Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is a philosophical dialogue in which three characters—Cleanthes, Demea, and Philo—debate whether human reason, observing the order of the world, can justify belief in God, and, if so, what kind of deity such arguments would support. Cleanthes defends an empiricist, design‑based natural theology; Demea promotes a more traditional, a priori and mystical theism; and Philo, Hume’s most skeptical spokesman, probes and undermines both positions. Across twelve dialogues, they examine the design argument, cosmological reasoning, the problem of evil, divine attributes, analogy, and the limits of human understanding, leaving the reader with a deliberately unsettled and ambiguous conclusion regarding natural religion’s rational foundations.
At a Glance
- Author
- David Hume
- Composed
- c. 1750–1776
- Language
- English
- Status
- copies only
- •Critique of the design argument from analogy: Philo challenges Cleanthes’ claim that the order and apparent purposiveness of the world justify an inference to an intelligent, divine designer, arguing that the analogy between the universe and human artifacts is weak, limited, and speculative.
- •Problem of evil as a challenge to theism: Philo insists that the vast amount and kinds of suffering, disorder, and moral evil in the world are difficult to reconcile with an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly benevolent deity, thereby undermining standard theistic conceptions derived from experience.
- •Limits of human reason and anthropomorphism: The dialogue emphasizes that human cognitive faculties and concepts are adapted to experience of a small corner of nature, so projecting human attributes such as intelligence, will, or moral goodness onto the creator of the universe is illicit anthropomorphism.
- •Critique of a priori and cosmological arguments: Through Philo’s and Cleanthes’ criticisms of Demea, the work questions the coherence of attempting to derive God’s existence from purely a priori reasoning or necessary‑being arguments, suggesting that such proofs either smuggle in empirical assumptions or end in obscure metaphysics.
- •Skeptical theism and mitigated skepticism: Philo articulates a ‘mitigated’ skepticism that allows for common life and practical reasoning but urges extreme caution when speculating about transcendent matters, concluding that natural religion cannot provide secure, detailed knowledge of God’s nature or purposes.
The work is now regarded as a classic text in philosophy of religion and a landmark in early modern skepticism. It systematically dissects the main rational arguments for God’s existence—especially the design argument—and helped to shift later discussion toward the evidential problem of evil, the limits of analogical reasoning, and the epistemology of religious belief. Its dialogical form allows Hume to explore multiple, partially conflicting positions, influencing figures from Kant to contemporary analytic philosophers of religion and contributing to later debates about intelligent design, skeptical theism, and the rationality of belief.
1. Introduction
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is David Hume’s sustained inquiry into whether human reason, relying only on experience of the natural world, can justify belief in God and determine anything about the divine nature. Cast as a conversation among three fictional characters, it examines and tests the main forms of natural religion—religious belief grounded in reason rather than revelation.
The work focuses on three interconnected questions:
- Whether the order and apparent purposiveness of the universe support an argument from design.
- Whether purely a priori or cosmological reasoning can establish a necessary being as the cause of the world.
- Whether, if some divine cause is admitted, we can legitimately ascribe to it the traditional divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness, especially in light of the problem of evil.
Hume uses the dialogue form to stage a debate between:
- Cleanthes, defender of empirical, design‑based theism.
- Demea, advocate of traditional, a priori theism and divine incomprehensibility.
- Philo, the skeptic, who questions both systems and emphasizes the limits of human understanding.
The work is framed as a letter by Pamphilus, a young observer, to an absent friend, which adds another interpretive layer. The Dialogues do not end with a straightforward resolution; instead, they leave readers with a range of competing positions and a deliberately ambiguous impression of which, if any, has prevailed. Subsequent sections of this entry examine the context, structure, and arguments of the work, together with its reception and philosophical legacy.
2. Historical and Intellectual Context
2.1 Enlightenment Background
The Dialogues were composed in the Scottish Enlightenment, a milieu marked by confidence in empirical science, historical inquiry, and philosophical reflection on human nature. Hume’s contemporaries—including Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, and Francis Hutcheson—debated the scope of reason, the foundations of morality, and the status of religion in a modern, increasingly secular culture.
Natural theology had an important place in this context:
- Many Protestant thinkers treated natural religion as a bridge between reason and revelation.
- Works such as Clarke’s Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and Clarke‑style sermons popularized rational theism.
