History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena
History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena is a reconstructed 1925 lecture course in which Martin Heidegger prepares the ground for Being and Time by critically examining the traditional, especially Aristotelian and neo-Kantian, understandings of time and by elaborating the phenomenological method required to approach temporality as an existential structure of Dasein rather than as a merely objective property of nature. The course develops a systematic analysis of the basic concepts of phenomenology, the notion of Dasein as the entity for whom Being is an issue, and the way everyday temporality, historicality, and the interpretation of world and self presuppose more originary temporal structures. By confronting the “history of the concept of time,” Heidegger argues that Western metaphysics has obscured the question of Being by treating time in derivative, physical, or psychological terms, and he outlines a prolegomenon to a fundamental ontology in which time is understood as the horizon for any disclosure of Being.
At a Glance
- Author
- Martin Heidegger
- Composed
- Summer semester 1925 (Marburg lecture course)
- Language
- German
- Status
- copies only
- •The concept of time in the Western philosophical tradition—shaped above all by Aristotle and subsequently transformed through medieval and modern metaphysics—has become objectified and detached from the concrete lived experience of temporality, thereby obscuring the more primordial phenomenon that makes any understanding of Being possible.
- •Phenomenology, correctly understood not as a doctrine but as a method and mode of access, consists in the elucidation of the structures of appearing (phenomena) as they show themselves from themselves; this requires a prior clarification of basic concepts such as intentionality, meaning, and worldhood in relation to Dasein.
- •Dasein, the entity that each of us is, is essentially characterized by its being-in-the-world and by its understanding of Being; the analysis of Dasein’s everydayness (care, concern, being-with-others, facticity) reveals temporality as the fundamental horizon of its existence.
- •Ordinary and scientific conceptions of time—whether as a sequence of “nows,” as measurable clock-time, or as a psychological flow—are derivative abstractions grounded in a more originary temporality that structures Dasein’s projection toward possibilities (future), retention of what has been (past), and involvement in the present world.
- •A genuine “history of the concept of time” must be a phenomenological destruction (Destruktion) of the tradition: not a mere historiography of doctrines, but a critical retrieval that uncovers how inherited concepts both reveal and conceal the question of Being and the temporal conditions of understanding.
After its posthumous publication in 1979, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena became recognized as a crucial transitional work that illuminates the genesis of Being and Time and clarifies Heidegger’s early development of phenomenological method, the concept of Dasein, and the problematic of temporality. It has been widely studied in Heidegger scholarship for the way it shows the movement from neo-Kantian and Husserlian frameworks toward a distinctively Heideggerian fundamental ontology, and it plays an important role in debates about the continuity between Heidegger’s early and later thought, the nature of phenomenology, and the relation between ontology, history, and time.
1. Introduction
History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena is the reconstructed text of Martin Heidegger’s Marburg lecture course from the summer semester of 1925. It occupies a transitional position between his early phenomenological work and the publication of Being and Time (1927). Heidegger characterizes the course as a preliminary investigation into the question of time that must be undertaken before a full “fundamental ontology” can be realized.
The work pursues two tightly connected aims. First, it clarifies the basic concept of phenomenology as a method that “lets what shows itself be seen from itself” and distinguishes this approach from psychology, epistemology, and neo-Kantian theories of consciousness. Second, it prepares a history of the concept of time by showing how inherited philosophical determinations of time are bound up with broader ontological commitments.
Central to this project is the introduction of Dasein, the being that each of us is, as the starting point for interrogating the meaning of Being and temporality. The lectures argue that ordinary and scientific notions of time presuppose more originary temporal structures belonging to Dasein’s being-in-the-world. In this way, the Prolegomena functions as a methodological and conceptual staging ground for the analyses later developed more systematically in Being and Time.
2. Historical and Intellectual Context
The 1925 lecture course emerges from Heidegger’s engagement with contemporary debates in German philosophy, especially phenomenology, neo-Kantianism, and life-philosophy. At Marburg he was working within, and against, a neo-Kantian environment dominated by figures such as Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, for whom philosophy was primarily a theory of scientific knowledge.
Philosophical Background
Heidegger had been trained within this tradition but became increasingly critical of its focus on epistemology. His encounter with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology—particularly the Logical Investigations and Ideas I—provided the methodological alternative that underpins the Prolegomena. Heidegger adopts the phenomenological slogan “to the things themselves,” yet reorients it away from pure consciousness toward factical existence and worldhood.
Broader Intellectual Setting
The course is also situated amid early 20th‑century reflections on time in physics, psychology, and theology:
| Field | Representative Developments (c. 1900–1925) | Relevance for Heidegger |
|---|---|---|
| Physics | Relativity theory (Einstein) | Challenges “absolute” time; motivates rethinking temporality beyond clock-time |
| Psychology | Theories of inner time-consciousness (Brentano, Husserl) | Provide analyses Heidegger will critically appropriate and transform |
| Theology/Life-philosophy | Dialectical theology (Barth), historicist and existential currents | Encourage focus on finitude, historicity, and concrete existence |
Commentators often read the Prolegomena as marking the point at which Heidegger consolidates his move from a Husserlian-transcendental framework to an original project of fundamental ontology, while still relying heavily on phenomenological tools.
3. Author and Composition of the 1925 Lecture Course
The Prolegomena stems from Martin Heidegger’s teaching at the University of Marburg, where he had been appointed associate professor in 1923. In the summer semester of 1925 he delivered a course entitled Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, attended by students who later became prominent philosophers, including Hans-Georg Gadamer.
