How to Do Things with Words

1. Introduction

How to Do Things with Words is a posthumously published set of lectures in which J. L. Austin develops what later came to be called speech act theory. The central claim is that uttering sentences is not only a matter of representing how things are, but also a way of performing actions governed by social and linguistic norms.

Austin begins from apparently simple contrasts—between sentences that describe and those that do something—and progressively complicates them. Early lectures focus on performative utterances, such as saying “I do” in a wedding, which seem neither true nor false but rather successful or unsuccessful. As the lectures proceed, Austin argues that this performative/constative contrast cannot be maintained and that a more general account of what we do in speaking is needed.

This project leads him to distinguish different “levels” or “dimensions” of an utterance (later labelled locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts) and to introduce the notion of felicity conditions: the circumstances under which a speech act is appropriately and effectively performed. He also tentatively classifies the wide variety of illocutionary forces—the kinds of acts performed in speaking—into several broad groups.

The work is widely regarded as foundational for later philosophy of language, pragmatics, and many forms of social and legal theory. Commentators have interpreted it as both a culmination of ordinary language philosophy and a point of departure for more systematic theories of communication and action. Subsequent sections of this entry examine the historical background, the structure and argument of the lectures, their technical vocabulary, and the diverse critical and interdisciplinary responses that have shaped the reception of Austin’s ideas.

2. Historical and Philosophical Context

How to Do Things with Words emerged within mid‑twentieth‑century analytic philosophy, especially the so‑called ordinary language philosophy associated with Oxford. Austin’s approach is often situated between earlier logical empiricism and later pragmatic and social theories of language.

Background in Analytic Philosophy

Earlier in the century, figures such as Frege, Russell, and early Wittgenstein had focused on logical form and truth‑conditions. Sentences were primarily treated as bearers of truth‑value; philosophical analysis aimed to uncover ideal logical structures behind everyday speech.

By the 1940s–50s, however, a “linguistic turn” had diversified. At Oxford, philosophers including Austin, P. F. Strawson, and H. L. A. Hart emphasized careful attention to ordinary English usage to dissolve or clarify philosophical puzzles. At Cambridge, later Wittgenstein had already highlighted language-games and the multiplicity of uses of language, influencing but not determining Austin’s direction. Some commentators read Austin as parallel to Wittgenstein in stressing use; others stress differences in method and emphasis.

Legal, Institutional, and Rhetorical Influences

Austin’s focus on explicit performatives—such as verdicts, contracts, and legislative acts—draws on long‑standing legal and institutional practices in which “saying so makes it so.” Scholars have linked his thinking to English common law traditions and to contemporaneous jurisprudence (e.g., Hart’s work on legal rules), though direct influence is debated.

Rhetorical and classical sources, including discussions of speech as action in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics, provide a more distant backdrop. Some historians see Austin as recovering themes about the force and function of speech that had been sidelined by modern logic‑centered theories.

Linguistics and Emerging Pragmatics

At the time of Austin’s lectures (1955), generative grammar and formal semantics had not yet fully developed, and pragmatics as a distinct field was only emerging. Later linguists would retrospectively regard Austin’s lectures as prefiguring a systematic study of language use, though Austin himself wrote before such disciplinary boundaries were fixed.

In sum, How to Do Things with Words occupies a transitional position: it retains analytic philosophy’s concern with clarity and argument while shifting focus from abstract propositions to the actions accomplished in concrete speech situations.

3. Author and Composition of the Work

J. L. Austin (1911–1960) was a leading figure in mid‑century Oxford philosophy, known for meticulous analysis of ordinary language and for a style that combined informal examples with rigorous distinctions. His work ranged from epistemology (e.g., “Other Minds”) to perception (Sense and Sensibilia), but How to Do Things with Words is his most influential contribution to the philosophy of language.

