Logic: The Theory of Inquiry
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry is John Dewey’s systematic attempt to reconceive logic as a theory of controlled, reflective inquiry rather than as a purely formal calculus of propositions. He argues that logical forms and principles arise from recurrent patterns in problem-solving activity and experimental inquiry in everyday life and the sciences. The book develops a naturalistic and instrumental account of logic, tying validity to warranted assertibility within inquiry contexts, and analyzes the phases, structures, and methods of inquiry as they occur in scientific practice, common sense, and specialized disciplines.
At a Glance
- Author
- John Dewey
- Composed
- c. 1934–1937
- Language
- English
- Status
- original survives
- •Logic as the theory of inquiry: Dewey contends that logic is not an a priori science of thought or propositions but a reflective account of the methods, operations, and forms that make inquiry efficacious; logical forms are tools that emerge from and are justified by their role in resolving problematic situations.
- •Problematic situations and the structure of inquiry: He argues that all genuine inquiry begins in an indeterminate, problematic situation, proceeds through the institution of hypotheses and guided operations, and culminates in a transformed, unified situation; this pattern underlies both common‑sense reasoning and scientific research.
- •Instrumental and operational view of concepts and propositions: Dewey maintains that concepts, propositions, and logical forms are instruments for directing inquiry operations rather than mere representations; their meaning is determined by the role they play in selecting, ordering, and testing possible ways of transforming a situation.
- •Warranted assertibility as the logical surrogate for truth: Rejecting static correspondence notions of truth as the primary logical notion, Dewey proposes 'warranted assertibility' as the key logical property of conclusions, emphasizing that what matters for logic is the conditions under which we are justified in asserting a claim as the outcome of inquiry.
- •Continuity of common sense and science: Dewey defends the continuity thesis that scientific inquiry grows out of and refines common‑sense inquiry; the same logical pattern of problem‑resolution operates in both, though science develops more explicit, systematic, and controlled forms of inquiry and symbolic methods.
Historically, the book is one of the most comprehensive statements of pragmatist logic and a cornerstone of Dewey’s mature philosophy. It helped articulate a naturalistic, practice‑oriented conception of logic that influenced later work in philosophy of science, epistemology, and educational theory. Dewey’s notions of problematic situations, inquiry, and warranted assertibility became central reference points for later pragmatists (e.g., C. I. Lewis, W. V. Quine, and Hilary Putnam) and for contemporary discussions of fallibilism, justification, and context‑sensitive rationality. Although it did not shape the mainstream development of formal logic, it contributed significantly to broader conceptions of rationality and scientific method.
1. Introduction
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) is John Dewey’s most systematic statement of his pragmatist conception of logic. Instead of treating logic as a purely formal calculus concerned with timeless relations among propositions, the book presents logic as a theory of inquiry: a reflective account of the methods and structures by which problematic situations are investigated and resolved.
Dewey frames the work as both a critique and a reconstruction. He argues that traditional logics—whether psychologistic, purely formal, or metaphysical—abstract logical forms from the activities that give them function and sense. Logical principles, on his view, originate in, and are justified by, their roles within empirical inquiry, ranging from everyday problem‑solving to advanced scientific research.
The book thus aims to show how logical notions such as validity, inference, concepts, and propositions can be understood naturalistically and instrumentally, without, proponents suggest, losing their normative force. Dewey’s distinctive replacement of “truth” by warranted assertibility as the key logical status of conclusions exemplifies this shift from static correspondence to context‑governed justification.
Within the broader landscape of twentieth‑century philosophy, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry is often characterized as an alternative to the emerging dominance of symbolic logic and logical empiricism, offering a practice‑oriented, experimental account of rationality that links logic closely to scientific method and social experience.
