After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory

1. Introduction

After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (1981) is a book-length treatise by the Scottish philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre that offers a historically informed diagnosis of modern moral life and a systematic proposal for rethinking ethics. It is widely regarded as a central text in the late twentieth‑century revival of virtue ethics.

The book advances two closely related theses:

1. Diagnostic thesis: contemporary moral discourse is, according to MacIntyre, radically fragmented and often intractable. Moral debates appear interminable not because participants are irrational, but because they rely on inherited moral concepts whose original teleological and social contexts have been lost. What remains, he argues, is a simulacrum of morality that in practice functions emotivistically.

2. Constructive thesis: in response, MacIntyre sketches a neo‑Aristotelian account of ethics. On this view, moral evaluation is grounded in the relationship between practices, virtues, and a telos (end) of human life that is articulated within historical traditions and embodied in communities oriented toward a common good.

The argument unfolds through an unusual combination of philosophical analysis, intellectual history, and social theory. MacIntyre links abstract questions in moral philosophy to characteristic modern social roles—such as the manager and the therapist—and to broad narratives about the Enlightenment and its aftermath.

The work does not simply defend a return to pre‑modern ethics; it also treats rival positions, especially Nietzschean genealogy, as powerful interlocutors. The choice MacIntyre frames between “Nietzsche or Aristotle” structures much of the book’s later argument about the possibility of rational moral disagreement across traditions.

Subsequent sections of this entry examine in turn the historical background of After Virtue, the circumstances of its composition, its internal structure, its central ideas—such as emotivism, practices, narrative unity, and tradition-constituted rationality—and the extensive debates it has generated in moral and political philosophy.

2. Historical Context and Intellectual Background

2.1 Philosophical Context in the 1960s–1970s

After Virtue emerged against a backdrop dominated, in the English‑speaking world, by analytic moral philosophy, especially:

Parallel developments in continental philosophy are also important. MacIntyre engages with Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and to some extent existentialism and phenomenology, treating them as critics of the moral culture the Enlightenment helped create.

2.2 Social and Political Background

The book was written in the wake of:

• Post‑war expansion of bureaucratic and managerial institutions in Western societies.
• Rising influence of social sciences and claims of value‑neutral expertise.
• Political disillusionment after the 1960s, including frustrations with both Marxism and liberal democracy.

MacIntyre interprets these developments as manifestations of a culture in which moral language persists, but its underlying teleological framework has allegedly disintegrated. The prominence of roles such as the manager and therapist figures in his sociological diagnosis of late modernity.

2.3 MacIntyre’s Intellectual Trajectory

MacIntyre’s earlier work in Marxism, analytic philosophy, and theology forms a significant prehistory to After Virtue. Commentators often emphasize that the book synthesizes:

Scholars disagree on how continuous After Virtue is with MacIntyre’s earlier Marxist writings. Some stress a decisive “conversion” to Aristotelianism; others read the book as a re‑working of Marxist concerns about alienation and fragmented social practices within a different ethical framework.

3. Author and Composition of After Virtue

3.1 Alasdair MacIntyre’s Background

Alasdair MacIntyre (b. 1929) was educated in the United Kingdom and initially trained within analytic philosophy, while also engaging with Marxism, theology, and political activism. Before After Virtue, he published on ethics, Marxism, and the philosophy of religion, and held academic posts in Britain and North America.

His early books, such as Marxism: An Interpretation (1953) and A Short History of Ethics (1966), foreshadow themes developed in After Virtue: the historical situatedness of moral concepts, the critique of liberal individualism, and the search for a substantive conception of the good.

3.2 Genesis and Writing Process

After Virtue was composed in the late 1970s and completed by 1980. MacIntyre has indicated in later prefaces that the book grew out of:

• A series of essays and lectures on moral philosophy and the sociology of modern institutions.
• Dissatisfaction with both Marxism and dominant analytic moral theory, especially their accounts of rationality and moral justification.
• Intensive re‑engagement with Aristotle and Thomistic thought.