- At the same time, religious skepticism and deism circulated in elite circles, especially in France and Britain.
2.2 Intellectual Predecessors
Hume’s interlocutors implicitly engage with several major traditions:
| Tradition / Figure | Influence on the Dialogues |
|---|---|
| Scholastic / Cartesian (e.g., Descartes, Leibniz) | A priori proofs, necessary being, and perfect‑being theology echo in Demea. |
| Newtonian natural philosophy | The empirical study of order and laws in nature informs Cleanthes’ design argument. |
| Epicurean and ancient skepticism | Provide models for Philo’s naturalistic hypotheses and skeptical stance. |
| British empiricism (Locke, Berkeley) | Shared focus on experience and limits of abstraction shapes Hume’s treatment of inference and analogy. |
2.3 Religious and Political Context
Mid‑18th‑century Britain still enforced blasphemy laws, and open atheism was socially and legally dangerous. Hume’s own earlier writings on religion had attracted suspicion, contributing to failed university appointments. Scholars often see the Dialogues as shaped by:
- Awareness of censorship and potential accusations of impiety.
- The need to distinguish philosophical examination of natural religion from explicit attacks on Christianity.
- Tensions between Presbyterian orthodoxy in Scotland and more latitudinarian currents in England.
Interpreters disagree on how far the Dialogues reflect merely a cautious rhetorical posture versus a deeper, principled commitment to mitigated skepticism in religious matters.
3. Author and Composition History
3.1 Hume’s Development on Religion
David Hume (1711–1776) had treated religious topics in earlier works, notably the Treatise of Human Nature, the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (especially “Of Miracles”), and essays such as “Of Superstition and Enthusiasm.” These works develop a naturalistic psychology of belief, including religious belief, and express doubts about metaphysical and theological speculation.
Many scholars hold that the Dialogues represent Hume’s mature synthesis on religion, where earlier themes—empiricism, skepticism, naturalistic explanation—are systematically applied to natural theology. Others argue that the Dialogues are more tentative and exploratory than programmatic.
3.2 Chronology and Stages of Composition
The composition history is unusually protracted and somewhat conjectural:
| Approx. Date | Evidenced Stage of Composition |
|---|---|
| c. 1750–51 | Hume mentions a work on natural religion in correspondence; many date the first draft of the Dialogues to this period. |
| 1750s–60s | Revisions and intermittent work inferred from letters and stylistic features. |
| Early 1770s | Hume prepares a carefully corrected manuscript and finalizes the order of parts. |
| 1776 | In his will, Hume instructs his nephew to publish the Dialogues posthumously. |
Debate continues over how much the text changed during these decades. Some scholars detect shifts in tone and strategy that might reflect Hume’s evolving engagement with critics and with developments in science and theology. Others interpret the work as relatively stable, with revisions polishing style and organization rather than altering substantive doctrine.
3.3 Relation to Hume’s Other Writings
The Dialogues are closely connected to Hume’s broader philosophy:
- The treatment of causal inference, analogy, and induction parallels the epistemology of the Enquiries.
- The emphasis on passion, custom, and imagination in religious belief echoes his essays.
- The skeptical posture toward a priori metaphysics relates to his critique of abstract reasoning in the Treatise.
Interpretive controversies include whether the Dialogues should be read as the definitive statement of Hume’s view on religion, or as one experiment among several, deliberately refraining from overt authorial endorsement of any single position.
4. Publication and Textual Transmission
4.1 Posthumous Publication
Hume chose not to publish the Dialogues during his lifetime. In his will he directed that the manuscript be given to his close friend Adam Smith, asking him to arrange for publication. Smith, however, declined, reportedly worrying about public reaction and his own position. The task passed to David Hume the Younger, the philosopher’s nephew and literary executor.
The work finally appeared in 1779 in London, anonymously, three years after Hume’s death. The first edition included a dedication to “the author’s friend,” generally understood to be Smith, although he had not supervised the edition.
4.2 Early Editions and Variants
The early textual history is relatively straightforward compared with many early modern works:
| Edition | Key Features |
|---|---|
| 1779 (1st ed.) | Anonymous; overseen by Hume’s nephew; based on Hume’s prepared manuscript. |
| 1779–1780s reprints | Minor typographical corrections; same basic text. |
| 1779 Dublin edition and other early printings | Sometimes exhibit small orthographic and punctuation variations. |
Surviving evidence suggests that Hume took care to revise and order the work before his death, reducing the likelihood of major textual corruption. No earlier, substantially different authorial versions are extant.