2. Historical and Intellectual Context
Dewey’s Logic emerged in a period marked by rapid developments in both philosophy and the sciences. The early twentieth century saw the rise of mathematical logic (Frege, Russell, Whitehead) and logical empiricism (Carnap, Schlick), which tended to identify logic with formal systems and the analysis of language. Dewey’s book was written partly in response to these trends, while also drawing on a longer lineage of pragmatist and scientific thought.
Key Background Currents
| Current | Relevance to Dewey’s Logic |
|---|---|
| Classical Pragmatism (Peirce, James) | Peirce’s notion of inquiry and James’s emphasis on consequences inform Dewey’s view that meanings and logical forms are tools for resolving doubt. |
| Darwinian Naturalism | Evolutionary ideas encourage Dewey’s depiction of inquiry as an adaptive, organism–environment transaction, and logic as a natural, not transcendental, discipline. |
| Experimental Science | Late‑19th and early‑20th‑century laboratory science provides Dewey with paradigms of hypothesis, controlled experimentation, and operational concepts. |
| Neo‑Kantianism and Idealism | Earlier in his career, Dewey engaged with idealist and Kantian traditions; in Logic he reinterprets their concern with normativity in empirical, practice‑based terms. |
| Emerging Analytic Philosophy | The focus on formal languages and verification shapes Dewey’s adversaries and interlocutors, even as he resists reducing logic to syntax or semantics alone. |
Commentators often note that Dewey positions his theory against both psychologism (which makes logic a description of mental processes) and purely formalism (which severs logic from inquiry). The book thus reflects, and intervenes in, contemporary debates over whether logic is primarily normative, formal, psychological, or methodological.
3. Author and Composition
John Dewey (1859–1952), a leading figure of American pragmatism, had worked on logical and methodological questions throughout his career. Earlier writings, such as Studies in Logical Theory (1903), already emphasized the functional and practical character of thought, but Logic: The Theory of Inquiry was conceived as his mature, comprehensive restatement of these ideas.
Development and Writing
Scholars generally date the main period of composition to roughly 1934–1937, during Dewey’s later years at Columbia University. During this time he was:
- Revising earlier accounts of logic in light of his more fully developed theories of experience, democracy, and education.
- Responding to new work in formal logic and to critiques from contemporaries such as Bertrand Russell.
A widely used critical edition is:
| Edition | Details |
|---|---|
| Later Works, vol. 12 (1938) | The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953: The Later Works, 1925–1953, vol. 12: 1938, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Southern Illinois University Press, 1986). |
The surviving manuscripts, lecture notes, and correspondence have been used by commentators to trace revisions and to clarify Dewey’s intended contrasts with both classical and symbolic logicians. Although the published volume lacks a formal dedication, Dewey explicitly acknowledges the thematic influence of Charles S. Peirce and dedicates the book to his Columbia colleague F. J. E. Woodbridge, underscoring its place within American philosophical discussions of logic and science.
4. Structure and Central Arguments
Dewey organizes Logic: The Theory of Inquiry into three main parts, each advancing a distinct aspect of his project.
Overall Structure
| Part | Title | Focus |
|---|---|---|
| I | The Problem of Logical Theory | Critique of traditional views of logic and statement of logic as a theory of inquiry. |
| II | The Logical Structure of Inquiry | Detailed analysis of the phases and elements constituting inquiry. |
| III | The Organization of Inquiry | Examination of how different domains (common sense, science, specialized disciplines) systematize inquiry. |
Central Arguments
-
Logic as Theory of Inquiry
Dewey argues that logic is a reflective reconstruction of the patterns that make inquiry efficacious. Logical forms are not timeless entities but tools abstracted from successful problem‑solving practices. -
Problematic Situations and the Pattern of Inquiry
Inquiry, according to Dewey, always begins with an indeterminate, problematic situation. Through the formulation of problems, construction of hypotheses, and execution of operations, this situation is transformed into a determinate one. Part I culminates in a general “pattern of inquiry” intended to underlie diverse fields. -
Instrumental Conception of Concepts and Propositions
In Part II, Dewey treats concepts and propositions as instrumental means for directing actions and tests within inquiry, rather than as mere mirrors of reality. Inference is analyzed as the controlled use of such instruments to guide experimental operations. -
Warranted Assertibility
Dewey maintains that the key logical property of conclusions is warranted assertibility: the status a claim attains when produced and tested under appropriate conditions of inquiry. Proponents interpret this as shifting the focus from metaphysical truth to publicly checkable justification. -
Continuity of Common Sense and Science
Part III elaborates the thesis that everyday and scientific inquiries share the same logical structure, differing mainly in degree of explicitness, control, and institutional organization.