The first edition appeared in 1981 with the University of Notre Dame Press. MacIntyre later taught at Notre Dame, and the intellectual milieu of Anglo‑American philosophy departments, Catholic universities, and ecumenical theological debates provided a context for the work’s reception and subsequent revisions.

3.3 Later Editions and Revisions

Two major subsequent editions shaped how the book has been read:

In the 2007 prologue, MacIntyre comments on misunderstandings of his criticism of Enlightenment morality and clarifies his account of tradition‑constituted rationality, situating After Virtue within a longer, evolving project.

Commentators differ over whether After Virtue should be read as a self-contained statement or as the opening of this larger series. Some emphasize its relative independence; others regard later works as essential for fully understanding its claims about traditions and rationality.

4. Structure and Organization of the Work

After Virtue is organized into seven parts, each with a distinct role in the overall argument.

4.1 Overview of the Seven Parts

4.2 Narrative and Argumentative Progression

The book’s structure alternates between diagnostic, historical, and constructive phases:

• Parts I–III pose the problem: the fragmentation and apparent emotivism of modern moral discourse, illustrated via characteristic modern roles.
• Part IV offers a genealogical narrative explaining how this condition allegedly arose from the breakdown of a teleological worldview and the failure of Enlightenment justifications of morality.
• Part V frames a choice of responses to this failure, centering on Nietzsche and Aristotle as representative of two divergent strategies.
• Parts VI–VII articulate a positive ethical theory and indicate its implications for contemporary life.

This architecture allows MacIntyre to move from an initially “disquieting suggestion” about moral language to broader claims about traditions, virtues, and the common good, while constantly relating philosophical positions to social forms.

5. The Disquieting Suggestion and Emotivism

5.1 The Disquieting Suggestion

The book opens with an imaginative parable of a future society in which the natural sciences have been destroyed and later reconstructed from scattered fragments—textbook pages, laboratory instruments, scientific jargon—without knowledge of the theories that once gave them coherence. MacIntyre proposes that contemporary moral discourse may be in an analogous state.

This is his “disquieting suggestion”: modern moral language retains terms such as “good,” “duty,” and “rights,” but these are, on his view, fragments detached from an older teleological framework. As a result, many moral disagreements are not merely difficult but in principle intractable, because parties invoke inherited standards whose underlying rational bases are no longer shared.

Supporters of MacIntyre’s reading hold that this analogy captures the sense in which modern moral argument is both intense and inconclusive. Critics respond that the parable overstates the degree of discontinuity between pre‑modern and modern ethics, and underestimates shared moral assumptions within pluralist societies.

5.2 Emotivism as Theory and Social Condition

From this starting point, MacIntyre introduces emotivism. Philosophically, he characterizes emotivism as the view that:

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“All evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling.”

— MacIntyre, After Virtue (ch. 2)

He argues that, even where people reject emotivism as a theory, modern practices often treat moral utterances as if they were expressions of preference and tools for influence rather than truth‑apt claims.

MacIntyre distinguishes between:

He links this social emotivism to the rise of apparently value‑neutral experts—such as the manager and therapist—whose work often involves influencing behavior while claiming merely technical competence.

Some commentators treat MacIntyre’s use of “emotivism” as a powerful sociological insight into contemporary moral life. Others argue that he conflates diverse moral theories, overlooks realist strands in modern ethics, or underplays the possibility of rational agreement despite deep disagreement.

6. The Critique of the Enlightenment Project

6.1 The “Enlightenment Project” as MacIntyre Describes It

MacIntyre uses the phrase “Enlightenment project of justifying morality” to describe a range of eighteenth‑ and nineteenth‑century efforts to provide a rational, secular foundation for morality after the decline of Aristotelian and Thomistic teleology. Key figures include Hume, Kant, Diderot, and later Kierkegaard.