4.3 Manuscripts and Critical Editions
The original holograph is no longer available, but several contemporary copies and printed texts underpin modern editions. Scholars generally classify the manuscript tradition as “copies only”, with no competing authorial redactions.
The most influential modern edition is Norman Kemp Smith’s 1935 critical text, which collated early printings and provided extensive editorial notes. Later editions (e.g., Dorothy Coleman’s Cambridge edition, Martin Bell’s Oxford edition) refine punctuation, provide updated introductions, and sometimes adjust paragraphing, but do not typically alter doctrinal content.
Textual debates focus less on variant wording than on:
- The arrangement and titling of parts.
- The status of editorial headings and notes.
- The relation between the Dialogues and associated works (such as “Of the Immortality of the Soul”) often printed together.
5. Dramatis Personae and Narrative Frame
5.1 Main Interlocutors
Hume structures the work as a conversation among three central figures, each representing a distinct approach to natural religion:
| Character | Religious/Philosophical Orientation |
|---|---|
| Cleanthes | Empiricist, design‑based theist; emphasizes observation, analogy to human artifice, and probabilistic reasoning. |
| Demea | Traditional, often scholastic theist; favors a priori proofs and stresses divine incomprehensibility and transcendence. |
| Philo | Skeptical inquirer; questions both empirical and a priori theologies, stressing the limits of human reason about the divine. |
Readers and scholars have frequently associated Philo with Hume’s own voice, Cleanthes with moderate rational theism, and Demea with more mystical or dogmatic orthodoxy, though none of these identifications is uncontroversial.
5.2 Pamphilus and the Outer Frame
The dialogue is presented as a letter written by Pamphilus, a young man and former pupil of Cleanthes, to a friend named Hermippus. Pamphilus:
- Reports the twelve‑part conversation he has heard.
- Occasionally comments on the manners and persuasiveness of the speakers.
- Concludes with his own assessment of who “won” the debate.
This second‑order narration adds interpretive complexity: Pamphilus’ evaluation may not align with Hume’s, and his deference to Cleanthes is often taken as reflecting his educational background more than an impartial verdict.
5.3 Functions of the Dialogue Form
The combination of inner dialogue and outer frame serves several purposes:
- It allows Hume to stage multiple positions without openly endorsing any one.
- It creates dramatic tension as characters’ views shift, especially in later parts.
- It provides rhetorical protection in a sensitive religious climate, since controversial claims are voiced by fictional figures.
Interpretations diverge on how to read the voices:
- Some view Philo as a close mouthpiece for Hume.
- Others see a deliberate polyphony, where no single character, including Pamphilus, reliably conveys the author’s own standpoint.
6. Structure and Organization of the Twelve Parts
The Dialogues are divided into twelve parts, each advancing specific themes while contributing to an overarching examination of natural religion. The sequence reflects a carefully staged progression rather than a random collection of discussions.
6.1 Overall Arc
A simplified overview of the progression is:
| Parts | Main Focus |
|---|---|
| I–III | Method and the initial design argument, with early criticisms. |
| IV | A priori and cosmological proofs. |
| V–VIII | Anthropomorphism, alternative hypotheses, and naturalistic accounts of order. |
| IX | Psychology and social roots of religion. |
| X–XI | The problem of evil and divine moral attributes. |
| XII | Apparent concessions and an ambiguous conclusion. |
6.2 Internal Rhythm and Reversals
Commentators often emphasize the rhythmic structure:
- Opening: Demea and Cleanthes dispute method; Philo adopts a more passive, ironic role.
- Middle: Philo increasingly dominates, testing both design arguments and metaphysical proofs with alternative scenarios (Parts V–VIII).
- Interlude: Part IX shifts briefly from abstract argument to the sociology and psychology of religion, before returning to metaphysical issues via the problem of evil.
- Climax: Parts X–XI intensify critical pressure through systematic discussion of suffering and divine attributes.
- Coda: Part XII introduces a notable tonal shift, with Philo apparently softening his stance and Pamphilus reporting Cleanthes’ victory.
