-ethical relativism uses such observations to make a philosophical claim about the status of moral truth, not just its diversity.

Main Varieties of Meta-Ethical Relativism

Philosophers distinguish several forms of meta-ethical relativism, depending on what aspect of morality is said to be relative.

1. Relativism about Moral Truth (Alethic Relativism)
   On this view, whether a moral statement (e.g., “Torture is wrong”) is true depends on a framework such as a culture or moral code. A statement can be true in one culture and false in another, without there being a framework-independent fact of the matter. Moral truth is thus indexed to cultures or perspectives.

2. Relativism about Justification (Epistemic Relativism)
   Here, the focus is on what counts as a justified moral belief. A belief is justified relative to the standards of a given culture or tradition, and there is no neutral, culture-transcendent standard for adjudicating between them. Even if one stops short of saying truth itself is relative, standards of rational moral assessment are taken to be framework-dependent.

3. Relativism about Moral Facts or Properties (Ontological Relativism)
   This stronger view holds that there are no culture-independent moral facts or properties; what counts as right, wrong, virtuous, or vicious is constituted by social practices, conventions, or forms of life. Different societies may literally make different moral facts obtain through their norms and practices.

4. Agent-Relativism vs. Appraiser-Relativism
   Another distinction concerns to whom the relativity is indexed:

   • Agent-relativism: The truth of moral claims is relative to the moral code of the agent performing the action.
   • Appraiser-relativism: The truth of moral claims is relative to the moral code of the person making the judgment (the appraiser).
     For example, an appraiser-relativist might say: “When I, from within my culture, say ‘Polygamy is wrong,’ my statement is true relative to my cultural framework, even if it is false relative to another culture’s framework.”

Arguments For and Against

Arguments in Favor

1. Explanation of Moral Disagreement and Diversity
   Proponents argue that meta-ethical relativism offers a natural explanation for deep and persistent moral disagreement across cultures and eras. Since different societies endorse incompatible moral norms (e.g., about marriage, punishment, gender roles), it can seem implausible that there is a single set of objectively correct moral truths that everyone is simply failing to converge on.

2. Sensitivity to Cultural Context
   Supporters often see relativism as promoting tolerance and open-mindedness, by encouraging people to recognize that their own moral standards are not uniquely privileged. It is taken to counteract ethnocentrism—the assumption that one’s own culture provides the correct or superior moral code.

3. Fit with Naturalistic or Constructivist Views of Morality
   Some argue that if morality is a human construction, shaped by evolutionary pressures, social needs, and historical contingencies, then it is plausible that moral truths are not independent of human practices. On such views, meta-ethical relativism may seem more compatible with a scientific or anthropological understanding of moral norms.

Criticisms and Challenges

1. Self-Refutation Worries
   A classic objection is that meta-ethical relativism appears to be self-refuting or at least unstable. If “All moral truths are relative” is itself a moral claim, is it absolutely true or only relatively true? If absolute, it contradicts itself; if relative, then objectivists can consistently reject it from within their own framework without doing anything wrong by relativist lights.

2. Difficulties with Moral Criticism and Reform
   Critics contend that relativism seems to undermine moral criticism, both across and within cultures. If what is right for a culture is simply whatever its norms endorse, it becomes difficult to:

   • Criticize obviously harmful practices in other societies (e.g., slavery, torture, systematic oppression), and
   • Make sense of moral reformers within a society (such as abolitionists or civil rights activists), since by relativist standards they are “wrong” as long as the prevailing norms say so.

3. The Problem of Tolerance
   While relativism is often associated with tolerance, objectors note that relativism cannot straightforwardly justify tolerance as a universal value. If a culture endorses intolerance or persecution, relativism appears committed to saying that intolerance is right for that culture. Thus, the stance that “we ought to be tolerant” cannot be defended as an objective requirement.

4. Convergence and Deep Similarities
   Some critics argue that despite surface diversity, many societies share deep moral similarities (e.g., prohibitions on arbitrary killing within the group, concern for fairness among members). They claim that these commonalities are better explained by some form of moral objectivism, or by shared human needs and capacities, than by a purely relativist account.

Relation to Other Meta-Ethical Views

Meta-ethical relativism sits within a broader landscape of positions about moral status:

• Moral Realism/Objectivism: Holds that some moral statements are objectively true or false, independently of what any culture or individual believes. Realists reject the core relativist thesis of framework-dependence.

• Moral Subjectivism: Often locates moral truth at the level of individual attitudes rather than cultures. While relativism typically emphasizes cultural frameworks, subjectivism emphasizes personal preferences or commitments.

• Noncognitivism (e.g., Emotivism, Expressivism): Maintains that moral judgments do not aim to state facts but to express attitudes or prescriptions. Some noncognitivists claim to rescue a form of moral discourse that is not straightforwardly subject to relativist truth conditions, though others combine noncognitivist insights with relativist elements.

• Error Theory: Argues that all positive moral claims are systematically false, because they presuppose objective moral properties that do not exist. Error theorists reject both objectivism and relativism about truth, since on their view there are no true moral statements (relative or otherwise) in the ordinary sense.

The debate over meta-ethical relativism continues to shape discussions about the nature of moral disagreement, the possibility of intercultural moral dialogue, and the extent to which morality can be both culturally embedded and philosophically justified.