Discourse on Inequality

Context and Aims

Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men (commonly shortened to Discourse on Inequality) was written in response to a question posed by the Academy of Dijon: what is the origin of inequality among humans, and is it authorized by natural law? Rousseau’s treatise, completed in 1754 and published in 1755, is both a philosophical essay and a speculative history of humanity.

The work intervenes in Enlightenment debates about human nature, natural law, and the legitimacy of social and political hierarchies. Rousseau challenges prevailing views—especially those associated with Hobbes, Locke, and the emerging science of political economy—that treat existing social arrangements and property relations as natural or inevitable. His aim is not merely historical explanation but also moral and political evaluation of modern society.

A central ambition of the work is to distinguish natural (or physical) inequality—differences of age, strength, health, or intelligence—from moral or political inequality, which depends on social convention and recognition, such as differences of wealth, rank, and power. Rousseau argues that understanding the genesis of the latter is crucial for any critique of injustice.

Structure and Method

The Discourse on Inequality consists of a preface, a dedication to the Republic of Geneva, an exordium that lays out the method, and two main parts:

1. An account of human beings in the state of nature
2. A conjectural history of the transition to civil society and the rise of inequality

Rousseau adopts a hypothetical and conjectural method. He explicitly notes that he is not offering a literal historical narrative but a “history of possibilities” grounded in what is known about human psychology and environment. By stripping away the “artificial” aspects of civilization, he seeks to imagine what humans might have been like before the emergence of social institutions.

This methodological move allows Rousseau to criticize contemporary society indirectly. Rather than arguing from abstract principles alone, he contrasts current social arrangements with a reconstructed, simpler condition in which humans were, he suggests, more equal and, in some respects, better off.

Central Arguments

Natural versus Moral Inequality

Rousseau’s opening distinction between natural and moral (political) inequality shapes the entire work:

• Natural inequality arises from bodily and mental differences given by nature.
• Moral or political inequality is “authorized by the consent of men” and includes inequalities of wealth, honor, power, and authority.

Rousseau maintains that only the second kind is problematic from the standpoint of justice, since it depends on social arrangements rather than fixed biological facts. He questions whether moral inequality can be justified by any principle of natural right.

Human Nature and the State of Nature

Against the view that early humans were violent and competitive (as in Hobbes) or already rational property-holders (as in Locke), Rousseau portrays natural man as:

• Solitary, not yet bound by complex social ties
• Guided by amour de soi (a basic self-love related to self-preservation)
• Possessing pitié (natural pity or compassion), a reluctance to see others suffer
• Limited in desires, with few artificial needs

In this condition, Rousseau suggests, inequality is minimal and largely physical; humans are relatively equal in their independence and in the narrow range of their needs. The state of nature is not idealized as a moral paradise, but it is presented as comparatively peaceful, free, and non-exploitative.

From Nature to Society: The Origins of Inequality

The second part of the treatise offers a conjectural sequence of developments through which social inequality emerges:

1. Rudimentary families and huts: As people begin to live together more regularly, they develop stable relationships, division of labor, and basic language. Attachments and comparisons become possible.

2. The birth of amour-propre: Rousseau introduces amour-propre (often translated as “vanity” or “self-love relative to others”), a socially generated desire to be esteemed and recognized. This contrasts with the more basic, non-comparative amour de soi. Amour-propre leads individuals to measure themselves against others and seek superiority.

3. Cooperation, tools, and early inequality: Cooperative labor and technological advances increase productivity, but also begin to differentiate people according to skills, strength, and reputation. Inequalities of esteem and influence grow.

4. The invention of private property: A decisive turning point comes with the emergence of private ownership of land. Rousseau famously imagines the “first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, thought of saying ‘This is mine’” and found others simple enough to believe him. For Rousseau, this act inaugurates a new form of inequality rooted in control over resources.

5. Institutionalization of inequality: Once property exists, differences of wealth rapidly translate into differences of power and dependence. The rich, fearing the resentment of the poor, propose political institutions and laws that purport to secure freedom and peace while in fact protecting the advantages of property-owners. Political society—far from being a neutral guarantor of rights—emerges, in this account, as a device for stabilizing and legitimating inequality.

Rousseau thus offers an early critique of what would later be called ideology: the idea that systems of law and government can present themselves as serving the common good while actually entrenching the interests of the powerful.

Critique of Civilization and Progress

The Discourse on Inequality also develops a broader critique of civilization and the ideal of progress:

• Advances in arts, sciences, and luxury are linked to corruption of morals and dependency.
• The multiplication of artificial needs makes individuals vulnerable, competitive, and anxious.
• Social structures encourage servility, as people trade independence for security or social status.

Rousseau does not call for a literal return to the primitive state. Instead, his analysis is meant to expose the costs of social development—especially for freedom and equality—and to question triumphalist narratives of modernization.

Normative Implications

While the Discourse does not present a positive political program (that belongs more to The Social Contract), it has important normative implications:

• It suggests that legitimate political order must address artificial inequalities rather than endorsing them.
• It implies that institutions should be judged by how they relate to humans’ basic capacities for compassion, self-love, and freedom, rather than by wealth or splendor.
• It raises the problem of whether and how a modern society can reconcile social cooperation with freedom and equality, an issue Rousseau later addresses via ideas of the general will and republican self-government.

Reception and Influence

The Discourse on Inequality attracted significant attention and controversy from its first publication. It did not win the Dijon prize for which it was written, but it quickly became one of Rousseau’s most discussed works.

Historically, the treatise has been seen as:

• A critique of emerging liberal and capitalist orders, influencing later socialist and egalitarian thinkers who drew on Rousseau’s suspicion of property-based inequality.
• A precursor to anthropology and social theory, through its conjectural history of social development and its insistence that what is often called “natural” is in fact socially produced.
• A foundational text in theories of recognition, with the concept of amour-propre anticipating later concerns about status, esteem, and misrecognition.

Critics have raised multiple objections:

• Some argue that Rousseau’s state of nature is too speculative and lacks empirical support.
• Others contend that his account idealizes pre-social life or underestimates the benefits of civil society, such as law, security, and culture.
• Liberal interpreters have questioned his apparent skepticism about private property and have defended property rights as compatible with, or even necessary for, freedom.

Despite these debates, the Discourse on Inequality remains a central reference point in discussions of social justice, human nature, and the critique of modern inequality. Its distinction between natural and social inequalities, its analysis of property and power, and its exploration of the psychological mechanisms of status continue to shape contemporary political philosophy and social critique.