Some scholars see this organization as a dialectical ascent and descent: strong theistic claims are introduced, challenged, revised downward, and finally re‑asserted in a weakened, minimal form. Others stress the circularity and deliberate instability of the structure, designed to prevent any final closure.
6.3 Relation of Parts to Character Development
The twelve‑part division also tracks changes in the characters’ roles:
- Demea’s prominence declines after Part IV, and he exits before the end, symbolizing (for some interpreters) the marginalization of purely a priori orthodoxy.
- Cleanthes and Philo become the principal antagonists, especially regarding design and evil.
- Pamphilus’ framing remarks at the beginning and end bracket the internal structure, providing a narrative unity that contrasts with the philosophical indeterminacy within.
7. Central Arguments: Design, Cosmology, and A Priori Proofs
7.1 The Design Argument
The design argument is primarily associated with Cleanthes. He claims that the world resembles a machine or house in its intricate order and purposiveness, and therefore invites a similar explanatory cause—an intelligent designer.
Key features:
- It is an argument from analogy: from observed resemblance between natural order and human artifacts to a further resemblance (intelligent origin).
- It is presented as empirical and probabilistic rather than demonstrative.
- It supports a conception of God as intelligent and purposive in a way somewhat akin to human minds, though greater in degree.
Demea criticizes this for compromising divine transcendence; Philo questions the strength and scope of the analogy, as discussed in later sections of the Dialogues.
7.2 Cosmological and A Priori Arguments
Demea instead promotes a priori reasoning, influenced by scholastic and rationalist traditions. He argues that:
- Every contingent being requires a cause.
- The series of contingent beings cannot regress infinitely without explanation.
- Therefore, there must be a necessary being which explains the existence of the contingent world.
This is closely related to cosmological proofs that infer a first cause or necessary ground of being from the existence of the universe.
7.3 Critical Responses within the Dialogues
Both Cleanthes and Philo challenge Demea’s approach:
- Cleanthes prefers an empirical route, suggesting that experience, not pure reason, gives content to the idea of God.
- Philo contends that the concept of a necessary existent is unintelligible beyond purely logical truths (relations of ideas); applying it to matters of fact or existence, he suggests, is illegitimate.
Philo also highlights a dilemma for natural theology:
- If theology relies on empirical analogy (Cleanthes), it risks anthropomorphism and an under‑determined deity.
- If it relies on a priori necessity (Demea), it risks obscurity and detachment from experience.
Subsequent parts of the Dialogues explore how far either style of argument can go in establishing specific divine attributes or a detailed theology.
8. The Problem of Evil and Divine Attributes
8.1 Forms of Evil Considered
Parts X and XI focus on the problem of evil: the difficulty of reconciling widespread suffering with a deity who is traditionally conceived as omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. Philo catalogs:
- Natural evils: disease, natural disasters, pain, and the fragility of life.
- Moral evils: human cruelty, injustice, and vice.
- Structural features of the world—such as scarcity, competition, and vulnerability—that systematically generate suffering.
The emphasis falls on the variety, intensity, and apparent gratuitousness of evils, rather than on a single dramatic example.
8.2 Tension with Traditional Attributes
Philo presents these observations as empirical data that complicate inferences from the world to divine attributes. The main tension is summarized as follows:
| Attribute | Problem Raised by Evil |
|---|---|
| Omnipotence | If God can do anything, why is there so much preventable suffering? |
| Omniscience | If God knows all consequences, why create such a world? |
| Perfect goodness | If God is wholly benevolent, why does the world look, at best, morally mixed? |
Philo’s criticism is not limited to whether evil disproves God’s existence, but more specifically to whether perfect goodness can be reasonably inferred from our limited sample of the universe.
8.3 Responses and Four Hypotheses
Cleanthes hints at theodical responses: human perspective is limited; what appears evil may be necessary for greater goods, such as virtue or order. Philo considers and problematizes several common moves, including appeals to unknown reasons or to laws of nature that God could not (or would not) break.
In Part XI, Philo systematizes the options into four hypotheses about divine moral character:
- God is perfectly good.
- God is perfectly evil.
- God is a mixture of good and evil.
- God is morally indifferent, beyond human moral categories.