According to MacIntyre, these thinkers shared the ambition to derive binding moral principles from:

• Universal features of reason (Kant).
• Stable patterns of human desire and sentiment (Hume).
• Conceptions of autonomy, choice, or human nature that avoided appeal to a thick, tradition‑specific telos.

6.2 MacIntyre’s Central Claims about Failure

MacIntyre contends that the Enlightenment project was “doomed to failure” because it attempted to retain moral norms and virtues originally embedded in a teleological worldview while discarding that worldview’s account of the human good. On his reading:

He argues that this leads, over time, to the fragmentation characteristic of modern moral discourse and paves the way for Nietzschean critiques of morality as will to power.

6.3 Responses and Alternative Readings

Scholars have debated the accuracy of this narrative:

• Some defenders claim MacIntyre rightly exposes a tension in Enlightenment ethics between universal justification and the loss of a substantive account of flourishing.
• Critics argue that he oversimplifies Enlightenment thought, neglecting internal diversity (e.g., differences between Kantian, Humean, and Rousseauian projects) and underestimating the capacity of Enlightenment frameworks to sustain robust moral norms.
• Others suggest that his contrast between a unified “pre‑modern tradition” and a failed Enlightenment is historically reductive and that the teleological tradition itself was more contested than he allows.

Despite these disagreements, his critique has become a central point of reference in discussions about whether modern ethics can be grounded without an appeal to comprehensive views of the human good.

7. Practices, Internal Goods, and the Virtues

7.1 The Concept of a Practice

A pivotal move in After Virtue is MacIntyre’s definition of practices:

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“Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized…”

— MacIntyre, After Virtue (ch. 14)

Examples include chess, architecture, medicine, and physics. Such activities exhibit:

• Shared standards of excellence.
• Forms of cooperation and apprenticeship.
• A history that shapes what counts as good performance.

Debate continues over the boundaries of this category—whether, for instance, parenting, business, or religious worship qualify—leading to divergent applications in ethics and social theory.

7.2 Internal and External Goods

Within practices, MacIntyre distinguishes:

On MacIntyre’s account, virtues are necessary to orient agents toward internal goods and to resist the corrupting pull of external rewards.

Critics have questioned whether this dichotomy is sharp or exhaustive, and how to treat goods (such as institutional survival) that seem partly internal and partly external.

7.3 Definition and Role of the Virtues

MacIntyre defines a virtue as:

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“An acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices…”

— MacIntyre, After Virtue (ch. 14)

He later links virtues to:

1. Participation in practices.
2. Sustaining the narrative unity of an individual life.
3. Upholding the traditions that shape practices.

Commonly cited virtues in his framework include truthfulness, justice, courage, and constancy.

Supporters see this as a powerful re‑anchoring of virtue ethics in social practices, avoiding purely subjective or rule‑bound approaches. Detractors argue that the account underplays innate moral capacities or universal norms and leaves unclear how to adjudicate conflicts between different practices or traditions that endorse incompatible virtues.

8. Narrative Unity, Selfhood, and Tradition

8.1 Narrative Unity of a Human Life

MacIntyre maintains that individual actions are intelligible only as parts of a story. A human life, on this view, exhibits (or ought to seek) narrative unity: a coherent ordering of episodes, commitments, and projects toward goods that make sense of what one does.

He suggests that questions such as “What am I to do?” presuppose answers to “Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?” Moral evaluation thus involves interpreting lives as narratives oriented, successfully or unsuccessfully, toward certain ends.

Critics have asked whether all lives can be rendered as unified narratives, and whether this model risks marginalizing experiences of fragmentation, discontinuity, or psychological disorder.

8.2 The Self as Story‑Bearer

In After Virtue, the self is not an abstract, unencumbered chooser but a “story‑embedded” agent whose identity is shaped by roles, relationships, and inherited practices. MacIntyre emphasizes:

• The dependence of identity on social roles (e.g., parent, citizen, practitioner).
• The way obligations arise from networks of social relationships that precede individual choice.
• The idea that character is formed through the development of virtues across time.