The William James Lectures (1955)

The core material originated as the William James Lectures given at Harvard University in 1955. Austin delivered a series of fifteen lectures under the general title How to Do Things with Words. Contemporary reports and surviving notes suggest that the lecture series had a well‑worked sequence, but Austin continued to refine details in subsequent teaching and discussion.

The composition was explicitly lecture‑driven rather than prepared as a treatise. Austin reportedly revised his material between sessions and adapted it in response to audience questions. This oral origin is often cited to explain the text’s informality, digressions, and occasional abrupt transitions.

Post‑Lecture Development

After 1955, Austin reused and expanded parts of the speech‑act material in Oxford seminars. Some scholars argue that various unpublished drafts show him reconsidering aspects of the performative/constative distinction and sharpening the triadic distinction among kinds of acts.

Austin died in 1960 before producing a definitive written version. Consequently, How to Do Things with Words as known today is a posthumous reconstruction. His own notes, partial drafts, and marginalia, alongside detailed student transcripts from Harvard, form the documentary basis for the published text. The editorial process by J. O. Urmson, with later assistance from Marina Sbisà, thus plays a significant role in shaping the final form in which Austin’s ideas on speech acts are received.

4. Publication History and Textual Status

Because Austin died before publishing How to Do Things with Words, the text has a distinctive reconstructed status.

First Edition and Editorial Reconstruction

The first edition appeared with Oxford University Press in 1962, edited by J. O. Urmson. Urmson drew on:

• Austin’s surviving lecture notes and outlines
• Annotated handouts
• Student transcripts from the 1955 Harvard lectures

Urmson arranged the material into a sequence of twelve lectures (chapters), smoothing transitions and occasionally supplying connective remarks. The extent of editorial intervention is debated: some scholars emphasize Urmson’s aim to follow Austin’s ordering faithfully; others note points where the structure or emphases may reflect editorial judgment.

Second Edition and Sbisà’s Contributions

A second edition (1975) introduced minor corrections and a new preface by Marina Sbisà, who assisted with further editorial work. Sbisà clarified some textual decisions and corrected typographical errors. No major re‑ordering was undertaken, but the second edition has become the standard reference text:

Textual Status and Reliability

Scholars generally regard the text as a reliable but not definitive record of Austin’s views at the time of the lectures:

• Some interpretive work reconstructs alternative ordering or emphasis based on archival materials.
• Others stress that any gaps or abrupt transitions may reflect oral delivery rather than incomplete doctrine.

Debates concern, for example, whether Austin would have further revised his provisional classification of illocutionary acts or clarified the relationship between performatives and truth had he prepared a final monograph.

Despite these issues, the published text is widely treated as the canonical source for Austin’s mature speech‑act theory. Most subsequent philosophical and linguistic discussions cite the 2nd edition, Clarendon Press (Oxford) as the standard version, while acknowledging its posthumous and partly conjectural character.

5. Structure and Organization of the Lectures

How to Do Things with Words is organized as a sequence of lectures that trace a gradual shift from an initial distinction between performative and constative utterances to a more general theory of speech acts.

Overall Progression

The printed book’s chapters correspond to lectures that build cumulatively:

The argumentative strategy is dialectical: Austin introduces simple contrasts, tests them against a wide range of examples, acknowledges complications, and then proposes refined distinctions.

Stylistic and Pedagogical Features

The lectures retain features of oral delivery:

• Frequent use of examples from everyday English and institutional contexts
• Parenthetical asides and anticipations of objections
• Recapitulations at the beginning of some lectures, linking back to previous sessions

This format allows Austin to introduce technical vocabulary gradually while continuously revisiting earlier distinctions. The structure is often described as spiral rather than linear: central themes (e.g., success vs. failure of speech acts, the nature of force) recur at multiple points with increasing sophistication.

Because of this organization, readers and commentators differ on where the “core” of the theory lies: some emphasize the early chapters on performatives, others the later triadic distinction and taxonomy of illocutionary forces. The structural design encourages treating the work as a developing investigation rather than a fully systematized doctrine.