Circumstances of Composition
Heidegger conceived the course as preparatory work for a large treatise on time and Being that was then in development. Many scholars argue that key sections of Being and Time can be traced back to material already worked out in these 1925 lectures, though the arrangement and emphasis differ.
The extant text is not an authorially sanctioned book. It is a reconstruction based primarily on:
| Source type | Description |
|---|---|
| Student lecture notes | Especially those of Helene Weiß and others |
| Heidegger’s materials | Surviving sketches, outlines, and marginalia |
Editor Petra Jaeger assembled these sources for GA 20 (1979). The degree to which the published text reproduces Heidegger’s exact formulations is therefore a matter of scholarly discussion; most commentators treat it as reliable for doctrinal content while acknowledging uncertainties about wording and lecture dynamics.
“Wir haben nur eine summarische Überlieferung des Vorlesungstextes, die jedoch die systematische Linie deutlich erkennen lässt.”
— Edited report in GA 20 (editorial apparatus)
4. Structure and Organization of the Work
The Prolegomena is organized as a systematic lecture course that moves from method, through an analysis of Dasein, to a preliminary treatment of time. Its internal architecture anticipates the division of Being and Time but remains more explicitly pedagogical.
Main Parts
| Part | Title (standard English) | Focus |
|---|---|---|
| I | The Task and Basic Concept of Phenomenology | Clarification of phenomenology, phenomenon, logos; relation to ontology |
| II | Exposition of the Basic Structures of Dasein | Being-in-the-world, being-with, concern, care; distinction from categories |
| III | Worldhood, Everydayness, and Interpretation | Practical world, equipmental totality, everyday understanding and discourse |
| IV | Time, Temporality, and the History of the Concept of Time | Ordinary time, scientific time, indication of originary temporality |
Within these parts, Heidegger proceeds through numbered sections and thematic “steps,” often revisiting earlier definitions as he refines them. The course repeatedly alternates between:
- Methodological clarifications (what phenomenology and ontology are doing),
- Analytical descriptions of existential structures,
- Programmatic historical remarks on how the tradition has understood time.
This spiral structure allows the same phenomena—world, Dasein, time—to be progressively disclosed at deeper levels without yet offering the comprehensive exposition that Being and Time would attempt.
5. Central Arguments and Key Concepts
The Prolegomena develops several arguments that structure Heidegger’s early ontology and theory of time.
Phenomenology and Ontology
Heidegger defines phenomenology as the method for accessing Being:
“Phänomenologie bedeutet: das, was sich zeigt, von ihm her sehen lassen, so wie es von ihm selbst her sich zeigt.”
— Heidegger, GA 20
This yields the thesis that ontology must begin from the analysis of the being for whom Being is an issue.
Dasein and Being-in-the-World
Dasein is introduced as the entity each of us is, characterized by being-in-the-world rather than by an inner subject facing external objects. Proponents of existential readings emphasize that the analysis of Dasein’s factical life (concern, care, being-with-others) already in 1925 breaks with traditional subject–object models.
Worldhood and Everydayness
The lectures argue that worldhood is primarily a web of significance disclosed through practical involvement. The world is first encountered as a totality of equipment “ready-to-hand,” not as a collection of present-at-hand objects. Everyday understanding, discourse, and interpretation are said to operate within prior “fore-structures” that guide how things show themselves.
Time and Temporality
Heidegger distinguishes ordinary time—conceived as a succession of “nows” and measured by clocks—from an underlying temporality (Zeitlichkeit) belonging to Dasein. He maintains that projection toward possibilities (future), retention of what has been (past), and engagement with the present world form an integrated existential structure.
A further central claim is that the history of the concept of time in philosophy has typically treated time as either a physical or psychological phenomenon, thereby obscuring its role as the horizon for the disclosure of Being. The Prolegomena sketches, but does not yet fully execute, a “destruction” of this tradition.
6. Legacy and Historical Significance
After its posthumous publication in 1979, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena came to be regarded as a key document for understanding the genesis of Being and Time and the early Heidegger’s project.
Role in Heidegger Scholarship
Scholars use the text to track shifts in Heidegger’s thinking between neo-Kantianism, Husserlian phenomenology, and his own fundamental ontology. Works by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, for example, treat the 1925 course as decisive evidence for how concepts such as Dasein, worldhood, and temporality took shape.
| Aspect of Legacy | Typical Scholarly Use |
|---|---|
| Genetic reconstruction of Being and Time | Tracing drafts, thematic continuities, and revisions |
| Methodological debates | Clarifying Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology |
| History-of-philosophy discussions | Assessing Heidegger’s program of “destruction” |
Broader Philosophical Impact
In continental philosophy, the Prolegomena is frequently cited as an especially clear exposition of Heidegger’s early method and as a bridge between Husserl and later hermeneutic thinkers such as Gadamer. It has also become a touchstone in debates about the relation between existential phenomenology and the philosophy of time, even where critics argue that it engages insufficiently with analytic or physical theories of time.
Some commentators view the work as illustrating both the power and the limits of Heidegger’s approach: it foregrounds concrete existence and historicity, yet, according to various critical traditions, leaves questions of social embodiment, politics, and scientific temporality largely unaddressed.
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title = {history-of-the-concept-of-time-prolegomena},
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year = {2025},
url = {https://philopedia.com/works/history-of-the-concept-of-time-prolegomena/},
urldate = {December 11, 2025}
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