Some commentators praise this as an alternative to liberal individualism and to purely psychological conceptions of the self. Others worry that tying identity so closely to social roles could entrench oppressive structures or undervalue individual autonomy.

8.3 Tradition and Tradition-Constituted Rationality

MacIntyre introduces traditions as historically extended arguments about the good, within which standards of rational justification are developed and revised. Rationality is, on his account, tradition‑constituted: there is no context‑free standpoint from which to assess practices and concepts.

Key features include:

Supporters see this as a nuanced alternative to both universalism and relativism. Critics question whether the account ultimately avoids a form of relativism, and how exactly rational comparison between radically different traditions is to be achieved in practice.

9. Nietzsche, Aristotelianism, and Competing Moral Traditions

9.1 Nietzsche as Diagnostician of Modern Morality

In Part V, MacIntyre presents Friedrich Nietzsche as the most perceptive critic of modern morality. Nietzsche’s genealogical method exposes, on this reading, the historical and psychological roots of moral values and reveals that purportedly universal moral claims often mask will to power.

MacIntyre credits Nietzsche with recognizing that, once the Enlightenment project fails, appeals to objective moral law or rational duty become groundless. The resulting stance encourages individuals (or “higher types”) to create values rather than discover them.

9.2 Aristotle as Alternative

Against this, MacIntyre turns to Aristotle as representative of a teleological, virtue‑centered tradition that links ethics to an account of human flourishing (eudaimonia). He argues that Aristotelian ethics:

• Grounds virtues in a determinate conception of the human good.
• Connects moral life to participation in a polis‑like community.
• Provides resources for explaining both moral agreement and disagreement.

In After Virtue, Aristotle is not presented as a historical curiosity but as a living interlocutor whose framework can, MacIntyre claims, be reconstructed and developed for modern conditions.

9.3 “Nietzsche or Aristotle?” and Rival Traditions

MacIntyre frames a choice between two broad traditions:

He contends that if Enlightenment moralism cannot be sustained, one is pushed toward either a Nietzschean rejection of objective morality or an Aristotelian recovery of teleology.

Commentators dispute whether this dichotomy is exhaustive. Some maintain that it overlooks viable Kantian, Habermasian, or Rawlsian alternatives. Others argue that MacIntyre’s portrayal of Nietzsche underestimates the complexity of Nietzsche’s positive ethical vision. Conversely, some Nietzsche scholars welcome MacIntyre’s acknowledgment of Nietzsche’s critical power while rejecting his appeal to Aristotle as the only constructive option.

Within MacIntyre’s broader project, these rival traditions exemplify his thesis that moral reasoning is conducted within historically specific, partially incompatible frameworks, whose merits must be assessed comparatively rather than from a neutral standpoint.

10. Key Concepts and Technical Terminology

This section summarizes central terms as used specifically in After Virtue, complementing the glossary.

10.1 Core Normative and Descriptive Terms

10.2 Representative “Characters” of Modernity

MacIntyre also employs quasi‑literary character types to illuminate moral roles:

These are not empirical categories in a strict sociological sense but ideal types used to diagnose features of modern social life.

10.3 Methodological Terms

Additional terms important to understanding MacIntyre’s method include:

Interpreters sometimes contest the precision of these terms, but they form the technical vocabulary through which After Virtue articulates its critique and its constructive neo‑Aristotelian proposal.

11. Famous Passages and Illustrative Allegories

11.1 The Post‑Catastrophe Science Fiction Parable

The most widely cited passage in After Virtue is the opening parable describing a world where the natural sciences have been destroyed and then pieced together from fragments. MacIntyre uses this story to suggest that contemporary moral discourse may be in an analogous state of fragmentation.

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“What we possess… are fragments: a vocabulary out of which we can construct sentences that resemble those we used to employ…but which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived.”

— MacIntyre, After Virtue (ch. 1)

This allegory frames the book’s argument and has been discussed extensively in both sympathetic and critical commentaries.