6. From Constatives to Performatives

The early lectures develop and then problematize the contrast between constative and performative utterances.

Initial Contrast

Austin introduces constatives as utterances that purport to state facts and are evaluated as true or false (e.g., “The cat is on the mat”). By contrast, performatives seem to perform an action simply in being uttered under appropriate conditions:

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“I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)”
“I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.”

These do not obviously describe a prior fact; rather, in saying them one does something (marries, names, bets, etc.). Austin notes features such as first‑person present tense and the possibility of adding “hereby” as diagnostic of explicit performatives.

Questioning Truth‑Value

Austin points out that such performatives are not readily classified as true or false; instead, they are “happy” or “unhappy” depending on whether certain conditions are met. This motivates the idea that not all utterances should be analyzed in terms of truth‑conditions.

Complications and Borderline Cases

In subsequent lectures, Austin considers cases that blur the distinction:

• Performatives that look constative, such as “I state that p” or “I argue that p”
• Constatives that appear to function performatively, such as “I warn you that the bull is dangerous”

He also notes that purported constatives are sensitive to circumstances, speaker authority, and conventions, suggesting they too involve conditions of appropriate use.

These explorations lead Austin to suspect that the constative/performative dichotomy is unstable. He suggests that all utterances can be seen as involving the performance of acts, some of which are assertoric (akin to traditional constatives) but still governed by conditions of successful performance. This shift sets the stage for the later, more general framework of speech acts that moves beyond the simple two‑fold division.

7. Felicity Conditions, Misfires, and Abuses

To analyze when performative utterances “work,” Austin introduces felicity conditions and a typology of failures.

Felicity Conditions

Felicity conditions are the conventional and contextual prerequisites for the successful performance of a speech act. In Lecture II, Austin groups them into two broad sets, often labelled A and B:

Commentators sometimes refine or re‑label these conditions, but the basic idea is that successful speech acts require more than mere utterance of certain words.

Misfires

When conditions in group A fail, the act does not come off at all; Austin calls this a misfire. For example, if someone with no authority to marry a couple says “I pronounce you man and wife,” no marriage is effected. Misfires include:

• Misinvocations: no such procedure, or wrong procedure invoked
• Misexecutions: procedure exists but is executed incorrectly or incompletely

In misfires, Austin holds that “the supposed act is void,” analogous to a null legal transaction.

Abuses (Infelicities of B‑Type)

When the conventional procedure is properly invoked and executed, but the psychological or ethical conditions (B‑type) are not met, the act is abused. Classic examples are insincere promises or apologies. Here, there is a promise or apology, but it is defective because:

• The speaker does not intend to do what is promised
• The expression of regret is not genuine

Austin emphasizes that abuses contrast with misfires: in abuses, an act is performed but is unhappy in another way (e.g., deceitful, hollow).

This analysis of felicity, misfires, and abuses extends beyond explicit performatives, suggesting that many utterances are governed by norms of appropriate and successful performance, even when they appear merely descriptive.

8. Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts

In later lectures, Austin introduces a threefold distinction to analyze what is done in issuing an utterance.

Locutionary Acts

A locutionary act is the act of saying something meaningful. Austin subdivides it into:

• Phonic act: producing certain sounds or marks
• Phatic act: forming words and sentences of a language
• Rhetic act: using those words with a particular sense and reference

Together, these constitute the act of producing an utterance with a certain propositional content.

Illocutionary Acts

An illocutionary act is the conventional act performed in saying something, such as asserting, promising, ordering, warning, or apologizing. It is characterized by its illocutionary force. Key features include:

• Dependence on linguistic and social conventions
• Ties to recognizable force‑indicating devices (e.g., performative verbs, mood, word order, “hereby”)
• Assessment by felicity conditions (e.g., authority, sincerity, uptake)

In Austin’s scheme, illocutionary acts occupy the central place: they capture what kind of speech act an utterance is.

