Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)

1. Introduction

Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (Beiträge zur Philosophie Vom [Ereignis]) is a dense, experimental treatise in which Martin Heidegger attempts to rethink philosophy after the perceived failure of traditional metaphysics and the limits of Being and Time. Written in 1936–1938 but only published in 1989 as volume 65 of the Gesamtausgabe (GA 65), it occupies a pivotal position in the development of his so‑called “later thought.”

Heidegger characterizes the work as a set of “contributions” rather than a system, organized into six “joinings” (Fügungen). Instead of linear argumentation, it proceeds through brief, numbered reflections, striving to prepare a new way of thinking attuned to what he calls Beyng (Seyn) and Ereignis (often rendered “enowning” or “event of appropriation”).

Commentators widely regard the text as a key locus for Heidegger’s effort to articulate a “second beginning” of Western thought, in contrast to the “first beginning” of Greek philosophy and its metaphysical legacy. The work is also central for understanding his notions of Da‑sein as the “there” of Beyng, the history of Being (Seinsgeschichte), and the enigmatic figure of the “last god.”

2. Historical Context and Composition

Intellectual and Political Setting (1930s)

Heidegger composed Contributions during 1936–1938, in the aftermath of his 1933–34 rectorate and disillusionment with National Socialism. Scholars commonly situate the manuscript within his attempt to reassess both his earlier project in Being and Time (1927) and his political hopes for a philosophical renewal of Germany.

Composition and Revision

Heidegger drafted Contributions as a private, transitional manuscript, not intended for publication in his lifetime. It is closely related to the so‑called Black Notebooks and to contemporaneous lecture courses. Between 1938 and 1940 he appears to have reworked and arranged the material into the six “joinings,” giving the text its final internal architecture.

He repeatedly referred to GA 65 as the central but “reserved” articulation of his later thought. The autograph manuscript survives and underlies the critical edition.

Posthumous Publication

The work was first published in 1989 by Vittorio Klostermann as GA 65, edited by Friedrich‑Wilhelm von Herrmann, and reached Anglophone readers through the 1999 Emad–Maly translation. Its late publication significantly reshaped interpretations of Heidegger’s “turn” and his notion of Ereignis.

3. Structure and Organization of the Six Joinings

Heidegger organizes Contributions into six major “joinings” (Fügungen), each composed of short, numbered reflections. The joinings are not sequential chapters in a conventional sense but mutually belonging regions of a single attempt to think Beyng.

Non‑linear, Constellational Order

Heidegger stresses that the joinings are mutually implicating rather than linearly ordered. Commentators describe the structure as a “constellation” or “ring”: motifs—such as Da‑sein, history of Being, and Ereignis—recur across joinings, gaining different inflections. The fragmentary, aphoristic presentation is intended to enact the break with systematic metaphysics and to correspond to the provisional, preparatory status of the work.

4. Central Arguments and Themes

From the “First Beginning” to a “Second Beginning”

A dominant line of argument portrays the history of Western philosophy as a “first beginning” in which Being is increasingly understood as presence, object, or ground. Proponents of this reading emphasize Heidegger’s claim that this trajectory culminates in modern technological enframing, where beings become mere resources and Being itself is forgotten.

Contributions seeks to prepare a “second beginning” that would no longer conceive Being metaphysically but as event (Ereignis). This second beginning is not a new doctrine but a transformation in how humans belong to Being.

Da‑sein and the Truth of Beyng

The work reinterprets Da‑sein as the finite, historical “there” of Beyng. Rather than a human subject, Da‑sein is the site where Beyng’s truth—understood as unconcealment and concealment—is at stake. Heidegger argues that Da‑sein bears responsibility for this clearing and must be prepared through attuned, resolute thinking.

Event, Leap, and Grounding

Another central theme is the event of enowning (Ereignis), in which Beyng and Da‑sein mutually “appropriate” each other. This event cannot be produced but only awaited and prepared. The “leap” names the risky, non‑methodical transition from metaphysical representation to such responsive thinking, while “grounding” (Part VI) defines philosophy’s task as preparing the historical ground for this event.

The Last God and the Ones to Come

Heidegger introduces the motifs of the “ones to come” and the “last god” to indicate a possible future configuration of the sacred within the history of Being. Interpretations vary on how literally or theologically these themes should be taken, but they generally mark the projected horizon of a transformed relation between mortals and Beyng.

5. Key Concepts: Ereignis, Da-sein, and the History of Being

Ereignis (Event of Enowning)

Ereignis is Heidegger’s term for the originary event in which Beyng and Da‑sein mutually appropriate one another. It is not an occurrence among others but the “event” that grants the clearing where beings can appear.

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“Ereignis is the enowning of Da‑sein into the truth of Beyng and of Beyng into the belonging of Da‑sein.”
— Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65

Translators and commentators debate how best to render Ereignis (“event,” “appropriation,” “enowning”), reflecting different emphases—temporal, relational, or possessive.

Da‑sein

In Contributions Heidegger distinguishes Da‑sein from the more anthropological “Dasein” of Being and Time. Da‑sein now names the historical “there” in which Beyng happens:

• not an individual psychological subject
• a finite, exposed site of openness and concealment
• the bearer of responsibility for the truth of Beyng

Many interpreters see this shift as replacing existential analysis with a more historical–ontological account of human being.

Seinsgeschichte (History of Being)

Seinsgeschichte designates a sequence of “epochs” in which Being reveals and conceals itself in different ways (e.g., as idea, substance, will to power). Heidegger treats modern technology as the latest configuration, where Being withdraws into sheer availability.

Some critics view Seinsgeschichte as an over‑generalized narrative, whereas others regard it as the indispensable framework for Heidegger’s later thought.

6. Legacy and Historical Significance

Impact on Heidegger Scholarship

The publication of GA 65 in 1989 significantly altered the reception of Heidegger’s later work. Many scholars came to see Contributions as the “keystone” of his post–Being and Time thinking, particularly for:

• clarifying Ereignis and Beyng
• systematizing (in a non‑systematic way) the history of Being
• reframing Da‑sein beyond subjectivity

Others contend that placing too much weight on this single manuscript risks marginalizing Heidegger’s contemporaneous lectures and essays.

Influence on Continental Philosophy and Theology

Contributions has influenced diverse currents:

Interpretations differ on whether Heidegger offers resources for a non‑metaphysical thinking of the sacred, or whether the quasi‑religious language re‑inscribes metaphysical structures.

Political and Historical Debates

Because Contributions was written near the time of Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism, it plays a central role in debates over his politics. Some readers detect a transposition of earlier political expectations into a more obscure language of “peoples,” “leaps,” and “the ones to come.” Others argue that the work marks a distancing from concrete political programs toward a more historically reflective stance.

Despite disagreements, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) is widely regarded as indispensable for understanding both Heidegger’s later philosophy and contemporary discussions of the “end of metaphysics.”