11.2 The “Disquieting Suggestion”

Closely linked to the parable is the “disquieting suggestion” that modern moral practice is essentially incoherent despite surface continuities of language. This suggestion challenges readers to consider whether their own moral convictions rest on stable rational foundations or on inherited but unexamined fragments.

11.3 The Manager and Therapist

MacIntyre’s depictions of the manager and therapist as emblematic modern characters have become canonical reference points:

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“The manager treats ends as given, as outside his scope; his concern is with technique, with effectiveness in transforming materials…including human materials.”

— Paraphrased from After Virtue (chs. 2–3)

These portraits function as illustrative social allegories that condense his critique of bureaucratic rationality and therapeutic culture.

11.4 Practices and Internal Goods

The formal definition of practice and internal goods at the start of Chapter 14 is another oft-quoted passage, serving as a key text for virtue ethicists and social theorists. It marks the transition from diagnosis to construction in the book.

11.5 The “New St Benedict” Ending

The final paragraph famously compares the contemporary West to the late Roman Empire, concluding with a call for a “new—and doubtless very different—St Benedict” to help sustain the virtues in small communities.

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“What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained…”

— MacIntyre, After Virtue (final paragraph)

This image has been interpreted variously as pessimistic, prophetic, communitarian, or monastic in inspiration, and has generated substantial discussion about the political implications of After Virtue.

12. Philosophical Method and Use of History

12.1 Blending Philosophy, History, and Sociology

After Virtue employs a distinctive methodological synthesis. Rather than arguing solely at the level of abstract moral theory, MacIntyre:

• Constructs a historical narrative of Western moral philosophy from Aristotle through the Enlightenment to Nietzsche.
• Uses sociological analysis of roles and institutions (manager, therapist, bureaucracy).
• Engages in conceptual analysis of terms such as virtue, practice, and rationality.

This approach aims to show how philosophical views both shape and are shaped by broader social and historical contexts.

12.2 Narrative and Genealogical Strategies

MacIntyre adapts elements of Nietzschean genealogy—historical explanation of moral concepts by uncovering their contingent origins—while rejecting Nietzsche’s conclusions. He also uses narrative as a mode of philosophical argument, both in the science‑fiction parable and in his portrayal of traditions as extended arguments.

Supporters see this as an innovative use of history to illuminate normative questions; critics contend that his narratives at times rely on selective or schematic readings of complex historical periods.

12.3 Tradition-Constituted Rationality

Methodologically, MacIntyre’s claim that rationality is tradition‑constituted shapes how he understands philosophical disagreement. He rejects the idea of a neutral, tradition‑free standpoint from which to adjudicate all moral claims. Instead, he proposes comparative evaluation of traditions based on:

• Their ability to resolve internal tensions.
• Their explanatory power regarding rival traditions’ strengths and weaknesses.
• Their success in integrating theory with practice and lived experience.

Debate persists over whether After Virtue itself consistently adheres to this methodological stance, since it offers a critical narrative about rival traditions that some interpret as implicitly appealing to extra‑traditional standards.

12.4 Historiographical Critiques

Historians and philosophers have challenged aspects of MacIntyre’s use of history:

Nevertheless, After Virtue has been influential in encouraging philosophers to treat intellectual history not merely as background but as integral to moral theory.

13. Reception, Criticism, and Debate

13.1 Immediate and Ongoing Reception

Upon publication, After Virtue was widely discussed across moral philosophy, political theory, and theology. It was praised for its bold scope and for reinvigorating virtue ethics, while provoking substantial critical response.

It has since become a standard text in discussions of virtue, tradition, and the critique of liberal modernity, frequently cited both by sympathizers and opponents.

13.2 Major Lines of Criticism

Prominent critical themes include:

13.3 Supportive Engagements

Many philosophers and theologians have built on MacIntyre’s work:

• Virtue ethicists have drawn on his account of practices and internal goods.
• Communitarian and post‑liberal theorists have invoked his critique of liberal individualism.
• Theological ethicists (notably in Catholic and Protestant traditions) have integrated his emphasis on tradition and narrative into religious moral thought.