Perlocutionary Acts

A perlocutionary act concerns the effects or consequences produced by saying something, such as convincing, alarming, inspiring, or amusing. Unlike illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts:

• Are less tightly tied to conventional procedures
• Can be produced in non‑standard or indirect ways
• Are often described with verbs like “persuade,” “scare,” or “get someone to …”

Austin stresses that these are analytical distinctions within a single complex event of utterance; one and the same speech event can be simultaneously described at all three levels. Later theorists have debated and modified the boundaries between these categories, but the tripartite framework remains a central reference point.

9. Classification of Illocutionary Forces

Austin attempts a preliminary taxonomy of illocutionary acts, grouping diverse speech acts into several broad classes based on their characteristic point and social role. He acknowledges the scheme’s provisional and language‑dependent character.

Austin’s Five Classes

Austin’s main classes are:

Austin arranges these partly by considering the point of the act (e.g., decision, commitment, evaluation) and partly by surveying English performative verbs.

Methodological Remarks

Austin repeatedly warns that:

• The boundaries between classes are fuzzy; many verbs might fit in multiple categories.
• The classification is not exhaustive even for English, and even less so cross‑linguistically.
• The grouping is intended as a heuristic to bring out patterns in the variety of speech acts.

Subsequent theorists, notably John Searle, proposed alternative taxonomies (e.g., assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, declarations). Some view Searle’s scheme as a refinement; others regard it as a different theoretical project. Comparative work often contrasts Austin’s more lexically and sociologically grounded approach with later attempts to base classifications on a small set of abstract parameters (direction of fit, psychological mode, etc.).

Within Austin’s own lectures, the taxonomy functions mainly to illustrate the richness and heterogeneity of illocutionary forces rather than to supply a fully worked‑out systematic theory.

10. Key Concepts and Technical Vocabulary

Austin introduces a number of terms that have become standard in discussions of speech acts. The following overview highlights their roles within the work.

These terms provide the conceptual toolkit with which Austin articulates his shift from a focus on sentences and truth‑values to an analysis of actions performed in speaking.

11. Philosophical Method: Ordinary Language and Analysis

Austin’s method in How to Do Things with Words exemplifies ordinary language philosophy but with distinctive features.

Attention to Ordinary Usage

Austin systematically examines everyday English expressions, especially verbs like “promise,” “warn,” “apologize,” “judge,” and “argue.” He treats the fine‑grained distinctions encoded in ordinary vocabulary as a resource for uncovering:

• The variety of things people do with words
• The conditions under which these acts are appropriately performed

This contrasts with approaches that prioritize idealized logical languages. Austin often insists that philosophers should consider “what we should say when,” rather than imposing preconceived theoretical categories.

Examples and Counterexamples

The lectures proceed through dense networks of examples and counterexamples:

• Canonical institutional cases (marriages, baptisms, verdicts)
• Informal everyday exchanges (greetings, apologies, warnings)

Austin subjects his own distinctions (e.g., performative vs. constative) to stress tests using borderline cases. When a proposed criterion breaks down, he revises or abandons it. This self‑corrective aspect is central to his method.

Anti‑Reductionism About Language

Methodologically, Austin resists reducing language to a single primary function (e.g., stating facts). Instead, he highlights its plurality of uses. This stance shapes his eventual move from a sharp dichotomy between performatives and constatives to a more nuanced spectrum of speech acts.

Relation to Formal Methods

Austin does not employ formal logical or semantic apparatus in the lectures. Some commentators see this as a limitation; others view it as an intentional focus on pre‑formal understanding of language use, which could later be connected to formal models. In either case, the method is:

• Empirical in a loose sense (drawing on intuitions about actual usage)
• Conceptual rather than experimental
• Sensitive to context, convention, and social practice

Subsequent sections of the entry examine how later theorists have adapted or departed from this methodological outlook in developing more systematic speech act theories.

12. Famous Examples and Central Passages

Several examples and passages in How to Do Things with Words have become standard reference points.