Philo argues that the mixed character of the world’s good and evil does not uniquely support the first hypothesis rather than the others. The evidential underdetermination of divine moral attributes becomes a central challenge for any attempt to construct a detailed natural theology from observation alone.
9. Analogy, Anthropomorphism, and the Limits of Reason
9.1 Analogy as a Mode of Theological Inference
Analogy is central to Cleanthes’ strategy: the world is like a machine, so its cause is like an intelligent designer. The argument from analogy allows inferences from familiar domains (human craftsmanship) to unfamiliar ones (the origin of the cosmos).
Philo scrutinizes this method. He grants that analogy has a legitimate role in everyday reasoning and science, but questions whether it can sustain large metaphysical inferences about the divine.
Key concerns include:
- The uniqueness of the universe: we lack a comparative class of worlds to support robust analogical generalization.
- The partial and limited similarity between organic or cosmic order and human artifacts.
- The danger of extrapolating beyond the modest claims warranted by the initial resemblance.
9.2 Anthropomorphism and Its Critique
Anthropomorphism—attributing human traits to God—is for Cleanthes a strength of his view, making God more intelligible by analogy with human mind. For Demea, it is a theological danger, as it seems to diminish divine transcendence.
Philo presses the anthropomorphism objection in two directions:
- If the analogy is taken seriously and strongly, the deity ends up too humanlike: finite, fallible, perhaps even morally ambiguous.
- If, to preserve transcendence, we weaken the analogy, then it loses its inferential power and cannot justify specific claims about God’s nature.
This creates a tension: the more we make God like us, the more we can reason about him—but the less he resembles the traditional, infinite deity.
9.3 Limits of Human Reason about the Divine
Throughout, Philo emphasizes the epistemic limitations of human beings:
- Our cognitive faculties are adapted to a small segment of reality.
- Concepts such as infinity, necessity, and absolute perfection are, at best, extrapolations from finite experience.
- Attempts to reason about the ultimate cause of the universe stretch our understanding beyond its proper bounds.
Proponents of this reading see the Dialogues as advocating a form of mitigated skepticism: we can form minimal, vague notions of a cause of order, but should resist detailed speculative theology. Others interpret the critique more narrowly as targeting specific analogies and anthropomorphic tendencies, leaving open the possibility of alternative, perhaps less human‑centered conceptions of the divine.
10. Philosophical Method and Skepticism
10.1 Competing Methods
The Dialogues juxtapose several philosophical methods:
| Character | Favored Method |
|---|---|
| Cleanthes | Empirical observation, analogy, inductive reasoning. |
| Demea | A priori demonstration, metaphysical necessity. |
| Philo | Skeptical critique, emphasis on limits of both approaches. |
The early parts explicitly address method in natural religion: whether one should begin from experience of the world or from abstract, necessary truths about existence and causality.
10.2 Humean Skepticism in the Dialogues
Philo articulates a form of “mitigated skepticism” often associated with Hume:
- In everyday life and empirical science, we must rely on custom, probability, and induction.
- In metaphysical and theological matters, these same tools are far weaker, and claims regularly outstrip the evidence.
- Reasonable philosophy therefore counsels caution and modesty, not total suspension of judgment, but resistance to ambitious, speculative systems.
Philo frequently appeals to Humean themes:
- Distinguishing “relations of ideas” (logical and mathematical truths) from “matters of fact” (contingent truths known only by experience).
- Questioning the application of necessity and infinity beyond mathematics.
- Highlighting the psychological origins of belief—fear, hope, and imagination—as opposed to strict rational inference.
10.3 The Role of the Dialogue Form in Method
The dialogical setting itself embodies a methodological stance:
- By staging ongoing disagreement without a final, clearly endorsed victor, the work models philosophical inquiry as open‑ended and provisional.
- Pamphilus’ framing narrative underscores the gap between persuasion and proof: who seems convincing to a particular listener may not be who has the strongest arguments by abstract standards.
- The interplay of positions allows Hume to test methods against each other: empiricism against rationalism, skepticism against both, and religious interpretation against naturalistic explanation.
Interpretations diverge on whether the Dialogues primarily promote a positive, albeit modest, theistic conclusion via empirical reasoning, or whether they are best understood as a sustained demonstration of the limits of philosophical theology under any method available to human reason.
