Moral Saints

The Concept of Moral Saints

In contemporary moral philosophy, moral saints are usually defined as people who are as morally good as possible, whose lives are thoroughly or maximally guided by moral considerations. The term is most closely associated with Susan Wolf’s influential 1982 paper “Moral Saints.” Moral saints serve as a theoretical ideal used to test the plausibility and implications of moral theories, rather than as a description of actual people.

Typically, a moral saint is imagined as someone who:

• Consistently gives morality overriding priority in decision-making
• Sacrifices personal interests and projects whenever they conflict with moral demands
• Displays an exemplary level of moral virtues like benevolence, justice, honesty, and self-control

Wolf distinguishes two idealized types:

• The Loving Saint, who finds deep personal joy in acting morally, so that moral self-sacrifice does not feel burdensome
• The Rational Saint, who might have non-moral desires but steadily overrules them on moral grounds

The core philosophical issue is whether standard moral theories—especially demanding forms of utilitarianism and Kantian ethics—implicitly recommend that we should all be moral saints, and whether a world of such agents is a plausible or even attractive moral ideal.

Wolf’s Critique of Moral Saints

Wolf argues that the lives of moral saints, understood as dominantly and continuously moralized, are not fully desirable from a human point of view. Her critique has two main components: one about personal flourishing and one about the plurality of values.

1. Crowding out non-moral values
   Wolf claims that moral saintliness leaves little room for activities, interests, or character traits that are non-moral but still valuable. For example:

   • Pursuing excellence in a non-moral skill (e.g., being a great artist or chess player) may require time and self-absorption that could have been spent helping others.
   • Enjoying certain forms of humor, aesthetic appreciation, or intense personal projects may seem frivolous or self-indulgent from the standpoint of strict moral sainthood.

   According to Wolf, a person whose life is governed almost entirely by moral reasons would be lacking in balance, omitting goods that matter to a rich human life.

2. Moral integrity vs. human attractiveness
   Wolf suggests that a moral saint may be admirable as a moral agent but not necessarily an ideal human model. For example, some morally serious people might be less fun, less spontaneous, or less able to engage in deep non-moral pursuits. The traits that make someone morally best may undermine what many regard as a well-rounded, flourishing person.

3. Critique of moral theories
   Wolf uses the notion of moral sainthood to raise doubts about highly demanding moral theories. If a theory implies that everyone ought to strive to be a moral saint, yet moral sainthood seems not fully desirable, this tension may count against the theory. The problem is not that saints are bad, but that treating saintliness as the unqualified ideal life may distort our moral self-understanding.

Overall, Wolf’s position suggests that morality is only one important dimension of value, and that a plausible moral outlook must leave space for non-moral ideals, personal projects, and forms of excellence independent of moral worth.

Responses and Ongoing Debates

Wolf’s discussion has generated a substantial literature, addressing both the desirability of moral sainthood and its theoretical status.

1. Defending moral sainthood
   Some philosophers argue that Wolf’s picture of moral saints is too narrow or caricatured:

   • They claim that a moral saint could appreciate art, humor, and personal projects, provided these are integrated into a morally responsible life.
   • Others suggest that morally excellent people might be especially skilled at balancing moral duties with self-care and personal relationships, rather than being one-dimensionally self-sacrificing.

   On this view, moral sainthood may not crowd out other values; instead, it might harmonize moral commitment with a rich array of non-moral goods.

2. Revising the ideal: partial compliance and “good enough” morality
   Another response concedes that strict moral sainthood is too demanding but denies that this is a problem for morality itself. Instead, these thinkers argue that:

   • Morality might set an ideal few will reach, with most people permissibly living “good enough” moral lives.
   • We may distinguish between moral obligation and supererogation (praiseworthy but not required acts). Moral saints then exemplify the supererogatory, not the mandatory.

   This line of thought relocates moral sainthood as a heroic ideal, admirable but not morally required for everyone.

3. Pluralism about value and the limits of morality
   Building on Wolf’s insights, some philosophers defend value pluralism, the idea that there are many kinds of value—moral, aesthetic, personal, intellectual—that are not reducible to one another. If so:

   • A life focused exclusively on moral value might be impoverished relative to a life that also cultivates other domains.
   • Morality itself may need to recognize its own limits, allowing individuals to legitimately prioritize non-moral projects.

   This perspective often challenges strong forms of consequentialism, which tend to aggregate all values into a single maximization problem.

4. Implications for everyday ethics
   The debate about moral saints influences practical ethical questions, especially in discussions of effective altruism, charity, and life choices:

   • Some argue that if we can do great good at relatively low cost, morality becomes highly demanding, pushing us toward something like sainthood.
   • Others invoke Wolf-style concerns to defend a moderate morality that respects demandingness but also legitimizes personal attachments and ambitions.

Overall, the concept of moral saints functions as a critical tool: it exposes tensions between idealized moral demands and ordinary human aspirations, and it forces moral theories to address whether they require lives that are psychologically, socially, or prudentially unattractive. The ongoing debate concerns whether this tension indicates a flaw in our moral theories, a misunderstanding of sainthood, or simply an inescapable conflict between moral aspiration and human limitation.