Marriage, Naming, and Betting

In Lecture I, Austin introduces classic explicit performatives:

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“I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)”
“I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth”
“I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.”

These illustrate utterances that apparently perform marriage, naming, and betting rather than describe them. They serve as paradigms for the initial notion of performative utterances.

Felicity Conditions List (A.1–B.2)

A key passage in Lecture II presents the list of felicity conditions, distinguishing procedural requirements and sincerity‑related conditions. Although wordings vary slightly by edition and commentary, this list provides the canonical framework for analyzing misfires and abuses and is often cited in discussions of speech act success.

Introduction of the Threefold Distinction

In Lecture VIII, Austin articulates the tripartite distinction:

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“We must distinguish three sorts of acts which are all distinguishable from one another, yet are related to one another…”

He then explicates locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. This passage is frequently quoted as the formal introduction of speech act theory’s core structure.

“Hereby” and Illocutionary Force

Lecture IX contains a well‑known discussion of “hereby” as a test for explicit performatives:

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“…one might say, ‘I hereby promise…’ but not, except perhaps jocularly, ‘I hereby state…’”

This passage is used to show both the usefulness and limits of grammatical diagnostics for illocutionary force.

Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts

Lecture XII sets out the classification into verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives, with illustrative lists of verbs. This section is widely cited when comparing Austin’s approach to later taxonomies.

Collectively, these examples and passages anchor much of the secondary literature. They are often treated as touchstones for interpreting Austin’s broader claims about the nature of speech acts and the boundaries between description and action in language.

13. Criticisms, Revisions, and Developments of Speech Act Theory

Austin’s framework has been both influential and heavily revised.

Systematicity and Taxonomy

Critics argue that Austin’s classification of illocutionary forces is unsystematic and too dependent on English vocabulary. In response, theorists such as John Searle proposed alternative frameworks. Searle’s taxonomy (assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, declarations) aims to base classification on general features such as “direction of fit” between words and world, rather than on lexical surveys.

Other philosophers and linguists (e.g., Kent Bach, Robert Harnish) have offered more detailed taxonomies or rejected taxonomic ambitions in favor of smaller sets of primitive notions.

Role of Intentions vs. Conventions

Some commentators contend that Austin underplays speaker intentions, emphasizing conventions and procedures instead. Searle, for instance, develops a theory in which illocutionary force is determined by a combination of conventional rules and speaker intentions satisfying certain conditions.

Others defend Austin’s emphasis on social norms and institutional structures, particularly in legal and political contexts, suggesting that an intention‑centered account risks individualizing what are fundamentally social acts.

Perlocutionary Acts and Pragmatics

Austin’s brief treatment of perlocutionary acts has been expanded in later pragmatics and discourse studies. Some researchers question whether the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction is sharp, especially in cases of indirect speech acts, implicature, and rhetorical effects.

Cross‑Linguistic and Cross‑Cultural Concerns

Anthropologists and linguists have suggested that Austin’s categories may be Anglocentric, reflecting English institutional practices and vocabulary. Cross‑linguistic work has examined how different languages encode force and how culturally specific conventions shape felicity conditions, sometimes requiring modification of Austinian terminology.

Integration with Formal Semantics and Pragmatics

In formal semantics, scholars such as David Lewis, Robert Stalnaker, and later dynamic semanticists have incorporated speech‑act‑like notions into models of context change. Some formal frameworks assimilate illocutionary force into operators on propositions or context‑updating rules, while others maintain a separation between semantic content and pragmatic force.

There is ongoing debate about how far Austin’s distinctions can be captured in formal systems and whether his ordinary language method can be reconciled with contemporary formal theories of meaning and communication.

14. Influence on Linguistics, Law, and Social Theory

Austin’s ideas have had wide‑ranging interdisciplinary impact.