11. Famous Passages and Illustrative Hypotheses
Hume employs vivid examples and thought‑experiments to clarify abstract issues and expose the underdetermination of theological claims.
11.1 The House or Machine Analogy
In Part II, Cleanthes famously compares the universe to a house or machine:
“The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence.”
— Cleanthes, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part II
This analogy crystallizes the design argument and furnishes the target for Philo’s later criticisms of analogy and anthropomorphism.
11.2 The Shipbuilder and Apprentice, and Many Deities
In Part V, Philo imagines that the world might be the first rough essay of an infant or senescent deity, like a ship that is:
“...the first rude essay of some infant deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance.”
He also proposes a polytheistic scenario, wherein multiple gods collaborate or compete in world‑building. These speculative hypotheses are not offered as serious alternatives, but as illustrations that the same empirical data—the world’s mixed order and disorder—are compatible with many divergent theologies.
11.3 The Epicurean Hypothesis
Part VIII introduces the Epicurean hypothesis, attributed to ancient atomists. It portrays a universe of matter in random motion that, given immense time, settles into relatively stable patterns which resemble design but arise without intention.
This passage is often noted for anticipating later ideas about self‑organizing systems and naturalistic explanations of order. Within the Dialogues, its role is to show that order alone does not uniquely confirm a designing mind.
11.4 The Four Hypotheses on Divine Moral Character
In Part XI, Philo’s classification of four hypotheses—perfectly good, perfectly evil, mixed, or morally indifferent deity—serves as a conceptual tool for analyzing how good and evil in the world relate to doctrinal claims about divine goodness. It is frequently cited in discussions of the evidential problem of evil and skeptical theism.
These illustrative passages have become touchstones in philosophy of religion, often discussed independently of the larger work because of their clarity, imaginative force, and susceptibility to diverse interpretations.
12. Reception, Criticism, and Interpretive Debates
12.1 Early Reception
Because the Dialogues appeared posthumously and anonymously, immediate public reaction was relatively muted. In theological and philosophical circles, however, the work was soon recognized as a significant challenge to natural theology. Some clergy and apologists regarded it as dangerously subversive; others treated it as a sophisticated foil prompting refinements of theistic arguments.
12.2 Major Lines of Criticism
Subsequent criticism has taken several forms:
| Critical Focus | Main Concerns |
|---|---|
| Strength of Hume’s objections | Theists argue that Philo targets weaker forms of design and cosmological arguments, neglecting more rigorous versions. |
| Over‑skepticism about analogy | Some contend that Hume’s standards, if applied consistently, would undermine much of science as well as theology. |
| Treatment of the problem of evil | Critics debate whether Philo underestimates possible theodicies or misrepresents traditional doctrines of providence. |
| Literary and rhetorical strategy | Some see the dialogues as stacked in favor of skepticism; others claim Philo’s final concessions are insincere or ironic. |
12.3 Interpretive Controversies
There is no consensus about Hume’s own position as expressed through the Dialogues:
- Atheist/agnostic readings view Philo’s skeptical arguments as decisive and his late‑stage concessions as rhetorical or prudential.
- Deist or minimal‑theist readings emphasize Philo’s apparent acceptance, in Part XII, of a vague, intelligent cause of the universe.
- Skeptical‑theist readings suggest Hume (through Philo) allows that God’s existence is possible or even probable, while denying that humans can know much about the divine nature or purposes.
- Polyphonic/literary readings stress that no character straightforwardly represents Hume; the work is seen as an open exploration of options rather than a coded doctrinal statement.
These debates are fueled by the deliberately ambiguous ending, the role of Pamphilus as narrator, and the tension between the strength of the skeptical arguments and the modest theistic conclusion suggested in the final pages.
13. Legacy and Historical Significance
13.1 Influence on Philosophy of Religion
The Dialogues are now a canonical text in modern philosophy of religion. They helped shift discussion from confident proofs of God’s existence to questions about:
- The evidential value of design and order.
- The problem of evil as a central issue for theism.
- The epistemic limits of human reason in theological matters.
Many later thinkers—Kant, for example—engaged with Hume’s challenges, sometimes explicitly, sometimes indirectly. In contemporary analytic philosophy, debates over intelligent design, fine‑tuning, and skeptical theism often refer back to arguments and distinctions found in the Dialogues.
