Satisficing

Origins and Core Idea

The term satisficing was introduced by the economist and cognitive scientist Herbert A. Simon in the 1950s as part of his theory of bounded rationality. Simon combined “satisfy” and “suffice” to describe a decision rule in which an agent selects the first option that meets some aspiration level or acceptability threshold, rather than continuing to search for the best possible option.

On this view, agents often do not, and in many cases cannot, maximize—that is, they cannot reliably identify and choose the single best option among all those available. Instead, because of limited information, limited computational capacity, and limited time, they satisfice: they look for an option that is “good enough” by their standards and stop searching once such an option is found.

Satisficing can be characterized by two main elements:

• An acceptability threshold: a standard of what counts as good enough.
• A stopping rule: once an option meets or exceeds that threshold, the search ends and the option is chosen.

Satisficing and Rationality

In decision theory and philosophy of action, satisficing is contrasted with maximizing and optimizing conceptions of rationality. On a standard maximizing model, a rational agent should choose the option that yields the highest expected utility. Satisficing models challenge this by suggesting that, under realistic conditions, choosing a merely adequate option may itself be rational.

Bounded rationality

Simon framed satisficing as a response to bounded rationality—the idea that human rationality is constrained by:

• Cognitive limits: finite memory and processing power.
• Informational limits: imperfect or costly information.
• Time limits: decisions often must be made quickly.

Within these bounds, searching for the absolute best option can be costly and sometimes counterproductive. Proponents of satisficing argue that factoring in search costs and cognitive limitations shows that satisficing procedures can be instrumentally rational—they are effective means to achieving agents’ goals, given their constraints.

Formal and philosophical debates

Philosophers of rational choice have debated whether satisficing can be reconciled with standard axioms of rationality:

• Defenders maintain that once search costs and cognitive limitations are incorporated into the utility function, a satisficing rule may itself be utility-maximizing at a higher level (for example, maximizing expected utility subject to a cost of information or deliberation).
• Critics contend this “reduction” of satisficing to maximizing either misrepresents the psychological reality of decision-making or collapses the distinctive normative point of satisficing, where agents are said to be rational even when they knowingly choose a non-maximal option.

Another issue concerns dynamic consistency: if an agent sets a satisficing threshold and later learns that a much better option is easily available, is it rational to stick with the original choice? Some argue that satisficing can generate choices that violate stability over time, while others respond by refining models to allow thresholds to adjust with new information.

Satisficing in Ethics

Beyond decision theory, satisficing has played an important role in contemporary ethical theory, especially in debates about consequentialism.

Satisficing consequentialism

Standard act consequentialism holds that an action is morally right if and only if it produces at least as much overall good as any alternative—that is, if it maximizes value. In the late 20th century, some philosophers proposed satisficing consequentialism, which maintains that an action can be morally right if it produces enough good, even if it is not among the best options available.

On this view, there is a moral threshold of adequacy: so long as one’s action yields outcomes that meet or exceed this level, it is morally permissible, even if other options would have produced more overall good. Satisficing consequentialism aims to capture common intuitions that morality does not always require us to do the very best we can, especially in demanding contexts like global poverty or personal sacrifice.

Motivations and objections

Motivations for satisficing in ethics include:

• Moderating demandingness: Pure maximizing consequentialism can appear extremely demanding, potentially requiring constant sacrifice for the greater good. Satisficing allows room for personal projects and partiality.
• Moral pluralism and common sense: Satisficing is sometimes said to align better with ordinary moral judgments, which often regard many different actions as “good enough” rather than singling out exactly one best act.
• Psychological realism: It may be unrealistic to expect agents always to identify and perform the best possible act; a satisficing standard can appear more humanly attainable.

Critics, however, raise several concerns:

• Arbitrariness: It can be unclear how to set the moral threshold. Why should a particular level of goodness, rather than the maximum, determine rightness?
• Inconsistency: Some argue that if producing more good is always morally preferable, then it is puzzling to call a knowingly non-maximal act fully right rather than merely excusable or supererogatory.
• Collapse worries: Others suggest that, with enough refinement, satisficing versions either collapse back into maximizing forms or lose what made them distinctly consequentialist.

These debates connect with broader discussions about supererogation, moral demandingness, and the structure of moral reasons.

Applications and Criticisms

Satisficing has been influential across several fields:

• In economics and organizational theory, it models how firms and managers make decisions under uncertainty, adopting aspiration levels for profit, quality, or growth instead of trying to compute global optima.
• In cognitive science and psychology, it serves as a descriptive account of how people actually choose, especially in complex, real-world environments.
• In philosophy of science and methodology, scientists and policymakers are sometimes said to satisfice when they adopt theories or policies that are sufficiently supported or workable rather than best in principle.

Despite this wide use, satisficing faces enduring criticisms:

• As a descriptive theory, some argue that real human decision-making is often even less structured than satisficing models suggest, influenced by biases and heuristics that do not clearly involve thresholds.
• As a normative ideal of rationality or morality, opponents worry that satisficing may license complacency, allowing agents to settle too quickly for merely adequate options when better ones are reasonably attainable.

Ongoing work attempts to refine satisficing models, specifying how thresholds are set and revised, how they interact with uncertainty and risk, and how they relate to broader conceptions of rational and moral agency. In both theoretical and applied contexts, satisficing remains a central concept for understanding how agents navigate a world of limited resources, incomplete information, and multiple competing values.