Linguistics and Pragmatics

In linguistics, How to Do Things with Words is often seen as foundational for pragmatics. Speech act theory has informed:

• Analyses of sentence mood, force markers, and discourse structure
• The study of indirect speech acts and politeness phenomena
• Pragmatic theories of context, presupposition, and conversational implicature (in dialogue with H. P. Grice’s work)

Some frameworks (e.g., conversation analysis, discourse representation theory) incorporate Austin‑style notions to explain how utterances contribute to ongoing interaction and context change.

Law and Legal Theory

Legal theorists have drawn on Austin’s account of illocutionary acts and felicity conditions to analyze:

• The nature of legislation, judgments, and contracts as performative acts
• The conditions under which legal norms are successfully promulgated
• The distinction between validity (akin to Austinian felicity) and truth

H. L. A. Hart’s work on legal rules shows parallels with Austin’s approach, and later legal philosophers have used speech act concepts to discuss issues such as authority, interpretation, and the performative dimension of constitutional provisions.

Social and Political Theory

In social theory, Austin’s notion that utterances can produce social realities has been influential. Judith Butler, for example, adapts and critiques Austin in developing the concept of performativity in gender and queer theory, arguing that repeated speech acts help constitute social identities and norms. Butler and others emphasize:

• The power of speech acts to reinforce or subvert social structures
• The role of iterability and citation in sustaining performative force

Critical race and feminist theorists have examined how hate speech, slurs, and discriminatory utterances can function as harmful or exclusionary acts, sometimes drawing on Austin’s focus on perlocutionary effects and felicity conditions.

Communication Studies and Discourse Analysis

In communication and discourse studies, Austin’s distinctions inform models of:

• Institutional talk (e.g., courtroom, medical, or classroom interaction)
• Media and political speech, where declarations, promises, and apologies are central genres

Analysts use speech act categories to describe how participants negotiate roles, rights, and responsibilities in conversation.

Across these fields, scholars both employ and modify Austin’s vocabulary, often emphasizing different aspects (conventions, power relations, psychological intentions, or social effects) depending on disciplinary concerns.

15. Legacy and Historical Significance

How to Do Things with Words is widely regarded as a landmark in twentieth‑century philosophy and beyond.

Reorientation of Philosophy of Language

The work contributed to a shift from viewing language primarily as a vehicle for stating truths to understanding it as a medium for performing actions. Subsequent philosophy of language and pragmatics routinely distinguish among content, force, and effect—distinctions that trace back, directly or indirectly, to Austin’s triadic schema.

Foundation of Speech Act Theory

Austin’s lectures provided the conceptual basis for speech act theory, later systematized by Searle and others. Even when later theorists revise or reject elements of Austin’s framework (e.g., his taxonomy, his treatment of intention), they typically do so against the backdrop of his distinctions between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts and his emphasis on felicity conditions.

Influence on Ordinary Language Philosophy’s Reputation

Historically, How to Do Things with Words has been read as one of the most enduring achievements of ordinary language philosophy, often contrasted with other, more ephemeral debates of the period. It helped rehabilitate attention to everyday linguistic practice as a serious philosophical method, even among those who subsequently turned to more formal techniques.

Interdisciplinary Legacy

Beyond philosophy, the work’s impact on linguistics, law, and social theory has ensured its continued relevance. Terms like “performative,” “speech act,” and “illocutionary force” have entered the broader theoretical lexicon, sometimes in senses that diverge from Austin’s own but nonetheless testify to the work’s reach.

Ongoing Debates

The text continues to generate discussion about:

• The relation between truth and felicity
• The balance between convention and intention in communication
• The extent to which language use constitutes social reality

Because the published book is a reconstructed set of lectures rather than a polished monograph, interpreters also debate how best to reconstruct Austin’s “final” position, and whether the work should be read as a set of open‑ended investigations rather than a finished theory.

In these ways, How to Do Things with Words occupies a central place in the history of analytic philosophy and continues to shape contemporary thinking about language, action, and social practice.