Commentators such as John Horton and Susan Mendus, Mark C. Murphy, Kelvin Knight, and Christopher Stephen Lutz have produced extensive analyses, some broadly sympathetic while offering refinements or corrections.

13.4 Internal Debates among Interpreters

Within the secondary literature, disputes persist over:

• How radical MacIntyre’s critique of modernity is intended to be.
• Whether his later works modify or deepen claims made in After Virtue.
• The extent to which his project is compatible with democratic pluralism.

These debates have ensured that After Virtue remains a focal point for ongoing discussion rather than a closed system.

14. Influence on Virtue Ethics and Political Theory

14.1 Revival of Virtue Ethics

After Virtue is widely credited with catalyzing the late twentieth‑century revival of virtue ethics. Its influence includes:

• Renewed interest in Aristotelian and Thomistic accounts of character.
• Development of practice‑based approaches in professional ethics (e.g., medicine, law, education).
• Integration of narrative and tradition into moral psychology and ethical theory.

Some virtue ethicists adopt MacIntyre’s social and historical emphases; others draw mainly on his critique of rule‑based ethics while modifying or rejecting his tradition‑dependent framework.

14.2 Impact on Political Theory

In political theory, After Virtue has informed:

Some political theorists use MacIntyre’s ideas to criticize market societies and technocratic governance, while others argue that liberal institutions can incorporate many of the virtues he values.

14.3 Influence in Theology and Religious Ethics

The book has had substantial impact on Christian ethics, particularly Catholic and Anabaptist traditions. Theologians such as Stanley Hauerwas have adapted MacIntyre’s account of virtue and tradition to ecclesial communities, seeing the church as a primary bearer of practices and narratives.

Debate continues over how closely theological appropriations should follow MacIntyre’s philosophical arguments, especially regarding natural law and the relation between church and broader society.

14.4 Interdisciplinary Extensions

Beyond philosophy and political theory, After Virtue has influenced:

• Sociology (concepts of practices and institutions).
• Business ethics (discussions of whether corporations can be or contain practices).
• Educational theory (virtues in professional formation and liberal education).

Some adopt MacIntyre’s framework directly; others use his terminology while revising it to suit empirical or policy‑oriented work.

15. Legacy and Historical Significance

15.1 Place in Twentieth-Century Philosophy

After Virtue is widely regarded as a landmark in late twentieth‑century moral philosophy. It helped to reorient ethical theory away from an exclusive focus on rules, rights, and utility toward questions of character, community, and history. Its combination of critique and constructive neo‑Aristotelianism has made it a reference point in debates on moral realism, pluralism, and the nature of rational justification.

15.2 Contribution to the Revival of Virtue and Tradition

The book’s articulation of practices, internal goods, and tradition‑constituted rationality has shaped subsequent discussions across philosophy, theology, and social theory. Even critics often frame their positions in response to MacIntyre’s categories, indicating the enduring conceptual influence of the work.

15.3 Continuing Controversies

The long‑term significance of After Virtue is closely tied to ongoing debates about:

• Whether its account of modernity and the Enlightenment is historically satisfactory.
• How its emphasis on traditions and local communities interacts with globalization, migration, and multicultural societies.
• The viability of a neo‑Aristotelian framework in pluralist contexts where no single conception of the human good is publicly shared.

These unresolved questions ensure that the book remains central to contemporary discussions about the future of moral and political philosophy.

15.4 Influence on MacIntyre’s Later Work

Within MacIntyre’s own corpus, After Virtue functions as the starting point for a multi‑volume project, followed by Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, among others. Later works elaborate and revise themes first introduced here, particularly the analysis of traditions and their rational comparison.

As a result, After Virtue is often read both as a self‑standing classic and as the opening movement in a longer argument about rationality, history, and the virtues whose impact continues to shape philosophical discourse.