5. Key Concepts and Famous Passages
Key Concepts
| Concept | Role in Dewey’s Logic |
|---|---|
| Inquiry | The controlled, reflective process that transforms a problematic situation into a determinate one. Logic studies the patterns and conditions that make such transformations successful. |
| Problematic Situation | The starting point of inquiry: a felt indeterminacy or conflict in experience that disrupts routine action and demands resolution. |
| Data and Ideas | “Data” are what is taken as given in a problematic situation; “ideas” are proposed ways of using and transforming these data. Their interaction, Dewey contends, constitutes the core of reasoning. |
| Instrumentalism | The thesis that logical forms, concepts, and propositions are instruments for directing inquiry and action, not merely representational pictures of reality. |
| Warranted Assertibility | The logical status of a conclusion that has been adequately tested and is justifiably assertible under specified conditions of inquiry. |
Famous Passages
-
Definition of Logic as Theory of Inquiry
Early in the Introduction, Dewey characterizes his project in a frequently cited formulation:Logic is the theory of inquiry.
— John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Introduction, §1
Commentators often highlight this sentence as encapsulating the book’s central reorientation.
-
The Problematic Situation
In Part I, Chapter VI (“The Pattern of Inquiry”), Dewey describes how inquiry arises from disruption of habitual activity and aims at a unified, stable situation. This analysis is commonly treated as the definitive statement of his theory of inquiry. -
Warranted Assertibility
In Part II, Chapter XXV (“The Existential Matrix of Inquiry”), Dewey introduces “warranted assertibility” as the principal logical property of conclusions, distinguishing it from broader metaphysical notions of truth. This passage is widely discussed in debates over pragmatist theories of justification and truth.
6. Legacy and Historical Significance
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry has had a complex reception history. At its publication, it was recognized in many pragmatist and educational circles as a major synthesis of Dewey’s philosophy, but it appeared alongside rapidly advancing work in symbolic logic and logical empiricism, which shaped the mainstream analytic canon.
Contemporary and Later Reception
| Aspect | Characterizations by Commentators |
|---|---|
| Relation to Formal Logic | Analytic logicians often judged the book as marginal to technical developments in mathematical logic, criticizing its limited engagement with formal systems. |
| Influence on Pragmatism | Later pragmatists (e.g., C. I. Lewis, W. V. Quine, Hilary Putnam) drew selectively on Dewey’s ideas about inquiry, fallibilism, and empirical justification, though they diverged on key issues such as modality and semantics. |
| Educational and Social Thought | Dewey’s logic of inquiry informed theories of reflective thinking and problem‑based learning in pedagogy, as well as approaches to democratic deliberation and social inquiry. |
Historical Significance
Historians of philosophy frequently regard the work as:
- A culminating statement of classical American pragmatism’s approach to logic and scientific method.
- An early, systematic articulation of a naturalized epistemology, anticipating later attempts to ground norms of justification in empirical practices.
- A significant contribution to broader conceptions of rationality, emphasizing the continuity between common‑sense and scientific reasoning and the role of social and institutional conditions in shaping inquiry.
At the same time, critics have raised enduring questions about the precision of Dewey’s key notions and the extent to which his naturalistic orientation can account for logical normativity. These debates continue to structure contemporary reassessments of the book’s place in twentieth‑century philosophy of logic and science.
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urldate = {December 11, 2025}
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