13.2 Impact on Broader Intellectual History
Beyond technical philosophy, the work contributed to:
- The secularization of intellectual discourse, by treating religion as an object of critical, historical, and psychological inquiry.
- The development of naturalistic explanations of religious belief, anticipating later work in anthropology and cognitive science of religion.
- The literary tradition of philosophical dialogues addressing religious themes, influencing later authors who use fictional debate to explore controversial ideas.
13.3 Ongoing Relevance
The Dialogues continue to be studied for:
- Their articulation of empiricism and skepticism.
- Their nuanced handling of scientific method and theological inference.
- Their exploration of how imagination, emotion, and social context shape religious belief.
Scholars also examine the work as part of Hume’s overall project to delineate the proper bounds of human understanding. Whether interpreted as covertly atheistic, minimally theistic, or methodologically skeptical, the Dialogues remain a central reference point for assessing the prospects of natural religion in a post‑Enlightenment world.
Study Guide
intermediateConceptually accessible with some background in early modern philosophy, but demanding in its layered dialogue form, subtle rhetorical strategy, and sustained engagement with technical issues in philosophy of religion and epistemology.
Natural religion
Religious belief and theology based solely on reason and observation of the natural world, without appeal to special revelation or scripture.
Design argument (argument from design)
An inference from the order, complexity, and apparent purposiveness of the universe to the existence of an intelligent designer, often formulated as an argument from analogy with human artifacts.
Argument from analogy
A reasoning pattern that infers similarities in unobserved respects from similarities in observed respects—for example, inferring an intelligent cause of the world because it resembles human machines.
A priori and cosmological arguments; necessary being
A priori arguments claim to prove God’s existence by pure reason, often via the idea of a necessary being that must exist and explains the contingent world (a central theme in cosmological proofs).
Problem of evil
The challenge of reconciling extensive suffering and moral evil with a deity who is all‑powerful, all‑knowing, and perfectly good.
Anthropomorphism
Attributing human traits—such as intellect, will, and moral qualities—to God or the universe.
Mitigated skepticism
Hume’s moderate skepticism that accepts everyday life and empirical science while urging caution about ambitious metaphysical and theological claims.
Narrative frame and dramatis personae (Pamphilus, Philo, Cleanthes, Demea)
The layered structure in which Pamphilus recounts a dialogue among three characters representing empiricist theism, a priori orthodoxy, and skepticism.
How does the dialogical and framed structure of the work (with Pamphilus reporting the conversation) influence your judgment about which position, if any, Hume wants readers to accept?
In what precise ways does Philo challenge the analogy between the universe and a machine in Cleanthes’ design argument? Are any of these objections decisive, or can a defender of design respond?
Why does Philo argue that the notion of a ‘necessary being’ is unintelligible when applied to matters of existence? How does this relate to Hume’s broader distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact?
What role does the problem of evil play in the overall strategy of the Dialogues? Does it aim to show that God does not exist, or rather to limit what we can infer about God from the world?
Is Philo’s stance best described as atheism, deism, skeptical theism, or something else? Justify your answer with reference to specific parts of the text, especially the apparent concessions in Part XII.
How do Hume’s discussions of the psychology and sociology of religion in Part IX (custom, fear, imagination) bear on the rational arguments surveyed elsewhere in the Dialogues?
To what extent does Hume’s critique of natural religion undermine or leave intact ordinary religious faith and practice, given his commitment to ‘mitigated skepticism’?
How to Cite This Entry
Use these citation formats to reference this work entry in your academic work. Click the copy button to copy the citation to your clipboard.
Philopedia. (2025). dialogues-concerning-natural-religion. Philopedia. https://philopedia.com/works/dialogues-concerning-natural-religion/
"dialogues-concerning-natural-religion." Philopedia, 2025, https://philopedia.com/works/dialogues-concerning-natural-religion/.
Philopedia. "dialogues-concerning-natural-religion." Philopedia. Accessed December 11, 2025. https://philopedia.com/works/dialogues-concerning-natural-religion/.
@online{philopedia_dialogues_concerning_natural_religion,
title = {dialogues-concerning-natural-religion},
author = {Philopedia},
year = {2025},
url = {https://philopedia.com/works/dialogues-concerning-natural-religion/},
urldate = {December 11, 2025}
}